The Basis of Morality · Arthur Schopenhauer
NOTE.
If we wish to reach the real origin of this hypothesis of Practical Reason, we must trace its descent a little further back. We shall find that it is derived from a doctrine, which Kant totally confuted, but which nevertheless, in this connection, lies secretly (indeed he himself is not aware of it) at the root of his assumption of a Practical Reason with its Imperatives and its Autonomy--a reminiscence of a former mode of thought. I mean the so-called Rational Psychology, according to which man is composed of two entirely heterogeneous substances--the material body, and the immaterial soul. Plato was the first to formulate this dogma, and he endeavoured to prove it as an objective truth. But it was Descartes who, by working it out with scientific exactness, perfectly developed and completed it. And this is just what brought its fallacy to light, as demonstrated by Spinoza, Locke, and Kant successively. It was demonstrated by Spinoza; because his philosophy consists chiefly in the refutation of his master's twofold dualism, and because he entirely and expressly denied the two Substances of Descartes, and took as his main principle the following proposition: "_Substantia cogitans et substantia externa una eademque est substantia, quae jam sub hoc, jam sub illo attribute comprehenditur._"[19] It was demonstrated by Locke; for he combated the theory of innate ideas, derived all knowledge from the sensuous, and taught that it is not impossible that Matter should think. And lastly, it was demonstrated by Kant, in his _Kritik der Rationalen Psychologie_, as given in the first edition. Leibnitz and Wolff were the champions on the bad side; and this brought Leibnitz the undeserved honour of being compared to the great Plato, who was really so unlike him.
But to enter into details here would be out of place. According to this Rational Psychology, the soul was originally and in its essence a =perceiving= substance, and only as a consequence thereof did it become possessed of volition. According as it carried on these two modes of its activity, Perception and Volition, conjoined with the body, or incorporeal, and entirely _per se_, so it was endowed with a lower or higher faculty of perception, and of volition in like kind. In its higher faculty the immaterial soul was active solely by itself, and without co-operation of the body. In this case it was _intellectus purus_, being composed of concepts, belonging exclusively to itself, and of the corresponding acts of will, both of which were absolutely spiritual, and had nothing sensuous about them--the sensuous being derived from the body.[20] So that it perceived nothing else but pure Abstracts, Universals, innate conceptions, _aeternae veritates_, etc.; wherefore also its volition was entirely controlled by purely spiritual ideas like these. On the other hand, the soul's =lower= faculty of Perception and Volition was the result of its working in concert and close union with the various organs of the body, whereby a prejudicial effect was produced on its an mixed spiritual activity.
Here, _i.e._, to this =lower= faculty, was supposed to belong every =intuitive= perception, which consequently would have to be obscure and confused, while the =abstract=, formed by separating from objects their qualities, would be clear! The will, which was determined by preceptions thus sensuously conditioned, formed the lower Volition, and it was for the most part bad; for its acts were guided by the impulse of the senses; while the other will (the higher) was untrammelled, was guided by Pure Reason, and appertained only to the immaterial soul. This doctrine of the Cartesians has been best expounded by De la Forge, in his _Tractatus de Mente Humana_, where in chap. 23 we read:[21] _Non nisi eadem voluntas est, quae appellatur appetitus sensitivus, quando excitatur per judicia, quae formantur consequenter ad perceptiones sensuum; et quae appetitus rationalis nominatur, cum mens judicia format de propriis suis ideis, independenter a cogitationibus sensuum confusis, quae inclinationum ejus sunt causae.... Id, quod occasionem dedit, ut duae istae diversae voluntatis propensiones pro duobus diversis appetitibus sumerentur, est, quod saepissime unus alteri opponatur, quia propositum, quod mens superaedificat propriis suis perceptionibus, non semper consentit cum cogitationibus, quae menti a corporis dispositione suggeruntur, per quam saepe obligatur ad aliquid volendum, dum ratio ejus earn aliud optare facit._
Out of the dim reminiscence of such views there finally arose Kant's doctrine of the Autonomy of the Will, which, as the mouth-piece of Pure, Practical Reason, lays down the law for all rational beings as such, and recognises nothing but =formal= motives, as opposed to =material=; the latter determining only the lower faculty of desires, to which the higher is hostile. For the rest, this whole theory, which was not really systematically set forth till the time of Descartes, is nevertheless to be found as far back as Aristotle. In his _De Anima_ I. 1, it is sufficiently clearly stated; while Plato in the _Phaedo_ (pp. 188 and 189, edit. Bipont.) had already paved the way, with no uncertain hints. After being elaborated to great perfection by the Cartesian doctrine, we find it a hundred years later waxed bold and strong, and occupying the foremost place; but precisely for this reason forced to reveal its true nature. An excellent _résumé_ of the view which then prevailed is presented in Muratori's _Della Forza della Fantasia,_ chaps.
1-4 and 13. In this work the imagination is regarded as a purely material, corporeal organ of the brain (the lower faculty of perception), its function being to intuitively apprehend the external world on the data of the senses; and nought remains for the immaterial soul but thinking, reflecting, and determining. It must have been felt how obviously this position involves the whole subject in doubt. For if Matter is capable of the intuitive apprehension of the world in all its complexity, it is inconceivable that it should not also be capable of abstracting this intuition; wherefrom everything else would follow. Abstraction is of course nothing else than an elimination of the qualities attaching to things which are not necessary for general purposes, in other words, the individual and special differences. For instance, if I disregard, or abstract, that which is peculiar to the sheep, ox, stag, camel, etc., I reach the conception of ruminants. By this operation the ideas lose their intuitiveness, and as merely abstract, non-intuitive notions or concepts, they require words to fix them in the consciousness, and allow of their being adequately handled. All this shows that Kant was still under the influence of the after-effect of that old-time doctrine, when he propounded his Practical Reason with its Imperatives. [1] These epigrams form the close of Schiller's poem "Die Philosophen," which is worth reading in this connection--(_Translator_.)
_Just as I thought! Can they give no more any answer of reason,_ _Quickly the ground is changed: Conscience, they say, is at fault._ --(_Translator._) [14] As from the Pythian tripod: _i.e._,--with official authority, _ex cathedra._ [15] _V_. Aristoph., _Aves_, 819 _et alibi_.--(_Translator_.) [16] _λόγιμος_ means "remarkable," being never used in the sense of "rational." _Tὸ logikὸn_ is perhaps a possible expression; the right word is _λόγος_.--(_Translator_.) [17] The three Ideas are: (1) The Psychological; (2) The Cosmological; (3) The Theological. _V_. The Paralogisms of Pure Reasons, in the Dialectics: _Kritik der Reinen Vernunft,_ Part I.--(_Translator_.) [18] An example easy to be imitated in its faults. _V_. Horace, _Ep._ Lib. I., xix. 17.--(_Translator_.) [19] The thinking substance, and substance in extension are one and the self-same substance, which is contained now under the latter attribute (_i.e._, extension), now under the former (_i.e._, the attribute of thinking).--_Ethica_, Part II., Prop. 7. Corollary. [20] _Intellectio pura est intellectio, quae circa nullas imagines corporeas versatur_. (Pure intelligence is intelligence that has nothing to do with any bodily forms.)--Cart., _Medit_., p. 188.
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