On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and On the Will in Nature · Arthur Schopenhauer
CHAPTER IV.
Should any misgivings assail you, remember that we are in Germany, where what would have been impossible in any other country, has been found possible: where a dull-witted, ignorant, pseudo-philosopher, whose ineffably hollow verbiage disorganizes peoples' brains completely and permanently, a scribbler of nonsense--I am speaking of our dearly beloved Hegel--has not only been actually proclaimed a profound thinker with impunity, and even without incurring ridicule, but is readily accepted as such: yes, indeed, for this fiction has found credence for the last thirty years, and is believed to this day!--Once therefore we have this Absolute with your help, we are quite safe, in spite of Kant and his Critique.--We may then philosophise in a lofty tone, making the Universe proceed from _the Absolute_ by means of the most heterogeneous deductions, one more tiresome than the other--this, by the way, being their only point of resemblance. We can call the world the Finite, and the Absolute the Infinite--thus giving an agreeable variety to our nonsense--and talk of nothing but God, explaining how, why, wherefore, by what voluntary or involuntary process he created or brought forth the world, showing whether he be within or without it, and so forth, as if Philosophy were Theology, and as if it sought for enlightenment concerning God, not concerning the Universe!" [61] Göthe, "Der Zauberlehrling."
The Cosmological Proof, with which we here have to do, and to which the above apostrophe is addressed, consists thus, properly speaking, in the assertion, that the principle of the sufficient reason of _becoming_, or the law of causality, necessarily leads to a thought which destroys it and declares it to be null and void. For the _causa prima_ (_absolutum_) can only be reached by proceeding upwards from consequence to reason, through a series prolonged _ad libitum_; but it is impossible to stop short at the _causa prima_ without at once annulling the principle of sufficient reason. Having thus briefly and clearly shown the nullity of the Cosmological Proof, as I had in my second chapter already shown the nullity of the Ontological Proof, the sympathizing reader may perhaps expect me to do the same with respect to the Physico-theological Proof, which is a great deal more plausible. As, however, this belongs by its nature to a different department of philosophy, it would be quite out of place here. I therefore refer him to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, as well as to his Critique of the Faculty of Judgment, where he treats this subject _ex professo_; I likewise refer him, as a complement to Kant's purely negative procedure, to my own positive one in "The Will in Nature,"[62] a work which, though small in bulk, is rich and weighty in content. As for the indifferent reader, he is free to let this and indeed all my writings pass down unread to his descendants. It matters not to me; for I am here, not for one generation only, but for many.
That we know this _à priori_, is proved by the consciousness of unassailable certainty with which, when we see a body disappear--whether it be by conjuring, by minute subdivision, by combustion, volatilisation, or indeed any process whatever--we all nevertheless firmly assume that its substance, _i.e._ its _matter_, must still exist somewhere or other in undiminished quantity, whatever may have become of its _form_; likewise, when we perceive a body suddenly in a place, where it was not before, that it must have been brought there or formed by some combination of invisible particles--for instance, by precipitation--but that it, _i.e._ its substance, cannot have then started into existence; for this implies a total impossibility and is utterly inconceivable. The certainty with which we assume this beforehand (_à priori_), proceeds from the fact, that our Understanding possesses absolutely no form under which to conceive the beginning and end of Matter. For, as before said, the law of causality--the only form in which we are able to conceive changes at all--is solely applicable to _states_ of bodies, and never under any circumstances to the existence of _that which undergoes_ all changes: _Matter_. This is why I place the principle of the permanence of Matter among the corollaries of the causal law.
Moreover, we cannot have acquired _à posteriori_ the conviction that substance is permanent, partly because it cannot, in most instances, be empirically established; partly also, because every empirical knowledge obtained exclusively by means of induction, has only approximate, consequently precarious, never unconditioned, certainty. The firmness of our persuasion as to this principle is therefore of a different kind and nature from our security of conviction with regard to the accuracy of any _empirically_ discovered law of Nature, since it has an entirely different, perfectly unshakable, never vacillating firmness. The reason of this is, that the principle expresses a _transcendental_ knowledge, _i.e._ one which determines and fixes, _prior_ to all experience, what is in any way possible within the whole range of experience; but, precisely by this, it reduces the world of experience to a mere cerebral phenomenon. Even the most universal among the non-transcendental laws of Nature and the one least liable to exception--the law of gravitation--is of empirical origin, consequently without guarantee as to its absolute universality; wherefore it is still from time to time called in question, and doubts occasionally arise as to its validity beyond our solar system; and astronomers carefully call attention to any indications corroborative of its doubtfulness with which they may happen to meet, thereby showing that they regard it as merely empirical.
The question may of course be raised, whether gravitation takes effect between bodies which are separated by an _absolute_ vacuum, or whether its action within a solar system may not be mediated by some sort of ether, and may not cease altogether between fixed stars; but these questions only admit of an empirical solution, and this proves that here we have not to do with a knowledge _à priori_. If, on the other hand, we admit with Kant and Laplace the hypothesis, as the most probable one, that each solar system has developed out of an original _nebula_ by a gradual process of condensation, we still cannot for a moment conceive the possibility of that original substance having sprung into being out of _nothing_: we are forced to assume the anterior existence of its particles somewhere or other, as well as their having been brought together somehow or other, precisely because of the transcendental nature of the principle of the permanence of Substance. In my Critique of Kantian Philosophy,[65] I have shown at length, that _Substance_ is but another word for _Matter_, the conception of substance not being realisable excepting in _Matter_, and therefore deriving its origin from _Matter_, and I have also specially pointed out how that conception was formed solely to serve a surreptitious purpose. Like many other equally certain truths, this eternity of Matter (called the permanence of substance) is forbidden fruit for professors of philosophy; so they slip past it with a bashful, sidelong glance.
The attraction of a thread by amber, for instance, at the present moment, is an effect; its cause is the preceding friction and actual contact of the amber with the thread; and the _force of Nature_ which acts in, and presides over, the process, is Electricity. The explanation of this matter is to be found in my chief work,[66] and there I have shown in a long chain of causes and effects how the most heterogeneous natural forces successively come into play in them. By this explanation the difference between transitory phenomena and permanent forms of operation, becomes exceedingly clear; and as, moreover, a whole section (§ 26) is devoted to the question, it will be sufficient here to give a brief sketch of it. The _rule_, by which a force of Nature manifests itself in the chain of causes and effects--consequently the link which connects it with them--is the law of Nature. But the confusion between forces of Nature and causes is as frequent as it is detrimental to clearness of thought. It seems indeed as though no one had accurately defined the difference between these conceptions before me, however great may have been the urgency for such a distinction.
Not only are forces of Nature turned into causes by such expressions as, 'Electricity, Gravity, &c., are the _cause_ of so-and-so,' but they are even often turned into effects by those who search for a cause for Electricity, Gravity, &c. &c., which is absurd. Diminishing the number of the forces of Nature, however, by reducing one to another, as for instance Magnetism is in our days reduced to Electricity, is a totally different thing. Every _true_, consequently really primary force of Nature--and every fundamental chemical property belongs to these forces--is essentially a _qualitas occulta_, _i.e._ it does not admit of physical, but only of metaphysical explanation: in other words, of an explanation which transcends the world of phenomena. No one has carried this confusion, or rather identification, of causes with forces of Nature further than Maine de Biran in his "Nouvelles considérations des rapports du physique au moral," for it is essential to his philosophy. It is besides remarkable, that when he speaks of causes, he rarely uses the word _cause_ alone, but almost always speaks of _cause ou force_, just as we have seen Spinoza above (§ 8) write _ratio sive causa_ no less than eight times in the same page. Both writers are evidently conscious that they are identifying two disparates, in order to be able to make use of the one or the other, according to circumstances; for this end they are obliged to keep the identification constantly before their readers' mind.--
The third form of causality is the _motive_. Under this form causality rules animal life proper: that is, the exterior, consciously performed actions of all animals. The medium for motives is _knowledge_: an intellect is accordingly needed for susceptibility to motives. The true characteristic of the animal is therefore the faculty of knowing, of representing (_Das Vorstellen_). Animals, as such, always move towards some aim and end, which therefore must have been _recognised_ by them: that is to say, it must have presented itself to them as something different from themselves, yet of which they are conscious. Therefore the proper definition of the animal would be: 'That which knows;' for no other definition quite hits the mark or can even perhaps stand the test of investigation. Movement induced by motives is necessarily wanting where there is no cognitive faculty, and movement by stimuli alone remains, _i.e._ plant life. Irritability and sensibility are therefore inseparable. Still motives evidently act in a different way from stimuli; for the action of the former may be very brief, nay, need only be momentary; since their efficacy, unlike that of stimuli, stands in no relation whatever to the duration of that action, to the proximity of the object, &c. &c. A motive needs but to be perceived therefore, to take effect; whereas stimuli always require outward, often even inward, contact and invariably a certain length of time.
This short sketch of the three forms of causality will suffice here. They are more fully described in my Prize-essay on Free Will.[67] One thing, however, still remains to be urged. The difference between cause, stimulus, and motive, is obviously only a consequence of the various degrees of _receptivity_ of beings; the greater their receptivity, the feebler may be the nature of the influence: a stone needs an impact, while man obeys a look. Nevertheless, both are moved by a sufficient cause, therefore with the same necessity. For '_motivation_'[68] is only causality passing through knowledge; the intellect is the medium of the motives, because it is the highest degree of receptivity. By this, however, the law of causality loses nothing whatever of its rigour and certainty; for motives are causes and operate with the same necessity which all causes bring with them. This necessity is easy to perceive in animals because of the greater simplicity of their intellect, which is limited to the perception of what is present. Man's intellect is double: for not only has he intuitive, but abstract, knowledge, which last is not limited to what is present.
Man possesses Reason; he therefore has a power of elective decision with clear consciousness: that is, he is able to weigh against one another motives which exclude each other, as such; in other terms, he can let them try their strength on his will. The most powerful motive then decides him, and his actions ensue with just the same necessity as the rolling of a ball after it has been struck. Freedom of Will[69] means (not professorial twaddle but) "_that a given human being, in a given situation, can act in two different ways_." But the utter absurdity of this assertion is a truth as certain and as clearly proved, as any truth can be which passes the limits of pure mathematics. In my Essay on Free Will, to which the Norwegian Society awarded the prize, this truth is demonstrated more clearly, methodically, and thoroughly than has been done before by anyone else, and this moreover with special reference to those facts of our consciousness by which ignorant people imagine that absurdity to be confirmed. In all that is essential however, Hobbes, Spinoza, Priestley, Voltaire, and even Kant[70] already taught the same doctrine.
Our professional philosophers, of course, do not let this interfere with their holding forth on Free Will, as if it were an understood thing which had never been questioned. But what do these gentlemen imagine the above-named great men to have come into the world for, by the grace of Nature? To enable them (the professors) to earn their livelihood by philosophy?--Since I had proved this truth in my prize-essay more clearly than had ever been done before, and since moreover a Royal Society had sanctioned that proof by placing my essay among its memoranda, it surely behoved these worthies, considering the views they held, to make a vigorous attack upon so pernicious a doctrine, so detestable a heresy, and thoroughly to refute it. Nay, this duty was all the more imperative as, in my other essay "On the Foundation of Morality,"[71] I had proved the utter groundlessness of Kant's practical Reason with its Categorical Imperative which, under the name of the Moral Law, is still used by these gentlemen as the corner-stone of their own shallow systems of morality. I have shown it to be a futile assumption so clearly and irrefutably, that no one with a spark of judgment can possibly believe any longer in this fiction.--"Well, and so they probably did."--Oh no!
They take good care not to venture on such slippery ground! Their ability consists in holding their tongues; silence is all they have to oppose to intelligence, earnestness, and truth. In not one of the products of their useless scribblings that have appeared since 1841, has the slightest notice been taken of my Ethics--undoubtedly the most important work on Moral Philosophy that has been published for the last sixty years--nay, their terror of me and of my truth is so great, that none of the literary journals issued by Academies or Universities has so much as mentioned the book. _Zitto, zitto_, lest the public should perceive anything: in this consists the whole of their policy. The instinct of self-preservation may, no doubt, be at the bottom of these artful tactics. For would not a philosophy, whose sole aim was truth, and which had no other consideration in view, be likely to play the part of the iron pot among the earthen ones, were it to come in contact with the petty systems composed under the influence of a thousand personal considerations by people whose chief qualification is the propriety of their sentiments? Their wretched fear of my writings is the fear of truth. Nor can it be denied, that precisely this very doctrine of the complete necessity of all acts of the will stands in flagrant contradiction with all the hypotheses of their favourite old-woman's philosophy cut after the pattern of Judaism. Still, that severely tested truth, far from being disturbed by all this, as a sure datum and criterion, as a true δός μοι ποῦ στῶ, proves the futility of all that old-woman's philosophy and the urgent need of a fundamentally different, incomparably deeper view of the Universe and of Man;--no matter whether that view be compatible with the official duties of a professional philosopher or not.
"It may therefore be taken for granted, that if we could see far enough into a man's mode of thinking, as it manifests itself in his inner, as well as outer actions, for us to know every, even the faintest motive, and in like manner all the other causes which act upon these, it would be possible to calculate his conduct in future with the same certainty as an eclipse of the sun or moon."--"Kritik der praktischen Vernunft" ed. Rosenkranz, p. 230 and p. 177 of the 4th edition. [71] Published in the same volume with the Prize-Essay on "Free Will." See "Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik." § 21. À priori _character of the conception of Causality_. _Intellectual Character of Empirical Perception._
Text from Project Gutenberg, public domain in the United States.