The Philosophy and Theology of Averroes · Averroës
OF DIRECTION
In that case seeing, hearing, in fact all the five senses would have been only one, which is quite contrary to our reason. This problem and others like it have obliged the Mutakallimun to admit that it is possible to _hear_ the colour, and _see_ the sounds. But this is against nature, as man has understood it to be. For it is absolutely evident that the sense of seeing is quite different from that of hearing. Their actions are quite distinct from one another, and the organ of the one cannot work as the organ of the other. It is just as impossible to turn hearing as to turn colour into sound. Those who say that sometimes sound can be seen, should be asked to define the sense of seeing. They would necessarily answer that it is a faculty which perceives those things which can be seen, such as colour and so on. Then they should be asked to define the sense of hearing. They would surely say that it is one sense by which sounds can be heard. Then they should be asked whether at the time of sound it is the sense of hearing only or seeing too. If they say that it is hearing only, they admit that it cannot perceive colours. If they say that it is seeing only, then it cannot hear sounds. If it is neither alone, for it perceives colours, then it is seeing and hearing both. But in this way everything can be proved to be one, even in the case of contradictory things. This is a thing which our Mutakallimun admit or they are compelled to do so. But it is clear that it is a philosophical opinion which is only fit for those ancient people famous for it.
Now the second method which Mutakallimun have adopted for proving the possibility of Divine Vision is that which has been mentioned by Abul Maali in his book, _Al Irshad_. It says that the senses can only feel the substance (_Zat_) of things, but that which separates the existent thing from one another is not to be found in the substance only. So the senses cannot perceive the substance, which is common to all the existent things. They can only perceive a thing because it exists. But all this is absurd, which is quite clear from the fact that if sight were only able to perceive things then it would not have been possible for it to differentiate between white and black, for there is no difference between things about those qualities which are common to all. This also becomes impossible as regards all the other senses. The sense of seeing could not perceive different kinds of colours; the sense of hearing cannot differentiate between tastes. It would be necessary that the objects perceived by the senses be all of a kind, and there should be no difference between objects perceived by seeing and apprehended by hearing. This is contrary to that which man commonly understands. In reality the senses perceive the substance of things by the power which is vouchsafed to them. The cause of this mistake lies in the fact that that which perceives a substance, is thought to be the thing perceived. Had there not been said so much about these things, and so much respect for those who said it, it would not have satisfied anybody with a strong common sense.
The cause of such a perplexing situation in the Law, which has compelled its votaries to take refuge in such worthless arguments, as would bring a smile to the lips of anybody who has made the least effort to distinguish between different kinds of arguments, is the exposition of anthropomorphic qualities of God to the common people, a fact which has been prohibited by God and His Prophet. It is so because it is very difficult for a man to believe at the same time that there exists One without a body, who can be seen with our eyes. For the things which the senses comprehend are in the bodies or the bodies themselves. Hence the Mutakallimun have tried to prove that the Divine Vision will be an addition to our existing qualities at that moment. This also should not have been disclosed to the common people. For since their intellect cannot go beyond their imagination that which they cannot imagine is non-existent for them. To imagine a thing which has no body is not possible, and hence a belief in the existence of an object which they cannot imagine, is impossible for them. It was for this reason that the Law refused to disclose this secret to them, and described God, for their sake, in terms which they can imagine, ascribing to him the attributes of hearing, seeing, having a face, &c. &c., at the same time telling them that He is not like anything which can be imagined. Had the intention of the Law been to make clear to the masses the fact of His having no body, it would not have mentioned these things in detail. But as light was the highest of imaginable things, it was given to them as an illustration of God, for it is the best known of the things both to the senses and to the imagination.
Such is also the case in respect to the possibility of their understanding the things of the Day of Judgment. These have also been mentioned in terms which they can imagine. So now when the Law has adopted this course about the apparent description of God, there arises no doubt about him. For when it is said that He is Light or that there is a curtain of light upon Him, as is mentioned in the Quran and authentic Traditions, and when it is said that the Faithful will see Him on the Day of Judgement as they see the sun, there arises no doubt or suspicion out of it for the common or the learned people. It is so because to the learned it is quite clear that that condition will be an addition to our former knowledge. But when this is disclosed to the common people, they cannot understand it, and hence they either disbelieve the whole of the Law, or consider its exponent to be an infidel. So one who adopts a method other than that laid down by the Law in this respect, certainly goes astray. If you look a little intently it will become clear to you, that in spite of the fact that the Law has not given illustration of those things for the common people, beyond which their imagination cannot go, it has also informed the learned men of the underlying meanings of those illustrations. So it is necessary to bear in mind the limits which the Law has set about the instruction of every class of men, and not to mix them together. For in this manner the purpose of the Law is multiplied. Hence it is that the Prophet has said, “We, the prophets, have been commanded to adapt ourselves to the conditions of the people, and address them according to their intelligence.” He who tries to instruct all the people in the matter of religion, in one and the same way, is like a man who wants to make them alike in actions too, which is quite against apparent laws and reason.
From the foregoing it must have become clear to you that the divine vision has an exoteric meaning in which there is no doubt, if we take the words of the Quran about God as they stand, that is, without proving or disproving the anthropomorphic attribute of God. Now since the first part of the Law has been made quite clear as to God’s purity, and the quantity of the teaching fit for the common people, it is time to begin the discussion about the actions of God, after which our purpose in writing this tractate will be over.
Ideas discussed in this chapter
Text from Project Gutenberg, public domain in the United States.