The Philosophy of Spinoza · Benedictus de Spinoza
II
_Joy and Sorrow_ If anything increases, diminishes, helps, or limits our body's power of action, the idea of that thing increases, diminishes, helps, or limits our mind's power of thought. We thus see that the mind can suffer great changes, and can pass now to a greater and now to a lesser perfection; these passions explaining to us the emotions of joy and sorrow. By _joy_, therefore, in what follows, I shall understand the passion by which the mind passes to a greater perfection; by _sorrow_, on the other hand, the passion by which it passes to a less perfection. The emotion of joy, related at the same time both to the mind and the body, I call _pleasurable excitement_ (_titillatio_) or _cheerfulness_; that of sorrow I call _pain_ or _melancholy_. It is, however, to be observed that pleasurable excitement and pain are related to a man when one of his parts is affected more than the others; cheerfulness and melancholy, on the other hand, when all parts are equally affected. What the nature of desire is I have explained; and besides these three--joy, sorrow, and desire--I know of no other primary emotion, the others springing from these. _Definitions of the Principal Emotions_ I.--_Desire_ is the essence itself of man in so far as it is conceived as determined to any action by any one of his modifications.
_Explanation._--We have said above, that desire is appetite which is self-conscious, and that appetite is the essence itself of man in so far as it is determined to such acts as contribute to his preservation. But I have taken care to remark that in truth I cannot recognize any difference between human appetite and desire. For whether a man be conscious of his appetite or not, it remains one and the same appetite, and so, lest I might appear to be guilty of tautology, I have not explained desire by appetite, but have tried to give such a definition of desire as would include all the efforts of human nature to which we give the name of appetite, desire, will, or impulse. For I might have said that desire is the essence itself of man in so far as it is considered as determined to any action; but from this definition it would not follow that the mind could be conscious of its desire or appetite, and therefore, in order that I might include the cause of this consciousness, it was necessary to add the words, _in so far as it is conceived as determined to any action by any one of his modifications_. For by a modification of the human essence we understand any constitution of that essence, whether it be innate, whether it be conceived through the attribute of thought alone or of extension alone, or whether it be related to both. By the word "desire," therefore, I understand all the efforts, impulses, appetites, and volitions of a man, which vary according to his changing disposition, and not unfrequently are so opposed to one another that he is drawn hither and thither, and knows not whither he ought to turn.
II. _Joy_ is man's passage from a less to a greater perfection. III. _Sorrow_ is man's passage from a greater to a less perfection. _Explanation._--I say passage, for joy is not perfection itself. If a man were born with the perfection to which he passes, he would possess it without the emotion of joy; a truth which will appear the more clearly from the emotion of sorrow, which is the opposite to joy. For that sorrow consists in the passage to a less perfection, but not in the less perfection itself, no one can deny, since in so far as a man shares any perfection he cannot be sad. Nor can we say that sorrow consists in the privation of a greater perfection for privation is nothing. But the emotion of sorrow is a reality, and it therefore must be the reality of the passage to a lesser perfection, or the reality by which man's power of acting is diminished or limited. As for the definitions of cheerfulness, pleasurable excitement, melancholy, and grief, I pass these by, because they are related rather to the body than to the mind, and are merely different kinds of joy or of sorrow. IV. _Astonishment_ is the imagination of an object in which the mind remains fixed because this particular imagination has no connection with others.
_Explanation._--That which causes the mind from the contemplation of one thing immediately to pass to the thought of another is that the images of these things are connected one with the other, and are so arranged that the one follows the other; a process which cannot be conceived when the image of the thing is new, for the mind will be held in the contemplation of the same object until other causes determine it to think of other things. The imagination, therefore, considered in itself, of a new object is of the same character as other imaginations; and for this reason I do not class astonishment among the emotions, nor do I see any reason why I should do it, since this abstraction of the mind arises from no positive cause by which it is abstracted from other things, but merely from the absence of any cause by which from the contemplation of one thing the mind is determined to think other things. I acknowledge, therefore, only three primitive or primary emotions, those of joy, sorrow, and desire; and the only reason which has induced me to speak of astonishment is, that it has been the custom to give other names to certain emotions derived from the three primitives whenever these emotions are related to objects at which we are astonished. This same reason also induces me to add the definition of contempt.
V. _Contempt_ is the imagination of an object which so little touches the mind that the mind is moved by the presence of the object to imagine those qualities which are not in it rather than those which are in it. The definitions of veneration and scorn I pass by here, because they give a name, so far as I know, to none of the emotions. VI. _Love_ is joy with the accompanying idea of an external cause. _Explanation._--This definition explains with sufficient clearness the essence of love; that which is given by some authors, who define love to be the will of the lover to unite himself to the beloved object, expresses not the essence of love but one of its properties. In as much as these authors have not seen with sufficient clearness what is the essence of love, they could not have a distinct conception of its properties, and consequently their definition has by everybody been thought very obscure. I must observe, however, when I say that it is a property in a lover to will a union with the beloved object, that I do not understand by will a consent or deliberation or a free decree of the mind (for that this is a fiction we have demonstrated above), nor even a desire of the lover to unite himself with the beloved object when it is absent, nor a desire to continue in its presence when it is present, for love can be conceived without either one or the other of these desires; but by will I understand the satisfaction that the beloved object produces in the lover by its presence, by virtue of which the joy of the lover is strengthened, or at any rate supported.
VII. _Hatred_ is sorrow with the accompanying idea of an external cause. _Explanation._--What is to be observed here will easily be seen from what has been said in the explanation of the preceding definition. VIII. _Inclination_ (_propensio_) is a joy with the accompanying idea of some object as being accidentally the cause of joy. IX. _Aversion_ is sorrow with the accompanying idea of some object which is accidentally the cause of the sorrow. X. _Devotion_ is love towards an object which astonishes us. _Explanation._--Astonishment arises from the novelty of the object. If, therefore, it should happen that we often imagine the object at which we are astonished, we shall cease to be astonished at it, and hence we see that the emotion of devotion easily degenerates into simple love. XI. _Derision_ is joy arising from the imagination that something we despise is present in an object we hate. _Explanation._--In so far as we despise a thing we hate do we deny its existence, and so far do we rejoice. But inasmuch as we suppose that a man hates what he ridicules, it follows that this joy is not solid. XII. _Hope_ is a joy not constant, arising from the idea of something future or past, about the issue of which we sometimes doubt. XIII. _Fear_ is a sorrow not constant, arising from the idea of something future or past, about the issue of which we sometimes doubt.
_Explanation._--From these definitions it follows that there is no hope without fear nor fear without hope, for the person who wavers in hope and doubts concerning the issue of anything is supposed to imagine something which may exclude its existence, and so far, therefore, to be sad, and consequently while he wavers in hope, to fear lest his wishes should not be accomplished. So also the person who fears, that is to say, who doubts whether what he hates will not come to pass, imagines something which excludes the existence of what he hates, and therefore is rejoiced, and consequently so far hopes that it will not happen. XIV. _Confidence_ is joy arising from the idea of a past or future object from which cause for doubting is removed. XV. _Despair_ is sorrow arising from the idea of a past or future object from which cause for doubting is removed. _Explanation._--Confidence, therefore, springs from hope and despair from fear, whenever the reason for doubting the issue is taken away; a case which occurs either because we imagine a thing past or future to be present and contemplate it as present, or because we imagine other things which exclude the existence of those which made us to doubt. For although we can never be sure about the issue of individual objects, it may nevertheless happen that we do not doubt it. For elsewhere we have shown that it is one thing not to doubt and another to possess certitude, and so it may happen that from the image of an object either past or future we are affected with the same emotion of joy or sorrow as that by which we should be affected from the image of an object present.
XVI. _Gladness_ (_gaudium_) is a joy with the accompanying idea of something past, which, unhoped for, has happened. XVII. _Remorse_ is sorrow with the accompanying idea of something past, which, unhoped for, has happened. XVIII. _Commiseration_ is sorrow with the accompanying idea of evil which has happened to some one whom we imagine like ourselves. _Explanation._--Between commiseration and compassion there seems to be no difference, excepting perhaps that commiseration refers rather to an individual emotion and compassion to it as a habit. XIX. _Favor_ is love towards those who have benefited others. XX. _Indignation_ is hatred towards those who have injured others. _Explanation._--I am aware that these names in common bear a different meaning. But my object is not to explain the meaning of words but the nature of things, and to indicate them by words whose customary meaning shall not be altogether opposed to the meaning which I desire to bestow upon them. I consider it sufficient to have said this once for all. XXI. _Over-estimation_ consists in thinking too highly of another person in consequence of our love for him. XXII. _Contempt_ consists in thinking too little of another person in consequence of our hatred for him. _Explanation._--Over-estimation and contempt are therefore respectively effects or properties of love or hatred, and so over-estimation may be defined as love in so far as it affects a man so that he thinks too much of the beloved object; and, on the contrary, contempt may be defined as hatred in so far as it affects a man so that he thinks too little of the object he hates.
XXIII. _Envy_ is hatred in so far as it affects a man so that he is sad at the good fortune of another person and is glad when any evil happens to him. _Explanation._--To envy is generally opposed compassion (_misericordia_), which may therefore be defined as follows, notwithstanding the usual signification of the word:-- XXIV. _Compassion_ is love in so far as it affects a man so that he is glad at the prosperity of another person and is sad when any evil happens to him. I pass now to consider other emotions which are attended by the idea of something within us as the cause. XXV. _Self-satisfaction_ is the joy which is produced by contemplating ourselves and our own power of action. XXVI. _Humility_ is the sorrow which is produced by contemplating our impotence or helplessness. Self-satisfaction is opposed to humility in so far as we understand by the former the joy which arises from contemplating our power of action, but in so far as we understand by it joy attended with the idea of something done, which we believe has been done by a free decree of our mind, it is opposed to repentance, which we may thus define:-- XXVII. _Repentance_ is sorrow accompanied with the idea of something done which we believe has been done by a free decree of our mind.
It is not to be wondered at that sorrow should always follow all those actions which are from _custom_ called wicked, and that joy should follow those which are called good. But that this is chiefly the effect of education will be evident from what we have before said. Parents, by reprobating what are called bad actions, and frequently blaming their children whenever they commit them, while they persuade them to what are called good actions, and praise their children when they perform them, have caused the emotions of sorrow to connect themselves with the former, and those of joy with the latter. Experience proves this, for custom and religion are not the same everywhere; but, on the contrary, things which are sacred to some are profane to others, and what are honorable with some are disgraceful with others. Education alone, therefore, will determine whether a man will repent of any deed or boast of it. XXVIII. _Pride_ is thinking too much of ourselves, through self-love. _Explanation._--Pride differs, therefore, from over-estimation, inasmuch as the latter is related to an external object, but pride to the man himself who thinks of himself too highly. As over-estimation, therefore, is an effect or property of love, so pride is an effect or property of self-love, and it may therefore be defined as love of ourselves or self-satisfaction, in so far as it affects us so that we think too highly of ourselves.
XXIX. _Despondency_ is thinking too little of ourselves through sorrow. _Explanation._--We are, nevertheless, often in the habit of opposing humility to pride, but only when we attend to their effects rather than to their nature. For we are accustomed to call a man proud who boasts too much, who talks about nothing but his own virtues and other people's vices, who wishes to be preferred to everybody else, and who marches along with that stateliness and pomp which belong to others whose position is far above his. On the other hand, we call a man humble who often blushes, who confesses his own faults and talks about the virtues of others, who yields to every one, who walks with bended head, and who neglects to adorn himself. These emotions, humility and despondency, are very rare, for human nature, considered in itself, struggles against them as much as it can, and hence those who have the most credit for being abject and humble are generally the most ambitious and envious. XXX. Self-exaltation is joy with the accompanying idea of some action we have done, which we imagine people praise. XXXI. _Shame_ is sorrow, with the accompanying idea of some action which we imagine people blame. _Explanation._--A difference, however, is here to be observed between shame and modesty. Shame is sorrow which follows a deed of which we are ashamed. Modesty is the dread or fear of shame, which keeps a man from committing any disgraceful act. To modesty is usually opposed impudence, which indeed is not an emotion, as I shall show in the proper place; but the names of emotions, as I have already said, are matters rather of custom than indications of the nature of the emotions. I have thus discharged the task which I set myself of explaining the emotions of joy and sorrow. I will advance now to those which I ascribe to desire.
XXXII. _Regret_ is the desire or longing to possess something, the emotion being strengthened by the memory of the object itself, and at the same time being restrained by the memory of other things which exclude the existence of the desired object. _Explanation._--Whenever we recollect a thing, as we have often said, we are thereby necessarily disposed to contemplate it with the same emotion as if it were present before us. But this disposition or effort, while we are awake, is generally restrained by the images of things which exclude the existence of the thing which we recollect. Whenever, therefore, we recollect a thing which affects us with any kind of joy, we thereby endeavor to contemplate it with the same emotion of joy as if it were present,--an attempt which is, however, immediately restrained by the memory of that which excludes the existence of the thing. Regret, therefore, is really a sorrow which is opposed to the joy which arises from the absence of what we hate. But because the name _regret_ seems to connect this emotion with desire, I therefore ascribe it to desire. XXXIII. _Emulation_ is the desire which is begotten in us of a thing because we imagine that other persons have the same desire. _Explanation._--He who seeks flight because others seek it, he who fears because he sees others fear, or even he who withdraws his hand and moves his body as if his hand were burning because he sees that another person has burnt his hand, such as these, I say, although they may indeed imitate the emotion of another, are not said to emulate it; not because we have recognized one cause for emulation and another for imitation, but because it has been the custom to call that man only emulous who imitates what we think noble, useful, or pleasant.
XXXIV. _Thankfulness_ or _gratitude_ is the desire or endeavor of love with which we strive to do good to others who, from a similar emotion of love, have done good to us. XXXV. _Benevolence_ is the desire to do good to those whom we pity. XXXVI. _Anger_ is the desire by which we are impelled, through hatred, to injure those whom we hate. XXXVII. _Vengeance_ is the desire which, springing from mutual hatred, urges us to injure those who, from a similar emotion, have injured us. XXXVIII. _Cruelty_ or _ferocity_ is the desire by which a man is impelled to injure any one whom we love or pity. _Explanation._--To cruelty is opposed mercy, which is not a passion, but a power of the mind by which a man restrains anger and vengeance. XXXIX. _Fear_ is the desire of avoiding the greater of two dreaded evils by the less. XL. _Audacity_ is the desire by which we are impelled to do something which is accompanied with a danger which our equals fear to meet. XLI. A person is said to be _pusillanimous_ whose desire is restrained by the fear of a danger which his equals dare to meet. _Explanation._--Pusillanimity, therefore, is nothing but the dread of some evil which most persons do not usually fear, and therefore I do not ascribe it to the emotions of desire. I wished, notwithstanding, to explain it here, because in so far as we attend to desire, pusillanimity is the true opposite of the emotion of audacity.
XLII. _Consternation_ is affirmed of the man whose desire of avoiding evil is restrained by astonishment at the evil which he fears. _Explanation._--Consternation is therefore a kind of pusillanimity. But because consternation springs from a double fear, it may be more aptly defined as that dread which holds a man stupefied or vacillating, so that he cannot remove an evil. I say _stupefied_, in so far as we understand his desire of removing the evil to be restrained by his astonishment. I say also _vacillating_, in so far as we conceive the same desire to be restrained by the fear of another evil which equally tortures him, so that he does not know which of the two evils to avoid. XLIII. _Courtesy_ or _moderation_ is the desire of doing those things which please men and omitting those which displease them. XLIV. _Ambition_ is the immoderate desire of glory. _Explanation._--Ambition is a desire which increases and strengthens all the emotions, and that is the reason why it can hardly be kept under control. For so long as a man is possessed by any desire, he is necessarily at the same time possessed by this. _Every noble man_, says Cicero, _is led by glory, and even the philosophers who write books about despising glory place their names on the title-page_. XLV. _Luxuriousness_ is the immoderate desire or love of good living.
XLVI. _Drunkenness_ is the immoderate desire and love of drinking. XLVII. _Avarice_ is the immoderate desire and love of riches. XLVIII. _Lust_ is the immoderate desire and love of sexual intercourse. _Explanation._--This desire of sexual intercourse is usually called lust, whether it be held within bounds or not. I may add that the five last-mentioned emotions have no contraries, for moderation is a kind of ambition, and I have already observed that temperance, sobriety, and chastity show a power and not a passion of the mind. Even supposing that an avaricious, ambitious, or timid man refrains from an excess of eating, drinking, or sexual intercourse, avarice, ambition, and fear are not therefore the opposites of voluptuousness, drunkenness, or lust. For the avaricious man generally desires to swallow as much meat and drink as he can, provided only it belong to another person. The ambitious man, too, if he hopes he can keep it a secret, will restrain himself in nothing, and if he lives amongst drunkards and libertines, will be more inclined to their vices just because he is ambitious. The timid man, too, does what he does not will; and although, in order to avoid death, he may throw his riches into the sea, he remains avaricious; nor does the lascivious man cease to be lascivious because he is sorry that he cannot gratify his desire. Absolutely, therefore, these emotions have reference not so much to the acts themselves of eating and drinking as to the appetite and love itself. Consequently nothing can be opposed to these emotions but nobility of soul and strength of mind, as we shall see afterwards.
The definitions of jealousy and the other vacillations of the mind I pass over in silence, both because they are compounded of the emotions which we have already defined, and also because many of them have no names,--a fact which shows that, for the purposes of life, it is sufficient to know these combinations generally. Moreover, it follows from the definitions of the emotions which we have explained that, they all arise from desire, joy, or sorrow, or rather that there are none but these three, which pass under names varying as their relations and external signs vary. If, therefore, we attend to these primitive emotions and to what has been said above about the nature of the mind, we shall be able here to define the emotions in so far as they are related to the mind alone. _General definition of the emotions._--Emotion, which is called _animi pathema_, is a confused idea by which the mind affirms of its body, or any part of it, a greater or less power of existence than before; and this increase of power being given, the mind itself is determined to one particular thought rather than to another.
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