The Complete Works in Philosophy, Politics and Morals of the late Dr. Benjamin Franklin, Vol. 3 [of 3] · Benjamin Franklin
FOOTNOTES:
"The Indians in the French interest are, upon all proper opportunities, _instigated by their priests_ (who have generally the chief management of their public councils) to acts of hostility against the English, even in time of profound peace between the two crowns. Of this there are many undeniable instances: the war between the Indians and the colonies of the Massachusett's Bay and New Hampshire, in 1723, by which those colonies suffered so much damage, was begun by the instigation of the French: their supplies were from them; and there are now original letters of several Jesuits to be produced, whereby it evidently appears, that they were continually animating the Indians, when almost tired with the war, to a farther prosecution of it. The French not only excited the Indians, and supported them, but joined their own forces with them in all the late hostilities that have been committed within his majesty's province of Nova Scotia. And from an intercepted letter this year from the Jesuits at Penobscot, and from other information, it is certain, that they have been using their utmost endeavours to excite the Indians to new acts of hostility against his majesty's colony of the Massachusett's Bay; and some have been committed. The French not only excite the Indians to acts of hostility, but reward them for it, by _buying the English prisoners of them_: for the ransom of each of which they afterwards demand of us the price that is usually given for a slave in these colonies. They do this under the specious pretence of rescuing the poor prisoners from the cruelties and barbarities of the savages; but in reality to encourage them to continue their depredations, as they can by this means get more by hunting the English, than by hunting wild-beasts; and the French at the same time are thereby enabled to keep up a large body of Indians, entirely at _the expence of the English_."
The Indian way of making war is by sudden attack upon exposed places; and as soon as they have done mischief, they retire, and either go home by the same or some different route, as they think safest; or go to some other place at a distance, to renew their stroke. If a sufficient party should happily be ready to pursue them, it is a great chance, whether in a country consisting of woods and swamps, which the English are not acquainted with, the enemy do not lie in ambush for them in some convenient place, and from thence destroy them. If this should not be the case, but the English should pursue them, as soon as they have gained the rivers, by means of their canoes (to the use of which they are brought up from their infancy) they presently get out of their reach: further, if a body of men were to march into their country, to the place where they are settled, they can, upon the least notice, without great disadvantage, quit their present habitation, and betake themselves to new ones." _Clark's Observations_, p. 13.
"It has been already remarked, that the tribes of the Indians, living upon the lakes and rivers that run upon the back of the English settlements in North America, are very numerous, and can furnish a great number of fighting men, all perfectly well acquainted with the use of arms as soon as capable of carrying them, as they get the whole of their subsistence from hunting; and that this army, large as it may be, can be maintained by the French without any expence. From their numbers, their situation, and the rivers that run into the English settlements, it is easy to conceive, that they can at any time make an attack upon, and constantly annoy as many of the exposed English settlements as they please, and those at any distance from each other. The effects of such incursions have been too severely felt by many of the British colonies, not to be very well known. The entire breaking up places, that had been for a considerable time settled at a great expence both of labour and money; burning the houses, destroying the flock, killing and making prisoners great numbers of the inhabitants, with all the cruel usage they meet with in their captivity, is only a part of the scene. All other places that are exposed are kept in continual terror; the lands lie waste and uncultivated, from the danger that attends those that shall presume to work upon them: besides the immense charge the governments must be at in a very ineffectual manner to defend their extended frontiers; and all this from the influence the French have had over, but comparatively, a few of the Indians. To the same or greater evils still will every one of the colonies be exposed, whenever the same influence shall be extended to the whole body of them." Ibid. p. 20.
_First term, from 1744 to 1748, inclusive._ _Northern Colonies._ _West India Islands._ 1744 £.640,114 12 4 £.796,112 17 9 1745 534,316 2 5 503,669 19 9 1746 754,945 4 3 472,994 19 7 1747 726,648 5 5 856,463 18 6 1748 830,243 16 9 734,095 15 3 --------------- --------------- Total, £.3,486,261 1 2 Tot. £.3,363,337 10 10 Difference, 122,930 10 4 ------------- £.3,486,268 1 2 _Second term, from 1754 to 1758, inclusive._ _Northern Colonies._ _West India Islands._ 1754 1,246,615 1 11 685,675 3 0 1755 1,177,848 6 10 694,667 13 3 1756 1,428,720 18 10 733,458 16 3 1757 1,727,924 2 10 776,488 0 6 1758 1,832,948 13 10 877,571 19 11 --------------- --------------- Total, £.7,414,057 4 3 Tot. £.3,767,841 12 11 Difference, 3,646,215 11 4 --------------- £.7,414,057 4 3 In the first term, total of West India islands, 3,363,337 10 10 In the second term, ditto 3,767,841 12 11 --------------- Increase, only £.0,404,504 2 1 In the first term, total for Northern Colonies, 3,486,268 1 2 In the second term, ditto 7,414,057 4 3 --------------- Increase, £.3,927,789 3 1 By these accounts it appears, that the exports to the West India islands, and to the northern colonies, were in the first term nearly equal (the difference being only 122,936_l._ 10s. 4d.) and in the second term, the exports to those islands had only increased 404,504_l._ 2s. 1d.--Whereas the increase to the northern colonies is 3,927,789_l._ 3s. 1d. almost _four millions_.
Some part of this increased demand for English goods may be ascribed to the armies and fleets we have had both in North America and the West Indies; not so much for what is consumed by the soldiery; their clothing, stores, ammunition, &c. sent from hence on account of the government, being (as is supposed) not included in these accounts of merchandize exported; but, as the war has occasioned a great plenty of money in America, many of the inhabitants have increased their expence. N. B. These accounts do not include any exports from Scotland to America, which are doubtless proportionally considerable; nor the exports from Ireland. [I shall carry on this calculation where Dr. Franklin left it. For four years, from 1770 to 1773 inclusively, the same average _annual_ exports to the same ports of the West Indies is 994,463_l._, and to the same ports of the North American plantations 2,919,669_l._ But the annual averages of the first and second terms of the former were 672,668_l._ and 753,568_l._: of the latter, 697,254_l._ and 1,482,811_l._ In ten years therefore (taking the middle years of the terms) the North American trade is found to have _doubled_ the West Indian: in the next sixteen years it becomes greater by _three-fold_.--With respect to itself, the North American trade in 32 years (taking the extremes of the terms) has quadrupled; while the West Indian trade increased only one half; of which increase I apprehend Jamaica has given more than one-third, chiefly in consequence of the quiet produced by the peace with the maroon negroes.--Had the West Indian trade continued stationary, the North American trade would have quadrupled with respect to it, in 26 years; and this, notwithstanding the checks given to the latter, by their non-importation agreements and the encouragement of their own manufactures.
There has been an accession to both these trades, produced by the cessions at the treaty of Paris, not touched upon by Dr. Franklin. The average _annual_ export-trade, from 1770 to 1773 inclusively, to the ceded West India islands, amounted to 258,299_l._: to the ceded North American territory it has been 280,423_l._ See Sir Charles Whitworth's State of Trade. B. V.] [45] _Copy of the Report of Governor Hopkins to the Board of Trade, on the Numbers of People in Rhode-Island._ In obedience to your lordships' commands, I have caused the within account to be taken by officers under oath. By it there appears to be in this colony at this time 35,939 white persons, and 4697 blacks, chiefly negroes. In the year 1730, by order of the then lords commissioners of trade and plantations, an account was taken of the number of people in this colony, and then there appeared to be 15,302 white persons, and 2633 blacks. Again in the year 1748, by like order, an account was taken of the number of people in this colony, by which it appears there were at that time 29,755 white persons, and 4373 blacks. _Colony of Rhode Island, Dec. 24, 1755._ STEPHEN HOPKINS. [46] _An Account of the Value of the Exports from England to Pensylvania, in one Year, taken at different Periods, viz._
In 1723 they amounted only to £. 15,992 19 4 1730 they were 48,592 7 5 1737 56,690 6 7 1742 75,295 3 4 1747 82,404 17 7 1752 201,666 19 11 1757 268,426 6 6 N. B. The accounts for 1758 and 1759, are not yet completed; but those acquainted with the North American trade know, that the increase in those two years has been in a still greater proportion; the last year being supposed to exceed any former year by a third; and this owing to the increased ability of the people to spend, from the greater quantities of money circulating among them by the war. [47] The _aid_ Dr. Franklin alludes to must probably have consisted in early and full supplies of arms, officers, intelligence, and trade of export and of import, through the river St. Lawrence, on risques both public and private; in the encouragement of splendid promises and a great ally; in the passage from Canada to the back settlements, being _shut_ to the British _forces_; in the quiet of the _great body_ of Indians; in the support of emissaries and discontented citizens; in loans and subsidies to congress, in ways _profitable to France_; in a refuge to be granted them in case of defeat, in vacant lands, as settlers; in the probability of war commencing earlier between England and France, at the gulph of St. Lawrence (when the shipping taken, were _rightfully_ addressed to Frenchmen) than in the present case. All this might have happened, as soon as America's distaste of the sovereign had exceeded the fear of the foreigner; a circumstance frequently seen possible in history, and which our ministers took care should not be wanting.
This explanation would have required apology for its insertion, were not the opinion pretty common in England, that _had not the French been removed from Canada, the revolt of America never would have taken place_. Why then were the French _not left_ in Canada, at the peace of 1763? Or, since they _were not_ left there, why was the American dispute begun? Yet in one sense, perhaps this opinion is true; for _had_ the French been left in Canada, ministers would not only have _sooner_ felt, but _sooner_ have seen, the strange fatality of their plans. B. V. [48] Remarks, p. 50, 51. [49] And Pharoah said unto his people, behold the people of the children of Israel are more and mightier than we; come on, let us deal wisely with them, lest they multiply, and it come to pass, that when there falleth out any war, they join also unto our enemies and fight against us, and so get them up out of the land. And the king spake to the Hebrew midwives, &c. Exodus, chap. 1. [50] In fact, there have not gone from Britain [itself] to our colonies these twenty years past to settle there, so many as ten families a year; the new settlers are either the offspring of the old, or emigrants from Germany, or the north of Ireland.
4. "That every _medium of trade should have an intrinsic value_, which paper-money has not. Gold and silver are therefore the fittest for this medium, as they are an equivalent; which paper never can be. 5. "That _debtors_ in the assemblies make paper-money with _fraudulent views_. 6. "That in the middle colonies, where the credit of the paper-money has been best supported, the bills have _never kept to their nominal value_ in circulation; but have constantly depreciated to a certain degree, whenever the quantity has been increased." To consider these reasons in their order; the first is, 1. "_That paper-money_ carries the gold and silver out _of the province, and so ruins the country; as_ experience has shewn, _in every colony where it has been practised in any great degree_."--This opinion, of its ruining the country, seems to be merely speculative, or not otherwise founded than upon misinformation in the matter of fact. The truth is, that the balance of their trade with Britain being greatly against them, the gold and silver are drawn out to pay that balance; and then the necessity of some medium of trade has induced the making of paper-money, which could _not_ be carried away. Thus, if carrying out all the gold and silver ruins a country, every colony was ruined before it made paper-money.--But, far from being ruined by it, the colonies that have made use of paper-money have been, and are all, in a thriving condition. The debt indeed to Britain has increased, because their numbers, and of course their trade, have increased; for all trade having always a proportion of debt outstanding, which is paid in its turn, while fresh debt is contracted, the proportion of debt naturally increases as the trade increases; but the improvement and increase of estates in the colonies have been in a greater proportion than their debt.
New England, particularly in 1696 (about the time they began the use of paper-money) had in all its four provinces but 180 churches or congregations; in 1760 they were 530. The number of farms and buildings there is increased in proportion to the numbers of people; and the goods exported to them from England in 1750, before the restraint took place, were near five times as much as before they had paper-money. Pensylvania, before it made any paper-money, was totally stript of its gold and silver; though they had from time to time, like the neighbouring colonies, agreed to take gold and silver coins at higher nominal values, in hopes of drawing money into, and retaining it, for the internal uses of the province. During that weak practice, silver got up by degrees to 8s. 9d. per ounce, and English crowns were called six, seven, and eight-shilling pieces, long before paper-money was made. But this practice of increasing the denomination was found not to answer the end. The balance of trade carried out the gold and silver as fast as they were brought in; the merchants raising the price of their goods in proportion to the increased denomination of the money.
The difficulties for want of cash were accordingly very great, the chief part of the trade being carried on by the extremely inconvenient method of barter; when in 1723 paper-money was first made there; which gave new life to business, promoted greatly the settlement of new lands (by lending small sums to beginners on easy interest, to be repaid by instalments) whereby the province has so greatly increased in inhabitants, that the export from hence thither is now more than tenfold what it then was; and by their trade with foreign colonies, they have been able to obtain great quantities of gold and silver to remit hither in return for the manufactures of this country. New York and New Jersey have also increased greatly during the same period, with the use of paper-money; so that it does not appear to be of the ruinous nature ascribed to it. And if the inhabitants of those countries are glad to have the use of paper among themselves, that they may thereby be enabled to spare, for remittances hither, the gold and silver they obtain by their commerce with foreigners; one would expect, that no objection against their parting with it could arise here, in the country that receives it.
The 2d reason is, "_That the_ merchants _trading to America have_ suffered _and lost by the paper-money_."--This may have been the case in particular instances, at particular times and places: as in South Carolina, about 58 years since; when the colony was thought in danger of being destroyed by the Indians and Spaniards; and the British merchants, in fear of losing their whole effects there, called precipitately for remittances; and the inhabitants, to get something lodged in safe countries, gave any price in paper-money for bills of exchange; whereby the paper, as compared with bills, or with produce, or other effects fit for exportation, was suddenly and greatly depreciated. The unsettled state of government for a long time in that province had also its share in depreciating its bills. But since that danger blew over, and the colony has been in the hands of the crown; their currency became fixed, and has so remained to this day.
Also in New England, when much greater quantities were issued than were necessary for a medium of trade, to defray the expedition against Louisbourg; and, during the last war in Virginia and North Carolina, when great sums were issued to pay the colony troops, and the war made tobacco a poorer remittance, from the higher price of freight and insurance: in these cases, the merchants trading to those colonies may sometimes have suffered by the sudden and unforeseen rise of exchange. By slow and gradual rises, they seldom suffer; the goods being sold at proportionable prices. But war is a common calamity in all countries, and the merchants that deal with them cannot expect to avoid a share of the losses it sometimes occasions, by affecting public credit. It is hoped, however, that the profits of their subsequent commerce with those colonies may have made them some reparation. And the merchants trading to the middle colonies (New York, New Jersey, and Pensylvania) have never suffered by any rise of exchange; it having ever been a constant rule there, to consider British debts as payable in Britain, and not to be discharged but by as much paper (whatever might be the rate of exchange) as would purchase a bill for the full sterling sum. On the contrary, the merchants have been great gainers by the use of paper-money in those colonies; as it enabled them to send much greater quantities of goods, and the purchasers to pay more punctually for them. And the people there make no complaint of any injury done them by paper-money, with a legal tender; they are sensible of its benefits; and petition to have it so allowed.
The 3d reason is, "_That the_ restriction _has had a_ beneficial effect _in New England_." Particular circumstances in the New England colonies made paper-money less necessary and less convenient to them. They have great and valuable fisheries of whale and cod, by which large remittances can be made. They are four distinct governments; but having much mutual intercourse of dealings, the money of each used to pass current in all: but the whole of this common currency not being under one common direction, was not so easily kept within due bounds; the prudent reserve of one colony in its emissions being rendered useless by excess in another. The Massachusets, therefore, were not dissatisfied with the restraint, as it restrained their neighbours as well as themselves; and perhaps _they_ do not desire to have the act repealed. They have not yet felt much inconvenience from it; as they were enabled to abolish their paper-currency, by a large sum in silver from Britain to reimburse their expences in taking Louisbourg, which, with the gold brought from Portugal, by means of their fish, kept them supplied with a currency; till the late war furnished them and all America with bills of exchange; so that little cash was needed for remittance. Their fisheries too furnish them with remittance through Spain and Portugal to England; which enables them the more easily to retain gold and silver in their country. The middle colonies have not this advantage; nor have they tobacco; which in Virginia and Maryland answers the same purpose. When colonies are so different in their circumstances, a regulation, that is not inconvenient to one or a few, may be very much so to the rest. But the pay is now become so indifferent in New England, at least in some of its provinces, through the want of currency, that the trade thither is at present under great discouragement.
The 4th reason is, "_That every_ medium of trade _should have an_ intrinsic value; _which paper-money has not_. _Gold and silver are therefore the fittest for this medium, as they are an equivalent; which paper never can be."_ However fit a particular thing may be for a particular purpose; wherever that thing is not to be had, or not to be had in sufficient quantity; it becomes necessary to use something else, the fittest that can be got, in lieu of it. Gold and silver are not the produce of North America, which has no mines; and that which is brought thither cannot be kept there in sufficient quantity for a currency. Britain, an independent great state, when its inhabitants grow too fond of the expensive luxuries of foreign countries, that draw away its money, can, and frequently does, make laws to discourage or prohibit such importations; and by that means can retain its cash. The _colonies_ are dependent governments; and their people having naturally great respect for the sovereign country, and being thence immoderately fond of its modes, manufactures, and superfluities, cannot be restrained from purchasing them by any province law; because such law, if made, would immediately be repealed here, as prejudicial to the trade and interest of Britain.
It seems hard therefore, to draw all, their real money from them, and then refuse them the poor privilege of using paper instead of it. Bank bills and bankers notes are daily used _here_ as a medium of trade, and in large dealings perhaps the greater part is transacted by their means; and yet _they_ have no intrinsic value, but rest on the credit of those that issue them; as paper-bills in the colonies do on the credit of the respective governments there. Their being payable in cash upon sight by the drawer is indeed a circumstance that cannot attend the colony bills; for the reasons just above-mentioned; their cash being drawn from them by the British trade; but the legal tender being substituted in its place is rather a greater advantage to the possessor; since he need not be at the trouble of going to a _particular bank_ or banker to demand the money, finding (wherever he has occasion to lay out money in the province) a person that is obliged to take the bills. So that even out of the province, the knowledge, that every man within that province is obliged to take its money, gives the bills a credit among its neighbours, nearly equal to what they have at home.
And were it not for the laws _here_, that restrain or prohibit as much as possible all losing trades, the cash of _this_ country would soon be exported: every merchant, who had occasion to remit it, would run to the bank with all its bills, that came into his hands, and take out his part of its treasure for that purpose; so that in a short time, it would be no more able to pay bills in money upon sight, than it is now in the power of a colony treasury so to do. And if government afterwards should have occasion for the credit of the bank, it must of necessity make its bills a legal tender; funding them however on taxes by which they may in time be paid off; as has been the general practice in the colonies.--At this very time, even the silver-money in England is obliged to the legal tender for part of its value; that part which is the difference between its real weight and its denomination. Great part of the shillings and sixpences now current are, by wearing, become five, ten, twenty, and some of the sixpences even fifty per cent. too light.
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