The Theological Tractates and The Consolation of Philosophy · Boethius
III.
Wherefore if Person belongs to substances alone, and these rational, and if every nature is a substance, existing not in universals but in individuals, we have found the definition of Person, viz.: "The individual substance of a rational nature."[60] Now by this definition we Latins have described what the Greeks call [Greek: hupostasis]. For the word person seems to be borrowed from a different source, namely from the masks which in comedies and tragedies used to signify the different subjects of representation. Now _persona_ "mask" is derived from _personare_, with a circumflex on the penultimate. But if the accent is put on the antepenultimate[61] the word will clearly be seen to come from _sonus_ "sound," and for this reason, that the hollow mask necessarily produces a larger sound. The Greeks, too, call these masks [Greek: prosopa] from the fact that they are placed over the face and conceal the countenance from the spectator: [Greek: para tou pros tous opas tithesthai]. But since, as we have said, it was by the masks they put on that actors played the different characters represented in a tragedy or comedy--Hecuba or Medea or Simon or Chremes,--so also all other men who could be recognized by their several characteristics were designated by the Latins with the term _persona_ and by the Greeks with [Greek: prosopa].
But the Greeks far more clearly gave to the individual subsistence of a rational nature the name [Greek: hupostasis] while we through want of appropriate words have kept a borrowed term, calling that _persona_ which they call [Greek: hupostasis]; but Greece with its richer vocabulary gives the name [Greek: hupostasis] to the individual subsistence. And, if I may use Greek in dealing with matters which were first mooted by Greeks before they came to be interpreted in Latin: [Greek: hai ousiai en men tois katholou einai dunantai. en de tois atomois kai kata meros monois huphistantai], that is: essences indeed can have potential existence in universals, but they have particular substantial existence in particulars alone. For it is from particulars that all our comprehension of universals is taken. Wherefore since subsistences are present in universals but acquire substance in particulars they rightly gave the name [Greek: hupostasis] to subsistences which acquired substance through the medium of particulars. For to no one using his eyes with any care or penetration will subsistence and substance appear identical.
For our equivalents of the Greek terms [Greek: ousiosis ousiosthai] are respectively _subsistentia_ and _subsistere_, while their [Greek: hupostasis huphistasthai] are represented by our _substantia_ and _substare_. For a thing has subsistence when it does not require accidents in order to be, but that thing has substance which supplies to other things, accidents to wit, a substrate enabling them to be; for it "substands" those things so long as it is subjected to accidents. Thus genera and species have only subsistence, for accidents do not attach to genera and species. But particulars have not only subsistence but substance, for they, no more than generals, depend on accidents for their Being; for they are already provided with their proper and specific differences and they enable accidents to be by supplying them with a substrate. Wherefore _esse_ and _subsistere_ represent [Greek: einai] and [Greek: ousiosthai], while _substare_ represents [Greek: huphistasthai]. For Greece is not, as Marcus Tullius[62] playfully says, short of words, but provides exact equivalents for _essentia, subsistentia, substantia_ and _persona_--[Greek: ousia] for _essentia_, [Greek: ousiosis] for _subsistentia_, [Greek: hupostasis] for _substantia_, [Greek: prosopon] for _persona_. But the Greeks called individual substances [Greek: hupostaseis] because they underlie the rest and offer support and substrate to what are called accidents; and we in our term call them substances as being substrate--[Greek: hupostaseis], and since they also term the same substances [Greek: prosopa], we too may call them persons. So [Greek: ousia] is identical with essence, [Greek: ousiosis] with subsistence, [Greek: hupostasis] with substance, [Greek: prosopon] with person. But the reason why the Greek does not use [Greek: hupostasis] of irrational animals while we apply the term substance to them is this: This term was applied to things of higher value, in order that what is more excellent might be distinguished, if not by a definition of nature answering to the literal meaning of [Greek: huphistasthai]=_substare_, at any rate by the words [Greek: hupostasis]=_substantia_.
To begin with, then, man is essence, i.e. [Greek: ousia], subsistence, i.e. [Greek: ousiosis, hupostasis], i.e. substance, [Greek: prosopon], i.e. person: [Greek: ousia] or _essentia_ because he is, [Greek: ousiosis], or subsistence because he is not accidental to any subject, [Greek: hupostusis] or substance because he is subject to all the things which are not subsistences or [Greek: ousioseis], while he is [Greek: prosopon] or person because he is a rational individual. Next, God is [Greek: ousia], or essence, for He is and is especially that from which proceeds the Being of all things. To Him belong [Greek: ousiosis], i.e. subsistence, for He subsists in absolute independence, and [Greek: huphistasthai], for He is substantial Being. Whence we go on to say that there is one [Greek: ousia] or [Greek: ousiosis], i.e. one essence or subsistence of the Godhead, but three [Greek: hupostaseis] or substances. And indeed, following this use, men have spoken of One essence, three substances and three persons of the Godhead. For did not the language of the Church forbid us to say three substances in speaking of God,[63] substance might seem a right term to apply to Him, not because He underlies all other things like a substrate, but because, just as He excels above all things, so He is the foundation and support of things, supplying them all with [Greek: ousiosthai] or subsistence. [60] Boethius's definition of _persona_ was adopted by St. Thomas (S. i. 29. 1), was regarded as classical by the Schoolmen, and has the approval of modern theologians. Cf. Dorner, _Doctrine of Christ_, iii. p. 311. [61] Implying a short penultimate. [62] _Tusc._ ii. 15. 35. [63] For a similar submission of his own opinion to the usage of the Church cf. the end of _Tr._ i. and of _Tr._ ii.
Ideas discussed in this chapter
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