The Will to Power · Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche
_A._
I see with astonishment that science resigns itself to-day to the fate of being reduced to the world of appearance: we certainly have no organ of knowledge for the real world--be it what it may. At this point we may well ask: With what organ of knowledge is this contradiction established?... The fact that a world which is accessible to our organs is also understood to be dependent upon these organs, and the fact that we should understand a world as subjectively conditioned, are _no_ proofs of the actual _possibility_ of an objective world. Who urges us to believe that subjectivity _is_ real or essential? The absolute is even an absurd concept: an "absolute mode of existence" is nonsense, the concept "being," "thing," is always _relative_ to us. The trouble is that, owing to the old antithesis "apparent" and "real," the correlative valuations "of little value" and "absolutely valuable" have been spread abroad. The world of appearance does not strike us as a "valuable" world; appearance is on a lower plane than the highest value. Only a "real" world can be absolutely "valuable".... _Prejudice of prejudices!_ It is perfectly possible in itself that the real nature of things would be so unfriendly, so opposed to the first conditions of life, that appearance is necessary in order to make life possible.... This is certainly the case in a large number of situations--for instance, marriage.
Our empirical world would thus be conditioned, even in its limits to knowledge, by the instinct of self-preservation, we regard that as good, valuable, and true, which favours the preservation of the species.... _(a)_ We have no categories which allow us to distinguish between a real and an apparent world. (At the most, there could exist a world of appearance, but not _our_ world of appearance.) _(b)_ Taking the _real_ world for granted, it might still be the _less valuable_ to us; for the quantum of illusion might be of the highest order, owing to its value to us as a preservative measure. (Unless _appearance_ in itself were sufficient to condemn anything?) _(c)_ That there exists a correlation between the _degrees of value_ and the _degrees of reality_ (so that the highest values also possessed the greatest degree of reality), is a metaphysical postulate which starts out with the hypothesis that we _know_ the order of rank among values; and that this order is a _moral_ one. It is only on this hypothesis that _truth_ is necessary as a definition of all that is of a superior value. It is of cardinal importance that the _real world_ should be suppressed. It is the most formidable inspirer of doubts, and depredator of values, concerning the _world which we are_: it was our most dangerous_ attempt_ heretofore on the life of Life.
_War_ against all the hypotheses upon which a real world has been imagined. The notion that _moral values_ are the _highest_ values, belongs to this hypothesis. The superiority of the moral valuation would be refuted, if it could be shown to be the result of an _immoral_ valuation--a specific case of real immorality: it would thus reduce itself to an _appearance,_ and as an _appearance_ it would cease from having any right to condemn appearance. Then the "Will to Truth" would have to be examined psychologically: it is not a moral power, but a form of the Will to Power. This would have to be proved by the fact that it avails itself of every _immoral_ means there is; above all, of the metaphysicians. At the present moment we are face to face with the necessity of testing the assumption that moral values are the highest values, _Method in research_ is attained only when all _moral prejudices_ have been overcome: it represents a conquest over morality....
Text from Project Gutenberg, public domain in the United States.