Philosophical Studies · G. E. Moore
THE REFUTATION OF IDEALISM
Modern Idealism, if it asserts any general conclusion about the universe at all, asserts that it is _spiritual._ There are two points about this assertion to which I wish to call attention. These points are that, whatever be its exact meaning, it is certainly meant to assert (1) that the universe is very different indeed from what it seems, and (2) that it has quite a large number of properties which it does not seem to have. Chairs and tables and mountains _seem_ to be very different from us; but, when the whole universe is declared to be spiritual, it is certainly meant to assert that they are far more like us than we think. The idealist means to assert that they are _in some sense_ neither lifeless nor unconscious, as they certainly seem to be; and I do not think his language is so grossly deceptive, but that we may assume him to believe that they really are very different indeed from what they seem. And secondly when he declares that they are _spiritual,_ he means to include in that term quite a large number of different properties.
When the whole universe is declared to be spiritual, it is meant not only that it is in some sense _conscious,_ but that it has what we recognise in ourselves as the _higher_ forms of consciousness. That it is intelligent; that it is purposeful; that it is not mechanical; all these different things are commonly asserted of it. In general, it may be said, this phrase 'reality is spiritual' excites and expresses the belief that the _whole_ universe possesses _all the qualities_ the possession of which is held to make us so superior to things which seem to be inanimate: at least, if it does not possess exactly those which we possess, it possesses not one only, but several others, which, by the same ethical standard, would be judged equal to or better than our own. When we say it is _spiritual_ we mean to say that it has quite a number of excellent qualities, different from any which we commonly attribute either to stars or planets or to cups and saucers.
Now why I mention these two points is that when engaged in the intricacies of philosophic discussion, we are apt to overlook the vastness of the difference between this idealistic view and the ordinary view of the world, and to overlook the number of _different_ propositions which the idealist must prove. It is, I think, owing to the vastness of this difference and owing to the number of different excellences which Idealists attribute to the universe, that it seems such an interesting and important question whether Idealism be true or not. But, when we begin to argue about it, I think we are apt to forget what a vast number of arguments this interesting question must involve: we are apt to assume, that if one or two points be made on either side, the whole case is won. I say this lest it should be thought that any of the arguments which will be advanced in this paper would be sufficient to disprove, or any refutation of them sufficient to prove, the truly interesting and important proposition that reality is spiritual.
For my own part I wish it to be clearly understood that I do not suppose that anything I shall say has the smallest tendency to prove that reality is not spiritual: I do not believe it possible to refute a single one of the many important propositions contained in the assertion that it is so. Reality may be spiritual, for all I know; and I devoutly hope it is. But I take 'Idealism' to be a wide term and to include not only this interesting conclusion but a number of arguments which are supposed to be, if not sufficient, at least _necessary,_ to prove it. Indeed I take it that modern Idealists are chiefly distinguished by certain arguments which they have in common. That reality is spiritual has, I believe, been the tenet of many theologians; and yet, for believing that alone, they should hardly be called Idealists. There are besides, I believe, many persons, not improperly called Idealists, who hold certain characteristic propositions, without venturing to think them quite sufficient to prove so grand a conclusion. It is, therefore, only with Idealistic _arguments_ that I am concerned; and if any Idealist holds that _no_ argument is necessary to prove that reality is spiritual, I shall certainly not have refuted him. I shall, however, attack at least one argument, which, to the best of my belief, is considered necessary to their position by _all_ Idealists. And I wish to point out a certain advantage which this procedure gives me--an advantage which justifies the assertion that, if my arguments are sound, they will have refuted Idealism. If I can refute a single proposition which is a necessary and essential step in all Idealistic arguments, then, no matter how good the rest of these arguments may be, I shall have proved that Idealists have _no reason whatever_ for their conclusion.
Suppose we have a chain of argument which takes the form: Since A is B, and B is C, and C is D, it follows A is D. In such an argument, though 'B is C' and 'C is D' may both be perfectly true, yet if 'A is B' be false, we have no more reason for asserting A is D than if all three were false. It does not, indeed, follow that A is D is false; nor does it follow that no other arguments would prove it to be true. But it does follow that, so far as this argument goes, it is the barest supposition, without the least bit of evidence. I propose to attack a proposition which seems to me to stand in this relation to the conclusion 'Reality is spiritual.' I do not propose to dispute that 'Reality is spiritual;' I do not deny that there may be reasons for thinking that it is: but I do propose to show that one reason upon which, to the best of my judgment, all other arguments ever used by Idealists depend is _false._ These other arguments may, for all I shall say, be eminently ingenious and true; they are very many and various, and different Idealists use the most different arguments to prove the same most important conclusions. Some of these _may_ be sufficient to prove that B is C and C is D; but if, as I shall try to show, their 'A is B' is false the conclusion A is D remains a pleasant supposition. I do not deny that to suggest pleasant and plausible suppositions may be the proper function of philosophy: but I am assuming that the name Idealism can only be properly applied where there is a certain amount of argument, intended to be cogent.
The subject of this paper is, therefore, quite uninteresting. Even if I prove my point, I shall have proved nothing about the Universe in general. Upon the important question whether Reality is or is not spiritual my argument will not have the remotest bearing. I shall only attempt to arrive at the truth about a matter, which is in itself quite trivial and insignificant, and from which, so far as I can see and certainly so far as I shall say, no conclusions can be drawn about any of the subjects about which we most want to know. The only importance I can claim for the subject I shall investigate is that it seems to me to be a matter upon which not Idealists only, but all philosophers and psychologists also, have been in error, and from their erroneous view of which they have inferred (validly or invalidly) their most striking and interesting conclusions. And that it has even this importance I cannot hope to prove. If it has this importance, it will indeed follow that all the most striking results of philosophy--Sensationalism. Agnosticism and Idealism alike--have, for all that has hitherto been urged in their favour, no more foundation than the supposition that a chimera lives in the moon. It will follow that, unless new reasons never urged hitherto can be found, all the most important philosophic doctrines have as little claim to assent as the most superstitious beliefs of the lowest savages. Upon the question what we have _reason_ to believe in the most interesting matters, I do therefore think that my results will have an important bearing; but I cannot too clearly insist that upon the question whether these beliefs are true they will have none whatever.
The trivial proposition which I propose to dispute is this: that _esse_ is _percipi._ This is a very ambiguous proposition, but, in some sense or other, it has been very widely held. That it is, in some sense, essential to Idealism, I must for the present merely assume. What I propose to show is that, in all the senses ever given to it, it is false. But, first of all, it may be useful to point out briefly in what relation I conceive it to stand to Idealistic arguments. That wherever you can truly predicate _esse_ you can truly predicate _percipi_, in some sense or other, is, I take it, a necessary step In all arguments, properly to be called Idealistic, and, what is more, in all arguments hitherto offered for the Idealistic conclusion. If _esse_ is _percipi,_ this is at once equivalent to saying that whatever is, is experienced; and this, again, is equivalent, in a sense, to saying that whatever is, is something mental. But this is not the sense in which the Idealist _conclusion_ must maintain that Reality is _mental._ The Idealist _conclusion_ is that _esse_ is _percipere_; and hence, whether _esse_ be _percipi_ or not, a further and different discussion is needed to show whether or not it is also _percipere._ And again, even if _esse_ be _percipere_, we need a vast quantity of further argument to show that what has _esse_ has also those higher mental qualities which are denoted by spiritual. This is why I said that the question I should discuss, namely, whether or not _esse is percipi_, must be utterly insufficient either to prove or to disprove that reality is spiritual.
But, on the other hand, I believe that every argument ever used to show that reality is spiritual has inferred this (validly or invalidly) from '_esse_ is _percipere'_ as one of its premisses; and that this again has never been pretended to be proved except by use of the premiss that _esse_ is _percipi._ The type of argument used for the latter purpose is familiar enough. It is said that since whatever is, is experienced, and since some things are which are not experienced by the individual, these must at least form part of some experience. Or again that, since an object necessarily implies a subject, and since the whole world must be an object, we must conceive it to belong to some subject or subjects, in the same sense in which whatever is the object of our experience belongs to us. Or again, that, since thought enters into the essence of all reality, we must conceive behind it, in it, or as its essence, a spirit akin to ours, who think: that 'spirit greets spirit' in its object. Into the validity of these inferences I do not propose to enter: they obviously require a great deal of discussion. I only desire to point out that, however correct they may be, yet if _esse_ is not _percipi,_ they leave us as far from a proof that reality is spiritual, as if they were all false too.
But now: Is _esse percipi?_ There are three very ambiguous terms in this proposition, and I must begin by distinguishing the different things that may be meant by some of them. And first with regard to _percipi._ This term need not trouble us long at present. It was, perhaps, originally used to mean 'sensation' only; but I am not going to be so unfair to modern Idealists--the only Idealists to whom the term should now be applied without qualification--as to hold that, if they say _esse_ is _percipi_, they mean by _percipi_ sensation only. On the contrary I quite agree with them that, if _esse_ be _percipi_ at all, _percipi_ must be understood to include not sensation only, but that other type of mental fact, which is called 'thought '; and, whether _esse_ be _percipi_ or not, I consider it to be the main service of the philosophic school, to which modern Idealists belong, that they have insisted on distinguishing 'sensation' and 'thought' and on emphasising the importance of the latter. Against Sensationalism and Empiricism they have maintained the true view. But the distinction between sensation and thought need not detain us here. For, in whatever respects they differ, they have at least this in common, that they are both forms of consciousness or, to use a term that seems to be more in fashion just now, they are both ways of experiencing. Accordingly, whatever _esse_ is _percipi_ may mean, it does _at least_ assert that whatever is, is _experienced._ And since what I wish to maintain is, that even this is untrue, the question whether it be experienced by way of sensation or thought or both is for my purpose quite irrelevant. If it be not experienced at all, it cannot be either an object of thought or an object of sense. It is only if being involves 'experience' that the question, whether it involves sensation or thought or both, becomes important. I beg, therefore, that _percipi_ may be understood, in what follows, to refer merely to what is _common_ to sensation and thought. A very recent article states the meaning of _esse_ is _percipi_ with all desirable clearness in so far as _percipi_ is concerned.
'I will undertake to show,' says Mr. Taylor,[1] 'that what makes [any piece of fact] real can be nothing but its presence as an inseparable aspect of _a sentient experience_.' I am glad to think that Mr. Taylor has been in time to supply me with so definite a statement that this is the ultimate premiss of Idealism. My paper will at least refute Mr. Taylor's Idealism, if it refutes anything at all: for I _shall_ undertake to show that what makes a thing real cannot possibly be its presence as an inseparable aspect of a senient experience. But Mr. Taylor's statement though clear, I think, with regard to the meaning of _percipi_ is highly ambiguous in other respects. I will leave it for the present to consider the next ambiguity in the statement: _Esse_ is _percipi._ What does the copula mean? What can be meant by saying that Esse _is_ percipi? There are just three meanings, one or other of which such a statement _must_ have, if it is to be true; and of these there is only one which it can have, if it is to be important. (1) The statement may be meant to assert that the word 'esse' is used to signify nothing either more or less than the word 'percipi': that the two words are precise synonyms: that they are merely different names for one and the same thing: that what is meant by _esse_ is absolutely identical with what is meant by _percipi._ I think I need not prove that the principle _esse_ is _percipi_ is _not_ thus intended merely to define a word; nor yet that, if it were, it would be an extremely bad definition. But if it does _not_ mean this, only two alternatives remain.
The second is (2) that what is meant by _esse,_ though not absolutely identical with what is meant by _percipi_, yet _includes_ the latter as a _part_ of its meaning. If this were the meaning of 'esse is percipi,' then to say that a thing was real would not be the same thing as to say that it was experienced. That it was _real_ would mean that it was experienced and _something else besides_: 'being experienced' would be _analytically essential_ to reality, but would not be the whole meaning of the term. From the fact that a thing was real we should be able to infer, by the law of contradiction, that it was experienced; since the latter would be _part_ of what is meant by the former. But, on the other hand, from the fact a thing was experienced we should _not_ be able to infer that it was real; since it would not follow from the fact that it had one of the attributes essential to reality, that it _also_ had the other or others. Now, if we understand _esse_ is _percipi_ in this second sense, we must distinguish _three_ different things which it asserts.
First of all, it gives a definition of the word 'reality,' asserting that word stands for a complex whole, of which what is meant by 'percipi' forms a part. And secondly it asserts that 'being experienced' forms a part of a certain whole. Both these propositions may be true, and at all events I do not wish to dispute them. I do not, indeed, think that the word 'reality' is commonly used to include 'percipi': but I do not wish to argue about the meaning of words. And that many things which are experienced are also something else--that to be experienced forms part of certain wholes, is, of course, indisputable. But what I wish to point out is, that neither of these propositions is of any importance, unless we add to them a _third._ That 'real' is a convenient name for a union of attributes which _sometimes_ occurs, it could not be worth any one's while to assert: no inferences of any importance could be drawn from such an assertion. Our principle could only mean that when a thing happens to have _percipi_ as well as the other qualities included under _esse,_ it has _percipi_: and we should never be able to _infer_ that it was experienced, except from a proposition which already asserted that it was both experienced and something else. Accordingly, if the assertion that _percipi_ forms part of the whole meant by reality is to have any importance, it must mean that the whole is organic, at least in this sense, that the other constituent or constituents of it _cannot_ occur without percipi, even if percipi can occur without them.
Let us call these other constituents _x._ The proposition that _esse_ includes _percipi,_ and that therefore from _esse percipi_ can be inferred, can only be important if it is meant to assert that _percipi_ can be inferred from _x._ The only importance of the question whether the whole _esse_ includes the part _percipi_ rests therefore on the question whether the part _x_ is necessarily connected with the part _percipi._ And this is (3) the third possible meaning of the assertion _esse is percipi:_ and, as we now see, the only important one. _Esse_ is _percipi_ asserts that wherever you have _x_ you also have _percipi_ that whatever has the property _x_ also has the property that it is _experienced._ And this being so, it will be convenient if, for the future, I may be allowed to use the term '_esse_' to denote _x alone._ I do not wish thereby to beg the question whether what we commonly mean by the word 'real' does or does not include _percipi_ as well as _x._ I am quite content that my definition of 'esse' to denote _x_, should be regarded merely as an arbitrary verbal definition.
Whether it is so or not, the only question of interest is whether from _x percipi_ can be inferred, and I should prefer to be able to express this in the form: can _percipi_ be inferred from _esse?_ Only let it be understood that when I say _esse,_ that term will not for the future _include percipi_: it denotes only that _x,_ which Idealists, perhaps rightly, include _along with percipi_ under _their_ term _esse._ That there is such an _x_ they must admit on pain of making the proposition an _absolute_ tautology; and that from this _x percipi_ can be inferred they must admit, on pain of making it a perfectly barren analytic proposition. Whether _x_ done should or should not be called _esse_ is not worth a dispute: what is worth dispute is whether _percipi_ is necessarily connected with _x._
We have therefore discovered the ambiguity of the copula in _esse_ is _percipi,_ so far as to see that this principle asserts two distinct terms to be so related, that whatever has the _one,_ which I call _esse,_ has _also_ the property that it is experienced. It asserts a necessary connexion between _esse_ on the one hand and _percipi_ on the other; these two words denoting each a distinct term, and _esse_ denoting a term in which that denoted by _percipi_ is not included. We have, then in _esse_ is _percipi,_ a _necessary synthetic_ proposition which I have undertaken to refute. And I may say at once that, understood as such, it cannot be refuted. If the Idealist chooses to assert that it is merely a self-evident truth, I have only to say that it does not appear to me to be so. But I believe that no Idealist ever has maintained it to be so. Although this--that two distinct terms are necessarily related--is the only sense which 'esse is percipi' can have if it is to be true and important, it _can_ have another sense, if it is to be an important falsehood. I believe that Idealists all hold this important falsehood. They do not perceive that _Esse_ is _percipi_ must, if true, be _merely_ a self-evident synthetic truth: they either identify with it or give as a reason for it another proposition which must be false because it is self-contradictory. Unless they did so, they would have to admit that it was a perfectly unfounded assumption; and if they recognised that it was _unfounded,_ I do not think they would maintain its truth to be evident. _Esse_ is _percipi,_ in the sense I have found for it, _may_ indeed be true; I cannot, refute it: but if this sense were clearly apprehended, no one, I think, would _believe_ that it was true.
Idealists, we have seen, must assert that whatever is experienced, is _necessarily_ so. And this doctrine they commonly express by saying that 'the object of experience is inconceivable apart from the subject.' I have hitherto been concerned with pointing out what meaning this assertion must have, if it is to be an important truth. I now propose to show that it may have an important meaning, which must be false, because it is self-contradictory. It is a well-known fact in the history of philosophy that _necessary_ truths in general, but especially those of which it is said that the opposite is inconceivable, have been commonly supposed to be _analytic,_ in the sense that the proposition denying them was self-contradictory. It was in this way, commonly supposed, before Kant, that many truths could be proved by the law of contradiction alone. This is, therefore, a mistake which it is plainly easy for the best philosophers to make. Even since Kant many have continued to assert it; but I am aware that among those Idealists, who most properly deserve the name, it has become more fashionable to assert that truths are _both_ analytic and synthetic. Now with many of their reasons for asserting this I am not concerned: it is possible that in some connexions the assertion may bear a useful and true sense. But if we understand 'analytic' in the sense just defined, namely, what is proved by the law of contradiction _alone_, it is plain that, if 'synthetic' means what is _not_ proved by this alone, no truth can be both analytic and synthetic. Now it seems to me that those who do maintain truths to be both, do nevertheless maintain that they are so in this as well as in other senses.
Ideas discussed in this chapter
Text from Project Gutenberg, public domain in the United States.