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The Querist · George Berkeley

Part III

Query 1. Whether the fable of Hercules and the carter ever suited any nation like this nation of Ireland? 2. Qu. Whether it be not a new spectacle under the sun, to behold, in such a climate and such a soil, and under such a gentle government, so many roads untrodden, fields untilled, houses desolate, and hands unemployed? 3. Qu. Whether there is any country in Christendom, either kingdom or republic, depending or independent, free or enslaved, which may not afford us a useful lesson? 4. Qu. Whether the frugal Swisses have any other commodities but their butter and cheese and a few cattle, for exportation; whether, nevertheless, the single canton of Berne hath not in her public treasury two millions sterling? 5. Qu. Whether that small town of Berne, with its scanty barren territory, in a mountainous corner, without sea-ports, without manufactures, without mines, be not rich by mere dint of frugality? 6. Qu. Whether the Swisses in general have not sumptuary laws, prohibiting the use of gold, jewels, silver, silk, and lace in their apparel, and indulging the women only to wear silk on festivals, weddings, and public solemnities? 7. Qu. Whether there be not two ways of growing rich, sparing and getting? But whether the lazy spendthrift must not be doubly poor? 8. Qu. Whether money circulating be not the life of industry; and whether the want thereof doth not render a State gouty and inactive?

9. Qu. But whether, if we had a national bank, and our present cash (small as it is) were put into the most convenient shape, men should hear any public complaints for want of money? 10. Qu. Whether all circulation be not alike a circulation of credit, whatsoever medium (metal or paper) is employed, and whether gold be any more than credit for so much power? 11. Qu. Whether the wealth of the richest nations in Christendom doth not consist in paper vastly more than in gold and silver? 12. Qu. Whether Lord Clarendon doth not aver of his own knowledge, that the Prince of Orange, with the best credit, and the assistance of the richest men in Amsterdam, was above ten days endeavouring to raise L20,000 in specie, without being able to raise half the sum in all that time? (See Clarendon's History, BK. XII) 13. Qu. Whether the whole city of Amsterdam would not have been troubled to have brought together twenty thousand pounds in one room? 14. Qu. Whether it be not absolutely necessary that there must be a bank and must be a trust? And, if so, whether it be not the most safe and prudent course to have a national bank and trust the legislature? 15. Qu. Whether objections against trust in general avail, when it is allowed there must be a trust, and the only question is where to place this trust, whether in the legislature or in private hands?

16. Qu. Whether it can be expected that private persons should have more regard to the public than the public itself? 17. Qu. Whether, if there be hazards from mismanagement, those may not be provided against in the framing of a pubic bank; but whether any provision can be made against the mismanagement of private banks that are under no check, control, or inspection? 18. Qu. Whatever may be said for the sake of objecting, yet, whether it be not false in fact, that men would prefer a private security to a public security? 19. Qu. Whether a national bank ought to be considered as a new experiment; and whether it be not a motive to try this scheme that it hath been already tried with success in other countries? 20. Qu. If power followeth money, whether this can be anywhere more properly and securely placed, than in the same hands wherein the supreme power is already placed? 21. Qu. Whether there be more danger of abuse in a private than in a public management? 22. Qu. Whether the proper usual remedy for abuses of private banks be not to bring them before Parliament, and subject them to the inspection of a committee; and whether it be not more prudent to prevent than to redress an evil? 23. Qu. Supposing there had been hitherto no such thing as a bank, and the question were now first proposed, whether it would be safer to circulate unlimited bills in a private credit, or bills to a limited value on the public credit of the community, what would men think?

24. Qu. Whether experience and example be not the plainest proof; and whether any instance can be assigned where a national bank hath not been attended with great advantage to the public? 25. Qu. Whether the evils apprehended from a national bank are not much more to be apprehended from private banks; but whether men by custom are not familiarized and reconciled to common dangers, which are therefore thought less than they really are? 26. Qu. Whether it would not be very hard to suppose all sense, honesty, and public spirit were in the keeping of only a few private men, and the public was not fit to be trusted? 27. Qu. Whether it be not ridiculous to suppose a legislature should be afraid to trust itself? 28. Qu. But, whether a private interest be not generally supported and pursued with more zeal than a public? 29. Qu. Whether the maxim, 'What is everybody's business is nobody's,' prevails in any country under the sun more than in Ireland? 30. Qu. Whether, nevertheless, the community of danger, which lulls private men asleep, ought not to awaken the public? 31. Qu. Whether there be not less security where there are more temptations and fewer checks? 32. Qu. If a man is to risk his fortune, whether it be more prudent to risk it on the credit of private men, or in that of the great assembly of the nation?

33. Qu. Where is it most reasonable to expect wise and punctual dealing, whether in a secret impenetrable recess, where credit depends on secrecy, or in a public management regulated and inspected by Parliament? 34. Qu. Whether a supine security be not catching, and whether numbers running the same risk, as they lessen the caution, may not increase the danger? 35. Qu. What real objection lies against a national bank erected by the legislature, and in the management of public deputies, appointed and inspected by the legislature? 36. Qu. What have we to fear from such a bank, which may not be as well feared without it? 37. Qu. How, why, by what means, or for what end, should it become an instrument of oppression? 38. Qu. Whether we can possibly be on a more precarious foot than we are already? Whether it be not in the power of any particular person at once to disappear and convey himself into foreign parts? or whether there can be any security in an estate of land when the demands upon it are unknown? 39. Qu. Whether the establishing of a national bank, if we suppose a concurrence of the government, be not very practicable? 40. Qu. But, whether though a scheme be never so evidently practicable and useful to the pubic, yet, if conceived to interfere with a private interest, it be not forthwith in danger of appearing doubtful, difficult, and impracticable?

41. Qu. Whether the legislative body hath not already sufficient power to hurt, if they may be supposed capable of it, and whether a bank would give them any new power? 42. Qu. What should tempt the pubic to defraud itself? 43. Qu. Whether, if the legislature destroyed the public, it would not be felo de se; and whether it be reasonable to suppose it bent on its own destruction? 44. Qu. Whether the objection to a pubic national bank, from want of secrecy, be not in truth an argument for it? 45. Qu. Whether the secrecy of private banks be not the very thing that renders them so hazardous? and whether, without that, there could have been of late so many sufferers? 46. Qu. Whether when all objections are answered it be still incumbent to answer surmises? 47. Qu. Whether it were just to insinuate that gentlemen would be against any proposal they could not turn into a job? 48. Qu. Suppose the legislature passed their word for any private banker, and regularly visited his books, would not money lodged in his bank be therefore reckoned more secure? 49. Qu. In a country where the legislative body is not fit to be trusted, what security can there be for trusting any one else? 50. Qu. If it be not ridiculous to question whether the pubic can find cash to circulate bills of a limited value when private bankers are supposed to find enough to circulate them to an unlimited value?

51. Qu. Whether the united stock of a nation be not the best security? And whether anything but the ruin of the State can produce a national bankruptcy? 52. Qu. Whether the total sum of the public treasure, power, and wisdom, all co-operating, be not most likely to establish a bank of credit, sufficient to answer the ends, relieve the wants, and satisfy the scruples of all people? 53. Qu. Whether those hazards that in a greater degree attend private banks can be admitted as objections against a public one? 54. Qu. Whether that which is an objection to everything be an objection to anything; and whether the possibility of an abuse be not of that kind? 55. Qu. Whether, in fact, all things are not more or less abused, and yet notwithstanding such abuse, whether many things are not upon the whole expedient and useful? 56. Qu. Whether those things that are subject to the most general inspection are not the least subject to abuse? 57. Qu. Whether, for private ends, it may not be sometimes expedient to object novelty to things that have been often tried, difficulty to the plainest things, and hazard to the safest? 58. Qu. Whether some men will not be apt to argue as if the question was between money and credit, and not (as in fact it is) which ought to be preferred, private credit or public credit?

59. Qu. Whether they will not prudently overlook the evils felt, or to be feared, on one side? 60. Qu. Whether, therefore, those that would make an impartial judgment ought not to be on their guard, keeping both prospects always in view, balancing the inconveniencies on each side and considering neither absolutely? 61. Qu. Whether wilful mistakes, examples without a likeness, and general addresses to the passions are not often more successful than arguments? 62. Qu. Whether there be not an art to puzzle plain cases as well as to explain obscure ones? 63. Qu. Whether private men are not often an over-match for the public; want of weight being made up for by activity? 64. Qu. If we suppose neither sense nor honesty in our leaders or representatives, whether we are not already undone, and so have nothing further to fear? 65. Qu. Suppose a power in the government to hurt the pubic by means of a national bank, yet what should give them the will to do this? Or supposing a will to do mischief, yet how could a national bank, modelled and administered by Parliament, put it in their power? 66. Qu. Whether even a wicked will entrusted with power can be supposed to abuse it for no end? 67. Qu. Whether it be not much more probable that those who maketh such objections do not believe them?

68. Qu. Whether it be not vain to object that our fellow-subjects of Great Britain would malign or obstruct our industry when it is exerted in a way which cannot interfere with their own? 66. Qu. Whether it is to be supposed they should take delight in the dirt and nakedness and famine of our people, or envy them shoes for their feet and beef for their belies? 70. Qu. What possible handle or inclination could our having a national bank give other people to distress us? 71. Qu. Whether it be not ridiculous to conceive that a project for cloathing and feeding our natives should give any umbrage to England? 72. Qu. Whether such unworthy surmises are not the pure effect of spleen? 73. Qu. Whether London is not to be considered as the metropolis of Ireland? And whether our wealth (such as it is) doth not circulate through London and throughout all England, as freely as that of any part of his Majesty's dominions? 74. Qu. Whether therefore it be not evidently the interest of the people of England to encourage rather than to oppose a national bank in this kingdom, as well as every other means for advancing our wealth which shall not impair their own? 75. Qu. Whether it is not our interest to be useful to them rather than rival them; and whether in that case we may not be sure of their good offices?

76. Qu. Whether we can propose to thrive so long as we entertain a wrongheaded distrust of England? 77. Qu. Whether, as a national bank would increase our industry, and that our wealth, England may not be a proportionable gainer; and whether we should not consider the gains of our mother-country as some accession to our own? 78. Qu. Whether the Protestant colony in this kingdom can ever forget what they owe to England? 79. Qu. Whether there ever was in any part of the world a country in such wretched circumstances, and which, at the same time, could be so easily remedied, and nevertheless the remedy not applied? 80. Qu. What must become of a people that can neither see the plainest things nor do the easiest? 81. Qu. Be the money lodged in the bank what it will, yet whether an Act to make good deficiencies would not remove all scruples? 82. Qu. If it be objected that a national bank must lower interest, and therefore hurt the monied man, whether the same objection would not hold as strong against multiplying our gold and silver? 83. Qu. But whether a bank that utters bills, with the sole view of promoting the public weal, may not so proportion their quantity as to avoid several inconveniencies which might attend private banks?

84. Qu. Whether there be any difficulty in comprehending that the whole wealth of the nation is in truth the stock of a national bank? And whether any more than the right comprehension of this be necessary to make all men easy with regard to its credit? 85. Qu. Whether any Thing be more reasonable than that the pubic, which makes the whole profit of the bank, should engage to make good its credit? 86. Qu. Whether the prejudices about gold and silver are not strong, but whether they are not still prejudices? 87. Qu. Whether paper doth not by its stamp and signature acquire a local value, and become as precious and as scarce as gold? And whether it be not much fitter to circulate large sums, and therefore preferable to gold? 88. Qu. Whether, in order to make men see and feel, it be not often necessary to inculcate the same thing, and place it in different lights? 89. Qu. Whether it doth not much import to have a right conception of money? And whether its true and just idea be not that of a ticket, entitling to power, and fitted to record and transfer such power? 90. Qu. Whether the managers and officers of a national bank ought to be considered otherwise than as the cashiers and clerks of private banks? Whether they are not in effect as little trusted, have as little power, are as much limited by rules, and as liable to inspection?

91. Qu. Whether the mistaking this point may not create some prejudice against a national bank, as if it depended on the credit, or wisdom, or honesty, of private men, rather than on the pubic, which is really the sole proprietor and director thereof, and as such obliged to support it? 92. Qu. Though the bank of Amsterdam doth very rarely, if at all, pay out money, yet whether every man possess'd of specie be not ready to convert it into paper, and act as cashier to the bank? And whether, from the same motive, every monied man throughout this kingdom would not be cashier to our national bank? 93. Qu. Whether a national bank would not be the great means and motive for employing our poor in manufactures? 94. Qu. Whether money, though lent out only to the rich, would not soon circulate among the poor? And whether any man borrows but with an intent to circulate? 95. Qu. Whether both government and people would not in the event be gainers by a national bank? And whether anything but wrong conceptions of its nature can make those that wish well to either averse from it? 96. Qu. Whether it may not be right to think, and to have it thought, that England and Ireland, prince and people, have one and the same interest?

97. Qu. Whether, if we had more means to set on foot such manufactures and such commerce as consists with the interest of England, there would not of course be less sheep-walk, and less wool exported to foreign countries? And whether a national bank would not supply such means? 98. Qu. Whether we may not obtain that as friends which it is in vain to hope for as rivals? 99. Qu. Whether in every instance by which we prejudice England, we do not in a greater degree prejudice ourselves? See Part II. qu. 153 and 154. 100. Qu. Whether in the rude original of society the first step was not the exchanging of commodities; the next a substituting of metals by weight as the common medium of circulation; after this the making use of coin; lastly, a further refinement by the use of paper with proper marks and signatures? And whether this, as it is the last, so it be not the greatest improvement? 101. Qu. Whether we are not in fact the only people who may be said to starve in the midst of plenty? 102. Qu. Whether business in general doth not languish among us? Whether our land is not untilled? Whether its inhabitants are not upon the wing? 103. Qu. Whether there can be a worse sign than that people should quit their country for a livelihood? Though men often leave their country for health, or pleasure, or riches, yet to leave it merely for a livelihood, whether this be not exceeding bad, and sheweth some peculiar mismanagement?

104. Qu. Whether our circumstances do not call aloud for some present remedy? And whether that remedy be not in our power? 105. Qu. Whether, in order to redress our evils, artificial helps are not most wanted in a land where industry is most against the natural grain of the people? 106. Qu. Whether, of all the helps to industry that ever were invented, there be any more secure, more easy, and more effectual than a national bank? 107. Qu. Whether medicines do not recommend themselves by experience, even though their reasons be obscure? But whether reason and fact are not equally clear in favour of this political medicine? 108. Qu. Whether, although the prepossessions about gold and silver have taken deep root, yet the example of our Colonies in America doth not make it as plain as day-light that they are not so necessary to the wealth of a nation as the vulgar of all ranks imagine? 109. Qu. Whether it be not evident that we may maintain a much greater inward and outward commerce, and be five times richer than we are, nay, and our bills abroad be of far greater credit, though we had not one ounce of gold or silver in the whole island? 110. Qu. Whether wrongheaded maxims, customs, and fashions are not sufficient to destroy any people which hath so few resources as the inhabitants of Ireland.

111. Qu. Whether it would not be a horrible thing to see our matrons make dress and play their chief concern? 112. Qu. Whether our ladies might not as well endow monasteries as wear Flanders lace? And whether it be not true that Popish nuns are maintained by Protestant contributions? 113. Qu. Whether England, which hath a free trade, whatever she remits for foreign luxury with one hand, doth not with the other receive much more from abroad? Whether, nevertheless, this nation would not be a gainer, if our women would content themselves with the same moderation in point of expense as the English ladies? 114. Qu. But whether it be not a notorious truth that our Irish ladies are on a foot, as to dress, with those of five times their fortune in England? 115. Qu. Whether it be not even certain that the matrons of this forlorn country send out a greater proportion of its wealth, for fine apparel, than any other females on the whole surface of this terraqueous globe? 116. Qu. Whether the expense, great as it is, be the greatest evil; but whether this folly may not produce many other follies, an entire derangement of domestic life, absurd manners, neglect of duties, bad mothers, a general corruption in both sexes? 117. Qu. Whether therefore a tax on all gold and silver in apparel, on all foreign laces and silks, may not raise a fund for the bank, and at the same time have other salutary effects on the public?

118. Qu. But, if gentlemen had rather tax themselves in another way, whether an additional tax of ten shillings the hogshead on wines may not supply a sufficient fund for the national bank, all defects to be made good by Parliament? 119. Qu. Whether upon the whole it may not be right to appoint a national bank? 120. Qu. Whether the stock and security of such bank would not be, in truth, the national stock, or the total sum of the wealth of this kingdom? 121. Qu. Whether, nevertheless, there should not be a particular fund for present use in answering bills and circulating credit? 122. Qu. Whether for this end any fund may not suffice, provided an Act be passed for making good deficiencies? 123. Qu. Whether the sole proprietor of such bank should not be the public, and the sole director the legislature? 124. Qu. Whether the managers, officers, and cashiers should not be servants of the pubic, acting by orders and limited by rules of the legislature? 125. Qu. Whether there should not be a standing number of inspectors, one-third men in great office, the rest members of both houses, half whereof to go out, and half to come in every session? 126. Qu. Whether those inspectors should not, all in a body, visit twice a year, and three as often as they pleased?

127. Qu. Whether the general bank should not be in Dublin, and subordinate banks or compters one in each province of Munster, Ulster, and Connaught? 128. Qu. Whether there should not be such provisions of stamps, signatures, checks, strong boxes, and all other measures for securing the bank notes and cash, as are usual in other banks? 129. Qu. Whether these ten or a dozen last queries may not easily be converted into heads of a bill? 130. Qu. Whether any one concerns himself about the security or funds of the banks of Venice or Amsterdam? And whether in a little time the case would not be the same as to our bank? 131. Qu. Whether the first beginning of expedients do not always meet with prejudices? And whether even the prejudices of a people ought not to be respected? 132. Qu. Whether a national bank be not the true philosopher's stone in a State? 133. Qu. Whether it be not the most obvious remedy for all the inconveniencies we labour under with regard to our coin? 134. Qu. Whether it be not agreed on all hands that our coin is on very bad foot, and calls for some present remedy? 135. Qu. Whether the want of silver hath not introduced a sort of traffic for change, which is purchased at no inconsiderable discount to the great obstruction of our domestic commerce?

Text from Project Gutenberg, public domain in the United States.

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