The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4 · George Berkeley
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191 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 2. M292 S. M293 S. M294 N. S. M295 Mo. M296 Mo. M297 Mo. N. 192 Is “inclusion” here virtually a synonym for verbal definition? M298 S. M299 N. M300 N. M301 S. M302 I. M303 I. M304 I. M305 M. M306 M. M307 M. S. 193 See _Principles_, sect. 2. The universe of Berkeley consists of Active Spirits that perceive and produce motion in impotent ideas or phenomena, realised in the percipient experience of persons. All supposed powers in Matter are refunded into Spirit. M308 P. M309 P. M310 I. M311 S. M312 S. M313 S. M314 S. 194 When self-conscious agents are included among “things.” We can have no sensuous image, i.e. idea, of _spirit_, although he maintains we can use the word intelligently. M315 Mo. M316 M. M317 S. G. M318 P. M319 M. M320 S. M321 M. P. M322 Mo. N. 195 Berkeley insists that we should individualise our thinking—“ipsis consuescere rebus,” as Bacon says,—to escape the dangers of artificial signs. This is the drift of his assault on abstract ideas, and his repulsion from what is not concrete. He would even dispense with words in his meditations in case of being sophisticated by abstractions. 196 Nature or the phenomenal world in short is the revelation of perfectly reasonable Will. 197 Gerard De Vries, the Cartesian.
M326 S. M327 G. T. M328 T. M329 T. M330 T. M331 M. M332 M. M333 M. M334 M. 198 Are the things of sense only modes in which percipient persons exist? 199 See Locke’s _Essay_, Bk. II. ch. 9. § 8. M336 M. S. M337 M. M338 M. M339 T. M340 M. M341 N. M342 M. M343 T. 200 Time being relative to the capacity of the percipient. 201 See Locke’s _Essay_, Bk. II. ch. 9. § 8. 202 To perceive what is not an idea (as Berkeley uses idea) is to perceive what is not realised, and therefore not real. 203 So things have a _potential_ objective existence in the Divine Will. 204 With Berkeley, change is time, and time, abstracted from all changes, is meaningless. 205 Could he know, by seeing only, even that he _had_ a body? M345 M. M346 M. M347 M. M348 M. M349 M. N. M350 N. 206 “the ideas attending these impressions,” i.e. the ideas that are correlatives of the (by us unperceived) organic impressions. 207 The Italian physical and metaphysical philosopher Fardella (1650-1718) maintained, by reasonings akin to those of Malebranche, that the existence of the material world could not be scientifically proved, and could only be maintained by faith in authoritative revelation. See his _Universæ Philosophiæ Systema_ (1690), and especially his _Logica_ (1696).
208 Locke’s _Essay_, Bk. IV. ch. 11. 209 What does he mean by “unknown substratum”? 210 He gets rid of the infinite in quantity, because it is incapable of concrete manifestation to the senses. When a phenomenon given in sense reaches the _minimum sensibile_, it reaches what is for us the margin of realisable existence: it cannot be infinitely little and still a phenomenon: insensible phenomena of sense involve a contradiction. And so too of the infinitely large. 211 In short he would idealise the visible world but not the tangible world. In the _Principles_, Berkeley idealises both. 212 Cf. _Essay on Vision_, sect. 149-59, where he concludes that “neither abstract nor visible extension makes the object of geometry.” 213 By the adult, who has learned to interpret its visual signs. 214 Inasmuch as no physical consequences _follow_ the volition; which however is still self-originated. 215 “A succession of ideas I take to _constitute_ time, and not to be only the sensible measure thereof, as Mr. Locke and others think.” (Berkeley’s letter to Johnson.) 216 Cf. _Essay_, Bk. II. ch. 16, sect. 8. 217 Cf. _Essay on Vision_, sect. 67-77. 218 Cf. _Essay on Vision_, sect. 88-120. 219 This is of the essence of Berkeley’s philosophy. M370 M. M371 M. M372 Mo. S. M373 S. M374 S. M375 S. 220 But in moral freedom originates in the agent, instead of being “consecutive” to his voluntary acts or found only in their consequences.
221 “Strigose” (strigosus)—meagre. M377 S. Mo. M378 N. M379 I. S. M380 S. 222 As he afterwards expresses it, we have intelligible _notions_, but not _ideas_—sensuous pictures—of the states or acts of our minds. 223 [“Omnes reales rerum proprietates continentur in Deo.” What means Le Clerc &c. by this? Log. I. ch. 8.]—AUTHOR, on margin. 224 “Si non rogas intelligo.” 225 This way of winning others to his own opinions is very characteristic of Berkeley. See p. 92 and note. 226 See _Third Dialogue_, on _sameness_ in things and _sameness_ in persons, which it puzzles him to reconcile with his New Principles. 227 Cf. _Essay on Vision_, sect. 52-61. 228 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 101-134. 229 “distance”—on opposite page in the MS. Cf. _Essay on Vision_, sect. 140. 230 Direct perception of phenomena is adequate to the perceived phenomena; indirect or scientific perception is inadequate, leaving room for faith and trust. 231 Cf. _Essay on Vision_, sect. 107-8. 232 The Divine Ideas of Malebranche and the sensuous ideas of Berkeley differ. 233 Cf. _Essay on Vision_, sect. 71. 234 Cf. Malebranche, _Recherche_, Bk. I. c. 6. That and the following chapters seem to have been in Berkeley’s mind. 235 He here assumes that extension (visible) is implied in the visible idea we call colour. 236 This strikingly illustrates Berkeley’s use of “idea,” and what he intends when he argues against “abstract” ideas.
237 An interesting autobiographical fact. From childhood he was indisposed to take things on trust. _ 238 Essay on Vision_, sect. 88-119. M396 M. M397 M. M398 M. M399 M. M400 P. M401 M. P. M402 M. M403 M. M404 I. M405 M. 239 “thoughts,” i.e. ideas of sense? 240 This, in a crude way, is the distinction of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια. It helps to explain Berkeley’s meaning, when he occasionally speaks of the ideas or phenomena that appear in the sense experience of different persons as if they were absolutely independent entities. 241 To be “in an unperceiving thing,” i.e. to be real, yet unperceived. Whatever is perceived is, because realised only through a percipient act, an _idea_—in Berkeley’s use of the word. 242 This as to the “Platonic strain” is not in the tone of _Siris_. 243 John Keill (1671-1721), an eminent mathematician, educated at the University of Edinburgh; in 1710 Savilian Professor of Astronomy at Oxford, and the first to teach the Newtonian philosophy in that University. In 1708 he was engaged in a controversy in support of Newton’s claims to the discovery of the method of fluxions. 244 This suggests a negative argument for Kant’s antinomies, and for Hamilton’s law of the conditioned. 245 Newton became Sir Isaac on April 16, 1705. Was this written before that date?
246 These may be _considered_ separately, but not _pictured_ as such. 247 In as far as they have not been sensibly realised in finite percipient mind. 248 [Or rather that invisible length does exist.]—AUTHOR, on margin. 249 Bonaventura Cavalieri (1598-1647), the Italian mathematician. His _Geometry of Indivisibles_ (1635) prepared the way for the Calculus. 250 [By “the excuse” is meant the finiteness of our mind—making it possible for contradictions to appear true to us.]—AUTHOR, on margin. 251 He allows elsewhere that words with meanings not realisable in imagination, i.e. in the form of idea, may discharge a useful office. See _Principles_, Introduction, sect. 20. 252 We do not perceive unperceived matter, but only matter realised in living perception—the percipient act being the factor of its reality. 253 The secondary qualities of things. 254 Because, while dependent on percipient sense, they are independent of _my_ personal will, being determined to appear under natural law, by Divine agency. 255 Keill’s _Introductio ad veram Physicam_ (Oxon. 1702)—Lectio 5—a curious work, dedicated to the Earl of Pembroke. 256 [Extension without breadth—i. e. insensible, intangible length—is not conceivable. ’Tis a mistake we are led into by the doctrine of abstraction.]—AUTHOR, on margin of MS. 257 Here “Sir Isaac.” Hence written after April, 1705.
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