The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4 · George Berkeley
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858 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 25, 26. 859 Cf. Ibid., sect. 2, 27, 135-142. 860 Inasmuch as I am conscious of _myself_, I can gather, through the sense symbolism, the real existence of other minds, external to my own. For I cannot, of course, enter into the very consciousness of another person. 861 “reason,” i.e. reasoning or necessary inference—founded here on our sense of personal dependence; not merely on our faith in sense symbolism and the interpretability of the sensible world. Our belief in the existence of finite minds, external to our own, is, with Berkeley, an application of this faith. 862 “Matter,” i.e. Matter as abstract substance. Cf. _Principles_, sect. 135-138. 863 Does this imply that with Berkeley, _self_, as distinguished from the _phenomena_ of which the material world consists, is not a necessary presuppostion of experience? He says in many places—I am _conscious_ of “my own being,” and that my mind is myself. Cf. _Principles_, sect, 2. 864 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 8. 865 Cf. Ibid., sect. 20 866 This important passage, printed within brackets, is not found in the first and second editions of the _Dialogues_. It is, by anticipation, Berkeley’s answer to Hume’s application of the objections to the reality of abstract or unperceived Matter, to the reality of the Ego or Self, of which we are aware through memory, as identical amid the changes of its successive states.
867 See note 4 on preceding page. 868 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 142. 869 Cf. Ibid., sect. 2. Does he assume that he exists when he is not conscious of ideas—sensible or other? Or, does he deny that he is ever unconscious? 870 That is of matter supposed to exist independently of any mind. Berkeley speaks here of a _consciousness_ of matter. Does he mean consciousness of belief in abstract material Substance? 871 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 54-57. 872 Which he does not doubt. 873 This sentence expresses the whole question between Berkeley and his antagonists. 874 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 29-41. 875 The words within brackets are omitted in the third edition. 876 The index pointing to the originative causes in the universe is thus the ethical judgment, which fastens upon the free voluntary agency of _persons_, as absolutely responsible causes, not merely caused causes. 877 That only ideas or phenomena are presented to our senses may be assented to by those who nevertheless maintain that intelligent sensuous experience implies more than the sensuous or empirical data. 878 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 49. 879 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 58. 880 “without the mind,” i.e. without the mind of each percipient person. 881 This is the gist of the whole question. According to the Materialists, sense-presented phenomena are due to unpresented, unperceived, abstract Matter; according to Berkeley, to living Spirit; according to Hume and Agnostics, their origin is unknowable, yet (incoherently) they claim that we _can_ interpret them—in physical science.
882 A similar objection is urged by Erdmann, in his criticism of Berkeley in the _Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie_. 883 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 50; _Siris_, sect. 319. 884 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 58. 885 “order”—“series,” in first and second editions. 886 “Matter,” i.e. when the reality of “matter” is supposed to signify what Berkeley argues cannot be; because really meaningless. 887 “the connexion of ideas,” i.e. the physical coexistences and sequences, maintained in constant order by Power external to the individual, and which are disclosed in the natural sciences. 888 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 38. Berkeley is not for making things _subjective_, but for recognising ideas or phenomena presented to the senses as _objective_. 889 They are not mere illusory appearances but are the very things themselves making their appearance, as far as our limited senses allow them to be realised for us. 890 i.e. abstract Matter. 891 Cf. _New Theory of Vision_, sect. 49; and _New Theory of Vision Vindicated_, sect. 9, 10, 15, &c. 892 Cf. _New Theory of Vision_, sect. 84-86. 893 “the connexion of ideas,” i.e. the order providentially maintained in nature. 894 Cf. _Principles_, Introduction, sect. 23-25. 895 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 8-10, 86, 87.
896 This difficulty is thus pressed by Reid:—“The ideas in my mind cannot be the same with the ideas in any other mind; therefore, if the objects I perceive be only ideas, it is impossible that two or more such minds can perceive the same thing. Thus there is one unconfutable consequence of Berkeley’s system, which he seems not to have attended to, and from which it will be found difficult, if at all possible, to guard it. The consequence I mean is this—that, although it leaves us sufficient evidence of a Supreme Mind, it seems to take away all the evidence we have of other intelligent beings like ourselves. What I call a father, or a brother, or a friend, is only a parcel of ideas in my own mind ; they cannot possibly have that relation to another mind which they have to mine, any more than the pain felt by me can be the _individual pain_ felt by another. I am thus left alone as the only creature of God in the universe” (Hamilton’s _Reid_, pp. 284-285). Implied Solipsism or Panegoism is thus charged against Berkeley, unless his conception of the material world is further guarded. 897 Reid and Hamilton argue in like manner against a fundamentally representative sense-perception. 898 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 6. 899 Cf. Ibid., sect. 87-90.
900 Cf. Ibid., sect. 18. 901 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 24. 902 “unknown,” i.e. unrealised in percipient life. 903 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 28-33. 904 See also Collier’s _Clavis Universalis_, p. 6: “Two or more persons who are present at a concert of music may indeed in some measure be said to hear the _same_ notes; yet the sound which the one hears is _not the very same_ with the sound which another hears, _because the souls or persons are supposed to be different_.” 905 Berkeley seems to hold that in _things_ there is no identity other than perfect similarity—only in _persons_. And even as to personal identity he is obscure. Cf. _Siris_, sect. 347, &c. 906 But the question is, whether the very ideas or phenomena that are perceived by me _can_ be also perceived by other persons; and if not, how I can discover that “other persons” exist, or that any finite person except myself is cognizant of the ideal cosmos—if the sort of _sameness_ that Berkeley advocates is all that can be predicated of concrete ideas; which are thus only _similar_, or generically the same. Unless the ideas are _numerically_ the same, can different persons make signs to one another through them? 907 Omitted in author’s last edition. 908 This seems to imply that intercourse between finite persons is maintained through ideas or phenomena presented to the senses, under a tacit faith in divinely guaranteed correspondence between the phenomena of which I am conscious, and the phenomena of which my neighbour is conscious; so that they are _practically_ “the same.” If we are living in a fundamentally divine, and therefore absolutely trustworthy, universe, the phenomena presented to my senses, which I attribute to the agency of another person, are so attributed rightly. For if not, the so-called cosmos is adapted to mislead me.
909 This explanation is often overlooked by Berkeley’s critics. 910 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 82-84. 911 i.e. if you take the term _idea_ in its wholly subjective and popular meaning. 912 i.e. if you take the term _idea_ in its objective meaning. 913 “philosophic,” i.e. _pseudo_-philosophic, against which he argues. 914 Had this their relative existence—this realisation of the material world through finite percipient and volitional life—any beginning? May not God have been eternally presenting phenomena to the senses of percipient beings in cosmical order, if not on this planet yet elsewhere, perhaps under other conditions? Has there been any beginning in the succession of finite persons? 915 In the first and second editions only. 916 Is “creation” by us distinguishable from continuous evolution, unbeginning and unending, in divinely constituted order; and is there a distinction between creation or evolution of _things_ and creation or evolution of _persons_? 917 Cf. _Siris_, sect. 347-349. 918 “Matter,” i.e. Matter in this pseudo-philosophical meaning of the word. 919 Thus Origen in the early Church. That “Matter” is co-eternal with God would mean that God is eternally making things real in the percipient experience of persons. 920 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 85-156, in which the religious and scientific advantages of the new conception of matter and the material cosmos are illustrated, when it is rightly understood and applied.
921 “substance and accident”—“subjects and adjuncts,”—in the first and the second edition. 922 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 28-42. In _Siris_, sect. 294-297, 300-318, 335, 359-365, we have glimpses of thought more allied to Platonism, if not to Hegelianism. 923 “Matter,” i.e. matter unrealised in any mind, finite or Divine. 924 These two propositions are a summary of Berkeley’s conception of the material world. With him, the _immediate_ objects of sense, realise in _perception_, are independent of the _will_ of the percipient, and are thus external to his proper personality. Berkeley’s “material world” of enlightened Common Sense, resulting from two factors, Divine and human, is independent of each finite mind; but not independent of all living Mind. 925 “voces male intellectæ.” Cf. _Principles of Human Knowledge_, “Introduction,” sect. 6, 23-25, on the abuse of language, especially by abstraction. 926 “veterum philosophorum.” The history of ancient speculations about motion, from the paradoxes of Zeno downwards, is, in some sort, a history of ancient metaphysics. It involves Space, Time, and the material world, with the ultimate causal relation of Nature to Spirit. 927 “hujus ævi philosophos.” As in Bacon on motion, and in the questions raised by Newton, Borelli, Leibniz, and others, discussed in the following sections. 928 Sect. 3-42 are concerned with the principle of Causality, exemplified in the motion, or change of place and state, that is continually going on in the material world, and which was supposed by some to explain all the phenomena of the universe.
929 “vis.” The assumption that _active power_ is an immediate datum of sense is the example here offered of the abase of abstract words. He proceeds to dissolve the assumption by shewing that it is meaningless. 930 “principio”—the ultimate explanation or originating cause. Cf. sect. 36. Metaphors, or indeed empty words, are accepted for explanations, it is argued, when _bodily_ power or force, in any form, e.g. gravitation, is taken as the real cause of motion. To call these “occult causes” is to say nothing that is intelligible. The perceived sensible effects and their customary sequences are all we know. Physicists are still deluded by words and metaphors. 931 Cf. sect. 53, where _sense_, _imagination_, and _intelligence_ are distinguished. 932 Cf. _Principles_, Introd. 16, 20, 21; also _Alciphron_, Dial. VII. sect. 8, 17. 933 [La Materia altro non è che un vaso di Circe incantato, il quale serve per ricettacolo della forza et de’ momenti dell’ impeto. La forzae l’impeti sono astratti tanto sottili, sono quintessenze tanto spiritose, che in altre ampolle non si possono racchiudere, fuor che nell’ intima corpulenza de’ solidi naturali, Vide _Lezioni Accademiche_.]—AUTHOR. Torricelli (1608-47), the eminent Italian physicist, and professor of mathematics at Florence, who invented the barometer. 934 Borelli (1608-79), Italian professor of mathematics at Pisa, and then of medicine at Florence; see his _De Vi Percussionis_, cap. XXIV. prop. 88, and cap. XXVII.
935 “per effectum,” i.e. by its sensible effects—real power or active force not being a datum of the senses, but found in the spiritual efficacy, of which we have an example in our personal agency. 936 “vim mortuam.” The only power we can find is the living power of Mind. Reason is perpetually active in the universe, imperceptible through the senses, and revealed to _them_ only in its sensible effects. “Power,” e.g. “gravitation,” in things, _per se_, is distinguished from perceived “motion” only through illusion due to misleading abstraction. There is no _physical_ power, intermediate between spiritual agency, on the one hand, and the sensible changes we see, on the other. Cf. sect. 11. 937 “meditatione subigenda sunt.” Cf. _Theory of Vision Vindicated_, sect. 35, 70. 938 “distingui.” It is here argued that so-called power within the things of sense is not distinguishable from the sensibly perceived sequences. To the meaningless supposition that it is, he attributes the frivolous verbal controversies among the learned mentioned in the following section. The province of natural philosophy, according to Berkeley, is to inquire what the rules are under which sensible effects are uniformly manifested. Cf. _Siris_, sect. 236, 247, 249. _ 939 Principia Math._ Def. III. _ 940 De Vi Percussionis_, cap. I. 941 “utiles.” Such words as “force,” “power,” “gravity,” “attraction,” are held to be convenient in physical reasonings about the _phenomena_ of motion, but worthless as philosophical expressions of the _cause_ of motion, which transcends sense and mechanical science. Cf. _Siris_, sect. 234, 235.
942 Cf. sect. 67. 943 “candem.” So in recent discussions on the conservation of force. 944 [Borellus.]—AUTHOR. See _De Vi Percussionis_, cap. XXIII. 945 [Leibnitius.]—AUTHOR. 946 On Berkeley’s reasoning all terms which involve the assumption that real causality is something presentable to the senses are a cover for meaninglessness. Only through self-conscious experience of personal activity does real meaning enter into the portion of language which deals with active causation. This is argued in detail in sect. 21-35. 947 Our concrete experience is assumed to be confined to (_a_) _bodies_, i.e. the data of the senses, and (_b_) _mind_ or _spirit_—sentient, intelligent, active—revealed by internal consciousness. Cf. _Principles_, sect. 1, 2, in which experience is resolved into _ideas_ and the _active intelligence_ which they presuppose. Here the word idea disappears, but, in accordance with its signification, “bodies” is still regarded as aggregates of external phenomena, the passive subjects of changes of place and state: the idealisation of the material world is tacitly implied, but not obtruded. 948 “nihilque,” &c. Cf. _Principles of Human Knowledge_, e.g. sect. 26, 65, 66. where the essential passivity of the _ideas_ presented to the senses, i.e. the material world, is maintained as a cardinal principle—on the positive ground of our percipient experience of sensible things. To speak of the cause of motion as _something sensible_, he argues (sect. 24), is merely to shew that we know nothing about it. Cf. sect. 28, 29, infra.
949 The phenomena that can be presented to the senses are taken as the measure of what can be attributed to the material world; and as the senses present _only_ conditioned change of place in bodies, we must look for the active cause in the invisible world which internal consciousness presents to us. 950 “_genus rerum cogitantium._” Cf. _Principles_, sect. 2. 951 “experientia didicimus.” Can the merely empirical data even of internal consciousness reveal this causal connexion between volition and bodily motions, without the venture of theistic faith? 952 “a primo et universali Principio” i.e. God, or the Universal Spirit, in whom the universe of bodies and spirits finds explanation; in a way which Berkeley does not attempt to unfold articulately and exhaustively in philosophical system. _ 953 Phys._ θ. 4. 255 a 5-7. _ 954 Princip. Math._ Def. III. 955 “resistentia.” Our muscular _sensation_ of resistance is apt to be accepted empirically as itself _active power in the concrete_, entering very much, as has been said, into the often inaccurate idea of power which is formed. See Editor’s Preface. 956 “nec incommode.” Cf. sect. 17, and note. 957 “hypothesis mathematica.” Cf. sect. 17, 35, 36-41, 66, 67; also _Siris_, sect. 250-251. 958 “nihil.” This section sums up Berkeley’s objections to crediting _matter_ with real power; the senses being taken as the test of what is contained in matter. It may be compared with David Hume, Thomas Brown, and J.S. Mill on Causation. Berkeley differs from them in recognising active power in spirit, while with them he resolves causation among bodies into invariable sequence.
959 Can the data presented to us reveal more than sequence, in the relation between our volitions and the corresponding movements of our bodies? Is not the difference found in the moral presupposition, which _supernaturalises_ man in his voluntary or morally responsible activity? This obliges us to see _ourselves_ as absolutely original causes of all bodily and mental states for which we can be morally approved or blamed. 960 “novumque genus.” Cf. sect. 21. We have here Berkeley’s antithesis of mind and matter—spirits and external phenomena presented to the senses—persons in contrast to passive ideas. _ 961 De Anima_, I. ii. 13, 22, 24. 962 “Cartesius.” The antithesis of extended things and thinking things pervades Descartes; but not, as with Berkeley, on the foundation of the new conception of what is truly meant by matter or sensible things. See e.g. _Principia_, P. I. §§ 63, 64. 963 “alii.” Does he refer to Locke, who suggests the possibility of matter thinking? 964 See Aristotle, _De Anima_, I. ii. 5, 13; Diogenes Laertius, Lib. VI. i. 6. _ 965 Nat. Ausc._ VIII. 15; also _De Anima_, III, x. 7. 966 Hardly any passage in the _Timæus_ exactly corresponds to this. The following is, perhaps, the most pertinent:—Κίνησιν γὰρ ἀπένειμεν αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ σώματος οἰκείαν, τῶν ἑπτὰ τὴν περὶ νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν μάλιστα οὖσαν (p. 34 a). Aristotle quotes the _Timæus_ in the same connexion, _De Anima_, I. iii. ii.
967 “philosophi Cartesiani.” Secundum Cartesium causa generalis omnium motuum et quietum est Deus.—Derodon, _Physica_, I. ix. 30. _ 968 Principia Mathematica_—Scholium Generale. 969 “naturam naturantem esse Deum”—as we might say, God considered as imminent cause in the universe. See St. Thomas Aquinas, _Opera_, vol. XXII. Quest. 6, p. 27. 970 “juxta certam et constantem rationem.” While all changes in Nature are determined by Will, it is not capricious but rational Will. The so-called arbitrariness of the Language of Nature is relative to us, and from our point of view. In itself, the universe of reality expresses Perfect Reason. 971 “permaneret.” Cf. sect. 51. 972 “spectat potius ad philosophiam primam.” The drift of the _De Motu_ is to distinguish the physical sequences of molecular motion, which the physical sciences articulate, from the Power with which metaphysics and theology are concerned, and which we approach through consciousness. 973 “regulas.” Cf. _Siris_, sect. 231-235. 974 Having, in the preceding sections, contrasted perceived motions and their immanent originating Power—matter and mind—physics and metaphysics—he proceeds in this and the seven following sections to explain more fully what ha means by _principium_ and also the two meanings (metaphysical and mechanical) of _solutio_. By _principium_, in philosophy, he understands universally efficient supersensible Power. In natural philosophy the term is applied to the orderly sequences manifested to our senses, not to the active cause of the order.
975 “ratiocinio ... redditæ universales.” Relations of the data of sense to universalising reason are here recognised. 976 “natura motus.” Sect. 43-66 treat of the nature of the _effect_—i.e. perceptible motion, as distinguished from its true causal origin (_principium_) in mind or spirit. The origin of motion belongs to metaphysics; its nature, as dependent on percipient experience, belongs to physics. Is motion independent of a plurality of bodies; or does it involve bodies in relation to other bodies, so that absolute motion is meaningless? Cf. _Principles_, sect. 111-116. 977 “idea illa tenuissima et subtilissima.” The difficulty as to definition of motion is attributed to abstractions, and the inclination of the scholastic mind to prefer these to concrete experience. 978 Motion is thus defined by Aristotle:—Διὸ ἡ κίνησις ἐντελέχεια τοῦ κινητοῦ, ᾗ κινητόν. Nat. Ausc. III. ii; see also i. and iii. Cf. Derodon, _Physica_, I. ix. 979 Newton. 980 Cf. sect. 3-42. 981 Descartes, _Principia_, P. II. § 25; also Borellus, _De Vi Percussionis_, p. 1. 982 “res faciles difficillimas.” Cf. _Principles_, “Introduction,” sect. 1. 983 Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δὴ χαλεπὸν αὐτὴν λαβεῖν τί ἐστίν. _Nat. Ausc._ III. ii. 984 e.g. Zeno, in his noted argument against the possibility of motion, referred to as a signal example of fallacy. 985 “de infinite, &c.” Cf. _Principles_, sect. 130-132, and the _Analyst_ passim, for Berkeley’s treatment of infinitesimals.
986 “confundere.” Cf. sect. 3-42 for illustrations of this confusion. 987 The modern conception of the “conservation of force.” 988 Aristotle states the question in _Nat. Ausc._ VIII. cap. i, and solves it in cap. iv. 989 “mutatio loci” is the effect, i.e. motion perceived by sense; “vitale principium” the real cause, i.e. vital rational agency. 990 “moventis et moti,” i.e. as concauses. 991 “motum localem.” Sect. 52-65 discuss the reality of absolute or empty space, in contrast with concrete space realised in perception of the local relations of bodies. The meaninglessness of absolute space and motion is argued. Cf. _Principles_, sect. 116, 117. See Locke’s _Essay_, Bk. II. ch. 13, 15, 17; also _Papers which passed between Mr. Leibnitz and Dr. Clarke in 1715-16_, pp. 55-59; 73-81; 97-103, &c. Leibniz calls absolute space “an ideal of some modern Englishman.” 992 Newton’s _Principia_, Def. Sch. III. See also Derodon, _Physica_, P. I. cap. vi. § 1. 993 Cf. Locke on a vacuum, and the “possibility of space existing without matter,” _Essay_, Bk. II. ch. 13. 994 Note the account here given of _imagination_ and _intellect_, as distinguished from _sense_, which may be compared with αἴσθησις, φαντασία, and νοῦς in Aristotelian psychology. 995 “attributorum divinorum particeps.” See Samuel Clarke, in his _Demonstration_, and in the _Papers between Clarke and Leibnitz_. 996 “nostrum,” sc. corpus. When we imagine space emptied of bodies, we are apt to forget that our own bodies are part of the material world.
997 [Vide quæ contra spatium absolutum disseruntur in libro _De Principiis Cognitionis Humanæ_, idiomate anglicano decem abhine annis edito.]—AUTHOR. He refers to sect. 116 of the _Principles_. 998 He treats absolute space as nothing, and relative space as dependent on Perception and Will. _ 999 Phys._ α. 5. 188a. 22, 23. 1000 See Locke, _Essay_, Bk. II. ch. 13, §§ 7-10. 1001 Sect. 67-72 treat of the supposed ejection of motion from the striking body into the body struck. Is this only metaphorical? Is the motion received by the latter to be supposed identical with, or equivalent to, that given forth by the former? _ 1002 Principia_, Def. IV. _ 1003 Lezioni Accademiche._ _ 1004 De Vi Percussionis_, cap. IX. 1005 Newton’s third law of motion. 1006 Berkeley sees in motion only a link in the chain which connects the sensible and intelligible worlds—a conception unfolded in his _Siris_, more than twenty years later. 1007 “provincia sua.” The _De Motu_, so far as it treats of motion perceptible to the senses, is assigned to physics; in contrast to theology or metaphysics, alone concerned with active causation.
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