First Principles · Herbert Spencer
CHAPTER IV. THE CAUSES OF EVOLUTION.
Such cause or causes of Evolution, may be sought for without in the least assuming that the ultimate mystery can be fathomed. Fully conscious that an absolute solution is for ever beyond us, we may still look for a relative solution—may try to reduce the problem to its lowest terms. Just as it was possible to interpret Kepler’s laws as necessary consequences of the law of gravitation, and then to admit that gravitation transcends analysis; so it may be possible to interpret the law of Evolution as the necessary consequence of some deeper law, beyond which we may nevertheless be unable to go. * * * * * § 59. The probability of common causation, and the possibility of formulating it, being granted, it will be well before going further, to consider what must be the general characteristics of such causation, and in what direction we ought to look for it. We can with certainty predict that be it simple or compound, the cause has a high degree of generality; seeing that it is common to such infinitely varied phenomena: in proportion to the universality of its application must be the abstractness of its character. Whatever be the agency and the conditions under which it acts, we need not expect to see in them an obvious explanation of this or that species of Evolution, because they equally underlie species of Evolution of quite a different order. Determining Evolution of every kind—astronomic, geologic, organic, ethnologic, social, economic, artistic, &c.—they must be concerned with something common to all these; and to see what these possess in common, will therefore be the best method of guiding ourselves towards the desired solution.
The only obvious respect in which all kinds of Evolution are alike, is, that they are modes of _change_. Every phenomenon to which we apply the term, presents us with a succession of states; and when such succession ceases, we no longer predicate Evolution. Equally in those past forms of it which are more or less hypothetical, and in those forms of it which we see going on around, this is the common characteristic. Note next, that the kind of change which constitutes Evolution, is broadly distinguished from change of an equally general kind, in this, that it is change of internal relations instead of change of external relations. All things in motion through space are the subjects of change; but while in this which we call mechanical motion, the relative position as measured from surrounding objects is continually altered, there is not implied any alteration in the positions of the parts of the moving body in respect to each other. Conversely, a body exhibiting what we call Evolution, while it either may or may not display new relations of position to the things around it, _must_ display new relations of position among the parts of which it is made up. Thus we narrow the field of inquiry by recognizing the change in which Evolution consists, as _a change in the arrangement of parts_: of course using the word parts in its most extended sense, as signifying both ultimate units and masses of such units. Further, we have to remember that this change in the arrangement of parts which constitutes Evolution, is a certain order of such change. As we saw in the last chapter, there is a change in the arrangement of parts which is not Evolution but Dissolution—a destructive change as opposed to a constructive change—a change by which the definite is gradually rendered indefinite, the coherent slowly becomes incoherent, and the heterogeneous eventually lapses into comparative homogeneity. Thus then we reduce that which we have to investigate to its most abstract shape. Our task is to find the cause or causes of a certain order of change that takes place in the arrangement of parts.
But whoever remembers that the forms of existence which the uncultivated speak of with so much scorn, are not only shown by the man of science to be the more marvellous in their attributes the more they are investigated, but are also proved to be in their ultimate nature absolutely incomprehensible—as absolutely incomprehensible as sensation, or the conscious something which perceives it—whoever fully realizes this truth, I say, will see that the course proposed does not imply a degradation of the so-called higher, but an elevation of the so-called lower. Perceiving, as he will, that the Materialist and Spiritualist controversy is a mere war of words, in which the disputants are equally absurd—each thinking he understands that which it is impossible for any man to understand—he will perceive how utterly groundless is the fear referred to. Being fully convinced that whatever nomenclature is used, the ultimate mystery must remain the same, he will be as ready to formulate all phenomena in terms of Matter, Motion, and Force, as in any other terms; and will rather indeed anticipate, that only in a doctrine which recognizes the Unknown Cause as co-extensive with all orders of phenomena, can there be a consistent Religion, or a consistent Science.
On the other hand, the conclusion that Evolution, considered under its most abstract form, is a certain change in the arrangement of parts; and that the causes of this change can be expressed only in terms of Matter, Motion, and Force; may in critical minds raise the question—What are Matter, Motion, and Force? Referring back in thought to the reasonings contained in the chapter on “Ultimate Scientific Ideas;” and remembering how it was there shown that absolute knowledge of Matter, Motion, and Force, is impossible; some readers will perhaps conclude that any such interpretation as the one above proposed, must be visionary. It may be asked—How can a comprehensible account of Evolution be given in terms that are themselves incomprehensible? Before proceeding, this question must be met. There can be no sound philosophy without clearly defined terms; and as, on the meanings of the terms to be here used, doubts have probably been cast by the reasonings contained in the chapter referred to, such doubts must be removed. If, as was shown, our ideas of things do not correspond with things in themselves, it becomes necessary to inquire in what way they are to be accepted. If they are not absolutely true, then what is the exact meaning of the assertion that they are relatively true? To this question let us now address ourselves.
Text from Project Gutenberg, public domain in the United States.