Kant's Critique of Judgement · Immanuel Kant
VIII. OF THE LOGICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE PURPOSIVENESS OF NATURE
Purposiveness may be represented in an object given in experience on a merely subjective ground, as the harmony of its form,--in the _apprehension_ (_apprehensio_) of it prior to any concept,--with the cognitive faculties, in order to unite the intuition with concepts for a cognition generally. Or it may be represented objectively as the harmony of the form of the object with the possibility of the thing itself, according to a concept of it which precedes and contains the ground of this form. We have seen that the representation of purposiveness of the first kind rests on the immediate pleasure in the form of the object in the mere reflection upon it. But the representation of purposiveness of the second kind, since it refers the form of the Object, not to the cognitive faculties of the subject in the apprehension of it, but to a definite cognition of the object under a given concept, has nothing to do with a feeling of pleasure in things, but only with the Understanding in its judgement upon them. If the concept of an object is given, the business of the Judgement in the use of the concept for cognition consists in _presentation_ (_exhibitio_), _i.e._ in setting a corresponding intuition beside the concept.
This may take place either through our own Imagination, as in Art when we realise a preconceived concept of an object which is a purpose of ours; or through Nature in its Technic (as in organised bodies) when we supply to it our concept of its purpose in order to judge of its products. In the latter case it is not merely the _purposiveness_ of nature in the form of the thing that is represented, but this its product is represented as a _natural purpose_.--Although our concept of a subjective purposiveness of nature in its forms according to empirical laws is not a concept of the Object, but only a principle of the Judgement for furnishing itself with concepts amid the immense variety of nature (and thus being able to ascertain its own position), yet we thus ascribe to nature as it were a regard to our cognitive faculty according to the analogy of purpose. Thus we can regard _natural beauty_ as the _presentation_ of the concept of the formal (merely subjective) purposiveness, and _natural purposes_ as the presentation of the concept of a real (objective) purposiveness. The former of these we judge of by Taste (aesthetically, by the medium of the feeling of pleasure), the latter by Understanding and Reason (logically, according to concepts). On this is based the division of the Critique of Judgement into the Critique of _aesthetical_ and of _teleological_ Judgement. By the first we understand the faculty of judging of the formal purposiveness (otherwise called subjective) of Nature by means of the feeling of pleasure or pain; by the second the faculty of judging its real (objective) purposiveness by means of Understanding and Reason.
In a Critique of Judgement the part containing the aesthetical Judgement is essential, because this alone contains a principle which the Judgement places quite _a priori_ at the basis of its reflection upon nature; viz., the principle of a formal purposiveness of nature, according to its particular (empirical) laws, for our cognitive faculty, without which the Understanding could not find itself in nature. On the other hand no reason _a priori_ could be specified,--and even the possibility of a reason would not be apparent from the concept of nature as an object of experience whether general or particular,--why there should be objective purposes of nature, _i.e._ things which are only possible as natural purposes; but the Judgement, without containing such a principle _a priori_ in itself, in given cases (of certain products), in order to make use of the concept of purposes on behalf of Reason, would only contain the rule according to which that transcendental principle has already prepared the Understanding to apply to nature the concept of a purpose (at least as regards its form).
But the transcendental principle which represents a purposiveness of nature (in subjective reference to our cognitive faculty) in the form of a thing as a principle by which we judge of nature, leaves it quite undetermined where and in what cases I have to judge of a product according to a principle of purposiveness, and not rather according to universal natural laws. It leaves it to the _aesthetical_ Judgement to decide by taste the harmony of this product (of its form) with our cognitive faculty (so far as this decision rests not on any agreement with concepts but on feeling). On the other hand, the Judgement teleologically employed furnishes conditions determinately under which something (_e.g._ an organised body) is to be judged according to the Idea of a purpose of nature; but it can adduce no fundamental proposition from the concept of nature as an object of experience authorising it to ascribe to nature _a priori_ a reference to purposes, or even indeterminately to assume this of such products in actual experience.
The Understanding legislates _a priori_ for nature as an Object of sense--for a theoretical knowledge of it in a possible experience. Reason legislates _a priori_ for freedom and its peculiar casuality; as the supersensible in the subject, for an unconditioned practical knowledge. The realm of the natural concept under the one legislation and that of the concept of freedom under the other are entirely removed from all mutual influence which they might have on one another (each according to its fundamental laws) by the great gulf that separates the supersensible from phenomena. The concept of freedom determines nothing in respect of the theoretical cognition of nature; and the natural concept determines nothing in respect of the practical laws of freedom. So far then it is not possible to throw a bridge from the one realm to the other. But although the determining grounds of causality according to the concept of freedom (and the practical rules which it contains) are not resident in nature, and the sensible cannot determine the supersensible in the subject, yet this is possible conversely (not, to be sure, in respect of the cognition of nature, but as regards the effects of the supersensible upon the sensible).
This in fact is involved in the concept of a causality through freedom, the _effect_ of which is to take place in the world according to its formal laws. The word _cause_, of course, when used of the supersensible only signifies the _ground_ which determines the causality of natural things to an effect in accordance with their proper natural laws, although harmoniously with the formal principle of the laws of Reason. Although the possibility of this cannot be comprehended, yet the objection of a contradiction alleged to be found in it can be sufficiently answered.[10]--The effect in accordance with the concept of freedom is the final purpose which (or its phenomenon in the world of sense) ought to exist; and the condition of the possibility of this is presupposed in nature (in the nature of the subject as a sensible being, that is, as man). The Judgement presupposes this _a priori_ and without reference to the practical; and thus furnishes the mediating concept between the concepts of nature and that of freedom. It makes possible the transition from the conformity to law in accordance with the former to the final purpose in accordance with the latter, and this by the concept of a _purposiveness_ of nature. For thus is cognised the possibility of the final purpose which alone can be actualised in nature in harmony with its laws.
The Understanding by the possibility of its _a priori_ laws for nature, gives a proof that nature is only cognised by us as phenomenon; and implies at the same time that it has a supersensible substrate, though it leaves this quite _undetermined_. The Judgement by its _a priori_ principle for the judging of nature according to its possible particular laws, makes the supersensible substrate (both in us and without us) _determinable by means of the intellectual faculty_. But the Reason by its practical _a priori_ law _determines_ it; and thus the Judgement makes possible the transition from the realm of the concept of nature to that of the concept of freedom. As regards the faculties of the soul in general, in their higher aspect, as containing an autonomy; the Understanding is that which contains the _constitutive_ principles _a priori_ for the _cognitive faculty_ (the theoretical cognition of nature). For the _feeling of pleasure and pain_ there is the Judgement, independently of concepts and sensations which relate to the determination of the faculty of desire and can thus be immediately practical. For the _faculty of desire_ there is the Reason which is practical without the mediation of any pleasure whatever. It determines for the faculty of desire, as a superior faculty, the final purpose which carries with it the pure intellectual satisfaction in the Object.--The concept formed by Judgement of a purposiveness of nature belongs to natural concepts, but only as a regulative principle of the cognitive faculty; although the aesthetical judgement upon certain objects (of Nature or Art) which occasions it is, in respect of the feeling of pleasure or pain, a constitutive principle. The spontaneity in the play of the cognitive faculties, the harmony of which contains the ground of this pleasure, makes the above concept [of the purposiveness of nature] fit to be the mediating link between the realm of the natural concept and that of the concept of freedom in its effects; whilst at the same time it promotes the sensibility of the mind for moral feeling.--The following table may facilitate the review of all the higher faculties according to their systematic unity.[11] _All the faculties of the mind_ Cognitive faculties. Faculties of desire. Feeling of pleasure and pain. _Cognitive faculties_ Understanding. Judgement. Reason. _A priori principles_ Conformity to law. Purposiveness. Final purpose. _Application to_ Nature. Art. Freedom.
Ideas discussed in this chapter
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