Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics · John Dewey
LII.
Positive Freedom. The _capacity_ of freedom lies in the power to form an ideal or conception of an end. _Actual_ freedom lies in the realization of that end which actually satisfies. An end may be freely adopted, and yet its actual working out may result not in freedom, but in slavery. It may result in rendering the agent more subject to his passions, less able to direct his own conduct, and more cramped and feeble in powers. Only that end which executed really effects greater energy and comprehensiveness of character makes for actual freedom. In a word, only the good man, the man who is truly realizing his individuality, is free, in the positive sense of that word. Every action which is not in the line of performance of functions must necessarily result in self-enslavement. The end of desire is activity; and it is only in fullness and unity of activity that freedom is found. When desires are not unified--when, that is, the idea of the exercise of function does not control conduct--one desire must conflict with another. Action is directed now this way, now that, and there is friction, loss of power. On account of this same lack of control of desires by the comprehensive law of social activity, one member of society is brought into conflict with another, with waste of energy, and with impeded and divided activity and satisfaction of desire. Exercise of function, on the other hand, unifies the desires, giving each its relative, although subordinate, place. It fits each into the others, and, through the harmonious adjustment of one to another, effects that complete and unhindered action which is freedom. The performance of specific function falls also into free relations with the activities of other persons, coöperating with them, giving and receiving what is needed, and thus constituting full liberty. Other aspects of freedom, as the negative and the potential, are simply means instrumental to the realization of individuality, and when not employed toward this, their true end, they become methods of enslaving the agent.
On the subject of moral freedom, as, upon the whole, in agreement with the view presented here: See Green: Prolegomena to Ethics, pp. 90-117; 142-158. Bradley: Ethical Studies, ch. I; Caird: Phil. of Kant, Vol. II, Bk. II, ch. 3; Alexander: Moral Order and Progress, pp. 336-341. And, for a view agreeing in part, Stephen: Science of Ethics, pp. 278-293. For presentations of the freedom of indifference, see, Lotze: Practical Philosophy, ch. 3. Martineau: Op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 34-40. Calderwood: Handbook of Moral Philosophy.
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