Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics · John Dewey
VI.
Moral Bearing of These Distinctions. It is the feelings which supply the impelling force to action. They may be termed, collectively, the _natural disposition_. The natural disposition in itself has no _moral_ value. This has been well illustrated by Bentham. Principles of Morals and Legislation, pp. 49-55. Bentham here uses the term 'motive' to designate what we have called the moving cause. We may select of the many examples which he gives that of curiosity. We may imagine a boy spinning a top, reading a useful book and letting a wild ox loose in a road. Now curiosity may be the 'motive' of each of these acts, yet the first act would generally be called morally indifferent, the second good, the third abominable. What we mean by the 'natural' feelings, then, is the feelings considered in abstraction from activity: Benevolence, as a _mere_ feeling, has no higher moral value than malevolence. But if it is directed upon action it gets a value at once; let the end, the act, be right, and benevolence becomes a name for a _moral_ disposition--a tendency to _act_ in the due way. Nothing is more important than to distinguish between mere sentiments, and feeling as an element in conduct.
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