Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics · John Dewey
XLII.
Theories Regarding Moral Authority. The idea of obligation or duty has two sides. There is the idea of law, of something which controls conduct, and there is the _consciousness_ of the necessity of conforming to this law. There is, of course, no separation between the two sides, but the consideration of the latter side--the recognition of obligation--may be best dealt with in discussing conscience. Here we shall deal simply with the fact that there is such a thing in conduct as law controlling action, and constituting obligation. Theories regarding obligation may, for our purposes, be subdivided into those which make its exercise restraint or coercion (and which therefore hold that in perfect moral conduct, duty as such disappears); and those which hold that obligation is a normal element in conduct as such, and that it is not, essentially, but only under certain circumstances, coercive. Of the former type, some theories (mainly the hedonistic) regard the restraint as originally imposed from without upon the desires of the individual, while others (as the Kantian) regard it as imposed by man's reason upon his desires and inclinations.
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