Principles of Political Economy · John Stuart Mill
Chapter IX. Influence Of Credit On Prices.
But we have now found that there are other things, such as bank-notes, bills of exchange, and checks, which circulate as money, and perform all the functions of it, and the question arises, Do these various substitutes operate on prices in the same manner as money itself? I apprehend that bank-notes, bills, or checks, as such, do not act on prices at all. What does act on prices is Credit, in whatever shape given, and whether it gives rise to any transferable instruments capable of passing into circulation or not. § 2. Credit a purchasing Power, similar to Money. Money acts upon prices in no other way than by being tendered in exchange for commodities. The demand which influences the prices of commodities consists of the money offered for them. Money not in circulation has no effect on prices. In the case, however, of payment by checks, the purchases are, at any rate, made, though not with the money in the buyer’s possession, yet with money to which he has a right. But he may make purchases with money which he only expects to have, or even only pretends to expect. He may obtain goods in return for his acceptances payable at a future time, or on his note of hand, or on a simple book-credit—that is, on a mere promise to pay. All these purchases have exactly the same effect on price as if they were made with ready money. The amount of purchasing power which a person can exercise is composed of all the money in his possession or due to him, and of all his credit. For exercising the whole of this power he finds a sufficient motive only under peculiar circumstances, but he always possesses it; and the portion of it which he at any time does exercise is the measure of the effect which he produces on price.
Suppose that, in the expectation that some commodity will rise in price, he determines not only to invest in it all his ready money, but to take up on credit, from the producers or importers, as much of it as their opinion of his resources will enable him to obtain. Every one must see that by thus acting he produces a greater effect on price than if he limited his purchases to the money he has actually in hand. He creates a demand for the article to the full amount of his money and credit taken together, and raises the price proportionally to both. And this effect is produced, though none of the written instruments called substitutes for currency may be called into existence; though the transaction may give rise to no bill of exchange, nor to the issue of a single bank-note. The buyer, instead of taking a mere book-credit, might have given a bill for the amount, or might have paid for the goods with bank-notes borrowed for that purpose from a banker, thus making the purchase not on his own credit with the seller, but on the banker’s credit with the seller, and his own with the banker. Had he done so, he would have produced as great an effect on price as by a simple purchase to the same amount on a book-credit, but no greater effect. The credit itself, not the form and mode in which it is given, is the operating cause.
This is the ideal extreme case of what is called a commercial crisis. There is said to be a commercial crisis when a great number of merchants and traders at once either have, or apprehend that they shall have, a difficulty in meeting their engagements. The most usual cause of this general embarrassment is the recoil of prices after they have been raised by a spirit of speculation, intense in degree, and extending to many commodities. When, after such a rise, the reaction comes and prices begin to fall, though at first perhaps only through the desire of the holders to realize, speculative purchases cease; but, were this all, prices would only fall to the level from which they rose, or to that which is justified by the state of the consumption and of the supply. They fall, however, much lower; for as, when prices were rising, and everybody apparently making a fortune, it was easy to obtain almost any amount of credit, so now, when everybody seems to be losing, and many fail entirely, it is with difficulty that firms of known solidity can obtain even the credit to which they are accustomed, and which it is the greatest inconvenience to them to be without, because all dealers have engagements to fulfill, and, nobody feeling sure that the portion of his means which he has intrusted to others will be available in time, no one likes to part with ready money, or to postpone his claim to it. To these rational considerations there is superadded, in extreme cases, a panic as unreasoning as the previous over-confidence; money is borrowed for short periods at almost any rate of interest, and sales of goods for immediate payment are made at almost any sacrifice. Thus general prices, during a commercial revulsion, fall as much below the usual level as during the previous period of speculation they have risen above it; the fall, as well as the rise, originating not in anything affecting money, but in the state of credit.
Professor Jevons seriously advanced a theory that, inasmuch as the harvests of the world were the causes of good or bad trade, and that their deficiency would regularly be followed by commercial distress, then a periodic cause of bad harvests, if found, would explain the constant recurrence of commercial crises. This cause he claimed to have found in the sun-spots, which periodically deprive the crops of that source of growth which is usually furnished by the sun when no spots appear.(243) It has not received general acceptance. In the United States financial disasters have occurred in 1814, 1819, 1825, 1837-1839, 1857, and 1873. Those of 1837 and 1873 seem to have been the most serious in their effects; but this field, so far as scientific study is concerned, has not been fully worked, and much remains to be learned about these crises in the United States. The crisis of 1873 was due to excessive railway-building. It was testified(244) concerning the New York banks in 1873 that “their capital needed for legitimate purposes was practically lent out on certain iron rails, railroad-ties, bridges, and rolling-stock, _called_ railroads, many of them laid down in places where these materials were practically useless.” Under the effects due to swift communication by steam, but especially to the electric telegraph, modern credit is a very different thing from what it was fifty years ago. Now, a shock on the Bourse at Vienna is felt the same day at Paris, London, and New York. A commercial crisis in one great money-center is felt at every other point in the world which has business connections with it. Moreover, as Cherbuliez(245) says: “A country is more subject to crises the more advanced is its economical development. There are certain maladies which attack only grown-up persons who have reached a certain degree of vigor and maturity.”
There is a form of credit transactions (4) by checks on bankers, and transfers in a banker’s books, which is exactly parallel in every respect to bank-notes, giving equal facilities to an extension of credit, and capable of acting on prices quite as powerfully. A bank, instead of lending its notes to a merchant or dealer, might open an account with him, and credit the account with the sum it had agreed to advance, on an understanding that he should not draw out that sum in any other mode than by drawing checks against it in favor of those to whom he had occasion to make payments. These checks might possibly even pass from hand to hand like bank-notes; more commonly, however, the receiver would pay them into the hands of his own banker, and when he wanted the money would draw a fresh check against it; and hence an objector may urge that as the original check would very soon be presented for payment, when it must be paid either in notes or in coin, notes or coin to an equal amount must be provided as the ultimate means of liquidation. It is not so, however. The person to whom the check is transferred may perhaps deal with the same banker, and the check may return to the very bank on which it was drawn.
This is very often the case in country districts; if so, no payment will be called for, but a simple transfer in the banker’s books will settle the transaction. If the check is paid into a different bank, it will not be presented for payment, but liquidated by set-off against other checks; and, in a state of circumstances favorable to a general extension of banking credits, a banker who has granted more credit, and has therefore more checks drawn on him, will also have more checks on other bankers paid to him, and will only have to provide notes or cash for the payment of balances; for which purpose the ordinary reserve of prudent bankers, one third of their liabilities, will abundantly suffice. § 5. On what the use of Credit depends.
The credit given to any one by those with whom he deals does not depend on the quantity of bank-notes or coin in circulation at the time, but on their opinion of his solvency. If any consideration of a more general character enters into their calculation, it is only in a time of pressure on the loan market, when they are not certain of being themselves able to obtain the credit on which they have been accustomed to rely; and even then, what they look to is the general state of the loan market, and not (preconceived theory apart) the amount of bank-notes. So far, as to the willingness to _give_ credit. And the willingness of a dealer to _use_ his credit depends on his expectations of gain, that is, on his opinion of the probable future price of his commodity; an opinion grounded either on the rise or fall already going on, or on his prospective judgment respecting the supply and the rate of consumption. When a dealer extends his purchases beyond his immediate means of payment, engaging to pay at a specified time, he does so in the expectation either that the transaction will have terminated favorably before that time arrives, or that he shall then be in possession of sufficient funds from the proceeds of his other transactions. The fulfillment of these expectations depends upon prices, but not specially upon the amount of bank-notes. It is obvious, however, that prices do not depend on money, but on purchases. Money left with a banker, and not drawn against, or drawn against for other purposes than buying commodities, has no effect on prices, any more than credit which is not used. Credit which _is_ used to purchase commodities affects prices in the same manner as money. Money and credit are thus exactly on a par in their effect on prices.
It is often seen, in our large cities, that money is very plentiful, but no one seems to wish its use (that is, no one with safe securities). Inability to find investments and to find industries in which the rate of profit is satisfactory—all of which depends on the business character and activity of the people—will prevent credit from being used, no matter how many bank-notes, or greenbacks, or how much gold there is in the country. It is impossible to make people invest, simply by increasing the number of counters by which commodities are exchanged against each other; that is, by increasing the money. The reason why more credit is wanted is because men see that increased production is possible of a kind that will find other commodities ready to be offered (i.e., demand) in exchange for that production. Normal credit, therefore, on a healthy basis, increases and slackens with the activity or dullness of trade. Speculation, or the wild extension of credit, on the other hand, is apt to be begotten by a plethora of money, which has induced low rates for loans, and moves with the uncertain waves of popular impression. By normal credit we mean that the wealth represented by the credit is really at the disposal of the borrowers; in a crisis, the quantity of wealth supposed to be represented by credit is very much greater than that at the disposal of the lenders.(246)
Ideas discussed in this chapter
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