Principles of Political Economy · John Stuart Mill
Chapter VI. Of An Interference Of Government Grounded On Erroneous Theories.
It was shown, however, in our analysis of the effects of international trade, as it had been often shown by former writers, that the importation of foreign commodities, in the common course of traffic, never takes place except when it is, economically speaking, a national good, by causing the same amount of commodities to be obtained at a smaller cost of labor and capital to the country. To prohibit, therefore, this importation, or impose duties which prevent it, is to render the labor and capital of the country less efficient in production than they would otherwise be, and compel a waste of the difference between the labor and capital necessary for the home production of the commodity and that which is required for producing the things with which it can be purchased from abroad. The amount of national loss thus occasioned is measured by the excess of the price at which the commodity is produced over that at which it could be imported. In the case of manufactured goods the whole difference between the two prices is absorbed in indemnifying the producers for waste of labor, or of the capital which supports that labor. Those who are supposed to be benefited, namely, the makers of the protected articles (unless they form an exclusive company, and have a monopoly against their own countrymen as well as against foreigners), do not obtain higher profits than other people. All is sheer loss to the country as well as to the consumer.
Of the industries in a country some are said to “need protection” and others not—that is, those industries which are carried on at a relative disadvantage are the only ones which need protection in order that they may continue in operation. By relative disadvantage is meant a greater relative cost, or sacrifice, to the same amount of labor and capital. Those industries which can not yield so great a value for the labor and capital engaged in them as other more profitable industries are those which are said to “need protection.” Wherever protective duties exist it is implied by those who lay them on that there production is carried on under more onerous conditions than in other competing places or occupations. After duties are thus supposed to have protected the less advantageously situated occupations, it may be said that all industries will then have an equal chance. “No doubt,” as Mr. Cairnes says, “they would be equalized just as by compelling every one to move about with a weight attached to his leg. The weight would, indeed, be an impediment to locomotion, but, provided it were in each case exactly proportioned to the strength of the limb which drew it, no one ... would have any reason to complain. No one would walk as fast as if his limbs were free, but then his neighbor would be equally fettered, and, if it took him twice as long to reach his destination as before, he would at least have company on his journey.”(357)
The principle of the Mercantile Theory is now given up even by writers and governments who still cling to the restrictive system. Whatever hold that system has over men’s minds, independently of the private interests exposed to real or apprehended loss by its abandonment, is derived from fallacies other than the old notion of the benefits of heaping up money in the country. The most effective of these is the specious plea of employing our own countrymen and our national industry, instead of feeding and supporting the industry of foreigners. The answer to this, from the principles laid down in former chapters, is evident. Without reverting to the fundamental theorem discussed in an early part of the present treatise,(358) respecting the nature and sources of employment for labor, it is sufficient to say, what has usually been said by the advocates of free trade, that the alternative is not between employing our own people and foreigners, but between employing one class and another of our own people. The imported commodity is always paid for, directly or indirectly, with the produce of our own industry: that industry being, at the same time, rendered more productive, since, with the same labor and outlay, we are enabled to possess ourselves of a greater quantity of the article.
Those who have not well considered the subject are apt to suppose that our exporting an equivalent in our own produce, for the foreign articles we consume, depends on contingencies—on the consent of foreign countries to make some corresponding relaxation of their own restrictions, or on the question whether those from whom we buy are induced by that circumstance to buy more from us; and that, if these things, or things equivalent to them, do not happen, the payment must be made in money. Now, in the first place, there is nothing more objectionable in a money payment than in payment by any other medium, if the state of the market makes it the most advantageous remittance; and the money itself was first acquired, and would again be replenished, by the export of an equivalent value of our own products. But, in the next place, a very short interval of paying in money would so lower prices as either to stop a part of the importation, or raise up a foreign demand for our produce, sufficient to pay for the imports.
I grant that this disturbance of the equation of international demand would be in some degree to our disadvantage, in the purchase of other imported articles; and that a country which prohibits some foreign commodities, does, _cæteris paribus_, obtain those which it does not prohibit at a less price than it would otherwise have to pay. To express the same thing in other words: a country which destroys or prevents altogether certain branches of foreign trade, thereby annihilating a general gain to the world, which would be shared in some proportion between itself and other countries, does, in some circumstances, draw to itself, at the expense of foreigners, a larger share than would else belong to it of the gain arising from that portion of its foreign trade which it suffers to subsist. But even this it can only be enabled to do, if foreigners do not maintain equivalent prohibitions or restrictions against its commodities. In any case, the justice or expediency of destroying one of two gains, in order to engross a rather larger share of the other, does not require much discussion; the gain, too, which is destroyed, being, in proportion to the magnitude of the transactions, the larger of the two, since it is the one which capital, left to itself, is supposed to seek by preference.
Since the introduction of steamships and the advance of invention in naval contrivances, the plea for navigation laws on the ground that they keep up a “nursery of seamen” for the navy is practically obsolete. The “seaman” employed on the modern naval ships more nearly resembles the artisan in a manufacturing establishment; he need have but comparatively little knowledge of the sea, since the days of sailing-vessels have passed by, so far as naval warfare is concerned. Steam and mechanical appliances now do what was before done by wind and sail. While Mr. Mill thinks navigation laws were economically—that is, so far as increase of wealth is concerned—disadvantageous, yet he believes that they may have been “politically expedient.” It is possible, for example, that retaliation by the United States and other countries against England early in this century brought about the remission of the English restrictions on foreign shipping. But it is quite another thing to say that such laws produced an ability to sail ships more cheaply. That the English navigation acts of 1651 built up English shipping is not supported by many proofs; whereas it is very distinctly shown that English shipping languished and suffered under them.(360) Moreover, under the _régime_ of steam and iron (which drew out England’s peculiar advantages in iron and coal), in all its history English shipping never prospered more than it has since the abolition in 1849 of the navigation laws—events which have taken place since Mr. Mill wrote.
The United States is still weighed down by navigation laws adapted to mediæval conditions, and the relics of a time when retaliation was the cause of their enactment. So long as wooden vessels did the carrying-trade, the natural advantages of the United States gave us a proud position on the ocean. Now, however, when it is a question of cheaper iron, steel, and coal for vessels of iron and steel, we are at a possible disadvantage, and the bulk of navigation laws proposed in these days are intended to draw capital either by raising prices through duties on ships and materials, or by outright bounties and subsidies from industries in which we have advantages, to building ships. And until of late no distinction has been made between ship-building and ship-owning (or ship-sailing). Within the last year (1884) many burdens on ship-sailing have been removed; but even when we are permitted to sail ships on equal terms with foreigners, we can not yet build them with as small a cost as England (which is proved by the very demand of the builders of iron vessels for the retention of protective duties), and our laws do not as yet allow us to buy ships abroad and sail them under our own flag.(361)
With regard to subsistence, the plea of the Protectionists has been so often and so triumphantly met, that it requires little notice here. That country is the most steadily as well as the most abundantly supplied with food which draws its supplies from the largest surface. It is ridiculous to found a general system of policy on so improbable a danger as that of being at war with all the nations of the world at once; or to suppose that, even if inferior at sea, a whole country could be blockaded like a town, or that the growers of food in other countries would not be as anxious not to lose an advantageous market as we should be not to be deprived of their corn.
In countries in which the system of Protection is declining, but not yet wholly given up, such as the United States, a doctrine has come into notice which is a sort of compromise between free trade and restriction, namely, that protection for protection’s sake is improper, but that there is nothing objectionable in having as much protection as may incidentally result from a tariff framed solely for revenue. Even in England regret is sometimes expressed that a “moderate fixed duty” was not preserved on corn, on account of the revenue it would yield. Independently, however, of the general impolicy of taxes on the necessaries of life, this doctrine overlooks the fact that revenue is received only on the quantity imported, but that the tax is paid on the entire quantity consumed. To make the public pay much, that the treasury may receive a little, is no eligible mode of obtaining a revenue. In the case of manufactured articles the doctrine involves a palpable inconsistency. The object of the duty as a means of revenue is inconsistent with its affording, even incidentally, any protection. It can only operate as protection in so far as it prevents importation, and to whatever degree it prevents importation it affords no revenue. § 4. —on the ground of encouraging young industries; colonial policy.
The only case in which, on mere principles of political economy, protecting duties can be defensible, is when they are imposed temporarily (especially in a young and rising nation) in hopes of naturalizing a foreign industry, in itself perfectly suitable to the circumstances of the country. The superiority of one country over another in a branch of production often arises only from having begun it sooner. There may be no inherent advantage on one part, or disadvantage on the other, but only a present superiority of acquired skill and experience. A country which has this skill and experience yet to acquire may in other respects be better adapted to the production than those which were earlier in the field; and, besides, it is a just remark of Mr. Rae that nothing has a greater tendency to promote improvements in any branch of production than its trial under a new set of conditions. But it can not be expected that individuals should, at their own risk, or rather to their certain loss, introduce a new manufacture, and bear the burden of carrying it on, until the producers have been educated up to the level of those with whom the processes are traditional. A protecting duty, continued for a reasonable time, will sometimes be the least inconvenient mode in which the nation can tax itself for the support of such an experiment. But the protection should be confined to cases in which there is good ground of assurance that the industry which it fosters will after a time be able to dispense with it; nor should the domestic producers ever be allowed to expect that it will be continued to them beyond the time necessary for a fair trial of what they are capable of accomplishing.
The great difficulty with this proposal is that it introduces (what is inconsistent with Mr. Mill’s general system) the Socialistic basis of state-help, instead of self-help. If industries will never support themselves, then, of course, it is a misappropriation of the property of its citizens whenever a government takes a slice by taxation from productive industries and gives it to a less productive one to make up its deficiencies. The only possible theory of protection to young industries is that, if protected for a season, the industries may soon grow strong and stand alone. Mr. Mill never contemplated anything else. But the difficulty is constantly met with, in putting this theory into practice, that the industry, once that it has learned to depend on the help of the state, never reaches a stage when it is willing to give up the assistance of the duties. Dependence on legislation begets a want of self-reliance, and destroys the stimulus to progress and good management. It is said: “There has never been an instance in the history of the country where the representatives of such industries, who have enjoyed protection for a long series of years, have been willing to submit to a reduction of the tariff, or have proposed it. But, on the contrary, their demands for still higher and higher duties are insatiable, and never intermitted.”(362) The question of fact, as to whether or not the United States is indebted for its present manufacturing position to protection when our industries were young, seems to be capable of answer, and an answer which shows that protection was imposed generally after the industries got a foothold, and that very little assistance was derived from the duties on imports.(363)
The following explanation by Mr. Mill(364) of the meaning put upon his argument of protection to young industries by those who have applied it to the United States will be of no slight interest: “The passage has been made use of to show the inapplicability of free trade to the United States, and for similar purpose in the Australian colonies, erroneously in my opinion, but certainly with more plausibility than can be the case in the United States, for Australia really is a new country whose capabilities for carrying on manufactures can not yet be said to have been tested; but the manufacturing parts of the United States—New England and Pennsylvania—are no longer new countries; they have carried on manufactures on a large scale, and with the benefit of high protecting duties, for at least two generations; their operatives have had full time to acquire the manufacturing skill in which those of England had preceded them; there has been ample experience to prove that the alleged inability of their manufactures to compete in the American market with those of Great Britain does not arise merely from the more recent date of their establishment, but from the fact that American labor and capital can, in the present circumstances of America, be employed with greater return, and greater advantage to the national wealth, in the production of other articles. I have never for a moment recommended or countenanced any protecting industry except for the purpose of enabling the protected branch of industry, in a very moderate time, to become independent of protection. That moderate time in the United States has been exceeded, and if the cotton and iron of America still need protection against those of the other hemisphere, it is in my eyes a complete proof that they aught not to have it, and that the longer it is continued the greater the injustice and the waste of national resources will be.”
There is only one part of the protectionist scheme which requires any further notice: its policy toward colonies and foreign dependencies; that of compelling them to trade exclusively with the dominant country. A country which thus secures to itself an extra foreign demand for its commodities, undoubtedly gives itself some advantage in the distribution of the general gains of the commercial world. Since, however, it causes the industry and capital of the colony to be diverted from channels which are proved to be the most productive, inasmuch as they are those into which industry and capital spontaneously tend to flow, there is a loss, on the whole, to the productive powers of the world, and the mother-country does not gain so much as she makes the colony lose. If, therefore, the mother-country refuses to acknowledge any reciprocity of obligations, she imposes a tribute on the colony in an indirect mode, greatly more oppressive and injurious than the direct. § 5. —on the ground of high wages.
The discussion by Mr. Cairnes on the question of wages as affected by the tariff is such that I have quoted it as fully as possible: “The position taken in the United States is that protection is only needed and only asked for where American industry is placed under a disadvantage, as compared with the industry of foreign countries.... The rates of wages measured in money are higher in the United States than in Europe, and, therefore, it is argued, the cost of producing commodities is higher.... The high rates of wages in the United States are not peculiar to any branch of industry, but are universal throughout its whole range. If, therefore, a high rate of wages proves a high cost of production, and a high cost of production proves a need of protection, it follows that the farmers of Illinois and the cotton-planters of the Southern States stand in as much need of fostering legislation as the cotton-spinners of New England or the iron-masters of Pennsylvania! A criterion which leads to such results must, I think, be regarded as sufficiently condemned. The fallacy is, in truth, ... that all industries are not in each country equally favored or disfavored by nature, and have not, therefore, equal need of this protecting care. If American protectionists are not prepared to demand protective duties in favor of the Illinois farmer against the competition of his English rival, they are bound to admit either that a high cost of production is not incompatible with effective competition, or else that a high rate of wages does not prove a high cost of production; and if this is not so in Illinois, then I wish to know why the case should be different in Pennsylvania or in New England. If a high rate of wages in the first of these States be consistent with a low cost of production, why may not a high rate of wages in Pennsylvania be consistent with a low cost of producing coal and iron?
“The rate of wages, whether measured in money or in the real remuneration of the laborer, affords an approximate criterion of the cost of production,(365) either of money, or of the commodities that enter into the laborer’s real remuneration, _but in a sense the inverse of that in which it is understood in the argument under consideration_: in other words, a high rate of wages indicates not a high but a low cost of production.(366) ... Thus in the United States the rate of wages is high, whether measured in gold or in the most important articles of the laborer’s consumption—a fact which proves that the cost of producing gold, as well as that of producing those other commodities, is low in the United States.... I would ask [objectors] to consider what are the true causes of the high remuneration of American industry. It will surely be admitted that, in the last resort, these resolve themselves into the one great fact of its high productive power.... I must, therefore, contend that the high scale of industrial remuneration in America, instead of being evidence of a high cost of production in that country, is distinctly evidence of a low cost of production—of a low cost of production, that is to say, in the first place, of gold, and, in the next, of the commodities which mainly constitute the real wages of labor—a description which embraces at once the most important raw materials of industry and the most important articles of general consumption. As regards commodities not included in this description, the criterion of wages stands in no constant relation of any kind to their cost, and is, therefore, simply irrelevant to the point at issue. And now we may see what this claim for protection to American industry, _founded on the high scale of American remuneration_, really comes to: it is a demand for special legislative aid in consideration of the possession of special industrial facilities—a complaint, in short, against the exceptional bounty of nature.
“Perhaps I shall here be asked, How, if the case be so—if the high rate of industrial remuneration in America be only evidence of a low cost of production—the fact is to be explained, since fact it undoubtedly is, that the people of the United States are unable to compete in neutral markets, in the sale of certain important wares, with England and other European countries?(367) No one will say that the people of New England, New York, and Pennsylvania, are deficient in any industrial qualities possessed by the workmen of any country in the world. How happens it, then, that, enjoying industrial advantages superior to other countries, they are yet unable to hold their own against them in the general markets of commerce? I shall endeavor to meet this objection fairly, and, in the first place, let me state what my contention is with regard to the cost of production in America. I do not contend that it is low in the case of all commodities capable of being produced in the country, but only in that of a large, very important, but still limited group. With regard to commodities lying outside this group, I hold that the rate of wages is simply no evidence as to the cost of their production, one way or the other.
But, secondly, I beg the reader to consider what is meant by the alleged ‘inability’ of New England and Pennsylvania to compete, let us say, with Manchester and Sheffield, in the manufacture of calico and cutlery. What it means, and what it only can mean, is that they are unable to do so _consistently with obtaining that rate of remuneration on their industry which is current in the United States_. If only American laborers and capitalists would be content with the wages and profits current in Great Britain, there is nothing that I know of to prevent them from holding their own in any markets to which Manchester and Sheffield can send their wares. And this brings us to the heart of the question. Over a large portion of the great field of industry the people of the United States enjoy, as compared with those of Europe, (1) advantages of a very exceptional kind; over the rest (2) the advantage is less decided, or (3) they stand on a par with Europeans, or (4) possibly they are, in some instances, at a disadvantage.
Ideas discussed in this chapter
Text from Project Gutenberg, public domain in the United States.