Secret Diplomatic History of The Eighteenth Century · Karl Marx
NO. 3.--SIR JAMES HARRIS TO LORD GRANTHAM.
"Petersburg, 16 (27 August), 1782. "(Private.) " ... On my arrival here I found the Court very different from what it had been described to me. So far from any partiality to England, its bearings were entirely French. The King of Prussia (then in possession of the Empress' ear) was exerting his influence against us. Count Panin assisted him powerfully; Lacy and Corberon, the Bourbon Ministers, were artful and intriguing; Prince Potemkin had been wrought upon by them; and the whole tribe which surrounded the Empress--the Schuwaloffs, Stroganoffs, and Chernicheffs--were what they still are, _garçons perruquiers de Paris_. Events seconded their endeavours. The assistance the French affected to afford Russia in settling its disputes with the Porte, and the two Courts being immediately after united as mediators at the Peace of Teschen, contributed not a little to reconcile them to each other. I was, therefore, not surprised that all my negotiations with Count Panin, _from February, 1778, to July, 1779_, should be unsuccessful, as he meant to prevent, not to promote, an alliance. It was in vain we made concessions to obtain it. He ever started fresh difficulties; had ever fresh obstacles ready. A very serious evil resulted, in the meanwhile, from my apparent confidence in him.
He availed himself of it to convey in his reports to the Empress, not the language I employed, and the sentiments I actually expressed, but the language and sentiments he wished I should employ and express. He was equally careful to conceal her opinions and feelings from me; and while he described England to her as obstinate, and overbearing, and reserved, he described the Empress to me as displeased, disgusted, and indifferent to our concerns; and he was so convinced that, by this double misrepresentation, he had shut up every avenue of success that, at the time when I presented to him the Spanish declaration, he ventured to say to me, ministerially, '_That Great Britain had, by its own haughty conduct, brought down all its misfortunes on itself; that they were now at their height; that we must consent to any concession to obtain peace; and that we could expect neither assistance from our friends nor forbearance from our enemies._' I had temper enough not to give way to my feelings on this occasion.... I applied, without loss of time, to Prince Potemkin, and, by his means, the Empress _condescended_ to see me alone at Peterhoff.
I was so fortunate in this interview, as not only to efface all bad impressions she had against us, but by stating in its true light, our situation, and THE INSEPARABLE INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN AND RUSSIA, to raise in her mind a decided resolution to assist us. _This resolution she declared to me in express words._ When this transpired--and Count Panin was the first who knew it--he became my implacable and inveterate enemy. He not only thwarted by falsehoods and by a most undue exertion of his influence my public negotiations, but employed every means the lowest and most vindictive malice could suggest to depreciate and injure me personally; and from the very infamous accusations with which he charged me, had I been prone to fear, I might have apprehended the most infamous attacks at his hands. This relentless persecution still continues; it has outlived his Ministry. _Notwithstanding the positive assurances I had received from the Empress herself_, he found means, first to stagger, and afterwards to alter her resolutions. He was, indeed, very officiously assisted by his Prussian Majesty, who, at the time, was as much bent on oversetting our interest as he now seems eager to restore it.
I was not, however, disheartened by this first disappointment, and, by redoubling my efforts, _I have twice more, during the course of my mission, brought the Empress to the verge_ (!) _of standing forth our professed friend_, and, each time, my _expectations were grounded on assurances from her own mouth_. The first was when _our enemies conjured up the armed_ neutrality;[10] the other WHEN MINORCA WAS OFFERED HER. Although, on the first of these occasions, I found the same opposition from the same quarter I had experienced before, yet I am compelled to say that the principal cause of my failure was attributable to the very awkward manner in which we replied to the famous neutral declaration of February, 1780. As I well knew from what quarter the blow would come, I was prepared to parry it. _My opinion was: 'If England feels itself strong enough to do without Russia, let it reject at once these new-fangled doctrines; but if its situation is such as to want assistance, let it yield to the necessity of the hour, recognise them as far as they relate to_ RUSSIA ALONE, _and by a well-timed act of complaisance insure itself a powerful friend._'[11] My opinion was _not_ received; an ambiguous and trimming answer was given; _we seemed equally afraid to accept or dismiss them.
I was instructed secretly to oppose, but avowedly to acquiesce in them_, and some unguarded expressions of one of its then confidential servants, made use of in speaking to Mr. Simolin, in direct contradiction to the temperate and cordial language that Minister had heard from Lord Stormont, _irritated_ the Empress to the last degree, and completed the _dislike_ and _bad opinion_ she entertained of that Administration.[12] Our enemies took advantage of these _circumstances_.... I SUGGESTED THE IDEA OF GIVING UP MINORCA TO THE EMPRESS, _because, as it was evident to me we should at the peace be compelled to make sacrifices, it seemed to me wiser to make them to our friends than to our enemies_. THE IDEA WAS ADOPTED AT HOME IN ITS WHOLE EXTENT,[13] _and nothing could be more perfectly calculated to the meridian of this Court than the judicious instructions I received on this occasion from Lord Stormont.
Why_ this project failed I am still at a loss to learn. _I never knew the Empress incline so strongly to any one measure as she did to this, before I had my full powers to treat, nor was I ever more astonished than when I found her shrink from her purpose when they arrived._ I imputed it at the same time, in my own mind, to the _rooted aversion she had for our Ministry_, and her _total want of confidence in them_; but I since am more strongly disposed to believe that she consulted the Emperor (of Austria) on the subject, and that he not only prevailed on her to decline the offer, but betrayed the secret to France, and that it thus became public. I cannot otherwise account for this rapid _change of sentiment in the Empress_, particularly as _Prince Potemkin_ (whatever he might be in other transactions) was certainly in this _cordial and sincere_ in his support, and both from what I saw at the time, and from what has since come to my knowledge, _had its success at heart as much as myself_. You will observe, my lord, that _the idea of bringing the Empress forward as a friendly mediatrix went hand-in-hand with the proposed cession of Minorca_.
As this idea has given rise to what has since followed, and involved us in all the dilemmas of the present mediation, it will be necessary for me to explain what my views then were, and to exculpate myself from the blame of having placed my Court in so embarrassing a situation, _my wish and intention was that she should be sole mediatrix without an adjoint_; if you have perused what passed between her and me, in December, 1780, your lordship will readily perceive how very potent reasons I had to imagine she would be a friendly and even a partial one.[14] I knew, indeed, she was unequal to the task; but I knew, too, how greatly _her vanity_ would be flattered by this distinction, and was well aware that when once engaged she would persist, and be inevitably involved in our quarrel, particularly when it should appear (and appear it would) that we had _gratified_ her with Minorca. The annexing to the mediation the other (Austrian) Imperial Court entirely overthrew this plan.
It not only afforded her a pretence for not keeping her word, but piqued and mortified her; and it was under this impression that she made over the whole business to the colleague we had given her, and ordered her Minister at Vienna to subscribe implicitly to whatever the Court proposed. Hence all the evils which have since arisen, and hence those we at this moment experience. I myself could never be brought to believe that the Court of Vienna, as long as Prince Kaunitz directs its measures, can mean England any good or France any harm. It was not with that view that I endeavoured to promote its influence here, but because _I found that of Prussia in constant opposition to me_; and because I thought that if I could by any means smite this, I should get rid of my greatest obstacle. I was mistaken, and, by a singular fatality, the Courts of Vienna and Berlin seem never to have agreed in anything but in the disposition to prejudice us here by turns.[15] The proposal relative to Minorca was the last attempt I made to induce the Empress to stand forth.
I had exhausted my strength and resources; the freedom with which I had spoken in my last interview with her, though respectful, had _displeased_; and _from this period to the removal of the late Administration_, I have been reduced to act on the defensive.... I have had more difficulty in preventing the Empress from doing harm than I ever had in attempting to engage her to do us good. It was to prevent evil, that I inclined strongly for the acceptation of _her single mediation between us and Holland, when her Imperial Majesty first offered it_. The _extreme dissatisfaction_ she expressed _at our refusal_ justified my opinion; and I TOOK UPON ME, when it was proposed a second time, _to urge the necessity of its being agreed to_ (ALTHOUGH I KNEW IT TO BE IN CONTRADICTION OF THE SENTIMENTS OF MY PRINCIPAL), since I firmly believed, had we again declined it, the Empress would, in a _moment of anger_, have joined the Dutch against us.
As it is, _all has gone on well_; our _judicious_ conduct has transferred to them the _ill-humour_ she originally was in with us, and she now is as partial to our cause as she was before partial to theirs. _Since the new Ministry in England, my road has been made smoother_; the great and new path struck out by _your predecessor,[16] and which you, my lord, pursue_, has operated a most advantageous change in our favour upon the Continent. Nothing, indeed, but events which come home to her, will, I believe, ever induce her Imperial Majesty to take an active part; but there is now a _strong glow of friendship_ in our favour; she approves our measures; she _trusts_ our Ministry, and _she gives way to that predilection she certainly has for our nation_. Our enemies know and feel this; it keeps them in awe. This is a succinct but accurate sketch of what has passed at this Court from the day of my arrival at Petersburg to the present hour.
Several inferences may be deduced from it.[17] That the Empress is led by her passions, not by reason and argument; that her prejudices are very strong, easily acquired, and, when once fixed, irremovable; while, on the contrary, there is no sure road to her good opinion; that even when obtained, it is subject to perpetual fluctuation, and liable to be biassed by the most trifling incidents; that till she is fairly embarked in a plan, no assurances can be depended on; but that when once fairly embarked, she never retracts, and may be carried any length; that with very bright parts, an elevated mind, an uncommon sagacity, she wants _judgment_, _precision of idea_, _reflection_, _and_ L'ESPRIT DE COMBINAISON(!!) That her Ministers are either ignorant of, or indifferent to, the welfare of the State, and act from a passive submission to her will, or from motives of party and private interests."[18] 4. (MANUSCRIPT) ACCOUNT OF RUSSIA DURING THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE REIGN OF THE EMPEROR PAUL, DRAWN UP BY THE REV. L. K. PITT, CHAPLAIN TO THE FACTORY OF ST. PETERSBURG, AND A NEAR RELATIVE OF WILLIAM PITT.[19] _Extract._
"There can scarcely exist a doubt concerning the real sentiments of the late Empress of Russia on the great points which have, within the last few years, convulsed the whole system of European politics. She certainly felt from the beginning the fatal tendency of the new principles, but was not, perhaps, displeased to see every European Power exhausting itself in a struggle which raised, in proportion to its violence, her own importance. It is more than probable that the state of the newly acquired provinces in Poland was likewise a point which had considerable influence over the political conduct of Catherine. The fatal effects resulting from an apprehension of revolt in the late seat of conquest seem to have been felt in a very great degree by the combined Powers, who in the early period of the Revolution were so near reinstating the regular Government in France. The same dread of revolt in Poland, which divided the attention of the combined Powers and hastened their retreat, deterred likewise the late Empress of Russia from entering on the great theatre of war, until a combination of circumstances rendered the progress of the French armies a more dangerous evil than any which could possibly result to the Russian Empire from active operations.... The last words which the Empress was known to utter were addressed to her Secretary when she dismissed him on the morning on which she was seized: 'Tell Prince' (Zuboff), she said, 'to come to me at twelve, and to remind me of signing the Treaty of Alliance with England.'"
Having entered into ample considerations on the Emperor Paul's acts and extravagances, the Rev. Mr. Pitt continues as follows: "When these considerations are impressed on the mind, the nature of the late secession from the coalition, and of the incalculable indignities offered to the Government of Great Britain, can alone be fairly estimated.... BUT THE TIES WHICH BIND HER (GREAT BRITAIN) TO THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE ARE FORMED BY NATURE, AND INVIOLABLE. United, these nations might almost brave the united world; divided, the strength and importance of each is FUNDAMENTALLY impaired. England has reason to regret with Russia that the imperial sceptre should be thus inconsistently wielded, but it is the sovereign of Russia alone who divides the Empires." The reverend gentleman concludes his account by the words: "As far as human foresight can at this moment penetrate, the despair of an enraged individual seems a more probable means to terminate the present scene of oppression than any more systematic combination of measures to restore the throne of Russia to its dignity and importance."
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