Academica · Marcus Tullius Cicero
BOOK I.
9, τα ‛υποπιπτοντα τη αισθησει. _Aut ita mobiles_, etc.: this strongly reminds one of the _Theaetetus_, esp. 160 D sq. For _constans_ cf. εστηκος, which so often occurs there and in the _Sophistes_. _Ne idem_: Manut. for MSS. _eidem_. In the _Theaetetus_, Heraclitus' theory of flux is carried to such an extent as to destroy the self-identity of things; even the word εμε is stated to be an absurdity, since it implies a permanent subject, whereas the subject is changing from moment to moment; the expression therefore ought to be τους εμε. _Continenter_: ουνεχως; cf. Simplicius quoted in Grote's Plato, I. p. 37, about Heraclitus, εν μεταβολη γαρ συνεχει τα οντα. _Laberentur et fluerent_: cf. the phrases ‛ροη, παντα ‛ρει, ‛οιον ‛ρευματα κινεισθαι τα παντα, etc., which are scattered thickly over the _Theaet._ and the ancient texts about Heraclitus; also a very similar passage in _Orator_ 10. _Opinabilem_: δοξαστην, so _opinabile_ = δοξαστον in Cic. _Tim_ ch. II. The term was largely used by Xenocrates (R. and P. 243--247), Arist. too distinguishes between the δοξαστον and the επιστητον, e.g _Analyt. Post._ I. 33 (qu. R. and P. 264).
The word is foreign to the Classic Greek Prose, as are ετυμος and all its derivatives. (Ετυμως means "etymologically" in the _De Mundo_, which however is not Aristotle's). The word ετυμολογια is itself not frequent in the older Stoics, who use rather ονοματων ορθοτης (Diog. Laert. VII. 83), the title of their books on the subject preserved by Diog. is generally "περι των ετυμολογικων" The systematic pursuit of etymology was not earlier than Chrysippus, when it became distinctive of the Stoic school, though Zeno and Cleanthes had given the first impulse (_N.D._ III. 63). Specimens of Stoic etymology are given in _N.D._ II. and ridiculed in _N.D._ III. (cf. esp. 62 _in enodandis nominibus quod miserandum sit laboratis_). _Post argumentis et quasi rerum notis ducibus_: the use of etymology in rhetoric in order to prove something about the thing denoted by the word is well illustrated in _Topica_ 10, 35. In this rhetorical sense Cic. rejects the translation _veriloquium_ of ετυμολογια and adopts _notatio_, the _rerum nota_ (Greek συμβολον) being the name so explained (_Top._ 35). Varro translated ετυμολογια by _originatio_ (Quintil. I. 6, 28). Aristotle had already laid down rules for this rhetorical use of etymology, and Plato also incidentally adopts it, so it may speciously be said to belong to the old Academico-Peripatetic school.
A closer examination of authorities would have led Halm to retract his bad em. _notationibus_ for _notas ducibus_, the word _notatio_ is used for the whole science of etymology, and not for particular derivations, while Cic. in numerous passages (e.g. _D.F._ V. 74) describes _verba_ or _nomina_ as _rerum notae_. Berkley's _nodis_ for _notis_ has no support, (_enodatio nominum_ in _N.D._ III. 62 is quite different). One more remark, and I conclude this wearisome note. The _quasi_ marks _rerum nota_ as an unfamiliar trans. of συμβολον. Davies therefore ought not to have placed it before _ducibus_, which word, strong as the metaphor is, requires no qualification, see a good instance in _T.D._ I. 27. _Itaque tradebatur_: so Halm improves on Madvig's _ita_ for _in qua_ of the MSS., which cannot be defended. Orelli's reference to 30 _pars_ for an antecedent to _qua_ (_in ea parte in qua_) is violent, while Goerenz's resort to _partem rerum opinabilem_ is simply silly. Manut. conj. _in quo_, Cic. does often use the neut. pronoun, as in _Orator_ 3, but not quite thus. I have sometimes thought that Cic. wrote _haec, inquam_ (cf. _huic_ below). _Dialecticae_: as λογικη had not been Latinised, Cic. is obliged to use this word to denote λογικη, of which διαλεκτικη is really one subdivision with the Stoics and Antiochus, ‛ρητορικη which is mentioned in the next sentence being the other; see Zeller 69, 70. _Orationis ratione conclusae_: speech drawn up in a syllogistic form which becomes _oratio perpetua_ under the influence of ‛ρητορικη. _Quasi ex altera parte_: a trans. of Aristotle's αντιστροφος in the beginning of the _Rhetoric_. _Oratoria_: Halm brackets this word; cf. however a close parallel in _Brut._ 261 _oratorio ornamenta dicendi_. The construction is simply a variation of Cic.'s favourite double genitive (_T.D._ III. 39), _oratoria_ being put for _oratoris_. _Ad persuadendum_: το πιθανον is with Arist. and all ancient authorities the one aim of ‛ρητορικη.
To the objection that Varro (who in 8 says _nihil enim meorum magno opere miror_) would not eulogise himself quite so unblushingly, Goer. feebly replies that the eulogy is meant for Antiochus, whom Varro is copying. _Aristoteles_: after this the copyist of Halm's G. alone, and evidently on his own conjecture, inserts _igitur_, which H. adopts. Varro's resumption of his exposition is certainly abrupt, but if chapter IX. ought to begin here, as Halm supposes, a reader would not be much incommoded. _Labefactavit_, that Antiochus still continued to include Aristotle in the supposed old Academico-Peripatetic school can only be explained by the fact that he considered ethical resemblances as of supreme importance, cf. the strong statement of Varro in Aug. XIX. 1 _nulla est causa philosophandi nisi finis boni_. _Divinum_: see R. and P. 210 for a full examination of the relation in which Plato's ιδεαι stand to his notion of the deity. _Suavis_: his constant epithet, see Gellius qu. R. and P. 327. His real name was not Theophrastus, he was called so from his style (cf. _loquendi nitor ille divinus_, Quint. X. 1, 83). For _suavis_ of style cf. _Orat._ 161, _Brut._ 120. _Negavit_: for his various offences see _D.F._ V. 12 sq., _T.D._ V. 25, 85. There is no reason to suppose that he departed very widely from the Aristotelian ethics; we have here a Stoic view of him transmitted through Antiochus. In II. 134 Cic. speaks very differently of him. Between the particular tenet here mentioned and that of Antiochus in 22 the difference is merely verbal. _Beate vivere_: the only translation of ευδαιμονιαν. Cic. _N.D._ I. 95 suggests _beatitas_ and _beatitudo_ but does not elsewhere employ them.
This view of Madvig's is strongly opposed to the fact that Cic. in 36 had explained with perfect correctness the Stoic theory of the αδιαφορα, nor is there anywhere in the numerous passages where he touches on the theory any trace of the same error. My explanation is that Cic. began with the intention to speak of the _sumenda_ only and then rapidly extended his thought so as to embrace the whole class of αδιαφορα, which he accordingly dealt with in the latter part of the same sentence and in the succeeding sentence. (The remainder has its own difficulties, which I defer for the present.) Cic. therefore is chargeable not with ignorance of Stoicism but with careless writing. A striking parallel occurs in _D.F._ III. 52, _quae secundum locum obtinent_, προηγμενα _id est producta nominentur, quae vel ita appellemus, vel promota et remota_. If this language be closely pressed, the αποπροηγμενα are made of a subdivision of the προηγμενα, though no sensible reader would suppose Cic. to have had that intention. So if his words in _D.F._ V. 90 be pressed, the _sumenda_ are made to include both _producta_ and _reducta_, in _D.F._ III. 16 _appeterent_ includes _fugerent_, _ibid._ II. 86 the opposite of _beata vita_ is abruptly introduced. So _D.F._ II. 88 _frui dolore_ must be construed together, and _ibid._ II. 73 _pudor modestia pudicitia_ are said _coerceri_, the writer's thoughts having drifted on rapidly to the vices which are opposite to these virtues.
I now pass on to a second class of difficulties. Supposing that by _ex iis_ Cic. means _mediis_, and not _sumendis_, about which he had intended to talk when he began the sentence; I believe that _pluris aestimanda_ and _minoris aestimanda_ simply indicate the αξια and απαξια of the Greek, _not_ different degrees of αξια (positive value). That _minor aestimatio_ should mean απαξια need not surprise us when we reflect (1) on the excessive difficulty there was in expressing this απαξια or negative value in Latin, a difficulty I have already observed on 36; (2) on the strong negative meaning which _minor_ bears in Latin, e.g. _sin minus_ in Cic. means "but if not." Even the Greeks fall victims to the task of expressing απαξια. Stobaeus, in a passage closely resembling ours makes ελαττων αξια equivalent to πολλη απαξια (II. 6, 6), while Sext. Emp. after rightly defining αποπροηγμενα as τα ‛ικανην απαξιαν εχοντα (_Adv. Math._ XI. 62--64) again speaks of them as τα μη ‛ικανην εχοντα αξιαν (_Pyrrhon. Hypot._ III. 191) words which usually have an opposite meaning. Now I contend that Cicero's words _minoris aestimanda_ bear quite as strong a negative meaning as the phrase of Sextus, τα μη ‛ικανην αξιαν εχοντα.
I therefore conclude that Cicero has striven, so far as the Latin language allowed, to express the Stoic doctrine that, of the αδιαφορα, some have αξια while others have απαξια. He may fairly claim to have applied to his words the rule "_re intellecta in verborum usu faciles esse debemus_" (_D.F._ III. 52). There is quite as good ground for accusing Sextus and Stobaeus of misunderstanding the Stoics as there is for accusing Cicero. There are difficulties connected with the terms ‛ικανη αξια and ‛ικανη απαξια which are not satisfactorily treated in the ordinary sources of information; I regret that my space forbids me to attempt the elucidation of them. The student will find valuable aid in the notes of Madv. on the passages of the _D.F._ quoted in this note. _Non tam rebus quam vocabulis_: Cic. frequently repeats this assertion of Antiochus, who, having stolen the clothes of the Stoics, proceeded to prove that they had never properly belonged to the Stoics at all. _Inter recte factum atque peccatum_: Stob. speaks II. 6, 6 of τα μεταξυ αρετης και κακιας. (This does not contradict his words a little earlier, II. 6, 5, αρετης δε και κακιας ουδεν μεταξυ, which have regard to divisions of men, not of actions. Diog. Laert., however, VII. 127, distinctly contradicts Cic. and Stob., see R. and P. 393.) _Recte factum_ = κατορθωμα, _peccatum_ = ‛αμαρτημα, _officium_ = καθηκον (cf. R. and P. 388--394, Zeller 238--248, 268--272). _Servata praetermissaque_: MSS. have _et_ before _servata_, which all edd. since Lamb. eject. Where _et_ and _que_ correspond in Cic., the _que_ is always an afterthought, added in oblivion of the _et_. With two nouns, adjectives, adverbs, or participles, this oblivion is barely possible, but when the conjunctions go with separate _clauses_ it is possible. Cf. 43 and _M.D.F._ V. 64.
The battle between virtue and vice therefore did not resemble a war between two separate powers, as in Plato and Aristotle, but a civil war carried on in one and the same country. _Virtutis usum_: cf. the description of Aristotle's _finis_ in _D.F._ II. 19. _Ipsum habitum_: the mere possession. So Plato, _Theaetet._ 197 B, uses the word ‛εξις, a use which must be clearly distinguished from the later sense found in the _Ethics_ of Arist. In this sense virtue is _not_ a ‛εξις, according to the Stoics, but a διαθεσις (Stob. II. 6, 5, Diog. VII. 89; yet Diog. sometimes speaks of virtue loosely as a ‛εξις, VII. 92, 93; cf. Zeller 249, with footnotes). _Nec virtutem cuiquam adesse ... uteretur_: cf. Stob. II. 6, 6 δυο γενη των ανθρωπων ειναι το μεν των σπουδαιων, το δε των φαυλων, και το μεν των σπουδαιων δια παντος του βιου χρησθαι ταις αρεταις, το δε των φαυλων ταις κακιαις. _Perturbationem_: I am surprised that Halm after the fine note of Wesenberg, printed on p. 324 of the same volume in which Halm's text of the _Acad._ appears, should read the plural _perturbationes_, a conj. of Walker. _Perturbationem_ means emotion in the abstract; _perturbationes_ below, particular emotions. There is exactly the same transition in _T.D._ III. 23, 24, IV.
59, 65, V. 43, while _perturbatio_ is used, in the same sense as here, in at least five other passages of the _T.D._, i.e. IV. 8, 11, 24, 57, 82. _Quasi mortis_: a trans. of Stoic παθεσι, which Cic. rejects in _D.F._ III. 35. _Voluit carere sapientem_: emotion being a disturbance of equilibrium in the reason, and perfect reason being virtue (20), it follows that the Stoic sapiens must be emotionless (Zeller 228 sq.). All emotions are reasonless; ‛ηδονη or _laetitia_ for instance is αλογος επαρσις. (_T.D._ Books III. and IV. treat largely of the Stoic view of emotions.) Wesenberg, _Em._ to the _T.D._ III. p. 8, says Cic. always uses _efferri laetitia_ but _ferri libidine_. §39. _Aliaque in parte_: so Plato, _Tim._ 69 C, _Rep._ 436, 441, Arist. _De Anima_ II. 3, etc.; cf. _T.D._ I. 20. _Voluntarias_: the whole aim of the Stoic theory of the emotions was to bring them under the predominance of the will. How the moral freedom of the will was reconciled with the general Stoic fatalism we are not told. _Opinionisque iudicio suscipi_: all emotion arose, said the Stoics, from a false judgment about some external object; cf. Diog. VII. 111. τα παθη κρισεις ειναι. Instances of each in Zeller 233. For _iudicio_ cf. _D.F._ III. 35, _T.D._ III. 61, IV. 14, 15, 18. _Intemperantiam_: the same in _T.D._ IV. 22, Gk. ακολασια, see Zeller 232. _Quintam naturam_: the πεμπτη ουσια or πεμπτον σωμα of Aristotle, who proves its existence in _De Coelo_ I. 2, in a curious and recondite fashion. Cic. is certainly wrong in stating that Arist. derived _mind_ from this fifth element, though the finest and highest of material substances. He always guards himself from assigning a material origin to mind. Cic. repeats the error in _T.D._ I. 22, 41, 65, _D.F._ IV. 12. On this last passage Madv. has an important note, but he fails to recognise the essential fact, which is clear from Stob.
I. 41, 33, that the Peripatetics of the time were in the habit of deriving the mind from αιθηρ, which is the very name that Aristotle gives to the fifth element (σωμα αιθεριον in the _De Coelo_), and of giving this out to be Aristotle's opinion. The error once made, no one could correct it, for there were a hundred influences at work to confirm it, while the works of Aristotle had fallen into a strange oblivion. I cannot here give an exhaustive account of these influences, but will mention a few. Stoicism had at the time succeeded in powerfully influencing every other sect, and it placed νους εν αιθερι (see Plutarch, qu. R. and P. 375). It had destroyed the belief in immaterial existence The notion that νους or ψυχη came from αιθηρ was also fostered by the language of Plato. He had spoken of the soul as αεικινητος in passages which were well known to Cic. and had taken great hold on his mind One from the _Phaedrus_ 245 C is translated twice, in _Somnium Scipionis_ (_De Rep._ VI.), and _T.D._ I. 53 sq.
Now the only thing with Aristotle which is αεικινητος in eternal perfect circular motion (for to the ancients circular motion is alone perfect and eternal), is the αιθηρ or πεμπτον σωμα, that fiery external rim of the universe of which the stars are mere nodes, and with which they revolve. How natural then, in the absence of Aristotle's works, to conclude that the αεικινητος ψυχη of Plato came from the αεικινητος αιθηρ of Aristotle! Arist. had guarded himself by saying that the soul as an αρχη κινησεως must be ακινητος, but Cic. had no means of knowing this (see Stob. I. 41, 36). Again, Plato had often spoken of souls at death flying away to the outer circle of the universe, as though to their natural home, just where Arist. placed his πεμπτον σωμα Any one who will compare _T.D._ I. 43 with the _Somn. Scipionis_ will see what power this had over Cicero. Further, Cic. would naturally link the mind in its origin with the stars which both Plato and Arist. looked on as divine (cf. _Somn.
Scip._ 15) These considerations will be enough to show that neither Cic. nor Antiochus, whom Madv. considers responsible for the error, could have escaped it in any way not superhuman except by the recovery of Aristotle's lost works, which did not happen till too late. _Sensus_: we seem here to have a remnant of the distinction drawn by Arist. between animal heat and other heat, the former being αναλογον τω των αστρων στοιχειω (_De Gen. An._ II. 3, qu. R. and P. 299). _Ignem_: the Stoics made no difference, except one of degree, between αιθηρ and πυρ, see Zeller 189, 190. _Ipsam naturam_: πυρ is κατ' εξοχην στοιχειον (Stob. I. 10, 16), and is the first thing generated from the αποιος ‛υλη; from it comes air, from air water, from water earth (Diog. Laert. VII. 136, 137) The fire is λογικον, from it comes the ‛ηγεμονικον of man, which comprises within it all powers of sensation and thought. These notions came from Heraclitus who was a great hero of the Stoics (Zeller ch. VIII. with notes) For his view of sensation and thought see Sextus _Adv. Math._ VII.
127--129, qu. by R. and P. 21. The Stoics probably misunderstood him; cf. R. and P. "Heraclitus," and Grote's _Plato_ I. 34 sq. _Expers corporis_: for Stoic materialism see Zeller, pp. 120 sq. The necessity of a connection between the perceiving mind and the things perceived followed from old physical principles such as that of Democritus (ου γαρ εγχωρειν τα ‛ετερα και διαφεροντα πασχειν ‛υπ' αλληλων, qu. from Arist. _De Gen. et Corr._ I. 7, by R. and P. 43), the same is affirmed loosely of all the old φυσικοι, (Sextus _Adv. Math._ VII. 116), and by Empedocles in his lines γαιαι μεν γαιαν οπωπαμεν, etc. Plato in the _Timaeus_ fosters the same notion, though in a different way. The Stoics simply followed out boldly that line of thought. _Xenocrates_: see II. 124, n. _Superiores_: merely the supposed old Academico-Peripatetic school. _Posse esse non corpus_: there is no ultimate difference between Force and Matter in the Stoic scheme, see Zeller, pp. 134, 135.
145. _Nova enim dicebat_: an admission not often made by Cic., who usually contends, with Antiochus, that Zeno merely renamed old doctrines (cf. 43). _Sensum_: so Stob., I. 41, 25 applies the term αισθησις to the φαντασια. _Scientiam_: the word επιστημη is used in two ways by the Stoics, (1) to denote a number of coordinated or systematised perceptions (καταληψεις or καταληπτικαι φαντασιαι) sometimes also called τεχνη (cf. Sext. _Pyrrh. Hyp._ III. 188 τεχνην δε ειναι συστημα εκ καταληψεων συγγεγυμνασμενων); (2) to denote a single perception, which use is copied by Cic. and may be seen in several passages quoted by Zeller 80. _Ut convelli ratione non posset_: here is a trace of later Stoicism. To Zeno all καταληπτικαι φαντασιαι were ασφαλεις, αμεταπτωτοι ‛υπο λογου. Later Stoics, however, allowed that some of them were not impervious to logical tests; see Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 253, qu. Zeller 88. Thus every καταληπτικη φαντασια, instead of carrying with it its own evidence, had to pass through the fire of sceptical criticism before it could be believed. This was, as Zeller remarks, equivalent to giving up all that was valuable in the Stoic theory. _Inscientiam: ex qua exsisteret_: I know nothing like this in the Stoic texts; αμαθια is very seldom talked of there. _Opinio_: δοξα, see Zeller and cf. _Ac._ II. 52, _T.D._ II. 52, IV. 15, 26.
Ideas discussed in this chapter
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