The dialogues of Plato in five volumes, Vol. 2 · Plato
ALCIBIADES, SOCRATES.
_Soc._ I will proceed; and, although no lover likes to speak with one who has no feeling of love in him[56], I will make an effort, and tell you what I meant: My love, Alcibiades, which 105 I hardly like to confess, would long ago have passed away, as I flatter myself, if I saw you loving your good things, or thinking that you ought to pass life in the enjoyment of them. But I shall reveal other thoughts of yours, which you keep to yourself; whereby you will know that I have always had my eye on you. Suppose that at this moment some God came to you and said: Alcibiades, will you live as you are, or die in an instant if you are forbidden to make any further acquisition?—I verily believe that you would choose death. And I will tell you the hope in which you are at present living: Before many days have elapsed, you think that you will come before the Athenian assembly, and will prove to them that you are more worthy of honour than Pericles, or any other man that ever lived, and having proved this, you will have the greatest power in the state.
When you have gained the greatest power among us, you will go on to other Hellenic states, and not only to Hellenes, but to all the barbarians who inhabit the same continent with us. And if the God were then to say to you again: Here in Europe is to be your seat of empire, and you must not cross over into Asia or meddle with Asiatic affairs, I do not believe that you would choose to live upon these terms; but the world, as I may say, must be filled with your power and name—no man less than Cyrus and Xerxes is of any account with you. Such I know to be your hopes—I am not guessing only—and very likely you, who know that I am speaking the truth, will reply, Well, Socrates, but what have my hopes to do with the explanation which you promised of your unwillingness to leave me? And that is what I am now going to tell you, sweet son of Cleinias and Dinomachè.
The explanation is, that all these designs of yours cannot be accomplished by you without my help; so great is the power which I believe myself to have over you and your concerns; and this I conceive to be the reason why the God has hitherto forbidden me to converse with you, and I have been long expecting his permission. For, as you hope to prove your own great value to the state, and having proved it, to attain at once to absolute power, so do I indulge a hope that I shall have the supreme power over you, if I am able to prove my own great value to you, and to show you that neither guardian, nor kinsman, nor any one is able to deliver into your hands the power which you desire, but I only, God being my helper. When you were young[57] and your hopes were not yet matured, I should have wasted my time, and therefore, as I conceive, the God forbade me to converse with 106 you; but now, having his permission, I will speak, for now you will listen to me. [Sidenote: Alcibiades does not deny the impeachment.] [Sidenote: _The qualifications of Alcibiades for statesmanship_] _Al._ Your silence, Socrates, was always a surprise to me. I never could understand why you followed me about, and now that you have begun to speak again, I am still more amazed. Whether I think all this or not, is a matter about which you seem to have already made up your mind, and therefore my denial will have no effect upon you. But granting, if I must, that you have perfectly divined my purposes, why is your assistance necessary to the attainment of them? Can you tell me why?
_Soc._ You want to know whether I can make a long speech, such as you are in the habit of hearing; but that is not my way. I think, however, that I can prove to you the truth of what I am saying, if you will grant me one little favour. _Al._ Yes, if the favour which you mean be not a troublesome one. _Soc._ Will you be troubled at having questions to answer? [Sidenote: Alcibiades is willing to answer questions.] _Al._ Not at all. _Soc._ Then please to answer. _Al._ Ask me. _Soc._ Have you not the intention which I attribute to you? _Al._ I will grant anything you like, in the hope of hearing what more you have to say. _Soc._ You do, then, mean, as I was saying, to come forward in a little while in the character of an adviser of the Athenians? And suppose that when you are ascending the bema, I pull you by the sleeve and say, Alcibiades, you are getting up to advise the Athenians—do you know the matter about which they are going to deliberate, better than they?—How would you answer? [Sidenote: He is going to advise the Athenians about matters which he knows better than they.] _Al._ I should reply, that I was going to advise them about a matter which I do know better than they.
_Soc._ Then you are a good adviser about the things which you know? _Al._ Certainly. _Soc._ And do you know anything but what you have learned of others, or found out yourself? _Al._ That is all. _Soc._ And would you have ever learned or discovered anything, if you had not been willing either to learn of others or to examine yourself? _Al._ I should not. [Sidenote: _are tested by Socrates._] _Soc._ And would you have been willing to learn or to examine what you supposed that you knew? _Al._ Certainly not. _Soc._ Then there was a time when you thought that you did not know what you are now supposed to know? _Al._ Certainly. [Sidenote: But when did he ever learn about these matters?] _Soc._ I think that I know tolerably well the extent of your acquirements; and you must tell me if I forget any of them: according to my recollection, you learned the arts of writing, of playing on the lyre, and of wrestling; the flute you never would learn; this is the sum of your accomplishments, unless there were some which you acquired in secret; and I think that secrecy was hardly possible, as you could not have come out of your door, either by day or night, without my seeing you. _Al._ Yes, that was the whole of my schooling.
_Soc._ And are you going to get up in the Athenian assembly, 107 and give them advice about writing? _Al._ No, indeed. _Soc._ Or about the touch of the lyre? _Al._ Certainly not. _Soc._ And they are not in the habit of deliberating about wrestling, in the assembly? _Al._ Hardly. _Soc._ Then what are the deliberations in which you propose to advise them? Surely not about building? _Al._ No. _Soc._ For the builder will advise better than you will about that? _Al._ He will. _Soc._ Nor about divination? _Al._ No. _Soc._ About that again the diviner will advise better than you will? _Al._ True. _Soc._ Whether he be little or great, good or ill-looking, noble or ignoble—makes no difference. _Al._ Certainly not. _Soc._ A man is a good adviser about anything, not because he has riches, but because he has knowledge? [Sidenote: _The cross-examination of_] _Al._ Assuredly. _Soc._ Whether their counsellor is rich or poor, is not a matter which will make any difference to the Athenians when they are deliberating about the health of the citizens; they only require that he should be a physician. _Al._ Of course. _Soc._ Then what will be the subject of deliberation about which you will be justified in getting up and advising them? _Al._ About their own concerns, Socrates. _Soc._ You mean about shipbuilding, for example, when the question is what sort of ships they ought to build?
_Al._ No, I should not advise them about that. _Soc._ I suppose, because you do not understand shipbuilding:—is that the reason? _Al._ It is. _Soc._ Then about what concerns of theirs will you advise them? [Sidenote: He will advise them about war and peace, and with whom they had better go to war, and when and how long.] _Al._ About war, Socrates, or about peace, or about any other concerns of the state. _Soc._ You mean, when they deliberate with whom they ought to make peace, and with whom they ought to go to war, and in what manner? _Al._ Yes. _Soc._ And they ought to go to war with those against whom it is better to go to war? _Al._ Yes. _Soc._ And when it is better? _Al._ Certainly. _Soc._ And for as long a time as is better? _Al._ Yes. _Soc._ But suppose the Athenians to deliberate with whom they ought to close in wrestling, and whom they should grasp by the hand, would you, or the master of gymnastics, be a better adviser of them? _Al._ Clearly, the master of gymnastics. _Soc._ And can you tell me on what grounds the master of gymnastics would decide, with whom they ought or ought not to close, and when and how? To take an instance: Would he not say that they should wrestle with those against whom it is best to wrestle?
_Al._ Very. _Soc._ Well, then, consider and try to explain what is the meaning of ‘better,’ in the matter of making peace and going to war with those against whom you ought to go to war? To what does the word refer? _Al._ I am thinking, and I cannot tell. _Soc._ But you surely know what are the charges which we bring against one another, when we arrive at the point of making war, and what name we give them? _Al._ Yes, certainly; we say that deceit or violence has been employed, or that we have been defrauded. _Soc._ And how does this happen? Will you tell me how? For there may be a difference in the manner. _Al._ Do you mean by ‘how,’ Socrates, whether we suffered these things justly or unjustly? _Soc._ Exactly. _Al._ There can be no greater difference than between just and unjust. [Sidenote: _What is the better?_] _Soc._ And would you advise the Athenians to go to war with the just or with the unjust? _Al._ That is an awkward question; for certainly, even if a person did intend to go to war with the just, he would not admit that they were just. _Soc._ He would not go to war, because it would be unlawful? _Al._ Neither lawful nor honourable. _Soc._ Then you, too, would address them on principles of justice?
_Al._ Certainly. [Sidenote: In going to war or not going to war, the better is the more just.] _Soc._ What, then, is justice but that better, of which I spoke, in going to war or not going to war with those against whom we ought or ought not, and when we ought or ought not to go to war? _Al._ Clearly. _Soc._ But how is this, friend Alcibiades? Have you forgotten that you do not know this, or have you been to the schoolmaster without my knowledge, and has he taught you to discern the just from the unjust? Who is he? I wish you would tell me, that I may go and learn of him—you shall introduce me. _Al._ You are mocking, Socrates. [Sidenote: But where did Alcibiades acquire this notion of just and unjust?] _Soc._ No, indeed; I most solemnly declare to you by Zeus, who is the God of our common friendship, and whom I never will forswear, that I am not; tell me, then, who this instructor is, if he exists. _Al._ But, perhaps, he does not exist; may I not have acquired the knowledge of just and unjust in some other way? _Soc._ Yes; if you have discovered them. _Al._ But do you not think that I could discover them? _Soc._ I am sure that you might, if you enquired about them.
_Al._ And do you not think that I would enquire? _Soc._ Yes; if you thought that you did not know them. _Al._ And was there not a time when I did so think? _Soc._ Very good; and can you tell me how long it is since you thought that you did not know the nature of the 110 just and the unjust? What do you say to a year ago? Were you then in a state of conscious ignorance and enquiry? or did you think that you knew? And please to answer truly, that our discussion may not be in vain. [Sidenote: _The nature of just and unjust._] _Al._ Well, I thought that I knew. _Soc._ And two years ago, and three years ago, and four years ago, you knew all the same? _Al._ I did. _Soc._ And more than four years ago you were a child—were you not? _Al._ Yes. _Soc._ And then I am quite sure that you thought you knew. _Al._ Why are you so sure? [Sidenote: He always had them.] _Soc._ Because I often heard you when a child, in your teacher’s house, or elsewhere, playing at dice or some other game with the boys, not hesitating at all about the nature of the just and unjust; but very confident—crying and shouting that one of the boys was a rogue and a cheat, and had been cheating. Is it not true?
_Al._ But what was I to do, Socrates, when anybody cheated me? _Soc._ And how can you say, ‘What was I to do’? if at the time you did not know whether you were wronged or not? _Al._ To be sure I knew; I was quite aware that I was being cheated. _Soc._ Then you suppose yourself even when a child to have known the nature of just and unjust? _Al._ Certainly; and I did know then. _Soc._ And when did you discover them—not, surely, at the time when you thought that you knew them? _Al._ Certainly not. _Soc._ And when did you think that you were ignorant—if you consider, you will find that there never was such a time? _Al._ Really, Socrates, I cannot say. _Soc._ Then you did not learn them by discovering them? _Al._ Clearly not. _Soc._ But just before you said that you did not know them by learning; now, if you have neither discovered nor learned them, how and whence do you come to know them? _Al._ I suppose that I was mistaken in saying that I knew them through my own discovery of them; whereas, in truth, I learned them in the same way that other people learn. [Sidenote: _Could the many have taught the principles of justice?_] _Soc._ So you said before, and I must again ask, of whom? Do tell me.
_Al._ Of the many. [Sidenote: He learned them of the many, as he learned Greek;—of those who knew it.] _Soc._ Do you take refuge in them? I cannot say much for your teachers. _Al._ Why, are they not able to teach? _Soc._ They could not teach you how to play at draughts, which you would acknowledge (would you not) to be a much smaller matter than justice? _Al._ Yes. _Soc._ And can they teach the better who are unable to teach the worse? _Al._ I think that they can; at any rate, they can teach many far better things than to play at draughts. _Soc._ What things? 111 _Al._ Why, for example, I learned to speak Greek of them, and I cannot say who was my teacher, or to whom I am to attribute my knowledge of Greek, if not to those good-for-nothing teachers, as you call them. _Soc._ Why, yes, my friend; and the many are good enough teachers of Greek, and some of their instructions in that line may be justly praised. _Al._ Why is that? _Soc._ Why, because they have the qualities which good teachers ought to have. _Al._ What qualities? _Soc._ Why, you know that knowledge is the first qualification of any teacher? _Al._ Certainly. _Soc._ And if they know, they must agree together and not differ?
_Al._ Yes. _Soc._ And would you say that they knew the things about which they differ? _Al._ No. _Soc._ Then how can they teach them? _Al._ They cannot. [Sidenote: Yes: the many can teach things about which they are agreed.] _Soc._ Well, but do you imagine that the many would differ about the nature of wood and stone? are they not agreed if you ask them what they are? and do they not run to fetch the same thing, when they want a piece of wood or a stone? And so in similar cases, which I suspect to be pretty nearly all that you mean by speaking Greek. [Sidenote: _That wars are caused by differences about just_] _Al._ True. _Soc._ These, as we were saying, are matters about which they are agreed with one another and with themselves; both individuals and states use the same words about them; they do not use some one word and some another. _Al._ They do not. _Soc._ Then they may be expected to be good teachers of these things? _Al._ Yes. _Soc._ And if we want to instruct any one in them, we shall be right in sending him to be taught by our friends the many? _Al._ Very true. _Soc._ But if we wanted further to know not only which are men and which are horses, but which men or horses have powers of running, would the many still be able to inform us?
_Al._ Certainly not. _Soc._ And you have a sufficient proof that they do not know these things and are not the best teachers of them, inasmuch as they are never agreed about them? _Al._ Yes. [Sidenote: But could the many teach things about which they are disagreed?] _Soc._ And suppose that we wanted to know not only what men are like, but what healthy or diseased men are like—would the many be able to teach us? _Al._ They would not. _Soc._ And you would have a proof that they were bad teachers of these matters, if you saw them at variance? _Al._ I should. [Sidenote: And one of these things is justice.] _Soc._ Well, but are the many agreed with themselves, or with one another, about the justice or injustice of men and 112 things? _Al._ Assuredly not, Socrates. _Soc._ There is no subject about which they are more at variance? _Al._ None. [Sidenote: _and unjust proved out of Homer._] _Soc._ I do not suppose that you ever saw or heard of men quarrelling over the principles of health and disease to such an extent as to go to war and kill one another for the sake of them? [Sidenote: Did not a question of justice cause the war between the Trojans and Achaeans, and between the Athenians Lacedaemonians?] _Al._ No indeed.
_Soc._ But of the quarrels about justice and injustice, even if you have never seen them, you have certainly heard from many people, including Homer; for you have heard of the Iliad and Odyssey? _Al._ To be sure, Socrates. _Soc._ A difference of just and unjust is the argument of and those poems? _Al._ True. _Soc._ Which difference caused all the wars and deaths of Trojans and Achaeans, and the deaths of the suitors of Penelope in their quarrel with Odysseus. _Al._ Very true. _Soc._ And when the Athenians and Lacedaemonians and Boeotians fell at Tanagra, and afterwards in the battle of Coronea, at which your father Cleinias met his end, the question was one of justice—this was the sole cause of the battles, and of their deaths. _Al._ Very true. [Sidenote: And yet they did not know what they were fighting about?] _Soc._ But can they be said to understand that about which they are quarrelling to the death? _Al._ Clearly not. _Soc._ And yet those whom you thus allow to be ignorant are the teachers to whom you are appealing. _Al._ Very true. _Soc._ But how are you ever likely to know the nature of justice and injustice, about which you are so perplexed, if you have neither learned them of others nor discovered them yourself? _Al._ From what you say, I suppose not.
_Soc._ See, again, how inaccurately you speak, Alcibiades! _Al._ In what respect? _Soc._ In saying that I say so. _Al._ Why, did you not say that I know nothing of the just and unjust? _Soc._ No; I did not. _Al._ Did I, then? [Sidenote: _Is it Socrates or Alcibiades_] _Soc._ Yes. _Al._ How was that? _Soc._ Let me explain. Suppose I were to ask you which is the greater number, two or one; you would reply ‘two’? _Al._ I should. _Soc._ And by how much greater? _Al._ By one. _Soc._ Which of us now says that two is more than one? _Al._ I do. _Soc._ Did not I ask, and you answer the question? _Al._ Yes. _Soc._ Then who is speaking? I who put the question, or 113 you who answer me? _Al._ I am. [Sidenote: The answerer, not the questioner, has been drawing these inferences.] _Soc._ Or suppose that I ask and you tell me the letters which make up the name Socrates, which of us is the speaker? _Al._ I am. _Soc._ Now let us put the case generally: whenever there is a question and answer, who is the speaker,—the questioner or the answerer? _Al._ I should say, Socrates, that the answerer was the speaker. _Soc._ And have I not been the questioner all through? _Al._ Yes. _Soc._ And you the answerer?
_Al._ Just so. _Soc._ Which of us, then, was the speaker? _Al._ The inference is, Socrates, that I was the speaker. _Soc._ Did not some one say that Alcibiades, the fair son of Cleinias, not understanding about just and unjust, but thinking that he did understand, was going to the assembly to advise the Athenians about what he did not know? Was not that said? _Al._ Very true. [Sidenote: How can you teach what you do not know?] _Soc._ Then, Alcibiades, the result may be expressed in the language of Euripides. I think that you have heard all this ‘from yourself, and not from me’; nor did I say this, which you erroneously attribute to me, but you yourself, and what you said was very true. For indeed, my dear fellow, the design which you meditate of teaching what you do not know, and have not taken any pains to learn, is downright insanity. [Sidenote: _who is the real speaker?_] [Sidenote: But the expedient, not the just, is the subject about which men commonly debate.] _Al._ But, Socrates, I think that the Athenians and the rest of the Hellenes do not often advise as to the more just or unjust; for they see no difficulty in them, and therefore they leave them, and consider which course of action will be most expedient; for there is a difference between justice and expediency. Many persons have done great wrong and profited by their injustice; others have done rightly and come to no good.
_Soc._ Well, but granting that the just and the expedient are ever so much opposed, you surely do not imagine that you know what is expedient for mankind, or why a thing is expedient? [Sidenote: Alcibiades insists that he will not have the old argument over again.] _Al._ Why not, Socrates?—But I am not going to be asked again from whom I learned, or when I made the discovery. _Soc._ What a way you have! When you make a mistake which might be refuted by a previous argument, you insist on having a new and different refutation; the old argument is a worn-out garment which you will no longer put on, but some one must produce another which is clean and new. Now I 114 shall disregard this move of yours, and shall ask over again,—Where did you learn and how do you know the nature of the expedient, and who is your teacher? All this I comprehend in a single question, and now you will manifestly be in the old difficulty, and will not be able to show that you know the expedient, either because you learned or because you discovered it yourself. But, as I perceive that you are dainty, and dislike the taste of a stale argument, I will enquire no further into your knowledge of what is expedient or what is not expedient for the Athenian people, and simply request you to say why you do not explain whether justice and expediency are the same or different? And if you like you may examine me as I have examined you, or, if you would rather, you may carry on the discussion by yourself.
Ideas discussed in this chapter
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