The works of Plato · Plato
ARGUMENT.
In the _second book_ he illustrates justice by a pretty long discourse about injustice, its contrary, and the social evils thence arising. From such a comprehensive view of society itself he is not unnaturally led into his main argument, the subject of civil government; carefully distinguishing between the head and the members—the governors and the governed; but also bearing in mind that society is the stage on which alone the virtues of the just man can be seen in perfection. The governors, says he, should be spirited and shrewd, so as to be able both to repel the violence of the state’s enemies, and severely to punish wicked citizens, as well as peaceably to maintain their own subjects or dependants under the law’s protection, and to appoint proper rewards for virtuous and deserving actions. The principal study then should, as respects a state, be devoted jointly to _music_ and _gymnastics_—the former referring to mental, the other to bodily training; but above all these he places _religion_, which though he does not statedly define it, yet he proves to be wholly distinct from the superstition of his own time.
CHAP. I.—Having said these things, I thought to have been relieved from the debate; but this it seems was only the introduction; for Glaucon is on all occasions most courageous, and then especially did not approve of Thrasymachus’s withdrawal from the debate, but said;—Socrates, have you any desire of seeming to have persuaded us, or to succeed in really persuading us that it is in every respect better to be just than unjust? I, for my part, said I, would prefer to do so in reality, if it depended on me. You are not doing then, said he, what you desire: for, tell me, does there appear to you any good of this kind, such as we would accept as a possession, without regard to its results, but embracing it [simply] for its own sake; such as joy and all kinds of harmless pleasures,[54] though for the future no other advantage springs from them than the delight arising from their possession. To me, indeed, said I, there does seem to be something of this kind. But what;—is there not some species of good which we both love for its own sake, and also for what springs from it,—as wisdom, sight, and health?—for such goods we surely embrace on both accounts.
Yes, said I. But do you see, said he, a third species of good,—among which are bodily exercise, being healed when sick, the practice of medicine, or any other lucrative employment?—for these things, we should say, are laborious, yet beneficial to us, and we should not choose them for their own sake, but on account of the rewards and other advantages that spring from them. There is, indeed, said I, this third species also: but what then? In which of these species, said he, do you place justice? I think, indeed, said I, in the most beautiful,—as being a good, which, both on its own account and for what springs from it, is desired by a man bent on being happy. It does not seem so, however, said he, to the multitude, but rather to be of that laborious kind which is pursued on account of rewards and honours [gained] through high repute, but on its own account to be shunned, as fraught with trouble. ----- Footnote 54: ἀβλαβεῖς means not only _harmless_ pleasures, but those which are pure and unalloyed with pain. We may remark here, that he divides goods (τὰ ἀγαθά) into three classes,—one, to be pursued for its own sake only, without reference to advantage.—another, which is to be loved both for its own sake, and for the advantages thence accruing,—and a third, which of itself perhaps is not worthy to be pursued, but only on account of the advantages thence accruing. In the second or mixed class Socrates places justice.
Though, for my own part, Socrates, it by no means appears so to me, still I am thrown into a state of doubt, from having my ears stunned by hearing Thrasymachus and innumerable others.—But as for the statement respecting justice, that it is better than injustice, I have never yet heard it explained as I wish. I wish, therefore, to hear it eulogized on its own account, and am quite of opinion that I shall hear it from you: wherefore, by way of opposition,[56] I shall speak in praise of an unjust life, and in so speaking will show you in what manner I want to hear you in turn condemn injustice and commend justice. But see if my proposal be agreeable to you. Quite so, said I; for about what would any man of intellect delight more frequently to speak and hear? You speak excellently well, said he:—and now, as to what I said I would first speak about, listen, both what justice is and whence it springs. ----- Footnote 55: Thrasymachus is here, on account of his passionate violence and uncouth manners, aptly compared to a snake, which, as the ancients believed, could be softened and subdued by music:—and we note particularly the elegant use of the verb κηλεῖν, which primarily signifies to _charm_, _sooth_, _subdue_, and then generally, _to soften by persuasion_ or argument.
Footnote 56: Respecting this use of the verb κατατείνειν, comp. ch. ix. p. 367 b. p. 47 of this translation:—ὡς δύναμαι μάλιστα κατατείνας λέγω. See also, Xen. Anab. ii. 5, s. 30, and Eurip. Hec. v. 132. ----- They say, forsooth, that to do injustice is naturally good, and to suffer injustice bad,—but that suffering injustice is attended with greater evil than doing injustice with good; so that, when men do each other injustice, and likewise suffer it, and have a taste of both, it seems advantageous for those, who are not able to avoid the one and choose the other, to agree among themselves neither to act unjustly nor yet to be treated so; and also, that hence they began to form for themselves laws and compacts, and to call what is enjoined by law lawful and just.—This, then, is the origin and essence of justice,—a medium between what is best, namely, when a man acts unjustly with impunity, and what is worst, that is, when one injured is unable to obtain redress;—and this justice being half-way between both these, is desired, not as good, but as being held in honour, owing to an incapacity for doing injustice; because the man who had ability to do so would never, if really a man, agree with any one neither to injure nor be injured; for he would be mad to do so. This, then, Socrates, and such like, is the nature of justice; and such, as they say, is the source whence it arises.
CHAP. III.—Again,—that those who cultivate it through an incapability of doing injustice, cultivate it unwillingly, we shall best be made aware, if we should mentally conceive such a case as follows:—Let us give full liberty to each of them, both the just and the unjust, to do whatever they please,—and then follow them, observing whither inclination will lead each.—We should then detect[57] the just man going the same way with the unjust, through a desire of having more than others,—which every nature naturally pursues as good, but by law and compulsion is led to respect equality.[58] And the liberty of which I speak may be chiefly of such a kind, as if they possessed such a power, as they say once belonged to Gyges (the progenitor of the Lydian king[59]); and of him, forsooth, they say, that he was a hired shepherd with the then governor of Lydia, but when a portion of ground was torn up by a prodigious rain and earthquake, and an opening made in the place where he was grazing [his flocks,]—that, in astonishment at the sight, he descended and saw other wonders besides, which men hand down in fables, especially a brazen horse, hollow, provided with doors, leaning against which, he beheld inside a dead body, apparently larger than that of a man, and that it had nothing else except that it wore a gold ring on its hand, which he took off and came out.
And when there was a meeting of the shepherds, as usual, for making their monthly report to the king about their flocks, he also came with the ring; and while sitting with the rest, he happened to turn the stone of the ring towards himself into the inner part of his hand; and when this was done, he became invisible to those who sat beside him, and they talked of him as absent: and astonished at this, he again handled his ring, turned the stone outward, and on turning it became visible. On observing this, then, he made trial of the ring, whether it had this power; and it always happened so, that, when he turned the stone inward, he became invisible,—when outward, visible. Perceiving this, he instantly contrived to be made one of the embassy to the king; and on his arrival he debauched his wife, and, with her, assaulted and killed the king,[60] and took possession of the kingdom. If now, there were two such rings, and the just man had one, and the unjust the other, no one, we should think, would be so case-hardened as to persevere in justice, and dare to refrain from others’ property and not touch it, when it was in his power both to take fearlessly, even from the market-place, whatever he pleased, and to enter houses, and embrace any one he pleased,—both to kill and loose from chains whomever he pleased,—and to do anything else likewise, as a god among men:—acting in this manner, he would in no respect differ from the other, but both would go the same road. This, in truth, one may say, is a strong proof, that no one is willingly just, but only by constraint, as if it were not an intrinsic good, because every one, where he thinks he can, does injustice.
Every man, then, thinks that injustice is intrinsically much more profitable than justice, thinking truly, as he says, who argues on such a subject as this: inasmuch as, if any one possessed of such a liberty were never to act unjustly, nor touch others’ property, he would be deemed by men of sense to be most wretched, and most void of understanding; yet would they praise him in each others’ presence, mutually deceiving one another through fear of being injured. Thus much, then, concerning these things. ----- Footnote 57: ἐπ’ αὐτοφώρῳ λαβεῖν, lit. _to catch in the fact_. Footnote 58: Euripides in his Phœn. v. 545, &c., elegantly expresses a similar notion:— ——κεῖνο κάλλιον, τέκνον, ἰσότητα τιμᾷν, ἣ φίλους ἀεὶ φίλοις πόλεις τε πόλεσι, συμμάχους τε συμμάχοις ξυνδεῖ· τὸ γὰρ ἴσον νόμιμον ἀνθρώποις ἔφυ. τῷ πλέονι δ’ ἀεὶ πολέμιον καθίσταται τοὔλασσον. To honour justice, and to love the right, Which friends to friends and state to state unite, Be ours. We honour equal aims and ends; But still the greater with the less contends, And evil times begin. Footnote 59: The words between brackets are considered spurious by Stallbaum, but admitted as genuine by Bekker and Schneider. The pretty generally received opinion now is, that ὁ Λυδός alludes to Crœsus, who was highly celebrated throughout Greece, and hence was emphatically termed “The Lydian.” Comp., however, Herod. i. 8 (pp. 4, 5. Cary’s Transl.), who tells a somewhat different story.
Footnote 60: Gyges slew Candaules in the second year of the sixteenth Olympiad, B.C. 614. See Cic. de Offic. iii. 9, where the story is given in nearly the same form. ----- CHAP. IV.—With respect, again, to the decision on the life of those of whom we are speaking,—if we distinguish the supremely just and the supremely unjust, we shall be able to come to a right judgment,—but not otherwise; and what, then, is this distinction? It is this;—let us, from the unjust man, take nothing of injustice, nor from the just man, of justice; but let us make each of them perfect in his own pursuit. First, then, let the unjust man act as clever artists [do]. For instance, a skilful pilot or physician comprehends both the possible and impossible in his art, the former of which he attempts, but relinquishes the latter;—and again, if he meet with any failure, he is able to rectify it:—so, in like manner, let the unjust man when he attempts clever acts of injustice, remain concealed, if he intends to be exceedingly unjust; but, as for him that is caught, he must be deemed worthless: for the most complete injustice is—to seem just, when not so.[61] To the completely unjust, then, we must ascribe the most complete injustice, and not take it from him, but allow him, while doing the greatest injustice, to win the highest reputation for justice; and, if he should fail at all, he should be able to rectify it, and be capable of speaking persuasively, if any report of his unjust deeds get abroad, and be able also to effect by force what requires force, owing to his courage and strength, and through the instrumentality of his friends and his wealth; supposing him, then, to be such as this, let us for argument place in contrast with him a just, simple-minded, and generous-hearted man, who, according to Æschylus, desires less the seeming than the reality of goodness:[62] let us take from him, then, the mere seeming of goodness; for, should he seem just, honours and rewards will be his lot, because he merely seems so:—and thus [it may be] uncertain whether he be such for the sake of justice, or rewards and honours.
CHAP. V.—Bah, bah, said I, dear Glaucon, how exceedingly anxious you are to cleanse each of these men for trial, just as [you would] a statue! As much, said he, as I can: but, as they are such, there will be no difficulty, I suppose, in ascertaining what life will be the lot of either. It shall be told, then:—and, even if it should be told with more than usual bluntness, think not, that it is I who tell it, Socrates, but those who praise injustice before justice.—This then will they say, that the just man, thus situated, will be scourged, tortured, fettered, have his eyes burnt out, and lastly, suffer all manner of evils, and be crucified;[63] and he will know too, that a man should desire not to be, but to appear just. As for that saying of Æschylus, too, it applied far better against the unjust man: for in reality men will say, that the unjust man, as being in pursuit of an object connected with truth, and not living according to opinion, has no desire to appear, but to be unjust,— Reaping the hollow furrow of his mind, Whence all his cherished councils blossom forth.
In the first place, he holds the magistracy in the state, because he is thought just,—next, he marries out of whatever family he pleases, and gives his children in marriage to whom he pleases, forms agreements and joins in partnership with whom he likes,—and, besides all this, succeeds in all his projects for gain, because he scruples not to commit injustice. When he engages, therefore, in competitions, he both in private and public surpasses and overreaches his adversaries; and by this overreaching gets rich, serves his friends, hurts his foes; and to the gods, as respects sacrifices and offerings, he not only sufficiently but even magnificently both sacrifices and makes offerings, serving far better than the just man, not only the gods, but of men also whomsoever he pleases; so that it is very likely that he should be a greater favourite of the gods than the just man. Thus, they say, Socrates, that with gods and men a better life awaits the unjust than the just. ----- Footnote 63: A similar passage occurs in Cicero de Republ. iii. 17:—Proque hac opinione bonus ille vir vexetur, rapiatur, manus ei denique offerantur, effodiantur oculi, damnetur, vinciatur, uratur, exterminetur, exeat, postremo jure etiam optimo omnibus miserrimus esse videatur. ----- CHAP. VI.—Glaucon having said this, I was thinking of saying something in reply; but his brother Adimantus said—Do you not think, Socrates, that enough has been already said on the matter? What then? said I. The very point has not been mooted, said he, which ought most especially to have been discussed. Why then, said I, as the saying is, let a brother help a brother,—so that, if he fails at all, do you help him out:—yet, as far as I am concerned, what he has alleged is quite sufficient to defeat me, and disable me from defending justice.
And he in reply said: Oh, it is a mere nothing you allege;—but still hear this in addition;—for we must go through all the arguments in opposition to what he has said, [those, namely,] which praise justice and condemn injustice,—in order that it may be more clearly seen, what, I think, Glaucon means: and perhaps parents tell and exhort their sons, as all those do who care for them, that they ought to be just,—not commending justice for itself, but for the reputation arising therefrom;—and hence to a man reputed to be just, there may accrue from that very repute both state-offices and marriage-connections, and whatever Glaucon just now enumerated as the consequences of being reputed just: these, however, carry this notion of repute too far;—for, throwing in the approbation of the gods, they can speak of abundant blessings, which, they say, the gods bestow on the holy. Just as noble Hesiod and Homer say;—the former, that the gods make oaks produce for just men Acorns at top, and in the middle bees; Their woolly sheep are laden thick with fleece;[64] and a great many other good things of the same nature:—similarly, also, the latter:— [Unrivalled, like the praise] of some great king, Who o’er a numerous people and renown’d Presiding like a deity, maintains Justice and truth. The earth under his sway Her produce yields abundantly; the trees Fruit-laden bend; the lusty flocks bring forth; The ocean teems with finny swarms beneath His joint control, and all the land is blest.[65]
Musæus, too, and his son [Eumolpus] tell us, that the gods give just men far more splendid blessings than these;[66] for carrying them in his poem into Hades, and placing them at table in company with holy men, at a feast prepared for them, they crown them, and make them pass the whole of their time drunken,—deeming eternal inebriation to be the best reward of virtue.—Some, however, extend down still further than these the rewards from the gods; for they say, that children’s children, and a future generation of the holy and faithful, are left on earth. These, then, and such as these, are their eulogies of justice. As for the unholy and unjust, however, they bury them in Hades, in mud, and compel them to carry water in a sieve;—and as for those that are yet living, if they lead them into wrong notions, as Glaucon did in enumerating the punishments of just persons, but reputed unjust,—this they can allege about the unjust, but nothing else. The praise then or blame belongs to either party [as they please]. ----- Footnote 64: Hesiod. Op. et Di. v. 231. Comp. Virg. Eclog. iv. 30, and Hor. Epod. xvi. 47. Footnote 65: Hom. Odyss. xix. 109-113. Footnote 66: Eumolpus, the son of Musæus, was a Thracian, who emigrated into Attica, and founded the Eleusinian mysteries,—from whom also the Athenians in charge of the rites were called Eumolpidæ. See Smith’s Dict. of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology,—articles _Musæus_ and _Eumolpus_;—also Kreuzer’s Symbolik. vol. iv. p. 342, &c.
How vice at once and easily we choose; The way so smooth, its dwelling too so nigh; Toil before virtue, thus forewill’d the gods—[69] and a certain road, both long and steep;—while others make Homer witness as to the persuasive power of men over the gods, inasmuch as that poet says,— ... the gods In virtue thy superiors, are themselves Yet placable; and if a mortal man Offend by transgression of their laws. Libation, incense, sacrifice, and prayers In meekness offer’d turn their wrath away.[70] They bring forward, too, a crowd of books of Musæus and Orpheus, the offspring of the Moon and the Muses, as they say, in accordance with which they perform their sacred rites, persuading not only private individuals, but states likewise, that both absolutions and purgations from iniquities are effected by sacrifices, and sportive pleasures,—and this, too, for the benefit of the living as well as the dead;—which purgations they call _mysteries_,[71] which absolve us from the evils of another life,—whereas a dreadful fate awaits those who perform no sacrifice. ----- Footnote 67: Comp. Hesiod. Op. et D. v. 287, &c., and Epicharmus, cited by Xenophon, Mem. II. 1. § 20. Footnote 68: The ἀγύρται were a species of itinerant sacrificers, who went about collecting money for the expense of sacrifices to certain gods or goddesses, and contrived to eke out a subsistence by imposing on the vulgar, whom they supplied also with nostrums, and cheated with lying prophecies.
Footnote 69: Hes. Op. et D. v. 285-288;—and they are cited also in the Laws, iv. p. 718, e. ----- CHAP. VIII.—As respects all such and so much as has been said, dear Socrates, about virtue and vice, and what reward both men and gods attach thereto,—what do we suppose the souls of our youth do when they hear them, such at least as are of good natural parts, and able to rush, as it were, to all that is said, and thence infer in what sort of character, and by what procedure one may best pass through life? He might probably say to himself, according to Pindar,— Shall I yon rampart, loftier far Than justice, dare ascend,—or crooked fraud Invite, to cheat the world, and thus Myself live cased in guilt’s base panoply.[72]
For what is said happens to me, if I am just, though I am not reputed so, they say it is no profit, but clearly, mere trouble and punishment,—whereas the unjust man, who has procured for himself the reputation of justice, is said to have a divine life. Since then, as the sages tell me,[73] appearance both does violence to reality, and is the arbiter of happiness, I ought surely to turn wholly thereto, drawing round myself, as a covering and picture, an image of virtue, but still dragging after me the cunning and versatile fox of that very clever Archilochus.[74] Perhaps, however, some one will say,—it is not easy for a bad man always to practise his wickedness in secret.—Neither is anything else easy (will we say) of important matters: but still, would we be happy, thither we must go where the tracks of reasoning lead us: for, with a view to concealment, we shall form conspiracies and associations; and there are masters of persuasion, who teach a popular and forensic wisdom,—by which, partly though persuasion and partly by force, we may escape punishment after all our over-reaching. However, it is not possible either to escape the notice of the gods, or to overpower them. ----- Footnote 70: Il. ix. 493. Footnote 71: Gr. τελετάς. Footnote 72: See _Boeckh_, _Pindari Fragm._ ccxxxii. p. 671.
Footnote 73: _Simonidis Fragm._ cxxiii. ed. Gaisford, i. p. 394. ----- Wherefore, if they have no existence, and have no care about human affairs, neither need we care about concealment; and as respects their existence and care for us, we neither know nor have heard of them otherwise than from traditions, and from the poets who write their genealogies;[75] and these very persons tell us, that they are to be moved and persuaded by sacrifices and propitiatory vows, and offerings,—both of which we are to believe, or neither. If, however, we are to believe both, we may do injustice, and offer sacrifice from the fruits of unjust deeds. For if we be just, we shall escape punishment from the gods, and then deprive ourselves of the gains of injustice: but if, on the other hand, we be unjust, we shall make gain, and after transgressing and offending, shall appease them by prayers, and so escape punishment. Nevertheless, we shall suffer in Hades the punishment of our misdeeds here, either ourselves, or our children’s children. But the reasoner may say, Friend, the mysteries again can do much, and the gods who expiate,—as say the mightiest states, and those children of the gods,—the poets and prophets, who declare that these things are so. ----- Footnote 74: That is, apparently, _virtue_; but, in reality, mere _cunning_. Archilochus has written more than one piece, in which the fox plays the part of a cunning and deceitful personage. See _Archil. Fragm._ ed. Gaisf. i. pp. 307, 308.
Ideas discussed in this chapter
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