The works of Plato · Plato
ARGUMENT.
In the _fourth book_, after defining the true position and functions of the φύλαξ and the arrangement of a model state,—which he further conceives to comprise, as essentials, wisdom, temperance, fortitude, and justice, the necessary union and coherence of which he demonstrates by analogy with the numerous mental faculties, which, like the members of a state, exist by mutual connexion and dependence. This concord of faculties is at the bottom of Plato’s notion of a state; and this constitutes justice, the benefits of which are negatively proved by the exposure of injustice. This justice, however, he proves to have numerous ramifications, just in the same way as both himself and Aristotle conceive that under the term politics is included everything that concerns civil administration when placed in the hands of the people themselves, both generically and in its specific departments.
CHAP. I.—Adimantus hereupon rejoining said: What answer will you make, Socrates, if one were to say that you do not make these men very happy,—and that owing to themselves, whose property the state really is,—yet they enjoy no advantage in the state, such as others do who possess lands, build beautiful and large houses, purchase suitable furniture, offer sacrifices to the gods at their own expense, entertain strangers, and, as you were just now saying, possess gold and silver, and everything generally supposed to contribute towards making men happy. Aye, doubtless, he may say, they seem, like hired auxiliaries, to be settled in the state for no other purpose than keeping guard. Yes, said I; and that too only for their maintenance, without receiving, like the rest, pay as well as rations;—so that they are not to be allowed so much as to travel abroad privately, though they wish it, nor bestow money on mistresses, nor spend it in such other ways as those do who are reputed to be happy. These and many such like things you leave out of the accusation. Well, let these charges too, said he, be made against them. What answer then, are we to make, you ask? I do.
While travelling on the same road, we shall find, methinks, what is to be said: for we shall state, that it would be nothing strange, were these men, under these circumstances, to be the happiest possible:—yet it was not with an eye to this, that we are establishing our state,—to have any one tribe in it remarkably happy, but that the whole state might be so to the fullest extent; for we judged, that in such an one more particularly we should meet with justice, and again in that the worst established injustice; and that, on thoroughly examining these, we might determine what we have long been seeking. Now then, as we suppose, we are forming a happy state, not by selection, making some few only so in it, but the whole: and we will next consider one its reverse.
Just as if, when we were painting human figures, a person should come and blame us, saying, that we do not place the most beautiful colours on the most beautiful parts of the creature,—inasmuch as the eyes, the most beautiful part, were not painted with purple, but black; we should seem perhaps to make a sufficient answer to him, by saying, Clever fellow, do not suppose that we ought to paint the eyes so beautifully, as that they should not appear to be eyes, and so with the other parts;—but consider, rather, whether, in giving each particular part its due, we make the whole beautiful. And especially now, do not oblige us to confer such happiness on our guardians as shall make them anything rather than guardians: for we know too, how to dress out the husbandmen in fine robes and gird them with gold, and bid them till the ground with a view to pleasure only,—and in like manner, those who make earthenware, to lie at their ease by the fire, drinking and feasting, and placing the wheel near them to work just so much as they like;—and so also how to confer happiness on every one in such a manner as to render the whole state happy.
But do not advise us in this way; because, if we obey you, neither will the husbandman be really a husbandman, nor the potter a potter; nor will any one else be really of any of those professions of which the state is composed. As to all the rest, it is of less consequence:—for, when shoemakers become bad and corrupt, and profess to be shoemakers when they are not so, no great mischief befals the state; but when guardians of the laws and of the state are not so really, but only in appearance, you see how entirely they destroy the whole state, and, on the other hand, that they alone have the opportunity of managing it well and effecting its happiness. If then we would appoint men who shall be really guardians of the city, [let us choose] those who will be least hurtful to it; but he who says that they should be a kind of farmers, and as in a festival meeting, not in a state, jolly entertainers, must speak of something else rather than a city. We must consider, then, whether we establish guardians with this view, that they may enjoy the greatest happiness,—or, looking to the entire state, we regard whether it is to be found therein; and we must compel these allies and guardians to do this, and persuade them to become the best performers of their own particular work, and act also towards all others in the same manner; and thus, as the whole city becomes prosperous, and well constituted, we must permit its several classes to share in that degree of happiness which their nature admits.
CHAP. II.—I think you say well, said he. Well then, said I, what is near akin to this, shall I be thought to say rightly. In what particularly? With respect to all other artificers again, consider whether these things corrupt them, so as to make them bad workmen. To what do you allude? Riches, said I, and poverty. As how? Thus:—Would the potter, think you, after he has become rich, have any desire still to mind his art? By no means, said he. But will he not become more idle and careless than he was before? Much more so. Will he not then become a worse potter? This too, much more so, said he. And, moreover, being unable through poverty to supply himself with tools, or other requisites of his art, his workmanship will be more imperfectly executed, and his sons, or others whom he instructs, will be inferior artists. Of course they will. Owing to both these causes, then, [namely] poverty and riches, the workmanship in the arts becomes inferior, and [the artists] themselves inferior too. It appears so. We have then, it seems, found out other things for our guardians, against which they must by all means watch, that they may not steal into the state without their knowledge. Of what sort are these?
Riches, said I, and poverty;—the one engendering luxury, idleness, and a love of innovation;—the other, illiberality and mischief, as well as a love of innovation. Quite so, said he. But, Socrates, pray consider this;—how is our state to have the power of engaging in war, when she is possessed of no money, especially if compelled to wage war against a great and opulent one? It is plain, said I, that to fight against one is somewhat difficult; but against two such is more easy. How say you? replied he. First of all, now, said I, if there is any occasion for fighting, will they not, being practised warriors, fight against rich men? Yes, surely, said he. What then, said I, Adimantus, would not a single boxer, trained as highly as possible to this exercise, seem to you easily able to fight against two who are not boxers, but on the other hand, are rich and fat? Not perhaps with both at once, said he. Not even, said I, if he should be enabled to retire a little, and then turn back and give a blow to the furthest in advance, and repeat this frequently in the sun and heat?—would not a person of this kind easily defeat many such as these? Clearly so, and no wonder, said he.
But think you not, that the rich have more science and experience in boxing than in the military art? I do, said he. In that case, according to appearances, our wrestlers will easily combat with double and threefold their number. I will agree with you, said he; for I believe you say right. But what,—supposing they were to send an embassy to another state, informing them of their true situation, telling them, We make no use either of gold or silver, neither is it lawful for us to use them, while for you it is so:—if then you become our allies in war, you shall receive the enemy’s spoils;—think you that any, on hearing this, would choose to fight against stanch and resolute dogs, rather than in alliance with the dogs to fight against fat and tender sheep? I think not; but, if the wealth of all the rest be accumulated in one single state, take care that it [the wealthy state] does not endanger that which is poor. How good you are, said I, to think that any other deserves to be called a state except such as we have established. Why not? said he.
To those others, said I, we must give a more magnificent appellation; for each of them comprises very many states, and is not one, as was said in the game;[147] for there are always in them, however small they be, two parties hostile to each other,—the poor and the rich; and in each of these again there are very many;—to which, if you apply as to one, you would be entirely mistaken;—but if, as to many, giving one party the goods and power, or even persons, of the other, you will always have the many for your allies, and the few for enemies; and, so long as your state be managed temperately, as lately established, it will be the greatest,—not I mean in mere repute, but really the greatest, though its defenders were no more than one thousand; for a single state of such size you will not easily find, either among Greeks or barbarians, but many which have the repute of being many times larger than one such as this.[148] Are you of a different opinion? No, by Zeus, said he. ----- Footnote 147: The scholiast tells us, that “to play at cities” (πόλεις παίζειν) is a kind of game at dice, in which the players cried,—“One city,” or “Many cities;” and he informs us, moreover, that the expression was proverbial.
Footnote 148: These notions are severely commented on by Aristotle in his Pol. ii. 4. ----- CHAP. III.—This, then, said I, will probably be the best boundary-mark for our rulers as to the size that a state should attain, and what extent of ground should be marked off for it in proportion to its bulk, without reference to anything further?[149] What boundary? said he. I suppose, said I, [it should be] this: So long as the city, as it increases, continues to be one, so far it may increase, but no further. Very right, said he. We will impose, then, this further injunction on our guardians, to take care by all means that the city be neither small nor great, but of moderate extent, and one only. This probably, said he, will be a trifling injunction. A more trifling one still, said I, is what we previously mentioned, when we observed, that if any descendant of the guardians be depraved, he should be dismissed to the other classes; and if one from the other classes be worthy, he should be promoted to that of the guardians;—by all which it was intended to show that all the other citizens should apply themselves each to that particular art for which he has a natural genius, that so, each minding his own proper work, should not become many, but one; and thus, consequently, the whole state would have the nature of unity;—not plurality. Well,—this, indeed, said he, is a still more trifling injunction than the other. We do not here, said I, good Adimantus, as any one might suppose, impose on them many and grave injunctions, but all of them rather trifling, if they take care of one grand point that we speak about, or rather not so much great as sufficient. What is that? said he.
The education, said I, and nurture of children; for if, by being well educated, they become temperate men, they will easily see through all these things, and such other things as we pass by at present,—women, marriages, and the propagation of the species,—inasmuch as these things ought all, according to the proverb,[150] to be made entirely common among friends. Yes,—for that, said he, would be most right. And moreover, said I, if once a republic is set a-going, it proceeds as a circle, constantly on the increase. For nurture and good education, when maintained, engender good dispositions, and good dispositions, partaking of such education, turn out still better than the former, especially with reference to propagation, just as with all other animals. Probably, said he. To speak then in brief, this, particularly, the guardians of the state must guard against, that it may not be corrupted unawares,—nay, above all things, must they guard against this, not to make innovations in gymnastics and music, contrary to the established order of the state, but as far as possible maintain it, through fear that while a man adopts that poetical expression, ... Men most admire that song Which most partakes of novelty,[151] one might often think that the poet means not new songs, but some new style of song, and so commends it: but such as this one ought neither to commend nor admit; for as to receiving a new kind of music one should be specially cautious, as endangering the whole: for never, as Damon says, and I quite agree with him, are the measures of music altered without affecting the most important laws of the state. And me too, you may place, said Adimantus, among those who are of that opinion.
CHAP. IV.—We must erect then, said I, in music, as it seems, a kind of citadel for our guardians. Nevertheless, neglect of the laws even here, said he, easily and imperceptibly steals in. Yes, said I, in the way of diversion, and as if it were doing no mischief. No, for it does nothing else, said he, but by gradually insinuating itself into it, insensibly flow into their manners and pursuits; and afterwards in a greater degree it finds its way into their contracts with each other; and from contracts it enters with much boldness into the laws and political establishments, Socrates, till at last it overturns everything, privately as well as publicly. Well, then, said I, is this the case? It appears so to me, he replied. Ought not our children then, as I said at the beginning, even from infancy, to be allowed diversions more conformable to the laws? because, if their diversions are inconsistent with the laws, and the children such themselves, it is impossible that they should grow up men obedient to the laws and virtuous. How can it be otherwise? said he.
When, therefore, children beginning well set about their diversions conformably to the laws, with music, quite the contrary to what happens in the former case attends them in everything, and grows up with them, and corrects in the state whatever was before neglected. True, indeed, said he. And regulations, even, said I, that seem but of little importance, these persons discover anew, which the others had allowed altogether to perish. What regulations? Such as these:—That the younger should keep silence before the elder, as is proper, and give them place, and rise up before them,[152] and show reverence to parents; likewise what shaving, what clothes and shoes are proper, with the whole bodily dress, and all similar matters. Do not you think so? I do. But to make laws about these things, would, I think, be silly; neither is it done anywhere; nor would it stand, though established both by word and writing. For how can it? It seems then, said I, Adimantus, that in whatever way a man sets out in his education, such accordingly will be its consequences; for does not the like always attract the like? Of course. And we may say, I suppose, that it results at last in something complete and vigorous, whether it be good or the contrary? Of course, said he.
I would not then, said I, for these reasons, undertake as yet, to make laws about such matters as these. Very properly, said he. But what, by the gods, said I, as to those laws relative to matters of contract, and to the traffic which they severally transact with each other in the market, and, if you please, their traffic likewise among their handicrafts, their abusiveness and bodily assaults, their entering of actions at law, their institution of judges, and likewise such imposts and payments of taxes as might be expedient either in the markets or at the ports,—or generally as to laws commercial, municipal, or marine, or any other the like,—shall we venture to establish any of these? It is improper, said he, to prescribe them to good and worthy men; for the greater part of them, such as ought to be established by law, they will easily find out for themselves. Yes, said I, my friend, if at least God grant them security for those laws which we have above described. But if not so, said he, they will spend the whole of their life making and amending many such [regulations,] imagining that they will thus attain to what is best.
CHAP. V.—You cannot then surely approve of it, even though the entire city (as we were lately saying) should act so; or rather, do they not seem to be doing the same that is done by all those cities, which, however ill-governed, command their citizens not to alter any part of the constitution, for that death will be inflicted on all who do any such things; while, on the other hand, whoever most cheerfully serves those who thus govern, gratifying them with insinuating flattery, and exhibits great dexterity in anticipating and satisfying their desires, will be deemed both good and wise in matters of highest importance, and will be held by them also in the greatest honour? They seem to me at least, said he, to do the very same thing, and I cannot by any means commend them. But what again as to those who desire to manage such states, and are even fond of it, do you not admire their courage and dexterity? I do, said he; excepting, indeed, such as are imposed on by them, and fancy that they are really politicians, because they are praised by the multitude. How do you mean?
Do you not pardon those men? said I. Do you think it even possible that a man ignorant of the art of measuring, supposing he should hear many other such men tell him that he is four cubits high, would not believe this of himself? Impossible, said he. Be not angry then; for such as these are of all the most ridiculous; because, as they are ever making laws about such things as we have just mentioned, and ever mending them, they conceive they shall find some end to the frauds respecting commerce, and what else I just now spoke about, through ignorance of the fact that they are in fact, as it were, trying to destroy a hydra. Nevertheless, it is nothing else, said he, that they are now attempting. I think, then, said I, that a true lawgiver ought not to give himself much trouble about such sorts of laws and police, either in an ill or well ordered state; in the one, because it is unprofitable and of no avail; in the other, because, as for some of the laws, any one whatever can find them out, while others flow quite of their own accord out of their former habits and pursuits.
What then, in the enactment of laws, said he, yet remains for us to consider? And I said: We have nothing, indeed, remaining: to the Delphian Apollo, however, there remains the greatest, noblest, and most important of legal institutions. Of what kind? said he. The erection of temples, sacrifices, and other services to the gods, demons, and heroes; likewise the rites of the dead, and what other ceremonies should be gone through, with a view to their propitiation. Such things as these, indeed, we neither know ourselves, nor, in founding the state, would we intrust them to any other, if we be wise; nor would we employ any other interpreter than that of the country: for surely this god, being the natural interpreter to all men about such matters, interprets to them sitting in the middle, and, as it were, navel of the earth. Aye, you say well, said he; and we must act accordingly.
CHAP. VI.—Thus then, son of Ariston, said I, is our state established. And, in the next place, having provided from some source or other sufficient light for it, do you yourself observe, and call on your brother and Polemarchus and these others also to do so also, whether we can at all perceive where justice lies, and where injustice, and in what respect they differ from each other; and likewise which of the two that man ought to possess, who proposes to be happy, whether with or without the knowledge of gods and men. You say nothing to the purpose, replied Glaucon; for you yourself promised to inquire into this, as it was unholy for you not to assist by all possible means the cause of justice. What you remind me of, said I, is true; and I must act accordingly; still it is proper, that you too should assist in the inquiry. Aye, that we will, said he. I hope then, said I, to be able to find what I want in the following manner:—I think that our city, if at least it has been rightly established, should be perfectly good. Necessarily so, said he. It is evident then, that it is wise, and brave, and temperate, and just. Manifestly so. Whatever then of these [virtues] we shall find in it, the remainder will be that which is not found? Of course. Supposing of any four things whatever, if we were in quest of one, were we to discover this one at first, we should be satisfied; and were we first to discover the other three, we should discover from this itself what we were inquiring after; for it would be manifestly no other than what was left behind. You say right, said he. Well then, since of the virtues above mentioned there happened to be four [in our state,] shall we not inquire about them in a similar manner? Plainly so.
CHAP. VII.—First of all, indeed, to my mind at least, wisdom appears to hold in it a very conspicuous place; and there appears to be something very peculiar about it. What is that? said he. The state which we have described appears to me to be really wise, for it is well advised; is it not? It is. And surely this very thing, the ability of advising well, is evidently a kind of science; for in no case do men advise well through ignorance, but only by means of science. Plainly so. But there are many and various kinds of science in the state? Of course there are. Is it then owing to the science of builders, that the state is to be termed wise and well-advised? By no means through this, said he; for it would only be clever in building. A state, then, is not to be called wise on account of its skill in advising the best methods of building? Surely not. And what, as respects skill in brass-work or anything else of a similar nature? For none of these, said he. Nor yet for its knowledge of the productions of the earth [is it said to be wise,] but only skilled in agriculture. I think so.
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