Plutarch's Lives, Volume 3 · Plutarch
LIFE OF NIKIAS.
"Full worthy to be punished though he be, Yet ostracism's not for such as he." The result was that no one was ever again ostracised at Athens, but Hyperbolus was the last, as Hipparchus of Cholargus, who was some relation to the despot of that name, was the first. Thus the ways of fortune are inscrutable, and beyond our finding out. If Nikias had undergone the trial of ostracism with Alkibiades, he would either have driven him into banishment, and governed Athens well and wisely during his absence, or he would himself have left the city, and avoided the terrible disaster which ended his life, and would have continued to enjoy the reputation of being an excellent general. I am well aware that Theophrastus says that Hyperbolus was ostracised in consequence of a quarrel of Alkibiades with Phæax and not with Nikias; but my account agrees with that given by the best historians.
XII. When ambassadors came to Athens from Egesta and Leontini, inviting the Athenians to commence a campaign in Sicily, Nikias opposed the project, but was overruled by Alkibiades and the war party. Before the assembly met to discuss the matter, men's heads were completely turned with vague hopes of conquest, so that the youths in the gymnasia, and the older men in their places of business or of recreation, did nothing but sketch the outline of the island of Sicily and of the adjacent seas and continents. They regarded Sicily not so much as a prize to be won, but as a stepping-stone to greater conquests, meaning from it to attack Carthage, and make themselves masters of the Mediterranean sea as far as the Columns of Herakles. Public opinion being thus biassed, Nikias could find few to help him in opposing the scheme. The rich feared lest they should be thought to wish to avoid the burden of fitting out ships and the other expensive duties which they would be called upon to fulfil, and disappointed him by remaining silent.
Yet Nikias did not relax his exertions, but even after the Athenian people had given their vote for the war, and had elected him to the chief command, with Alkibiades and Lamachus for his colleagues--even then, on the next meeting of the assembly, he made a solemn appeal to them to desist, and at last accused Alkibiades of involving the city in a terrible war in a remote country merely to serve his own ambition and rapacity. However, he gained nothing by this speech, for the Athenians thought that he would be the best man to command the expedition because of his experience in war, and that his caution would serve as a salutary check upon the rashness of Alkibiades and the easy temper of Lamachus; so that, instead of dissuading them his words rather confirmed them in their intention. For Demostratus, who of all the popular orators was the most eager promoter of the expedition, rose, and said that he would put an end to these excuses of Nikias: and he prevailed upon the people to pass a decree that the generals, both at home and in the field, should be invested with absolute irresponsible power.
XIII. Yet it is said that the expedition met with great opposition from the priests; but Alkibiades found certain soothsayers devoted to his own interests, and quoted an ancient oracle which foretold that the Athenians should one day win great glory in Sicily. Special messengers also came from the shrine of Ammon,[1] bringing an oracular response to the effect that the Athenians would take all the Syracusans. Those oracles which made against the project, people dared not mention, for fear of saying words of ill-omen. Yet even the most obvious portents would not turn them from their purpose, such as the mutilation of all the Hermæ, or statues of Hermes, in Athens, in a single night, except only one, which is called the Hermes of Andokides, which was erected by the tribe Ægeis, and stands before the house in which Andokides lived at that time. A man likewise leaped upon the altar of the Twelve Gods, sat astride upon it, and in that posture mutilated himself with a sharp stone. At Delphi too there is a golden statue of Pallas Athene standing upon a brazen palm tree, an offering made by the city of Athens from the spoils taken in the Persian war.
This was for many days pecked at by crows, who at last pecked off and cast upon the ground the golden fruit of the palm tree. This was said to be merely a fable invented by the people of Delphi, who were bribed by the Syracusans. Another oracle bade the Athenians bring to Athens the priestess of Athena at Klazomenae, and accordingly they sent for her. Her name happened to be Hesychia, signifying Repose; and this is probably what the oracle meant that the Athenians had better remain quiet. The astronomer, Meton, who was appointed to some office in the army, either because of these adverse omens and prophecies, or because he was convinced that the expedition would miscarry, pretended to be mad and to set fire to his house. Some historians relate that he did not feign madness, but that he burned down his house one night, and next morning appeared in the market-place in a miserable plight, and besought his countrymen that, in consideration of the misfortune which had befallen him, they would allow his son, who was about to sail for Sicily in command of a trireme, to remain at home. We are told that Sokrates the philosopher was warned by one of the signs from heaven which he so often received that the expedition would be the ruin of the city. And many were filled with consternation at the time fixed for the departure of the armament. It was during the celebration of the Adonia, or mourning for the death of Adonis, and in all parts of the city were to be seen images of Adonis carried along with funeral rites, and women beating their breasts, so that those who were superstitious enough to notice such matters became alarmed for the fate of the armament, and foretold that it would start forth gloriously, but would wither untimely away.
XIV. The conduct of Nikias in opposing the war when it was being deliberated upon, and his steadfastness of mind in not being dazzled by the hopes which were entertained of its success, or by the splendid position which it offered himself, deserves the utmost praise; but when, in spite of his exertions, he could not persuade the people to desist from the war, or to remove him from the office of general, into which he was as it were driven by main force, his excessive caution and slowness became very much out of place. His childish regrets, his looking back towards Athens, and his unreasonable delays disheartened his colleagues, and spoiled the effect of the expedition, which ought at once to have proceeded to act with vigour, and put its fortune to the test.
But although Lamachus begged him to sail at once to Syracuse and fight a battle as near as possible to the city walls, while Alkibiades urged him to detach the other Sicilian states from their alliance with Syracuse, and then attack that place, he dispirited his men by refusing to adopt either plan, and proposed to sail quietly along the coast, displaying the fleet and army to the Sicilians, and then, after affording some slight assistance to the people of Egesta, to return home to Athens. Shortly after this, the Athenians sent for Alkibiades to return home for his trial on a charge of treason, and Nikias, who was nominally Lamachus's colleague, but really absolute, proceeded to waste time in idle negotiations and languid manœuvres, until his troops had quite lost the high spirits and hopes with which they had arrived at Sicily; while the enemy, who were at first terrified, began to recover their spirits, and despise the Athenians. While Alkibiades was still with them they had sailed to Syracuse with sixty ships, and while the rest remained in line of battle outside, ten of these had entered the harbour to reconnoitre.
These ships, approaching the city, made a proclamation by a herald that they were come to restore the people of Leontini to their city, and they also captured a Syracusan vessel, in which they found tables on which were written the names of all the inhabitants of Syracuse, according to their tribes and houses. These tables were kept far away from the city, in the temple of the Olympian Zeus, but at that time the Syracusans had sent for them in order to discover the number of men able to bear arms. These tables were now taken by the Athenians, and carried to their general. When the soothsayers saw this roll of names, they were much alarmed, fearing that this was the fulfilment of the prophecy that the Athenians should capture all the Syracusans. However, some declare that the prophecy was really fulfilled when the Athenian Kallippus slew Dion, and captured Syracuse.
XV. Shortly after this, Alkibiades left Sicily, and the supreme command devolved upon Nikias. For Lamachus, though a brave and honest man, and one who always freely risked his life in battle, was but a plain simple man, and was so excessively poor, that whenever he was appointed general he was forced to ask the Athenians to advance him a small sum of money to provide him with clothes and shoes. Now Nikias was excessively haughty, both on account of his great wealth, and his military renown. It is said that once when the generals were debating some question together, Nikias bade Sophokles the poet give his opinion first, because he was the eldest man present, to which Sophokles answered, "I am the eldest, but you are the chief." Thus when in Sicily he domineered over Lamachus, although the latter was a far abler soldier, and by sailing about the coast at the point furthest removed from the enemy, gave them confidence, which was turned into contempt, when he was repulsed from Hybla, a little fort in the interior. At last he returned to Katana, without having effected anything, except the reduction of Hykkara, a town of the aborigines, not of the Greeks, from which it is said the celebrated courtezan Lais, then a very young girl, was carried away captive and sent to Peloponnesus.
XVI. As the summer advanced, and Nikias remained inactive, the Syracusans gained so much confidence that they called upon their generals to lead them to the attack of the Athenian position at Katana, since the Athenians did not dare approach Syracuse; while Syracusan horsemen even went so far as to insult the Athenians in their camp, riding up to ask if they were come to settle as peaceful citizens in Katana, instead of restoring the Leontines. This unexpected humiliation at length forced Nikias to proceed to Syracuse, and he devised a stratagem by which he was able to approach that city and pitch his camp before it unmolested. He despatched to Syracuse a citizen of Katana, who informed the Syracusans that if they desired to seize the camp and arms of the Athenians, they would only have to appoint a day and to march in force to Katana. Many of the Athenians, he said, spent all their time within the walls of Katana, and it would be easy for the Syracusan party there to close the gates, assail the Athenians within, and set fire to their ships. A numerous body of Kataneans, he added, were eager to co-operate in the plan now proposed.
This was by far the ablest piece of strategy accomplished by Nikias during all the time that he remained in Sicily. The Syracusans were induced to march out their entire force, leaving their city with scarcely any defenders. Meanwhile, Nikias sailed round from Katana, took possession of the harbour, and encamped his forces on the mainland in a position where he could not be attacked by the enemy's cavalry. When the Syracusan army returned from Katana, he marched out the Athenians and defeated them, but with little loss on their side, as their cavalry covered their retreat. Nikias now broke down the bridges over the river Anapus, which gave occasion to Hermokrates to say, when he was making a speech to encourage the Syracusans, that it was a ridiculous thing for Nikias to try to avoid fighting, as though it were not for the express purpose of fighting that he had been sent thither. But in spite of all that Hermokrates could say, the Syracusans were very much cast down and disheartened. Instead of the fifteen generals who usually commanded their troops they chose three, upon whom they conferred absolute powers, and swore a solemn oath that they would leave them unfettered in the exercise of those powers. The Athenians were very anxious to occupy the temple of Olympian Zeus, which was near their camp, and full of offerings of gold and silver. Nikias, however, purposely delayed the attack until a force was sent from Syracuse to defend the temple. He thought that if the soldiers did succeed in plundering it, the state would be none the better for it, and he himself would have to bear all the blame of sacrilege.
Nikias made no use of his boasted victory, and after a short time drew off his forces to Naxos, where he passed the winter, expending an enormous sum of money for the maintenance of so large a force, and effecting little or nothing except the reduction of a few disorderly tribes in the interior. The Syracusans now took heart again, marched into the Katanean territory and laid it waste, and attempted to burn the camp of the Athenians. Upon this all men blamed Nikias for deliberating and taking precautions until the time for action was gone by. No one could find any fault with him when he was actually fighting; but though a bold and energetic man in action, he was slow to form plans and begin an enterprise.
"Eight times they beat the Syracusan host, Before the gods themselves declared them lost." Indeed, they beat the Syracusans far more than eight times, before the gods turned against the Athenians and dashed them to the ground when at the height of their pride. XVIII. Nikias was present, in spite of his sufferings, at most of these actions; but when his disease grew worse, he was forced to stay in the camp with a small guard, while Lamachus took the command of the army, and fought a battle with the Syracusans, who were endeavouring to build a counter-wall which would obstruct the Athenians in building their wall of circumvallation. The Athenians were victorious, but followed up their success in such a disorderly manner that Lamachus was left alone and exposed to the attacks of the Syracusan cavalry. He at once challenged their leader, a brave man named Kallimachus, to single combat, and both received and inflicted a mortal wound. His dead body and arms fell into the hands of the Syracusans, who at once charged up to the Athenian walls, where Nikias lay helpless. The extremity of the danger roused him, and he ordered his attendants to set fire to a quantity of timber which had been brought thither to construct military engines, and to some of the engines themselves. This desperate expedient checked the Syracusans, and saved Nikias and the Athenians; for the rest of the Syracusan forces on perceiving so great a body of flame returned in haste to their city.
This affair left Nikias in sole command, and he had great hopes of taking the place; for many cities in Sicily had formed alliances with him, ships laden with corn kept arriving to supply his camp, and all began to be eager to be on his side, and to share in the fruits of his success. The Syracusans themselves sent to propose terms of peace, for they despaired of being able to defend their city any longer against him. At this time Gylippus too, a Lacedæmonian who was sent to assist them, heard during his voyage that they were completely enclosed and reduced to great straits, but held on his voyage notwithstanding, in order that even if, as he imagined, all Sicily had fallen into the hands of the Athenians, he might at any rate defend the Greek cities in Italy from sharing its fate. The air indeed was full of rumours that the Athenians were carrying all before them, and that the good fortune and skill of their general rendered him invincible. Even Nikias himself was so elated by his apparent good fortune, that he forgot his wonted prudence, and imagining from the secret intelligence which he had from his friends within Syracuse that it was on the point of surrender, neglected Gylippus altogether, and kept so bad a watch at the straits of Messina with his fleet, that Gylippus managed to cross there and land in Sicily. Here he at once proceeded to gather an army together, but in a quarter of the island far away from Syracuse, so that the people of Syracuse knew nothing of his arrival. They even appointed a day for the public assembly to meet and discuss terms of surrender with Nikias, and were about to attend it, as they thought that it would be best for them to come to terms before the city was quite surrounded by the wall of the Athenians. There was now only a very small portion of this left to be finished, and all the materials for building it were collected on the spot.
XIX. At this crisis there arrived at Syracuse Gongylus, a Corinthian, in one trireme. All crowded round him, to hear what news he brought. He informed them that Gylippus would soon come to their aid by land, and that other triremes besides his own were on their way by sea. This intelligence was scarcely believed, until it was confirmed by a message from Gylippus himself, bidding them march out and meet him. They now took courage and prepared for battle. Gylippus marched into the town, and at once led the Syracusans out to attack the Athenians. When Nikias had likewise brought his army out of their camp, Gylippus halted his men, and sent a herald to offer them an armistice for five days, on condition that they would collect their effects and withdraw from Sicily. Nikias disdained to answer this insulting message; but some of his soldiers jeeringly enquired whether the presence of one Spartan cloak and staff had all at once made the Syracusans so strong that they could despise the Athenians, who used to keep three hundred such men, stronger than Gylippus and with longer hair, locked up in prison, and feared them so little that they delivered them up to the Lacedæmonians again.
Timæus says that the Sicilian Greeks despised Gylippus for his avaricious and contemptible character, and that when they first saw him, they ridiculed his long hair and Spartan cloak. Afterwards, however, he tells us that as soon as Gylippus appeared they flocked round him as small birds flock round an owl, and were eager to take service under him. This indeed is the more probable story; for they rallied round him, regarding his cloak and staff to be the symbols of the authority of Sparta. And not only Thucydides, but Philistus, a Syracusan citizen by birth, who was an eye-witness of the whole campaign, tells us that nothing could have been done without Gylippus. In the first battle after his arrival, the Athenians were victorious, and slew some few Syracusans, amongst whom was the Corinthian Gongylus, but on the following day Gylippus displayed the qualities of a true general. He used the same arms, horses, and ground as before, but he dealt with them so differently that he defeated the Athenians.
Checking the Syracusans, who wished to chase them back to their camp, he ordered them to use the stones and timber which had been collected by the Athenians, to build a counter-wall, reaching beyond the line of circumvallation, so that the Athenians could no longer hope to surround the city. And now the Syracusans, taking fresh courage, began to man their ships of war, and to cut off the stragglers with their cavalry. Gylippus personally visited many of the Greek cities in Sicily, all of whom eagerly promised their aid, and furnished him with troops; so that Nikias, perceiving that he was losing ground, relapsed into his former desponding condition, and wrote a despatch to Athens, bidding the people either send out another armament, or let the one now in Sicily return to Athens, and especially beseeching them to relieve him from his command, for which he was incapacitated by disease.
XX. The Athenians had long before proposed to send out a reinforcement to the army in Sicily, but as all had gone on prosperously, the enemies of Nikias had contrived to put it off. Now, however, they were eager to send him assistance. It was arranged that Demosthenes should employ himself actively in getting ready a large force, to go to reinforce Nikias in the early spring, while Eurymedon, although it was winter, started immediately with a supply of money, and with a decree naming Euthydemus and Menander, officers already serving in his army, to be joint commanders along with him. Meanwhile, Nikias was suddenly attacked by the Syracusans both by sea and land. His ships were at first thrown into confusion, but rallied and sank many of the enemy, or forced them to run on shore; but on land Gylippus managed at the same time to surprise the fort of Plemmyrium, where there was a magazine of naval stores and war material of all kinds. A considerable number of the garrison, also, were either slain or taken prisoners; but the most serious result was the stoppage of Nikias's supplies, which heretofore had been easily and quickly brought through the Great Harbour, while it remained in the hands of the Athenians, but which now could not reach his camp by sea without a convoy and a battle.[2] Moreover, the Syracusan fleet had not been defeated by any superiority of force of the Athenians, but by the disorder into which it had been thrown by pursuing the enemy. They therefore determined to renew the conflict with better success.
Nikias, on his part, was unwilling to fight a second time, thinking it was folly to fight with a diminished and disheartened force when he knew that Demosthenes was hurrying to his aid with a large and unbroken armament. However, Menander and Euthydemus, the newly-elected generals, were eager to distinguish themselves by performing some brilliant action before the arrival of Demosthenes, and to eclipse the fame of Nikias himself. The pretext they used was the glory of Athens, which they said would be dishonoured for ever if they should now appear afraid to accept the Syracusans' offer of battle. The battle was fought: and the Athenian left wing, we are told by Thucydides, was utterly defeated by the skilful tactics of the Corinthian steersman Aristion. Many Athenians perished, and Nikias was greatly disheartened, for he had now proved unfortunate both when sole commander and when acting with colleagues. XXI. Matters were in this posture when Demosthenes was descried in the offing, approaching with a splendid armament which struck terror into the hearts of the enemy. His fleet consisted of seventy-three ships, on board of which were five thousand heavy-armed troops, and three thousand javelin men, archers, and slingers. The glittering arms of the troops, the flaunting banners of the ships of war, and the music of the flutes to which the rowers kept time with their oars, made a gallant display, which delighted the Athenians as much as it depressed the Syracusans. These latter, indeed, were struck with dismay, and thought that their last victory had been won in vain, and that they were labouring to no purpose against a foe whose ranks were continually reinforced.
Text from Project Gutenberg, public domain in the United States.