Six metaphysical meditations · René Descartes
ANSWER.
When I said, _That is a Mind_, _a Soul_, _an Understanding_, _Reason_, &c. I did not mean by these _names_ the _Faculties_ only, but the _things_ indow’d with those _Faculties_; and so ’tis alwayes understood by the two first names (_mind_ and _soul_) and very often so understood by the two last Names (_understanding_ and _Reason_) and this I have explain’d so often, and in so many places of these Meditations, that there is not the least occasion of questioning my meaning. Neither is there any parity between _Walking_ and _Thought_, for _walking_ is used only for the _Act_ it self, but _thought_ is sometimes used for the _Act_, sometimes for the _Faculty_, and sometimes for the _thing_ it self, wherein the _Faculty_ resides. Neither do I say, that the _understanding thing_ and _intellection_ are the same, or that the _understanding thing_ and the _intellect_ are the same, if the _intellect_ be taken for the _Faculty_, but only when ’tis taken for the _thing it self that understands_. Yet I willingly confess, that I have (as much as in me lay) made use of _abstracted words_ to signifie that _thing_ or _substance_, which I would have devested of all those things that belong not to it. Whereas contrarily this Philosopher uses the most _concrete Words_ to signifie this _thinking thing_, such as _subject_, _matter_, _Body_, &c. that he may not suffer it to be separated from _Body_.
Neither am I concern’d that His manner of joyning many things together may seem to some fitter for the discovery of Truth, than mine, wherein I separate as much as possibly each particular. But let us omit words and speak of things. _It may be_ (sayes he) _that a Thinking thing is a corporeal thing, the contrary whereof is here assumed and not proved._ But herein he is mistaken, for I never _assumed_ the _contrary_, neither have I used it as a _Foundation_, for the rest of _my Superstructure_, but left it wholly _undetermin’d_ till the _sixth Meditation_, and in that ’tis proved. Then he tells us rightly, _that we cannot conceive any Act without its subject_, as _thought_ without a _thinking thing_, for what _thinks_ cannot be _nothing_; but then he subjoyns without any Reason, and against the usual manner of speaking, and contrary to all Logick, _that hence it seem to follow, that a thinking thing is a corporeal Being_. Truly the _subjects_ of all _Acts_ are understood under the notion of _substance_, or if you please under the notion of _matter_ (that is to say of _metaphysical matter_) but not therefore under the notion of _Bodies_. But Logicians and Commonly all Men are used to say, that there are some _Spiritual_, some _Corporeal_ substances. And by the Instance of Wax I only proved that _Colour_, _Consistence_, _Shape_, &c. appertain not to the _Ratio Formalis_ of the Wax; For in that Place I treated neither of the _Ratio Formalis_ of the _Mind_, neither of _Body_.
Neither is it pertinent to the business, that the Philosopher asserts, _That one Thought cannot be the subject of an other thought_, for Who besides Himself ever Imagin’d This? But that I may explain the matter in a few words, ’Tis certain that _Thought_ cannot be without a _Thinking Thing_, neither any _Act_ or any _Accident_ without a _substance_ wherein it resides. But seeing that we know not a _substance immediately by it self_, but by this alone, that ’tis the _subject_ of several _Acts_, it is very consonant to the commands of Reason and Custome, that we should call by _different names_ those _substances_, which we perceive are the _subjects_ of very _different Acts_ or _Accidents_, and that afterwards we should examine, whether those _different names_ signifie _different_ or _one_ and the _same_ thing. Now there are some _Acts_ which we call _corporeal_, as _magnitude_, _figure_, _motion_, and what ever else cannot be thought on without _local extension_, and the _substance_ wherein these reside we call _Body_; neither can it be imagin’d that ’tis one _substance_ which is the _subject_ of _Figure_, and another _substance_ which is the _subject_ of _local motion_, &c. Because all these _Acts_ agree under one common notion of _Extension_. Besides there are other _Acts_, which we call _cogitative_ or _thinking_, as _understanding_, _will_, _imagination_, _sense_, &c. All which agree under the common notion of _thought_, _perception_, or _Conscience_; And the _substance_ wherein they are, we say, is a _thinking thing_, or _mind_, or call it by whatever other name we please, so we do not confound it with _corporeal substance_, because _cogitative Acts_ have no affinity with _corporeal Acts_, and _thought_, which is the common _Ratio_ of _those_ is wholly different from _Extension_, which is the common _Ratio_ of _These_. But after we have formed two _distinct conceptions_ of these two _substances_, from what is said in the sixth Meditation, ’tis easie to know, whether they be _one_ and the _same_ or _different_.
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