Six metaphysical meditations · René Descartes
MEDITAT. III.
_Of GOD, and that there is a God._ Now will I shut my eyes, I will stop my ears, and withdraw all my senses, I will blot out the Images of _corporeal_ things clearly from my mind, or (because that can scarce be accomplish’d) I will give no heed to them, as being _vain_ and _false_, and by discoursing with my self, and prying more rightly into my own Nature, will endeavour to make my self by degrees more known and familiar to my self. I am a _Thinking Thing_, that is to say, _doubting_, _affirming_, _denying_, _understanding_ few things, _ignorant_ of many things, _willing_, _nilling_, _imagining_ also, and _sensitive_. For (as before I have noted) though perhaps whatever I _imagine_, or am sensible of, as without me, _Is not_; yet that _manner_ of _thinking_ which I call _sense_ and _imagination_ (as they are only certain _Modes_ of _Thinking_) I am certain are in Me. So that in these few Words I have mention’d whatever I _know_, or at least Whatever as yet I _perceive_ my self to _know_. Now will I look about me more carefully to see Whether there Be not some other Thing in Me, of Which I have not yet taken Notice. I am sure That I am a _Thinking Thing_, and therefore Do not I know what is Required to make _certain_ of any Thing? I Answer, that in this My _first knowledge_ ’tis Nothing but a _clear_, and _distinct perception_ of What I affirm, Which would not be sufficient to make me _certain_ of the _Truth_ of a Thing, if it were _Possible_ that any thing that I so _clearly_ and _distinctly_ Perceive should be _false_. Wherefore I may lay this Down as a _Principle_. _Whatever I Clearly and Distinctly perceive is certainly True._
But I have formerly Admitted of many Things as very _Certain_ and _manifest_, Which I afterwards found to be _doubtful_. Therefore What sort of Things were they? _Viz._ Heaven, Earth, Stars, and all other things which I perceived by my _Senses_. But What did I Perceive of These _Clearly? Viz._ That I had the _Ideas_ or _Thoughts_ of these things in my mind, and at Present I cannot deny that I have these _Ideas_ in Me. But there was some other thing Which I affirm’d, and Which (by Reason of the common Way of Belief) I thought that I _Clearly_ Perceived; Which nevertheless, I did not really Perceive; And that was, that there were Certain Things _Without Me_ from whence these _Ideas Proceeded_, and to which they were exactly like. And this it was, Wherein I was either _Deceived_, or if by Chance I Judged _truly_, yet it Proceeded not from the strength of my _Perception_.
But When I was exercised about any single and easie Proposition in Arithmetick or Geometry, as that two and three added make five, Did not I Perceive them _Clearly_ enough to make me affirm them True? Truly concerning these I had no other Reason afterwards to _Doubt_, but That I thought Perhaps there may be a _God_ who might have so created me, that I should be _Deceived_ even in those things which seem’d most _Clear_ to me. And as often as this Pre-conceived opinion of _Gods great Power_ comes into my Mind, I cannot but Confess that he may easily cause me to Err even in those things which I Think I perceive most _Evidently_ with my Mind; yet as often as I Consider the Things themselves, which I Judge my self to perceive so _Clearly_, I am so fully Perswaded by them, that I easily Break out into these Expressions, Let Who can Deceive Me, yet he shall never Cause me _Not to Be_ whilst _I think that I Am_, or that it shall ever be True, _that I never was_, Whilst at Present ’tis True _that I am_, or Perhaps, that Two and Three added make More or Less then Five; for in These things I Percieve a Manifest Repugnancy; And truely seeing I have no reason to Think any _God_ a _Deceiver_, Nor as yet fully know Whether there Be _any God_, or _Not_, ’Tis but a slight and (as I may say) Metaphysical Reason of Doubt, which depends only on that opinion of which I am not yet Perswaded.
Wherefore That this Hindrance may be taken away, When I have time I ought to Enquire, Whether there _Be a God_, And if there be One, Whether he can be a _Deceiver_, For whilst I am _Ignorant_ of this, I cannot possibly be fully _Certain_ of any Other thing. But now Method seems to Require Me to Rank all My Thoughts under certain Heads, and to search in Which of them _Truth_ or _Falshood_ properly Consists. Some of them are (as it were) the _Images_ of Things, and to these alone the Name of an _Idea_ properly belongs, as When I think upon a Man, A Chimera or Monster, Heaven, an Angel, or _God_. But there are others of them, that have _superadded Forms_ to them, as when I Will, when I Fear, when I Affirm, when I Deny. I know I have alwayes (when ever I think) some certain Thing as the _subject_ or _object_ of my Thought, but in this last sort of thoughts there is something _more_ which I Think upon then Barely the likeness of the Thing. And of these Thoughts some are called _Wills_ and _Affections_, and Others of them _Judgments_. Now as touching _Ideas_, if they be Consider’d alone as they are in themselves, without _Respect_ to any other Things, they cannot Properly be _false_; for Whether I _Imagine_ a Goat or a Chimera, ’tis as _Certain_ that I _Imagine_ one as t’other. Also in the _Will_ and _Affections_ I need not Fear any _Falshood_, For tho I should _Wish_ for _evil Things_, or Things that are Not, it is not therefore _Not true_ that I Wish for them.
Wherefore there onely Remains my _Judgments_ of Things, in which I must take Care that I be not _deceived_. Now the Chief and most usual _Error_ that I discover in them is, That I _Judge_ Those _Ideas_ that are _within_ me to be _Conformable_ and like to certain things that are _without_ Me; for truely if I Consider those Ideas as certain _Modes_ of my _Thought_, without Respect to any other Thing, they will scarce afford me an Occasion of _Erring_. Of these _Ideas_ some are _Innate_, some _Adventitious_, and some Others seem to Me as Created by my self; For that I understand what _A Thing_ Is, What is _Truth_, What a _Thought_, seems to Proceed meerly from my own _Nature_. But that I now _hear_ a Noise, _see_ the Sun, or _feel_ heat, _I_ have alwayes _Judged_ to Proceed from Things _External_. But Lastly, Mermaids, Griffins, and such like Monsters, are _made meerly_ by _My self_. And yet _I_ may well think all of them either _Adventitious_, or all of them _Innate_, or all of them _made by my self_, for I have not as yet discover’d their true _Original_.
But _I_ ought cheifly to search after those of them which _I_ count _Adventitious_, and which I consider as coming from _outward objects_, that I may know what reason I have to think them _like_ the things themselves, which they _represent_. Viz. _Nature so teaches Me_; and also I know that they _depend_ not on my _Will_, and therefore _not on me_; for they are often present with me against my inclinations, or (as they say) in spite of my teeth, as now whether _I will_ or _no_ I feel heat, and therefore I think that the _sense_ or _Idea_ of heat is propagated to me by a _thing_ really _distinct_ from _my self_, and that is by the _heat_ of the _Fire_ at which I sit; And nothing is more obvious then for me to judge that That thing should transmit its own _Likeness_ into me, rather then that any other thing should be transmitted by it. Which sort of arguments whether firme enough or not I shall now Trie.
When I here say, that _nature so teaches me_, I understand only, that I am as it were _willingly forced_ to beleive it, and not that ’tis _discover’d_ to me to be _true_ by any _natural light_; for these two differ very much. For whatever is discover’d to me by the _Light_ of _nature_ (as that it necessarily Follows _that I am_, because _I think_) cannot possibly be _doubted_; Because I am endowed with no other _Faculty_, in which I may put so great confidence, as I can in the _Light_ of _nature_; or _which_ can possibly tell me, that those things are _false_, which _natural light_ teaches me to be _true_; and as to my _natural Inclinations_, I have heretofore often judged my self led by them to the election of the _worst part_, when I was in the choosing _one_ of two Goods; and therefore I see no reason why I should ever _trust_ them in any other thing. And then, tho these _Ideas depend not_ on my _will_, it does not therefore follow that they _necessarily proceed_ from _things external_. For as, Altho those _Inclinations_ (which I but now mention’d) are in me, yet they seem _distinct_ and _different_ from my _will_; so perhaps there may be in me some other _faculty_ (to me _unknown_) which may prove the _Efficient cause_ of these _Ideas_, as hitherto I have observed them to be formed in me whilst I _dream_, without the help of any _External Object_.
And last of all, tho they should _proceed_ from things which are _different_ from me, it does not therefore follow that they must be _like_ those things. For often times I have found the _thing_ and the _Idea differing_ much. As for example, I find in my self two divers _Ideas_ of the Sun, _one_ as _received_ by my _senses_ (and which cheifly I reckon among those I call adventitious) by which it appears to me very _smal_, * _another_ as taken from the arguments of Astronomers (that is to say, _consequentially collected_, or some other ways made by me from certain _natural notions_) by which ’tis rendred something bigger then the Globe of the Earth. Certainly both of these cannot be _like_ that sun which is _without me_, and my reason perswades me, that that _Idea_ is most _unlike_ the Sun, which seems to _proceed Immediately_ from it self. All which things sufficiently prove, that I have hitherto (not from a _true judgement_, but from a _blind impulse_) beleived that there are certain things _different_ from my self, and which have sent their _Ideas_ or _Images_ into me by the Organs of my _senses_, or some other way.
But I have yet an other Way of inquiring, whether any of those Things (whose _Ideas_ I have _within_ Me) are Really Existent _without_ Me; And that is Thus: As those _Ideas_ are only _Modes_ of _Thinking_, I acknowledge no _Inequality_ between them, and they all proceed from me in the _same Manner_. But as _one_ Represents _one thing_, an _other_, an _other Thing_, ’tis Evident there is a _Great difference_ between them. * For without doubt, Those of them which Represent _Substances_ are something _More_, or (as I may say) have _More_ of _Objective Reallity_ in them, then those that Represent only _Modes_ or _Accidents_; and again, _That_ by Which I understand a _Mighty God_, _Eternal_, _Infinite_, _Omniscient_, _Omnipotent Creatour_ of all things besides himself, has certainly in it _more Objective Reallity_, then Those _Ideas_ by which _Finite Substances_ are Exhibited. But Now, it is evident by the _Light_ of _Nature_ that there must be _as much_ at least in the _Total efficient Cause_, as there is in the _Effect_ of _that Cause_; For from Whence can the _effect_ have its _Reallity_, but from the _Cause_? and how can the _Cause_ give it that _Reallity_, unless _it self have_ it? And from hence it follows, that neither a _Thing_ can be made out of _Nothing_, Neither a Thing which is _more Perfect_ (that is, Which has in it self _more Reallity_) _proceed_ from That Which is _Less Perfect_.
And this is _Clearly_ True, not only in those _Effects_ whose _Actual_ or _Formal Reallity_ is Consider’d, But in Those _Ideas_ also, Whose _Objective Reallity_ is only Respected; That is to say, for Example of Illustration, it is not only impossible that a stone, Which _was not_, should now begin _to Be_, unless it were produced by _something_, in Which, Whatever goes to the Making a Stone, is either _Formally_ or _Virtually_; neither can _heat_ be Produced in any Thing, which before was _not hot_, but by a Thing which is at least of as equal a _degree_ of _Perfection_ as _heat_ is; But also ’tis Impossible that I should have an _Idea_ of Heat, or of a _Stone_, unless it were put into me by some _Cause_, in which there is at Least as much _Reallity_, as I Conceive there is in heat or a Stone. For tho that _Cause_ transfers none of its own _Actual_ or _Formal Reality_ into my _Idea_, I must not from thence conclude that ’tis _less real_; but I may think that the _nature_ of the _Idea_ it self is such, that of it self it requires no other _formal reality_, but what it has from my _thought_, of which ’tis a _mode_. But that this Idea has _this_ or _that objective reallity_, rather then any _other_, proceeds clearly from some _cause_, in which there ought to be at least as much _formal reallity_, as there is of _objective reallity_ in the _Idea_ it self. For if we suppose any thing in the _Idea_, which was not in its _cause_, it must of necessity have this from _nothing_; but (tho it be a most _Imperfect manner_ of _existing_, by which the thing is _objectively_ in the _Intellect_ by an _Idea_, yet) it is not _altogether nothing_, and therefore cannot proceed from _nothing_.
Neither ought I to doubt, seeing the _reallity_ which I perceive in my _Ideas_ is only an _objective reallity_, that therefore it must of necessity follow, that the same _reallity_ should be in the _causes_ of these _Ideas formally_. But I may conclude, that ’tis sufficient that this _reallity_ be in the very _causes_ only _objectively_. For as that _objective manner_ of _being_ appertains to the very _nature_ of an _Idea_, so that _formal manner_ of _being_ appertains to the very _nature_ of a _cause_ of _Ideas_, at least to the _first_ and _chiefest causes_ of them; For tho perhaps one _Idea_ may receive its birth from an other, yet we cannot proceed in _Infinitum_, but at last we must arrive at some _first Idea_, whose _cause_ is (as it were) an _Original copy_, in which all the _objective reallity_ of the _Idea_ is _formally contain’d_. So that I plainly discover by the _light_ of _nature_, that the _Ideas_, which are in me, are (as it were) _Pictures_, which may easily _come short_ of the _perfection_ of those things from whence they are taken, but cannot _contain_ any thing _greater_ or _more perfect_ then them: And the _longer_ and _more diligently_ I pry into these things, so much the more _clearly_ and _distinctly_ do I discover them to be _true_.
But what shall I conclude from hence? Thus, that if the _objective reallity_ of any of my _Ideas_ be _such_, that it cannot be in me either _formally_ or _eminently_, and that therefore I cannot be the _cause_ of _that Idea_, from hence it necessarily Follows, that _I alone_ do not only _exist_, but that some other thing, which is _cause_ of that _Idea_, does _exist also_. But if I can find no _such Idea_ in me, I have no argument to perswade me of the _existence_ of any thing besides my self for I have diligently enquired, and hitherto I could discover no other _perswasive_. Some of these _Ideas_ there are (besides that which represents _my self_ to _my self_, of which in this place I cannot doubt) which represent to me, one of them a _God_, others of them _Corporeal_ and _Inanimate_ things, some of them _Angels_, others _Animals_, and lastly some of them which exhibite to me _men like my self_. As touching those that represent _Men_ or _Angels_ or _Animals_, I easily understand that they may be _made up_ of those _Ideas_ which I have of _my self_, of _Corporeal_ things, and of _God_, tho there were neither _man_ (but my self) nor _Angel_, nor _Animal_ in being.
And as to the _Ideas_ of _Corporeal_ things, I find nothing in them of that _perfection_, but it may proceed from my self; for if I look into them more narrowly, and examine them more particularly, as yesterday (_in the second Medit._) I did the _Idea_ of Wax, I find there are but few things which I perceive _clearly_ and _distinctly_ in them, viz. _Magnitude_ or _extension_ in _Longitude_, _Latitude_, and _Profundity_, the _Figure_ or _shape_ which arises from the _termination_ of that _Extension_, the _Position_ or _place_ which divers _Figured Bodies_ have in _respect_ of each other, their _motion_ or _change of place_; to which may be added, their _substance_, _continuance_, and _number_; as to the other, such as are, _Light_, _Colours_, _Sounds_, _Smels_, _Tasts_, _Heat_, and _Cold_, with the other _tactile qualities_, I have but very _obscure_ and _confused thoughts_ of them, so that I know not, whether they are _true_ or _false_, that is to say, whether the _Ideas_ I have of them are the _Ideas_ of _things_ which _really are_, or _are not_. For altho _falshood formally_ and _properly_ so called, consists only in the _judgement_ (as before I have observed) yet there is an other sort of _material falshood_ in _Ideas_, when they represent a _thing_ as _really existent_, tho it does _not exist_; so, for example, the _Ideas_ I have of _heat_ and _cold_ are so _obscure_ and _confused_, that I cannot collect from them, whether _cold_ be a _privation_ of _heat_, or _heat_ a _privation_ of _cold_, or whether either of them be a _real quality_, or whether neither of them be _real_. And since every _Idea_ must be _like_ the thing it represents, if it be _true_ that _cold_ is nothing but the _privation_ of _heat_, that _Idea_ which represents it to me as a thing _real_ and _positive_ may deservedly be called _false_. The same may be apply’d to other Ideas.
And now I see no necessity why I should assigne any other _Author_ of these _Ideas_ but _my self_; for if they are _false_, that is, represent things that _are not_, I know by the _light_ of _nature_ that they proceed from _nothing_; that is to say, I harbour them upon no other account, but because my _nature_ is _deficient_ in something, and _imperfect_. But if they are _true_, yet seeing I discover so little _reality_ in them, that that very _reality_ scarce _seems_ to _be realy_, I see no reason why I my self should not be the _Author_ of them. But also some of those very _Ideas_ of _Corporeal_ things which are _clear_ and _distinct_, I may seem to have borrow’d from the _Idea_ I have of _my self_, viz. _Substance_, _duration_, _number_, and the like; For when I conceive a _stone_ to be a _substance_ (that is, _a thing apt of it self to exist_) and also that I _my self_ am a _substance_, tho I conceive _my self_ a _thinking substance_ and _not extended_, and the _stone_ an _extended substance_ and _not thinking_, by which there is a great _diversity_ between both the _conceptions_, yet they _agree_ in this, that they are _both substances_. So when I conceive my self as _now_ in being, and also remember, that _heretofore_ I _have been_; and since I have _divers_ thoughts, which I can _number_ or _count_; from hence it is that I come by the notions of _duration_ and _number_; which afterwards I apply to other things.
As to those other things, of which the _Idea_ of a _body_ is made up, as _extension_, _figure_, _place_ and _motion_, they are not _formally_ in me, seeing I am only a _thinking thing_; yet seeing they are only certain _modes_ of _substance_, and I my self also am a _substance_, they may seem to be in me _eminently_. * Wherefore there only Remains the _Idea_ of a _God_, wherein I must consider whether there be not something included, which cannot possibly have its _original_ from me. By the word _God_, I mean a certain _Infinite Substance_, _Independent_, _Omniscient_, _Almighty_, by whom both _I my self_, and every thing else that _is_ (if any thing do _Actualy exist_) was created. All which _Attributes_ are of such an _high nature_, that the more attentively I consider them, the less I conceive my self possible to be the _Author_ of these notions.
From what therefore has been said I must conclude that there is a _God_; for tho the _Idea_ of _substance_ may arise in me, because that I my self am a _substance_, yet I could not have the _Idea_ of an _Infinite substance_ (seeing I my self am _finite_) unless it proceeded from a _substance_ which is _really Infinite_. Neither ought I to think that I have no _true Idea_ of _Infinity_, or that I perceive it only by the _negation_ of what is _finite_, as I conceive _rest_ and _darkness_ by the _negation_ or _absence_ of _motion_ or _light_. But on the contrary I plainly understand, that there is _more reality_ in an _Infinite substance_, then in a _Finite_; and that therefore the _perception_ of an _Infinite_ (as _God_) is _antecedent_ to the _notion_ I have of a _finite_ (as _my self_). For how should I know that I _doubt_ or _desire_, that is to say, that I _want_ something, and that I am _not altogether perfect_, unless I had the _Idea_ of a _being more perfect_ then _my self_, by _comparing_ my self to which I may discover my own _Imperfections_.
Neither can it be said that this _Idea_ of _God_ is _false Materialiter_, and that therefore it _proceeds_ from _nothing_, as before I observed of the _Ideas_ of _heat_ and _cold_, _&c._ For on the contrary, seeing this _notion_ is most _clear_ and _distinct_, and contains in it self more _objective reality_ then any other _Idea_, none can be more _true_ in it self, nor in which less _suspition_ of _falshood_ can be found. This _Idea_ (I say) of a _being infinitely perfect_ is most _true_, for tho it may be supposed that such a _being_ does _not exist_, yet it cannot be supposed that the _Idea_ of such a _being_ exhibites to me nothing _real_, as before I have said of the _Idea_ of _cold_. This _Idea_ also is most _clear_ and _distinct_, for whatever I perceive _clearly_ and _distinctly_ to be _real_, and _true_, and _perfect_, is wholy _contain’d_ in this _Idea_ of _God_. Neither can it be objected, that I cannot _comprehend_ an _Infinite_, or that there are innumerable other things in _God_, which I can neither _conceive_, nor in the least _think upon_; for it is of the _very nature_ of an _Infinite_ not to be _apprehendable_ by _me_ who am _finite_. And ’tis sufficient to me to prove this my _Idea_ of _God_ to be the most _true_, the most _clear_, and the most _distinct Idea_ of all those _Ideas_ I have, upon this _account_, that I understand that _God_ is _not to be understood_, and that I judge that whatever I _clearly_ perceive and know _Implys_ any _perfection_, as also perhaps other innumerable _perfections_, which I am ignorant of, are in _God_ either _formally_ or _eminently_.
_Doubt._ But perhaps _I am_ something _more_ then I take my self to _be_, and perhaps all these _perfections_ which I attribute to _God_, are _potentially_ in me, tho at present they do not shew themselves, and break into action. For I am now fully experienced that my _Knowledge_ may be _encreased_, and I see nothing that hinders why it may not _encrease_ by degrees in _Infinitum_, nor why by my _knowledge_ so _encreased_ I may not attain to the other _perfections_ of _God_; nor lastly, why the _power_ or _aptitude_ of _having_ these perfections may not be sufficient to produce the _Idea_ of them in _me_. _Solution._ But none of these will do; for first, tho it be true that my _Knowledge_ is capable of being _increased_, and that many things are in me _potentially_, which _actually_ are not, yet none of these go to the making an _Idea_ of _God_, in which I conceive nothing _potentially_, for tis a certain argument of _imperfection_ that a thing _may be encreased Gradually_. Moreover, tho my knowledge may be _more_ and _more encreased_, yet I know that it can never be _actually Infinite_, for it can never arrive to that _height_ of _perfection_, which admits not of an _higher degree_. But I conceive God to be _actually_ so _Infinite_, that nothing can be _added_ to his _perfections_. And lastly, I perceive that the _objective being_ of an _Idea_ cannot be _produced_ only by the _potential being_ of a _thing_ (which in proper speech is _nothing_) but requires an _actual_ or _formal being_ to its _production_.
Text from Project Gutenberg, public domain in the United States.