The Principles of Psychology, Volume 1 · William James
SUMMARY.
To sum up now this long chapter. The consciousness of Self involves a stream of thought, each part of which as 'I' can 1) remember those which went before, and know the things they knew; and 2) emphasize and care paramountly for certain ones among them as 'me,' and _appropriate to these_ the rest. The nucleus of the '_me_' is always the bodily existence felt to be present at the time. Whatever remembered-past-feelings _resemble_ this present feeling are deemed to belong to the same _me_ with it. Whatever other things are perceived to be _associated_ with this feeling are deemed to form part of that me's _experience_; and of them certain ones (which fluctuate more or less) are reckoned to be themselves _constituents_ of the me in a larger sense,--such are the clothes, the material possessions, the friends, the honors and esteem which the person receives or may receive. This me is an empirical aggregate of things objectively known. The _I_ which knows them cannot itself be an aggregate, neither for psychological purposes need it be considered to be an unchanging metaphysical entity like the Soul, or a principle like the pure Ego, viewed as 'out of time.' It is a _Thought_, at each moment different from that of the last moment, but _appropriative_ of the latter, together with all that the latter called its own. All the experiential facts find their place in this description, unencumbered with any hypothesis save that of the existence of passing thoughts or states of mind. The same brain may subserve many conscious selves, either alternate or coexisting; but by what modifications in its action, or whether ultra-cerebral conditions may intervene, are questions which cannot now be answered.
If anyone urge that I assign no _reason_ why the successive passing thoughts should inherit each other's possessions, or why they and the brain-states should be functions (in the mathematical sense) of each other, I reply that the reason, if there be any, must lie where all real reasons lie, in the total sense or meaning of the world. If there be such a meaning, or any approach to it (as we are bound to trust there is), it alone can make clear to us why such finite human streams of thought are called into existence in such functional dependence upon brains. This is as much as to say that the special natural science of _psychology_ must stop with the mere functional formula. _If the passing thought be the directly verifiable existent which no school has hitherto doubted it to be, then that thought is itself the thinker_, and psychology need not look beyond. The only pathway that I can discover for bringing in a more transcendental thinker would be to _deny_ that we have any _direct_ knowledge of the thought as such. The latter's existence would then be reduced to a postulate, an assertion that there _must be_ a _knower_ correlative to all this _known_; and the problem _who that knower is_ would have become a metaphysical problem. With the question once stated in these terms, the spiritualist and transcendentalist solutions must be considered as _prima facie_ on a par with our own psychological one, and discussed impartially. But that carries us beyond the psychological or naturalistic point of view.
Text from Project Gutenberg, public domain in the United States.