Concept
Intentional stance
Overview
The intentional stance is a term coined by philosopher Daniel Dennett for the level of abstraction in which we view the behavior of an entity in terms of mental properties. It is part of a theory of mental content proposed by Dennett, which provides the underpinnings of his later works on free will, consciousness, folk psychology, and evolution.
Here is how it works: first you decide to treat the object whose behavior is to be predicted as a rational agent; then you figure out what beliefs that agent ought to have, given its place in the world and its purpose. Then you figure out what desires it ought to have, on the same considerations, and finally you predict that this rational agent will act to further its goals in the light of its beliefs. A little practical reasoning from the chosen set of beliefs and desires will in most instances yield a decision about what the agent ought to do; that is what you predict the agent will do.
Overview adapted from Wikipedia (CC BY-SA 4.0; see the article history for authors).
Possible passages
Found by search and not yet checked by a person; they may only mention the idea in passing.
But before all things we must learn to distinguish will [_Wille_] (_voluntas_) from free-will [_Willkühr_] (_arbitrium_)[199] and to understand that the former can subsist without the latter; this however presupposes my whole philosophy. The will is called free-will when it is illumined by knowledge, therefore when the causes which move it are motives: that is, representations.
Arthur Schopenhauer, On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and On the Will in Nature
States what Intentional stance is.
13. Wherever thought is wholly wanting, or the power to act or forbear according to the direction of thought, there necessity takes place. This, in an agent capable of volition, when the beginning or continuation of any action is contrary to that preference of his mind, is called compulsion; when the hindering or stopping any action is contrary to his volition, it is called restraint. Agents that have no thought, no…
John Locke, An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1
States what Intentional stance is.
{BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 25} By primacy between two or more things connected by reason, I understand the prerogative, belonging to one, of being the first determining principle in the connection with all the rest. In a narrower practical sense it means the prerogative of the interest of one in so far as the interest of the other is subordinated to it, while it is not postponed to any other. To every faculty of…
Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Practical Reason
States what Intentional stance is.
Philosophers who discussed Intentional stance
Related ideas
- Eleanor Rosch
- Artificial intelligence
- Philosophical realism
- Philosophy
- John Searle
- Experimental philosophy
- Qualia
- Explanatory gap
- Instrumentalism
- Allen Newell
- Abstraction
- Folk psychology
- Free will
- Abstract and concrete
- Consciousness
- Cognitive psychology
- Hard problem of consciousness
- Operationalization
- Philosophical zombie
- Franz Brentano
- Daniel Dennett
- Evolution
- Mental world
- Zenon Pylyshyn
Opposing perspectives
Place in the tradition
Part of American philosophy.