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Non-essentialism

Non-essentialism
Raphael · Public domain · source

Overview

Non-essentialism is a philosophical position which states that "things" (including but not limited to ideas, inanimate objects, living beings, and purported religious or metaphysical entities) do not contain an inherent essence that is inseparable from their being.

Fundamentally, the concept of non-essentialism is the opposite of essentialism, and may be considered similar to the concept of anti-foundationalism. Non-essentialism might also be defined cataphatically (i.e. affirmatively; see cataphatic theology) as the belief that for any entity, there are no specific traits or ground of being which entities of that kind must possess to be considered "that entity."

Non-essentialism is not restricted to general philosophical speculation. It is also found in academic disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, theology, history/historiography and science. How non-essentialism is used in these discourses varies given their different content and subject matter.

Overview adapted from Wikipedia (CC BY-SA 4.0; see the article history for authors).

Possible passages

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  1. Reply Obj. 3: Non-being is desirable, not of itself, but only relatively--i.e. inasmuch as the removal of an evil, which can only be removed by non-being, is desirable. Now the removal of an evil cannot be desirable, except so far as this evil deprives a thing of some being.

    Aquinas Thomas, Summa Theologica, Part I

    States what Non-essentialism is.

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  2. For materialism denies reality to the objects of almost all the impulses which we most cherish. The real _meaning_ of the impulses, it says, is something which has no emotional interest for us whatever. Now, what is called 'extradition' is quite as characteristic of our emotions as of our senses: both point to an object as the cause of the present feeling. What an intensely objective reference lies in fear!

    William James, The Will to Believe, and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy

    States what Non-essentialism is.

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  3. Attributes are never called Beings; nor are feelings. A Being is that which excites feelings, and which possesses attributes. The soul is called a Being; God and angels are called Beings; but if we were to say, extension, colour, wisdom, virtue, are beings, we should perhaps be suspected of thinking with some of the ancients, that the cardinal virtues are animals; or, at the least, of holding with the Platonic…

    John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic

    States what Non-essentialism is.

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Related ideas

Place in the tradition

Part of Deconstruction.

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