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Concept

Pain

Pain
Injurymap · CC BY 4.0 · source

Overview

Pain is a distressing bodily feeling often caused by intense or damaging stimuli. The International Association for the Study of Pain defines pain as "an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with, or resembling that associated with, actual or potential tissue damage."

Pain motivates animals to withdraw from damaging situations, to protect a damaged body part while it heals, and to avoid similar experiences in the future. Most pain resolves once the noxious stimulus is removed and the body has healed, but it may persist despite removal of the stimulus and apparent healing of the body. Sometimes pain arises in the absence of any detectable stimulus, damage or disease.

Pain is the most common reason for physician consultation in most developed countries. It is a major symptom in many medical conditions, and can interfere with a person's quality of life and general functioning. People in pain experience impaired concentration, working memory, mental flexibility, problem-solving and information processing speed, and are more likely to experience irritability, depression, and anxiety.

Simple over-the-counter pain medications are useful in 20% to 70% of cases of common acute pain, such as post-tooth extraction pain. Psychological factors such as social support, cognitive behavioral therapy, excitement, or distraction can affect pain's intensity or unpleasantness.

Overview adapted from Wikipedia (CC BY-SA 4.0; see the article history for authors).

In the original texts

Passages from public-domain books where Pain is discussed.

  1. Wherefore, if, as you granted in the beginning, infamy is worse than pain, pain is certainly nothing; for while it appears to you base and unmanly to groan, cry out, lament, or faint under pain—while you cherish notions of probity, dignity, honour, and keeping your eye on them, refrain yourself—pain will certainly yield to virtue, and by the influence of imagination, will lose its whole force.—For you must either…

    Marcus Tullius Cicero, The Academic Questions, Treatise De Finibus, and Tusculan Disputations, of M.T. Cicero, With a Sketch of the Greek Philosophers Mentioned by

    names the idea; a chapter is titled for it; states what it is; opens on it

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  2. That pain is relative not to structures only, but to their states as well, is also manifest--more manifest indeed. The sensibility of an external part depends on its temperature.

    Herbert Spencer, The Data of Ethics

    a chapter is titled for it; states what it is; names the idea; opens on it

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  3. On the other side, what disgrace, what ignominy, would he not submit to that he might avoid pain, when persuaded that it was the greatest of evils? Besides, what person, if it be only true that pain is the greatest of evils, is not miserable, not only when he actually feels pain, but also whenever he is aware that it may befall him. And who is there whom pain may not befall? So that it is clear that there is…

    Marcus Tullius Cicero, Cicero's Tusculan Disputations Also, Treatises On The Nature Of The Gods, And On The Commonwealth

    names the idea; a chapter is titled for it; states what it is; opens on it

    Read the chapter · Open in the reader

  4. The converse, which would be an increase in the feeling of pain through small intercalated pleasurable stimuli, does not exist: pleasure and pain are not opposites. Pain is undoubtedly an intellectual process in which a judgment is inherent--the judgment harmful, in which long experience is epitomised. There is no such thing as pain in itself.

    Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, The Will to Power

    names the idea; states what it is; opens on it

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  5. In fine, all these passions are moved by things, only as they appear to be the causes of pleasure and pain, or to have pleasure or pain some way or other annexed to them. Thus we extend our hatred usually to the subject (at least, if a sensible or voluntary agent) which has produced pain in us; because the fear it leaves is a constant pain: but we do not so constantly love what has done us good; because pleasure…

    John Locke, An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1

    names the idea; a chapter is titled for it; opens on it

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Philosophers who discussed Pain

Related ideas

Opposing perspectives

Place in the tradition

Part of Biological naturalism.

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