Argument
Pessimistic induction
Overview
In the philosophy of science, the pessimistic induction, also known as the pessimistic meta-induction, is an argument that seeks to rebut scientific realism, particularly the scientific realist's notion of epistemic optimism. The pessimistic meta-induction is the argument that if past successful and accepted scientific theories were found to be false, we have no reason to believe the scientific realist's claim that our currently successful theories are approximately true.
Overview adapted from Wikipedia (CC BY-SA 4.0; see the article history for authors).
Possible passages
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But there are two different ways in which a philosophy may seek to base itself upon science. It may emphasise the most general _results_ of science, and seek to give even greater generality and unity to these results.
Bertrand Russell, Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays
Close in meaning to Pessimistic induction; the term itself is not named.
Of Inductions Improperly So Called. § 1. Induction, then, is that operation of the mind, by which we infer that what we know to be true in a particular case or cases, will be true in all cases which resemble the former in certain assignable respects. In other words, Induction is the process by which we conclude that what is true of certain individuals of a class is true of the whole class, or that what is true at…
John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive
States what Pessimistic induction is.
When, in short, the conclusion is more general than the largest of the premises, the argument is commonly called Induction; when less general, or equally general, it is Ratiocination.
John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic
States what Pessimistic induction is.
Related ideas
- Thomas Kuhn
- Scientific realism
- The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
- Philosophy of science
- Celestial spheres
- Inductive reasoning
Place in the tradition
Part of Scientific realism.