Concept

Reference

Overview

In logic, a reference is a relationship between objects in which one object designates, or acts as a means by which to connect to or link to, another object. The first object in this relation is said to refer to the second object. It is called a name for the second object. The next object, the one to which the first object refers, is called the referent of the first object. A name is usually a phrase or expression, or some other symbolic representation. Its referent may be anything – a material object, a person, an event, an activity, or an abstract concept.

References can take on many forms, including: a thought, a sensory perception that is audible (onomatopoeia), visual (text), olfactory, or tactile, emotional state, relationship with other, spacetime coordinates, symbolic or alpha-numeric, a physical object, or an energy projection. In some cases, methods are used that intentionally hide the reference from some observers, as in cryptography.

References feature in many spheres of human activity and knowledge, and the term adopts shades of meaning particular to the contexts in which it is used. Some of them are described in the sections below.

Overview adapted from Wikipedia (CC BY-SA 4.0; see the article history for authors).

In the original texts

Passages from public-domain books where Reference is discussed.

Those things are called relative, which, being either said to be of something else or related to something else, are explained by reference to that other thing. For instance, the word 'superior' is explained by reference to something else, for it is superiority over something else that is meant.
Aristotle, The Categories
names the idea; states what it is; opens on it
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But occasionally, either the coherence or the verification fails. We then revise our conceptual scheme so as to preserve the general trust in the symbolic reference, while relegating definite details of that reference to the category of errors. Such errors are termed ‘delusive appearances.’ This error arises from the extreme vagueness of the spatial and temporal perspectives in the case of perception in the pure…
Alfred North Whitehead, Symbolism, its meaning and effect
names the idea; states what it is; opens on it
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A reference, it may be argued, must be a reference to something. But it seems as if in this case the something were the fact of reference itself, the rational convention between intelligent beings, or rather the world which has existence, whether for one rational being or for many,…
John Dewey, Studies in Logical Theory
names the idea; opens on it
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Either both physical and social reference or neither is logical; if neither, then it is because the meaning functions, as it originates, in a specific situation which carries with it its own tests (see p. 96). Lotze's conception is made possible only by unconsciously substituting the idea of an object as a content of thought for a large number of persons (or a _de facto_ somewhat for every consciousness), for the…
John Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic
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Besides the attribute “first” is a relative term, being in regard to time the same as the terms “long” and “short” are in regard to a line. Both expressions, “first” and “created,” are equally inadmissible in reference to any being to which the attribute of time is not applicable, just as we do not say “crooked” or “straight” in reference to taste, “salted” or “insipid” in reference to the voice. These subjects are…
Moses Maimonides, The guide for the perplexed
names the idea; states what it is
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Reference

Overview

In the original texts

Philosophers who discussed Reference

Related ideas

Place in the tradition