Concept

Truth-conditional semantics

Overview

Truth-conditional semantics is an approach to semantics of natural language that sees meaning (or at least the meaning of assertions) as being the same as, or reducible to, their truth conditions. This approach to semantics is principally associated with Donald Davidson, and attempts to carry out for the semantics of natural language what Tarski's semantic theory of truth achieves for the semantics of logic.

Truth-conditional theories of semantics attempt to define the meaning of a given proposition by explaining when the sentence is true. So, for example, because 'snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white, the meaning of 'snow is white' is snow is white.

Overview adapted from Wikipedia (CC BY-SA 4.0; see the article history for authors).

Possible passages

Found by search and not yet checked by a person; they may only mention the idea in passing.

1. This is one view which may be taken of the subject. But there is also another and a different view. It may be said, that it is true we _know_ nothing of sensible objects, except the sensations they excite in us; that the fact of our receiving from snow the particular sensation which is called a sensation of white, is the _ground_ on which we ascribe to that substance the quality whiteness; the sole proof of its…

   John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive

   States what Truth-conditional semantics is.

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2. 1. Truth and Falsehood properly belong to Propositions, not to Ideas. Though truth and falsehood belong, in propriety of speech, only to PROPOSITIONS: yet IDEAS are oftentimes termed true or false (as what words are there that are not used with great latitude, and with some deviation from their strict and proper significations?) Though I think that when ideas themselves are termed true or false, there is still some…

   John Locke, An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1

   States what Truth-conditional semantics is.

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3. But, however satisfactory such a definition may be found, it would be a great mistake to suppose that it makes the idea of reality perfectly clear. Here, then, let us apply our rules. According to them, reality, like every other quality, consists in the peculiar sensible effects which things partaking of it produce.

   Charles S. Peirce, Chance, Love, and Logic

   Close in meaning to Truth-conditional semantics; the term itself is not named.

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Related ideas

• If and only if
• Synthese
• Natural language
• Sense and reference
• Donald Davidson (philosopher)
• Michael Dummett
• Logical truth
• Pragmatics
• Speech act
• Truth condition
• Alfred Tarski
• Semantic theory of truth
• Scott Soames

Place in the tradition

Part of Philosophy of language.

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