The Basis of Morality · Arthur Schopenhauer
ON THE BASIS OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS.
On it depends in the first place the intuitive perception of the external world; for the senses by themselves are only capable of =impression=, a thing which is very far from being =intuitive perception=; indeed, the former is nothing but the material of the latter: _νοῡς ὁρᾷ, καὶ νοῡς ἀκούει, τ'ἄλλα κωϕὰ καὶ τυϕλά._ (The mind sees, the mind hears; everything else is deaf and blind.) =Intuitive perception= is the result of our directly referring the impressions of the sense-organs to their cause, which, exactly because of this act of the intelligence, presents itself as an =external object= under the mode of intuition proper to us, _i.e._, in =space=. This is a proof that the Law of Causality is known to us _a priori_, and does not arise from experience, since experience itself, inasmuch as it presupposes intuitive perception, is only possible through the same law.
All the higher qualities of the intellect, all cleverness, sagacity, penetration, acumen are directly proportional to the exactness and fulness with which the workings of Causality in all its relations are grasped; for all knowledge of the =connection= of things, in the widest sense of the word, is based on the comprehension of this law, and the clearness and accuracy with which it is understood is the measure of one man's superiority to another in =understanding=, shrewdness, cunning. On the other hand, the epithet =reasonable= has at all times been applied to the man who does not allow himself to be guided by intuitive impressions, but by =thoughts= and =conceptions=, and who therefore always sets to work logically after due reflection and forethought. Conduct of this sort is everywhere known as =reasonable=. Not that this by any means implies uprightness and love for one's fellows. On the contrary, it is quite possible to act in the most reasonable way, that is, according to conclusions scientifically deduced, and weighed with the nicest exactitude; and yet to follow the most selfish, unjust, and even iniquitons maxims. So that never before Kant did it occur to any one to identify just, virtuous, and noble conduct with =reasonable=; the two lines of behaviour have always been completely separated, and kept apart.
The one depends on the =kind of motivation=; the other on the difference in fundamental principles. Only after Kant (because he taught that virtue has its source in Pure Reason) did the virtuous and the reasonable become one and the same thing, despite the usage of these words which all languages have adopted--a usage which is not fortuitous, but the work of universal, and therefore uniform, human judgment. "Reasonable" and "vicious" are terms that go very well together; indeed great, far-reaching crimes are only possible from their union. Similarly, "unreasonable" and "noble-minded" are often found associated; _e.g._, if I give to-day to the needy man what I shall myself require to-morrow more urgently than he; or, if I am so far affected as to hand over to one in distress the sum which my creditor is waiting for; and such cases could be multiplied indefinitely. We have seen that this exaltation of Reason to be the source of all virtue rests on two assertions. First, as =Practical Reason=, it is said to issue, like an oracle, peremptory Imperatives purely _a priori._ Secondly, taken in connection with the false explanation of =Theoretical Reason=, as given in the _Kritik der Reinen Vernunft_, it is presented as a certain faculty essentially concerned with the =Unconditioned=, as manifested in three alleged Ideas[17] (the impossibility of which the intellect at the same time recognises _a priori_). And we found that this position, as an _exemplar vitiis imitabile_,[18] led our muddy-headed philosophers, Jacobi at their head, from bad to worse.
They talked of =Reason= (_Vernunft_) as directly comprehending (_vernehmend_) the "=Supersensuous=," and absurdly declared that it is a certain mental property which has to do essentially with things transcending all experience, _i.e._, with metaphysics; and that it perceives directly and intuitively the ultimate causes of all things, and of all Being, the Supersensuous, the Absolute, the Divine, etc. Now, had it been wished to use Reason, instead of deifying it, such assertions as these must long ago have been met by the simple remark that, if man, by virtue of a special organ, furnished by his Reason, for solving the riddle of the world, possessed an innate metaphysics that only required development; in that case there would have to be just as complete agreement on metaphysical matters as on the truths of arithmetic and geometry; and this would make it totally impossible that there should exist on the earth a large number of radically different religions, and a still larger number of radically different systems of philosophy. Indeed, we may rather suppose that, if any one were found to differ from the rest in his religious or philosophical views, he would be at once regarded as a subject for mental pathology. Nor would the following plain reflection have failed to present itself.
If we discovered a species of apes which intentionally prepared instruments for fighting, or building, or for any other purpose; we should immediately admit that it was endowed with Reason. On the other hand, if we meet with savages destitute of all metaphysics, or of all religion (and there are such); it does not occur to us to deny them Reason on that account. The Reason that =proves= its pretended supersensuous knowledge was duly brought back to bounds by Kant's critique; but Jacobi's wonderful Reason, that directly =comprehends= the supersensuous, he must indeed have thought =beneath= all criticism. Meanwhile, a certain imperious and oracular Reason of the same kind is still, at the Universities, fastened on the shoulders of our innocent youth.
Ideas discussed in this chapter
Text from Project Gutenberg, public domain in the United States.