The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4 · George Berkeley
ERRATA
Subvertitur geometria ut non practica sed speculativa. Archimedes’s proposition about squaring the circle has nothing to do with circumferences containing less than 96 points; & if the circumference contain 96 points it may be apply’d, but nothing will follow against indivisibles. V. Barrow. Those curve lines that you can rectify geometrically. Compare them with their equal right lines & by a microscope you shall discover an inequality. Hence my squaring of the circle as good and exact as the best. ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ (M43) Qu. whether the substance of body or anything else be any more than the collection of concrete ideas included in that thing? Thus the substance of any particular body is extension, solidity, figure(82). Of general abstract body we can have no idea. (M44) Mem. Most carefully to inculcate and set forth that the endeavouring to express abstract philosophic thoughts by words unavoidably runs a man into difficulties. This to be done in the Introduction(83). ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Mem. To endeavour most accurately to understand what is meant by this axiom: Quæ sibi mutuo congruunt æqualia sunt. Qu. what the geometers mean by equality of lines, & whether, according to their definition of equality, a curve line can possibly be equal to a right line? If wth me you call those lines equal wch contain an equal number of points, then there will be no difficulty. That curve is equal to a right line wch contains the same points as the right one doth.
(M48) All knowledge onely about ideas. Locke, B. 4. c. 1. (M49) It seems improper, & liable to difficulties, to make the word person stand for an idea, or to make ourselves ideas, or thinking things ideas. (M50) Abstract ideas cause of much trifling and mistake. Mathematicians seem not to speak clearly and coherently of equality. They nowhere define wt they mean by that word when apply’d to lines. Locke says the modes of simple ideas, besides extension and number, are counted by degrees. I deny there are any modes or degrees of simple ideas. What he terms such are complex ideas, as I have proved. ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Wt do the mathematicians mean by considering curves as polygons? Either they are polygons or they are not. If they are, why do they give them the name of curves? Why do not they constantly call them polygons, & treat them as such? If they are not polygons, I think it absurd to use polygons in their stead. Wt is this but to pervert language? to adapt an idea to a name that belongs not to it but to a different idea? The mathematicians should look to their axiom, Quæ congruunt sunt æqualia. I know not what they mean by bidding me put one triangle on another. The under triangle is no triangle—nothing at all, it not being perceiv’d. I ask, must sight be judge of this congruentia or not? If it must, then all lines seen under the same angle are equal, wch they will not acknowledge. Must the touch be judge? But we cannot touch or feel lines and surfaces, such as triangles, &c., according to the mathematicians themselves. Much less can we touch a line or triangle that’s cover’d by another line or triangle.
Do you mean by saying one triangle is equall to another, that they both take up equal spaces? But then the question recurs, what mean you by equal spaces? If you mean _spatia congruentia_, answer the above difficulty truly. I can mean (for my part) nothing else by equal triangles than triangles containing equal numbers of points. I can mean nothing by equal lines but lines wch ’tis indifferent whether of them I take, lines in wch I observe by my senses no difference, & wch therefore have the same name. Must the imagination be judge in the aforementioned cases? but then imagination cannot go beyond the touch and sight. Say you, pure intellect must be judge. I reply that lines and triangles are not operations of the mind. ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ If I speak positively and with the air of a mathematician in things of which I am certain, ’tis to avoid disputes, to make men careful to think before they answer, to discuss my arguments before they go to refute them. I would by no means injure truth and certainty by an affected modesty & submission to better judgments. Wt I lay before you are undoubted theorems; not plausible conjectures of my own, nor learned opinions of other men. I pretend not to prove them by figures, analogy, or authority. Let them stand or fall by their own evidence.
(M57) them the mind could have no knowledge, no thought at all. All ... of introversion, meditation, contemplation, and spiritual acts, as if these could be exerted before we had ideas from without by the senses, are manifestly absurd. This may be of great use in that it makes the happyness of the life to come more conceivable and agreeable to our present nature. The schoolemen & refiners in philosophy gave the greatest part of mankind no more tempting idea of heaven or the joys of the blest. The vast, wide-spread, universal cause of our mistakes is, that we do not consider our own notions. I mean consider them in themselves—fix, settle, and determine them,—we regarding them with relation to each other only. In short, we are much out in study[ing] the relations of things before we study them absolutely and in themselves. Thus we study to find out the relations of figures to one another, the relations also of number, without endeavouring rightly to understand the nature of extension and number in themselves. This we think is of no concern, of no difficulty; but if I mistake not ’tis of the last importance, (M58) I allow not of the distinction there is made ’twixt profit and pleasure. (M59) I’d never blame a man for acting upon interest. He’s a fool that acts on any other principles. The not considering these things has been of ill consequence in morality.
My positive assertions are no less modest than those that are introduced with “It seems to me,” “I suppose,” &c.; since I declare, once for all, that all I write or think is entirely about things as they appear to me. It concerns no man else any further than his thoughts agree with mine. This in the Preface. (M60) Two things are apt to confound men in their reasonings one with another. 1st. Words signifying the operations of the mind are taken from sensible ideas. 2ndly. Words as used by the vulgar are taken in some latitude, their signification is confused. Hence if a man use words in a determined, settled signification, he is at a hazard either of not being understood, or of speaking improperly. All this remedyed by studying the understanding. Unity no simple idea. I have no idea meerly answering the word one. All number consists in relations(87). Entia realia et entia rationis, a foolish distinction of the Schoolemen. (M61) We have an intuitive knowledge of the existence of other things besides ourselves & order, præcedaneous(88). To the knowledge of our own existence—in that we must have ideas or else we cannot think. (M62) We move our legs ourselves. ’Tis we that will their movement. Herein I differ from Malbranch(89). (M63) Mem. Nicely to discuss Lib. 4. c. 4. Locke(90).
(M64) Mem. Again and again to mention & illustrate the doctrine of the reality of things, rerum natura, &c. (M65) Wt I say is demonstration—perfect demonstration. Wherever men have fix’d & determin’d ideas annexed to their words they can hardly be mistaken. Stick but to my definition of likeness, and ’tis a demonstration yt colours are not simple ideas, all reds being like, &c. So also in other things. This to be heartily insisted on. (M66) The abstract idea of Being or Existence is never thought of by the vulgar. They never use those words standing for abstract ideas. (M67) I must not say the words thing, substance, &c. have been the cause of mistakes, but the not reflecting on their meaning. I will be still for retaining the words. I only desire that men would think before they speak, and settle the meaning of their words. (M68) I approve not of that which Locke says, viz. truth consists in the joining and separating of signs. (M69) Locke cannot explain general truth or knowledge without treating of words and propositions. This makes for me against abstract general ideas. Vide Locke, lib. 4. ch. 6. ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ (M70) Men have been very industrious in travelling forward. They have gone a great way. But none have gone backward beyond the Principles. On that side there lies much terra incognita to be travel’d over and discovered by me. A vast field for invention.
Locke greatly out in reckoning the recording our ideas by words amongst the uses and not the abuses of language. (M74) Of great use & ye last importance to contemplate a man put into the world alone, with admirable abilitys, and see how after long experience he would know wthout words. Such a one would never think of genera and species or abstract general ideas. (M75) Wonderful in Locke that he could, wn advanced in years, see at all thro’ a mist; it had been so long a gathering, & was consequently thick. This more to be admir’d than yt he did not see farther. Identity of ideas may be taken in a double sense, either as including or excluding identity of circumstances, such as time, place, &c. (M76) I am glad the people I converse with are not all richer, wiser, &c. than I. This is agreeable to reason; is no sin. ’Tis certain that if the happyness of my acquaintance encreases, & mine not proportionably, mine must decrease. The not understanding this & the doctrine about relative good, discuss’d with French, Madden(93), &c., to be noticed as 2 causes of mistake in judging of moral matters. Mem. To observe (wn you talk of the division of ideas into simple and complex) that there may be another cause of the undefinableness of certain ideas besides that which Locke gives; viz. the want of names.
(M77) Mem. To begin the First Book(94) not with mention of sensation and reflection, but instead of sensation to use perception or thought in general. (M78) I defy any man to imagine or conceive perception without an idea, or an idea without perception. (M79) Locke’s very supposition that matter & motion should exist before thought is absurd—includes a manifest contradiction. Locke’s harangue about coherent, methodical discourses amounting to nothing, apply’d to the mathematicians. They talk of determining all the points of a curve by an equation. Wt mean they by this? Wt would they signify by the word points? Do they stick to the definition of Euclid? (M80) We think we know not the Soul, because we have no imaginable or sensible idea annex’d to that sound. This the effect of prejudice. (M81) Certainly we do not know it. This will be plain if we examine what we mean by the word knowledge. Neither doth this argue any defect in our knowledge, no more than our not knowing a contradiction. The very existence of ideas constitutes the Soul(95). (M82) Consciousness(96), perception, existence of ideas, seem to be all one. Consult, ransack yr understanding. Wt find you there besides several perceptions or thoughts? Wt mean you by the word mind? You must mean something that you perceive, or yt you do not perceive. A thing not perceived is a contradiction. To mean (also) a thing you do not perceive is a contradiction. We are in all this matter strangely abused by words.
Mind is a congeries of perceptions(97). Take away perceptions and you take away the mind. Put the perceptions and you put the mind. Say you, the mind is not the perception, not that thing which perceives. I answer, you are abused by the words “that a thing.” These are vague and empty words with us. (M83) The having ideas is not the same thing with perception. A man may have ideas when he only imagines. But then this imagination presupposeth perception. ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ (M84) That wch extreamly strengthens us in prejudice is yt we think we see an empty space, which I shall demonstrate to be false in the Third Book(98). There may be demonstrations used even in Divinity. I mean in revealed Theology, as contradistinguish’d from natural; for tho’ the principles may be founded in faith, yet this hinders not but that legitimate demonstrations might be built thereon; provided still that we define the words we use, and never go beyond our ideas. Hence ’twere no very hard matter for those who hold episcopacy or monarchy to be established _jure Divino_ to demonstrate their doctrines if they are true. But to pretend to demonstrate or reason anything about the Trinity is absurd. Here an implicit faith becomes us. (M85) Qu. if there be any real difference betwixt certain ideas of reflection & others of sensation, e.g. betwixt perception and white, black, sweet, &c.? Wherein, I pray you, does the perception of white differ from white men....
I shall demonstrate all my doctrines. The nature of demonstration to be set forth and insisted on in the Introduction(99). In that I must needs differ from Locke, forasmuch as he makes all demonstration to be about abstract ideas, wch I say we have not nor can have. (M86) The understanding seemeth not to differ from its perceptions or ideas. Qu. What must one think of the will and passions? (M87) A good proof that Existence is nothing without or distinct from perception, may be drawn from considering a man put into the world without company(100). (M88) There was a smell, i.e. there was a smell perceiv’d. Thus we see that common speech confirms my doctrine. (M89) No broken intervals of death or annihilation. Those intervals are nothing; each person’s time being measured to him by his own ideas. (M90) We are frequently puzzl’d and at a loss in obtaining clear and determin’d meanings of words commonly in use, & that because we imagine words stand for abstract general ideas which are altogether inconceivable. (M91) “A stone is a stone.” This a nonsensical proposition, and such as the solitary man would never think on. Nor do I believe he would ever think on this: “The whole is equal to its parts,” &c. (M92) Let it not be said that I take away existence. I only declare the meaning of the word, so far as I can comprehend it.
(M93) If you take away abstraction, how do men differ from beasts? I answer, by shape, by language. Rather by degrees of more and less. Wt means Locke by inferences in words, consequences of words, as something different from consequences of ideas? I conceive no such thing. (M94) N. B. Much complaint about the imperfection of language(101). ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ (M95) But perhaps some man may say, an inert thoughtless Substance may exist, though not extended, moved, &c., but with other properties whereof we have no idea. But even this I shall demonstrate to be impossible, wn I come to treat more particularly of Existence. ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Will not rightly distinguish’d from Desire by Locke—it seeming to superadd nothing to the idea of an action, but the uneasiness for its absence or non-existence. (M96) Mem. To enquire diligently into that strange mistery, viz. How it is that I can cast about, think of this or that man, place, action, wn nothing appears to introduce them into my thoughts, wn they have no perceivable connexion with the ideas suggested by my senses at the present? (M97) ’Tis not to be imagin’d wt a marvellous emptiness & scarcity of ideas that man shall descry who will lay aside all use of words in his meditations. (M98) Incongruous in Locke to fancy we want a sense proper to see substances with.
(M99) Locke owns that abstract ideas were made in order to naming. (M100) The common errour of the opticians, that we judge of distance by angles(102), strengthens men in their prejudice that they see things without and distant from their mind. (M101) I am persuaded, would men but examine wt they mean by the word existence, they wou’d agree with me. c. 20. s. 8. b. 4. of Locke makes for me against the mathematicians. (M102) The supposition that things are distinct from ideas takes away all real truth, & consequently brings in a universal scepticism; since all our knowledge and contemplation is confin’d barely to our own ideas(103). (M103) Qu. whether the solitary man would not find it necessary to make use of words to record his ideas, if not in memory or meditation, yet at least in writing—without which he could scarce retain his knowledge. We read in history there was a time when fears and jealousies, privileges of parliament, malignant party, and such like expressions of too unlimited and doubtful a meaning, were words of much sway. Also the words Church, Whig, Tory, &c., contribute very much to faction and dispute. (M104) The distinguishing betwixt an idea and perception of the idea has been one great cause of imagining material substances(104). (M105) That God and blessed spirits have Will is a manifest argument against Locke’s proofs that the Will cannot be conceiv’d, put into action, without a previous uneasiness.
(M106) The act of the Will, or volition, is not uneasiness, for that uneasiness may be without volition. (M107) Volition is distinct from the object or idea for the same reason. (M108) Also from uneasiness and idea together. The understanding not distinct from particular perceptions or ideas. The Will not distinct from particular volitions. (M109) It is not so very evident that an idea, or at least uneasiness, may be without all volition or act. The understanding taken for a faculty is not really distinct from ye will. This allow’d hereafter. (M110) To ask whether a man can will either side is an absurd question, for the word _can_ presupposes volition. ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ (M111) Anima mundi, substantial form, omniscient radical heat, plastic vertue, Hylaschic principle—all these vanish(105). (M112) Newton proves that gravity is proportional to gravity. I think that’s all(106). Qu. whether it be the vis inertiæ that makes it difficult to move a stone, or the vis attractivæ, or both, or neither? ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Mem. To express the doctrines as fully and copiously and clearly as may be. Also to be full and particular in answering objections(107). (M113) To say ye Will is a power; [therefore] volition is an act. This is idem per idem. Wt makes men despise extension, motion, &c., & separate them from the essence of the soul, is that they imagine them to be distinct from thought, and to exist in unthinking substance.
An extended may have passive modes of thinking good actions. There might be idea, there might be uneasiness, there might be the greatest uneasiness wthout any volition, therefore the.... (M114) Matter once allow’d, I defy any man to prove that God is not Matter(108). ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ (M115) Man is free. There is no difficulty in this proposition, if we but settle the signification of the word _free_—if we had an idea annext to the word free, and would but contemplate that idea. (M116) We are imposed on by the words will, determine, agent, free, can, &c. (M117) Uneasiness precedes not every volition. This evident by experience. (M118) Trace an infant in the womb. Mark the train & succession of its ideas. Observe how volition comes into the mind. This may perhaps acquaint you with its nature. (M119) Complacency seems rather to determine, or precede, or coincide wth & constitute the essence of volition, than uneasiness. (M120) You tell me, according to my doctrine a man is not free. I answer, tell me wt you mean by the word free, and I shall resolve you(109). ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ (M121) Qu. Wt do men mean when they talk of one body’s touching another? I say you never saw one body touch, or (rather) I say, I never saw one body that I could say touch’d this or that other; for that if my optiques were improv’d, I should see intervalls and other bodies behind those whch now seem to touch.
Mem. Upon all occasions to use the utmost modesty—to confute the mathematicians wth the utmost civility & respect, not to style them Nihilarians, &c. N. B. To rein in ye satyrical nature. Blame me not if I use my words sometimes in some latitude. ’Tis wt cannot be helpt. ’Tis the fault of language that you cannot always apprehend the clear and determinate meaning of my words. Say you, there might be a thinking Substance—something unknown—wch perceives, and supports, and ties together the ideas(110). Say I, make it appear there is any need of it and you shall have it for me. I care not to take away anything I can see the least reason to think should exist. I affirm ’tis manifestly absurd—no excuse in the world can be given why a man should use a word without an idea(111). Certainly we shall find that wt ever word we make use of in matter of pure reasoning has, or ought to have, a compleat idea, annext to it, i.e. its meaning, or the sense we take it in, must be compleatly known. ’Tis demonstrable a man can never be brought to imagine anything should exist whereof he has no idea. Whoever says he does, banters himself with words. ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ (M122) We imagine a great difference & distance in respect of knowledge, power, &c., betwixt a man & a worm. The like difference betwixt man and God may be imagin’d; or infinitely greater(112) difference.
(M123) We find in our own minds a great number of different ideas. We may imagine in God a greater number, i.e. that ours in number, or the number of ours, is inconsiderable in respect thereof. The words difference and number, old and known, we apply to that wch is unknown. But I am embrangled(113) in words—’tis scarce possible it should be otherwise. ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ The chief thing I do or pretend to do is onely to remove the mist or veil of words(114). This has occasion’d ignorance & confusion. This has ruined the schoolmen and mathematicians, lawyers and divines. ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ (M124) The grand cause of perplexity & darkness in treating of the Will, is that we imagine it to be an object of thought: (to speak with the vulgar), we think we may perceive, contemplate, and view it like any of our ideas; whereas in truth ’tis no idea, nor is there any idea of it. ’Tis _toto cælo_ different from the understanding, i.e. from all our ideas. If you say the Will, or rather volition, is something, I answer, there is an homonymy(115) in the word _thing_, wn apply’d to ideas and volition and understanding and will. All ideas are passive(116). (M125) Thing & idea are much what words of the same extent and meaning. Why, therefore, do I not use the word thing? Ans. Because thing is of greater latitude than idea. Thing comprehends also volitions or actions. Now these are no ideas(117).
(M126) There can be perception wthout volition. Qu. whether there can be volition without perception? (M127) Existence not conceivable without perception or volition—not distinguish’d therefrom. (M128) N. B. Several distinct ideas can be perceived by sight and touch at once. Not so by the other senses. ’Tis this diversity of sensations in other senses chiefly, but sometimes in touch and sight (as also diversity of volitions, whereof there cannot be more than one at once, or rather, it seems there cannot, for of that I doubt), gives us the idea of time—or _is_ time itself. Wt would the solitary man think of number? (M129) There are innate ideas, i.e. ideas created with us(118). ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ (M130) Locke seems to be mistaken wn he says thought is not essential to the mind(119). (M131) Certainly the mind always and constantly thinks: and we know this too. In sleep and trances the mind _exists not_—there is no time, no succession of ideas(120). (M132) To say the mind exists without thinking is a contradiction, nonsense, nothing. ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ (M133) Folly to inquire wt determines the Will. Uneasiness, &c. are ideas, therefore unactive, therefore can do nothing, therefore cannot determine the Will(121). (M134) Again, wt mean you by determine? (M135) (M136) For want of rightly understanding time, motion, existence, &c., men are forc’d into such absurd contradictions as this, viz. light moves 16 diameters of earth in a second of time.
Ideas discussed in this chapter
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