The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4 · George Berkeley
ERRATA
(M137) ’Twas the opinion that ideas could exist unperceiv’d, or before perception, that made men think perception(122) was somewhat different from the idea perceived, i.e. yt it was an idea of reflection; whereas the thing perceiv’d was an idea of sensation. I say, ’twas this made ’em think the understanding took it in, receiv’d it from without; wch could never be did not they think it existed without(123). (M138) Properly speaking, idea is the picture of the imagination’s making. This is ye likeness of, and refer’d to the real idea, or (if you will) thing(124). (M139) To ask, have we an idea of Will or volition, is nonsense. An idea can resemble nothing but an idea. (M140) If you ask wt thing it is that wills, I answer, if you mean idea by the word thing, or anything like any idea, then I say, ’tis no thing at all that wills(125). This how extravagant soever it may seem, yet is a certain truth. We are cheated by these general terms, thing, is, &c. (M141) Again, if by is you mean is perceived, or does perceive, I say nothing wch is perceived or does perceive wills. (M142) The referring ideas to things wch are not ideas, the using the term “idea of(126),” is one great cause of mistake, as in other matters, so also in this.
(M143) Some words there are wch do not stand for ideas, viz. particles, will, &c. Particles stand for volitions and their concomitant ideas. (M144) There seem to be but two colours wch are simple ideas, viz. those exhibited by the most and least refrangible rays; [the others], being the intermediate ones, may be formed by composition. (M145) I have no idea of a volition or act of the mind, neither has any other intelligence; for that were a contradiction. N. B. Simple ideas, viz. colours, are not devoid of all sort of composition, tho’ it must be granted they are not made up of distinguishable ideas. Yet there is another sort of composition. Men are wont to call those things compounded in which we do not actually discover the component ingredients. Bodies are said to be compounded of chymical principles, which, nevertheless, come not into view till after the dissolution of the bodies—wch were not, could not, be discerned in the bodies whilst remaining entire. ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ (M146) All our knowledge is about particular ideas, according to Locke. All our sensations are particular ideas, as is evident. Wt use then do we make of abstract general ideas, since we neither know nor perceive them? (M147) ’Tis allow’d that particles stand not for ideas, and yet they are not said to be empty useless sounds. The truth really is, they stand for operations of the mind, i.e. volitions.
(M148) Locke says all our knowledge is about particulars. If so, pray wt is the following ratiocination but a jumble of words? “Omnis homo est animal; omne animal vivit: ergo omnis homo vivit.” It amounts (if you annex particular ideas to the words “animal” and “vivit”) to no more than this: “Omnis homo est homo; omnis homo est homo: ergo, omnis homo est homo.” A mere sport and trifling with sounds. (M149) We have no ideas of vertues & vices, no ideas of moral actions(127). Wherefore it may be question’d whether we are capable of arriving at demonstration about them(128), the morality consisting in the volition chiefly. ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ (M150) Strange it is that men should be at a loss to find their idea of Existence; since that (if such there be distinct from perception) it is brought into the mind by all the ways of sensation and reflection(129), methinks it should be most familiar to us, and we best acquainted with it. (M151) This I am sure, I have no idea of Existence(130), or annext to the word Existence. And if others have that’s nothing to me; they can never make me sensible of it; simple ideas being incommunicable by language. (M152) Say you, the unknown substratum of volitions & ideas is something whereof I have no idea. I ask, Is there any other being which has or can have an idea of it? If there be, then it must be itself an idea; which you will think absurd.
(M153) There is somewhat active in most perceptions, i.e. such as ensue upon our volitions, such as we can prevent and stop: e.g. I turn my eyes toward the sun: I open them. All this is active. (M154) Things are twofold—active or inactive. The existence of active things is to act; of inactive to be perceiv’d. (M155) Distinct from or without perception there is no volition; therefore neither is there existence without perception. (M156) God may comprehend all ideas, even the ideas wch are painfull & unpleasant, without being in any degree pained thereby(131). Thus we ourselves can imagine the pain of a burn, &c. without any misery or uneasiness at all. (M157) Truth, three sorts thereof—natural, mathematical, & moral. (M158) Agreement of relation onely where numbers do obtain: of co-existence, in nature: of signification, by including, in morality. (M159) Gyant who shakes the mountain that’s on him must be acknowledged. Or rather thus: I am no more to be reckon’d stronger than Locke than a pigmy should be reckon’d stronger than a gyant, because he could throw off the molehill wch lay upon him, and the gyant could onely shake or shove the mountain that oppressed him. This in the Preface. (M160) Promise to extend our knowledge & clear it of those shamefull contradictions which embarrass it. Something like this to begin the Introduction in a modest way(132).
(M161) Whoever shall pretend to censure any part, I desire he would read out the whole, else he may perhaps not understand me. In the Preface or Introduction(133). (M162) Doctrine of identity best explain’d by taking the Will for volitions, the Understanding for ideas. The difficulty of consciousness of wt are never acted surely solv’d thereby. (M163) I must acknowledge myself beholding to the philosophers who have gone before me. They have given good rules, though certainly they do not always observe them. Similitude of adventurers, who, tho’ they attained not the desired port, they by their wrecks have made known the rocks and sands, whereby the passage of aftercomers is made more secure & easy. Preface or Introduction. (M164) The opinion that men had ideas of moral actions(134) has render’d the demonstrating ethiques very difficult to them. (M165) An idea being itself unactive cannot be the resemblance or image of an active thing. (M166) Excuse to be made in the Introduction for using the word _idea_, viz. because it has obtain’d. But a caution must be added. Scripture and possibility are the onely proofs(135) with Malbranch. Add to these what he calls a great propension to think so: this perhaps may be questioned. Perhaps men, if they think before they speak, will not be found so thoroughly persuaded of the existence of Matter.
(M167) On second thoughts I am on t’other extream. I am certain of that wch Malbranch seems to doubt of, viz. the existence of bodies(136). (M168) Mem. To bring the killing blow at the last, e.g. in the matter of abstraction to bring Locke’s general triangle in the last(137). (M169) They give good rules, tho’ perhaps they themselves do not always observe them. They speak much of clear and distinct ideas, though at the same time they talk of general abstract ideas, &c. I’ll [instance] in Locke’s opinion of abstraction, he being as clear a writer as I have met with. Such was the candour of this great man that I perswade myself, were he alive(138), he would not be offended that I differ from him: seeing that even in so doing I follow his advice, viz. to use my own judgement, see with my own eyes, & not with another’s. Introduction. (M170) The word thing, as comprising or standing for idea & volition, usefull; as standing for idea and archetype without the mind(139), mischievous and useless. (M171) To demonstrate morality it seems one need only make a dictionary of words, and see which included which. At least, this is the greatest part and bulk of the work. (M172) Locke’s instances of demonstration in morality are, according to his own rule, trifling propositions.
(M173) Qu. How comes it that some ideas are confessedly allow’d by all to be onely in the mind(140), and others as generally taken to be without the mind(141), if, according to you, all are equally and only in the mind? Ans. Because that in proportion to pleasure or pain ideas are attended with desire, exertion, and other actions which include volition. Now volition is by all granted to be in spirit. (M174) If men would lay aside words in thinking, ’tis impossible they should ever mistake, save only in matters of fact. I mean it seems impossible they should be positive & secure that anything was true wch in truth is not so. Certainly I cannot err in matter of simple perception. So far as we can in reasoning go without the help of signs, there we have certain knowledge. Indeed, in long deductions made by signs there may be slips of memory. (M175) From my doctrine there follows a cure for pride. We are only to be praised for those things which are our own, or of our own doing; natural abilitys are not consequences of our volitions. ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ (M176) Mem. Candidly to take notice that Locke holds some dangerous opinions; such as the infinity and eternity of Space and the possibility of Matter’s thinking(142).
(M177) Once more I desire my reader may be upon his guard against the fallacy of words. Let him beware that I do not impose on him by plausible empty talk, that common dangerous way of cheating men into absurditys. Let him not regard my words any otherwise than as occasions of bringing into his mind determin’d significations. So far as they fail of this they are gibberish, jargon, & deserve not the name of language. I desire & warn him not to expect to find truth in my book, or anywhere but in his own mind. Wtever I see myself ’tis impossible I can paint it out in words. (M178) N. B. To consider well wt is meant by that wch Locke saith concerning algebra—that it supplys intermediate ideas. Also to think of a method affording the same use in morals &c. that this doth in mathematiques. (M179) _Homo_ is not proved to be _vivens_ by means of any intermediate idea. I don’t fully agree wth Locke in wt he says concerning sagacity in finding out intermediate ideas in matter capable of demonstration & the use thereof; as if that were the onely means of improving and enlarging demonstrative knowledge. (M180) There is a difference betwixt power & volition. There may be volition without power. But there can be no power without volition. Power implyeth volition, & at the same time a connotation of the effects following the volition(143).
(M181) We have assuredly an idea of substance. ’Twas absurd of Locke(144) to think we had a name without a meaning. This might prove acceptable to the Stillingfleetians. (M182) The substance of Body we know(145). The substance of Spirit we do not know—it not being knowable, it being a _purus actus_. (M183) Words have ruin’d and overrun all the sciences—law, physique, chymistry, astrology, &c. (M184) Abstract ideas only to be had amongst the learned. The vulgar never think they have any such, nor truly do they find any want of them. Genera & species & abstract ideas are terms unknown to them. (M185) Locke’s out(146)—the case is different. We can have an idea of body without motion, but not of soul without thought. (M186) God ought to be worship’d. This easily demonstrated when once we ascertain the signification of the words God, worship, ought. (M187) No perception, according to Locke, is active. Therefore no perception (i.e. no idea) can be the image of, or like unto, that which is altogether active & not at all passive, i.e. the Will. (M188) I can will the calling to mind something that is past, tho’ at the same time that wch I call to mind was not in my thoughts before that volition of mine, & consequently I could have had no uneasiness for the want of it.
(M189) The Will & the Understanding may very well be thought two distinct beings. (M190) Sed quia voluntas raro agit nisi ducente desiderio. V. Locke, Epistles, p. 479, ad Limburgum. You cannot say the m. t. [minimum tangibile] is like or one with the m. v. [minimum visibile], because they be both minima, just perceiv’d, and next door to nothing. You may as well say the m. t. is the same with or like unto a sound, so small that it is scarce perceiv’d. ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Extension seems to be a mode of some tangible or sensible quality according as it is seen or felt. ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ (M191) The spirit—the active thing—that wch is soul, & God—is the Will alone. The ideas are effects—impotent things. (M192) The concrete of the will & understanding I might call mind; not person, lest offence be given. Mem. Carefully to omit defining of person, or making much mention of it. (M193) You ask, do these volitions make _one_ Will? Wt you ask is meerly about a word—unity being no more(147). ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ N. B. To use utmost caution not to give the least handle of offence to the Church or Churchmen. (M194) Even to speak somewhat favourably of the Schoolmen, and shew that they who blame them for jargon are not free of it themselves. Introd. Locke’s great oversight seems to be that he did not begin with his third book; at least that he had not some thought of it at first. Certainly the 2d & 4th books don’t agree wth wt he says in ye 3d(148).
(M195) If Matter(149) is once allow’d to exist, clippings of weeds and parings of nails may think, for ought that Locke can tell; tho’ he seems positive of the contrary. Since I say men cannot mistake in short reasoning about things demonstrable, if they lay aside words, it will be expected this Treatise will contain nothing but wt is certain & evident demonstration, & in truth I hope you will find nothing in it but what is such. Certainly I take it all for such. Introd. (M196) When I say I will reject all propositions wherein I know not fully and adequately and clearly, so far as knowable, the thing meant thereby, this is not to be extended to propositions in the Scripture. I speak of matters of Reason and Philosophy—not Revelation. In this I think an humble, implicit faith becomes us (when we cannot comprehend or understand the proposition), such as a popish peasant gives to propositions he hears at mass in Latin. This proud men may call blind, popish, implicit, irrational. For my part I think it is more irrational to pretend to dispute at, cavil, and ridicule holy mysteries, i.e. propositions about things that are altogether above our knowledge, out of our reach. When I shall come to plenary knowledge of the meaning of any fact, then I shall yield an explicit belief. Introd.
Complexation of ideas twofold. Ys refers to colours being complex ideas. Considering length without breadth is considering any length, be the breadth wt it will. (M197) I may say earth, plants, &c. were created before man—there being other intelligences to perceive them, before man was created(150). (M198) There is a philosopher(151) who says we can get an idea of substance by no way of sensation or reflection, & seems to imagine that we want a sense proper for it. Truly if we had a new sense it could only give us a new idea. Now I suppose he will not say substance, according to him, is an idea. For my part, I own I have no idea can stand for substance in his and the Schoolmen’s sense of that word. But take it in the common vulgar sense, & then we see and feel substance. (M199) N. B. That not common usage, but the Schoolmen coined the word Existence, supposed to stand for an abstract general idea. ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Writers of Optics mistaken in their principles both in judging of magnitudes and distances. ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ (M200) ’Tis evident yt wn the solitary man should be taught to speak, the words would give him no other new ideas (save only the sounds, and complex ideas which, tho’ unknown before, may be signified by language) beside wt he had before. If he had not, could not have, an abstract idea before, he cannot have it after he is taught to speak.
(M201) “Homo est homo,” &c. comes at last to Petrus est Petrus, &c. Now, if these identical propositions are sought after in the mind, they will not be found. There are no identical mental propositions. ’Tis all about sounds and terms. (M202) Hence we see the doctrine of certainty by ideas, and proving by intermediate ideas, comes to nothing(152). (M203) We may have certainty & knowledge without ideas, i.e. without other ideas than the words, and their standing for one idea, i.e. their being to be used indifferently. (M204) It seems to me that we have no certainty about ideas, but only about words. ’Tis improper to say, I am certain I see, I feel, &c. There are no mental propositions form’d answering to these words, & in simple perception ’tis allowed by all there is no affirmation or negation, and consequently no certainty(153). (M205) The reason why we can demonstrate so well about signs is, that they are perfectly arbitrary & in our power—made at pleasure. (M206) The obscure ambiguous term _relation_, which is said to be the largest field of knowledge, confounds us, deceives us. (M207) Let any man shew me a demonstration, not verbal, that does not depend on some false principle; or at best on some principle of nature, which is ye effect of God’s will, and we know not how soon it may be changed.
(M208) Qu. What becomes of the _æternæ veritates_? Ans. They vanish(154). (M209) But, say you, I find it difficult to look beneath the words and uncover my ideas. Say I, Use will make it easy. In the sequel of my Book the cause of this difficulty shall be more clearly made out. (M210) To view the deformity of error we need onely undress it. (M211) “Cogito ergo sum.” Tautology. No mental proposition answering thereto. (M212) Knowledge, or certainty, or perception of agreement of ideas—as to identity and diversity, and real existence, vanisheth; of relation, becometh merely nominal; of co-existence, remaineth. Locke thought in this latter our knowledge was little or nothing. Whereas in this only real knowledge seemeth to be found(155). (M213) We must wth the mob place certainty in the senses(156). ’Tis a man’s duty, ’tis the fruit of friendship, to speak well of his friend. Wonder not therefore that I do wt I do. (M214) A man of slow parts may overtake truth, &c. Introd. Even my shortsightedness might perhaps be aiding to me in this matter—’twill make me bring the object nearer to my thoughts. A purblind person, &c. Introd. (M215) Locke to Limborch, &c. Talk of _judicium intellectus_ preceding the volition: I think _judicium_ includes volition. I can by no means distinguish these—_judicium_, _intellectus_, _indifferentia_, uneasiness to many things accompanying or preceding every volition, as e.g. the motion of my hand.
(M216) Qu. Wt mean you by my perceptions, my volitions? Both all the perceptions I perceive or conceive(157), &c. are mine; all the volitions I am conscious to are mine. (M217) Homo est agens liberum. What mean they by _homo_ and _agens_ in this place? (M218) Will any man say that brutes have ideas of Unity & Existence? I believe not. Yet if they are suggested by all the ways of sensation, ’tis strange they should want them(158). (M219) It is a strange thing and deserves our attention, that the more time and pains men have consum’d in the study of philosophy, by so much the more they look upon themselves to be ignorant & weak creatures. They discover flaws and imperfections in their faculties wch other men never spy out. They find themselves under a necessity of admitting many inconsistent, irreconcilable opinions for true. There is nothing they touch with their hand, or behold with their eyes, but has its dark sides much larger and more numerous than wt is perceived, & at length turn scepticks, at least in most things. I imagine all this proceeds from, &c. Exord. Introd.(159) (M220) These men with a supercilious pride disdain the common single information of sense. They grasp at knowledge by sheafs & bundles. (’Tis well if, catching at too much at once, they hold nothing but emptiness & air.) They in the depth of their understanding contemplate abstract ideas.
It seems not improbable that the most comprehensive & sublime intellects see more m.v.’s at once, i.e. that their visual systems are the largest. Words (by them meaning all sorts of signs) are so necessary that, instead of being (wn duly us’d or in their own nature) prejudicial to the advancement of knowledge, or an hindrance to knowledge, without them there could in mathematiques themselves be no demonstration. ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Mem. To be eternally banishing Metaphisics, &c., and recalling men to Common Sense(160). ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ (M221) We cannot conceive other minds besides our own but as so many selves. We suppose ourselves affected wth such & such thoughts & such and such sensations(161). (M222) Qu. whether composition of ideas be not that faculty which chiefly serves to discriminate us from brutes? I question whether a brute does or can imagine a blue horse or chimera. Naturalists do not distinguish betwixt cause and occasion. Useful to enquire after co-existing ideas or occasions. (M223) Morality may be demonstrated as mixt mathematics. (M224) Perception is passive, but this not distinct from idea. Therefore there can be no idea of volition. Algebraic species or letters are denominations of denominations. Therefore Arithmetic to be treated of before Algebra. 2 crowns are called ten shillings. Hence may appear the value of numbers. Complex ideas are the creatures of the mind. Hence may appear the nature of numbers. This to be deeply discuss’d.
I am better informed & shall know more by telling me there are 10,000 men, than by shewing me them all drawn up. I shall better be able to judge of the bargain you’d have me make wn you tell me how much (i.e. the name of ye) money lies on the table, than by offering and shewing it without naming. I regard not the idea, the looks, but the names. Hence may appear the nature of numbers. Children are unacquainted with numbers till they have made some progress in language. This could not be if they were ideas suggested by all the senses. Numbers are nothing but names—never words. Mem. Imaginary roots—to unravel that mystery. Ideas of utility are annexed to numbers. In arithmetical problems men seek not any idea of number. They only seek a denomination. This is all can be of use to them. Take away the signs from Arithmetic and Algebra, and pray wt remains? These are sciences purely verbal, and entirely useless but for practice in societies of men. No speculative knowledge, no comparing of ideas in them(162). Qu. whether Geometry may not properly be reckon’d amongst the mixt mathematics—Arithmetic & Algebra being the only abstracted pure, i.e. entirely nominal—Geometry being an application of these to points(163)? ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ (M225) Locke of Trifling Propositions. [b. 4. c. 8] Mem. Well to observe & con over that chapter.
(M226) Existence, Extension, &c. are abstract, i.e. no ideas. They are words, unknown and useless to the vulgar. ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ (M227) Sensual pleasure is the _summum bonum_. This the great principle of morality. This once rightly understood, all the doctrines, even the severest of the Gospels, may clearly be demonstrated. (M228) Sensual pleasure, quâ pleasure, is good & desirable by a wise man(164). But if it be contemptible, ’tis not quâ pleasure but quâ pain, or cause of pain, or (which is the same thing) of loss of greater pleasure. ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ (M229) Wn I consider, the more objects we see at once the more distant they are, and that eye which beholds a great many things can see none of them near. (M230) By _idea_ I mean any sensible or imaginable thing(165). (M231) To be sure or certain of wt we do not actually perceive(166) (I say perceive, not imagine), we must not be altogether passive; there must be a disposition to act; there must be assent, wch is active. Nay, what do I talk; there must be actual volition. What do we demonstrate in Geometry but that lines are equal or unequal? i.e. may not be called by the same name(167). ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ (M232) I approve of this axiom of the Schoolmen, “Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuit in sensu.”(168) I wish they had stuck to it. It had never taught them the doctrine of abstract ideas.
Ideas discussed in this chapter
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