The dialogues of Plato in five volumes, Vol. 2 · Plato
ALCIBIADES, SOCRATES.
Why, I have been informed by a credible person who went up to the king [at Susa], that he passed through a large tract of excellent land, extending for nearly a day’s journey, which the people of the country called the queen’s girdle, and another, which they called her veil; and several other fair and fertile districts, which were reserved for the adornment of the queen, and are named after her several habiliments. Now, I cannot help thinking to myself, What if some one were to go to Amestris, the wife of Xerxes and mother of Artaxerxes, and say to her, There is a certain Dinomachè, whose whole wardrobe is not worth fifty minae—and that will be more than the value—and she has a son who is possessed of a three-hundred acre patch at Erchiae, and he has a mind to go to war with your son—would she not wonder to what this Alcibiades trusts for success in the conflict? ‘He must rely,’ she would say to herself, ‘upon his training and wisdom—these are the things which Hellenes value.’
And if she heard that this Alcibiades who is making the attempt is not as yet twenty years old, and is wholly uneducated, and when his lover tells him that he ought to get education and training first, and then go and fight the king, he refuses, and says that he is well enough as he is, would she not be amazed, and ask, ‘On what, then, does the youth rely?’ And if we replied: He relies on his beauty, and stature, and birth, and mental endowments, she would think that we were mad, Alcibiades, when she compared the advantages which you possess with those of her own people. And I believe that even Lampido, the daughter 124 of Leotychides, the wife of Archidamus and mother of Agis, all of whom were kings, would have the same feeling; if, in your present uneducated state, you were to turn your thoughts against her son, she too would be equally astonished. But how disgraceful, that we should not have as high a notion of what is required in us as our enemies’ wives and mothers have of the qualities which are required in their assailants! O my friend, be persuaded by me, and hear the Delphian inscription, ‘Know thyself’—not the men whom you think, but these kings are our rivals, and we can only overcome them by pains and skill. And if you fail in the required qualities, you will fail also in becoming renowned among Hellenes and Barbarians, which you seem to desire more than any other man ever desired anything.
_Al._ Yes. _Soc._ Then in that he is bad? _Al._ Yes. _Soc._ Then upon this view of the matter the same man is good and also bad? _Al._ True. _Soc._ But would you say that the good are the same as the bad? _Al._ Certainly not. _Soc._ Then whom do you call the good? [Sidenote: And the wise are those who take counsel for the better order and] _Al._ I mean by the good those who are able to rule in the city. _Soc._ Not, surely, over horses? _Al._ Certainly not. _Soc._ But over men? [Sidenote: improvement of the city.] [Sidenote: _The analogy of other employments._] _Al._ Yes. _Soc._ When they are sick? _Al._ No. _Soc._ Or on a voyage? _Al._ No. _Soc._ Or reaping the harvest? _Al._ No. _Soc._ When they are doing something or nothing? _Al._ When they are doing something, I should say. _Soc._ I wish that you would explain to me what this something is. _Al._ When they are having dealings with one another, and using one another’s services, as we citizens do in our daily life. [Sidenote: Illustrations.] _Soc._ Those of whom you speak are ruling over men who are using the services of other men? _Al._ Yes. _Soc._ Are they ruling over the signal-men who give the time to the rowers? _Al._ No; they are not.
_Soc._ That would be the office of the pilot? _Al._ Yes. _Soc._ But, perhaps you mean that they rule over flute-players who lead the singers and use the services of the dancers? _Al._ Certainly not. _Soc._ That would be the business of the teacher of the chorus? _Al._ Yes. _Soc._ Then what is the meaning of being able to rule over men who use other men? _Al._ I mean that they rule over men who have common rights of citizenship, and dealings with one another. _Soc._ And what sort of an art is this? Suppose that I ask you again, as I did just now, What art makes men know how to rule over their fellow-sailors,—how would you answer? _Al._ The art of the pilot. _Soc._ And, if I may recur to another old instance, what art enables them to rule over their fellow-singers? [Sidenote: _How is a state improved?_] _Al._ The art of the teacher of the chorus, which you were just now mentioning. _Soc._ And what do you call the art of fellow-citizens? _Al._ I should say, good counsel, Socrates. _Soc._ And is the art of the pilot evil counsel? _Al._ No. _Soc._ But good counsel? _Al._ Yes, that is what I should say,—good counsel, of which 126 the aim is the preservation of the voyagers. _Soc._ True. And what is the aim of that other good counsel of which you speak?
_Al._ The aim is the better order and preservation of the city. _Soc._ And what is that of which the absence or presence improves and preserves the order of the city? Suppose you were to ask me, what is that of which the presence or absence improves or preserves the order of the body? I should reply, the presence of health and the absence of disease. You would say the same? _Al._ Yes. _Soc._ And if you were to ask me the same question about the eyes, I should reply in the same way, ‘the presence of sight and the absence of blindness;’ or about the ears, I should reply, that they were improved and were in better case, when deafness was absent, and hearing was present in them. _Al._ True. [Sidenote: And this improvement is given by friendship and agreement, such as exists between the members of a family, however they may differ in their qualities and accomplishments.] _Soc._ And what would you say of a state? What is that by the presence or absence of which the state is improved and better managed and ordered? _Al._ I should say, Socrates:—the presence of friendship and the absence of hatred and division. _Soc._ And do you mean by friendship agreement or disagreement? _Al._ Agreement. _Soc._ What art makes cities agree about numbers?
_Al._ Arithmetic. _Soc._ And private individuals? _Al._ The same. _Soc._ And what art makes each individual agree with himself? [Sidenote: _The art of measure._] _Al._ The same. _Soc._ And what art makes each of us agree with himself about the comparative length of the span and of the cubit? Does not the art of measure? _Al._ Yes. _Soc._ Individuals are agreed with one another about this; and states, equally? _Al._ Yes. _Soc._ And the same holds of the balance? _Al._ True. _Soc._ But what is the other agreement of which you speak, and about what? what art can give that agreement? And does that which gives it to the state give it also to the individual, so as to make him consistent with himself and with another? _Al._ I should suppose so. _Soc._ But what is the nature of the agreement?—answer, and faint not. _Al._ I mean to say that there should be such friendship and agreement as exists between an affectionate father and mother and their son, or between brothers, or between husband and wife. _Soc._ But can a man, Alcibiades, agree with a woman about the spinning of wool, which she understands and he does not? _Al._ No, truly. _Soc._ Nor has he any need, for spinning is a female accomplishment. _Al._ Yes. _Soc._ And would a woman agree with a man about the 127 science of arms, which she has never learned?
_Al._ Certainly not. _Soc._ I suppose that the use of arms would be regarded by you as a male accomplishment? _Al._ It would. _Soc._ Then, upon your view, women and men have two sorts of knowledge? _Al._ Certainly. _Soc._ Then in their knowledge there is no agreement of women and men? _Al._ There is not. [Sidenote: _Apparent antagonism of friendship and justice._] _Soc._ Nor can there be friendship, if friendship is agreement? _Al._ Plainly not. _Soc._ Then women are not loved by men when they do their own work? _Al._ I suppose not. _Soc._ Nor men by women when they do their own work? _Al._ No. [Sidenote: If everybody is doing his own business, how can this promote friendship? And yet when individuals are doing each his own work, they are doing what is just.] _Soc._ Nor are states well administered, when individuals do their own work? _Al._ I should rather think, Socrates, that the reverse is the truth[59]. _Soc._ What! do you mean to say that states are well administered when friendship is absent, the presence of which, as we were saying, alone secures their good order? _Al._ But I should say that there is friendship among them, for this very reason, that the two parties respectively do their own work. _Soc._ That was not what you were saying before; and what do you mean now by affirming that friendship exists when there is no agreement? How can there be agreement about matters which the one party knows, and of which the other is in ignorance?
_Al._ Impossible. _Soc._ And when individuals are doing their own work, are they doing what is just or unjust? _Al._ What is just, certainly. _Soc._ And when individuals do what is just in the state, is there no friendship among them? _Al._ I suppose that there must be, Socrates. _Soc._ Then what do you mean by this friendship or agreement about which we must be wise and discreet in order that we may be good men? I cannot make out where it exists or among whom; according to you, the same persons may sometimes have it, and sometimes not. _Al._ But, indeed, Socrates, I do not know what I am saying; and I have long been, unconsciously to myself, in a most disgraceful state. _Soc._ Nevertheless, cheer up; at fifty, if you had discovered your deficiency, you would have been too old, and the time for taking care of yourself would have passed away, but yours is just the age at which the discovery should be made. [Sidenote: _Alcibiades is puzzled._] _Al._ And what should he do, Socrates, who would make the discovery? [Sidenote: The way to clear up difficulties is to answer questions. Alcibiades is willing to have recourse to this method of improvement.] _Soc._ Answer questions, Alcibiades; and that is a process which, by the grace of God, if I may put any faith in my oracle, will be very improving to both of us.
_Al._ If I can be improved by answering, I will answer. _Soc._ And first of all, that we may not peradventure be 128 deceived by appearances, fancying, perhaps, that we are taking care of ourselves when we are not, what is the meaning of a man taking care of himself? and when does he take care? Does he take care of himself when he takes care of what belongs to him? _Al._ I should think so. _Soc._ When does a man take care of his feet? Does he not take care of them when he takes care of that which belongs to his feet? _Al._ I do not understand. _Soc._ Let me take the hand as an illustration; does not a ring belong to the finger, and to the finger only? _Al._ Yes. _Soc._ And the shoe in like manner to the foot? _Al._ Yes. _Soc._ And when we take care of our shoes, do we not take care of our feet? _Al._ I do not comprehend, Socrates. _Soc._ But you would admit, Alcibiades, that to take proper care of a thing is a correct expression? _Al._ Yes. _Soc._ And taking proper care means improving? _Al._ Yes. _Soc._ And what is the art which improves our shoes? _Al._ Shoemaking. _Soc._ Then by shoemaking we take care of our shoes? _Al._ Yes.
_Soc._ And do we by shoemaking take care of our feet, or by some other art which improves the feet? _Al._ By some other art. [Sidenote: _He is learning by examples._] _Soc._ And the same art improves the feet which improves the rest of the body? _Al._ Very true. _Soc._ Which is gymnastic? _Al._ Certainly. _Soc._ Then by gymnastic we take care of our feet, and by shoemaking of that which belongs to our feet? _Al._ Very true. _Soc._ And by gymnastic we take care of our hands, and by the art of graving rings of that which belongs to our hands? _Al._ Yes. _Soc._ And by gymnastic we take care of the body, and by the art of weaving and the other arts we take care of the things of the body? _Al._ Clearly. [Sidenote: It has been shown by examples that a man does not take care of himself, when he only takes care of what belongs to him.] _Soc._ Then the art which takes care of each thing is different from that which takes care of the belongings of each thing? _Al._ True. _Soc._ Then in taking care of what belongs to you, you do not take care of yourself? _Al._ Certainly not. _Soc._ For the art which takes care of our belongings appears not to be the same as that which takes care of ourselves?
_Al._ Clearly not. _Soc._ And now let me ask you what is the art with which we take care of ourselves? _Al._ I cannot say. _Soc._ At any rate, thus much has been admitted, that the art is not one which makes any of our possessions, but which makes ourselves better? _Al._ True. _Soc._ But should we ever have known what art makes a shoe better, if we did not know a shoe? _Al._ Impossible. _Soc._ Nor should we know what art makes a ring better, if we did not know a ring? _Al._ That is true. [Sidenote: A man must know himself before he can improve himself or know what belongs to him.] _Soc._ And can we ever know what art makes a man better, 129 if we do not know what we are ourselves? [Sidenote: _The knowledge of self._] _Al._ Impossible. _Soc._ And is self-knowledge such an easy thing, and was he to be lightly esteemed who inscribed the text on the temple at Delphi? Or is self-knowledge a difficult thing, which few are able to attain? _Al._ At times I fancy, Socrates, that anybody can know himself; at other times the task appears to be very difficult. _Soc._ But whether easy or difficult, Alcibiades, still there is no other way; knowing what we are, we shall know how to take care of ourselves, and if we are ignorant we shall not know.
_Al._ That is true. _Soc._ Well, then, let us see in what way the self-existent can be discovered by us; that will give us a chance of discovering our own existence, which otherwise we can never know. _Al._ You say truly. _Soc._ Come, now, I beseech you, tell me with whom you are conversing?—with whom but with me? _Al._ Yes. _Soc._ As I am, with you? _Al._ Yes. _Soc._ That is to say, I, Socrates, am talking? _Al._ Yes. _Soc._ And Alcibiades is my hearer? _Al._ Yes. _Soc._ And I in talking use words? _Al._ Certainly. _Soc._ And talking and using words have, I suppose, the same meaning? _Al._ To be sure. _Soc._ And the user is not the same as the thing which he uses? _Al._ What do you mean? _Soc._ I will explain; the shoemaker, for example, uses a square tool, and a circular tool, and other tools for cutting? _Al._ Yes. _Soc._ But the tool is not the same as the cutter and user of the tool? _Al._ Of course not. [Sidenote: _More analogies and examples._] _Soc._ And in the same way the instrument of the harper is to be distinguished from the harper himself? _Al._ It is. _Soc._ Now the question which I asked was whether you conceive the user to be always different from that which he uses?
_Al._ I do. _Soc._ Then what shall we say of the shoemaker? Does he cut with his tools only or with his hands? _Al._ With his hands as well. _Soc._ He uses his hands too? _Al._ Yes. _Soc._ And does he use his eyes in cutting leather? _Al._ He does. [Sidenote: He is distinct from what he uses; and therefore distinct from his own body.] _Soc._ And we admit that the user is not the same with the things which he uses? _Al._ Yes. _Soc._ Then the shoemaker and the harper are to be distinguished from the hands and feet which they use? _Al._ Clearly. _Soc._ And does not a man use the whole body? _Al._ Certainly. _Soc._ And that which uses is different from that which is used? _Al._ True. _Soc._ Then a man is not the same as his own body? _Al._ That is the inference. _Soc._ What is he, then? _Al._ I cannot say. _Soc._ Nay, you can say that he is the user of the body. _Al._ Yes. _Soc._ And the user of the body is the soul? 130 _Al._ Yes, the soul. _Soc._ And the soul rules? _Al._ Yes. _Soc._ Let me make an assertion which will, I think, be universally admitted. _Al._ What is it? [Sidenote: But he must be one of three things:—Soul, body, or the union of the two. What is the ruling principle in him? Clearly the soul.]
_Soc._ That man is one of three things. _Al._ What are they? [Sidenote: _The true self or being of a man._] _Soc._ Soul, body, or both together forming a whole. _Al._ Certainly. _Soc._ But did we not say that the actual ruling principle of the body is man? _Al._ Yes, we did. _Soc._ And does the body rule over itself? _Al._ Certainly not. _Soc._ It is subject, as we were saying? _Al._ Yes. _Soc._ Then that is not the principle which we are seeking? _Al._ It would seem not. _Soc._ But may we say that the union of the two rules over the body, and consequently that this is man? _Al._ Very likely. _Soc._ The most unlikely of all things; for if one of the members is subject, the two united cannot possibly rule. _Al._ True. _Soc._ But since neither the body, nor the union of the two, is man, either man has no real existence, or the soul is man? _Al._ Just so. _Soc._ Is anything more required to prove that the soul is man? _Al._ Certainly not; the proof is, I think, quite sufficient. [Sidenote: There remains a question of absolute existence, which has not been considered by us, or rather is being considered by us when we speak of the soul.] _Soc._ And if the proof, although not perfect, be sufficient, we shall be satisfied;—more precise proof will be supplied when we have discovered that which we were led to omit, from a fear that the enquiry would be too much protracted.
_Al._ What was that? _Soc._ What I meant, when I said that absolute existence must be first considered; but now, instead of absolute existence, we have been considering the nature of individual existence, and this may, perhaps, be sufficient; for surely there is nothing which may be called more properly ourselves than the soul? _Al._ There is nothing. [Sidenote: You and I are talking soul to soul.] _Soc._ Then we may truly conceive that you and I are conversing with one another, soul to soul? _Al._ Very true. [Sidenote: _The man and his belongings._] _Soc._ And that is just what I was saying before—that I, Socrates, am not arguing or talking with the face of Alcibiades, but with the real Alcibiades; or in other words, with his soul. _Al._ True. _Soc._ Then he who bids a man know himself, would have him know his soul? _Al._ That appears to be true. [Sidenote: But if the soul is the man, he who knows only the arts which concern man does not know himself.] _Soc._ He whose knowledge only extends to the body, 131 knows the things of a man, and not the man himself? _Al._ That is true. _Soc._ Then neither the physician regarded as a physician, nor the trainer regarded as a trainer, knows himself? _Al._ He does not. _Soc._ The husbandmen and the other craftsmen are very far from knowing themselves, for they would seem not even to know their own belongings? When regarded in relation to the arts which they practise they are even further removed from self-knowledge, for they only know the belongings of the body, which minister to the body.
_Al._ That is true. _Soc._ Then if temperance is the knowledge of self, in respect of his art none of them is temperate? _Al._ I agree. _Soc._ And this is the reason why their arts are accounted vulgar, and are not such as a good man would practise? _Al._ Quite true. _Soc._ Again, he who cherishes his body cherishes not himself, but what belongs to him? _Al._ That is true. _Soc._ But he who cherishes his money, cherishes neither himself nor his belongings, but is in a stage yet further removed from himself? _Al._ I agree. _Soc._ Then the money-maker has really ceased to be occupied with his own concerns? _Al._ True. [Sidenote: The lover of the soul is the true lover.] _Soc._ And if any one has fallen in love with the person of Alcibiades, he loves not Alcibiades, but the belongings of Alcibiades? _Al._ True. _Soc._ But he who loves your soul is the true lover? [Sidenote: _Socrates, the only true lover of Alcibiades._] _Al._ That is the necessary inference. _Soc._ The lover of the body goes away when the flower of youth fades? _Al._ True. [Sidenote: He only remains and goes not away, so long as the soul of his beloved follows after virtue.] _Soc._ But he who loves the soul goes not away, as long as the soul follows after virtue?
_Al._ Yes. _Soc._ And I am the lover who goes not away, but remains with you, when you are no longer young and the rest are gone? _Al._ Yes, Socrates; and therein you do well, and I hope that you will remain. _Soc._ Then you must try to look your best. _Al._ I will. _Soc._ The fact is, that there is only one lover of Alcibiades the son of Cleinias; there neither is nor ever has been seemingly any other; and he is his darling,—Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus and Phaenarete. _Al._ True. _Soc._ And did you not say, that if I had not spoken first, you were on the point of coming to me, and enquiring why I only remained? _Al._ That is true. [Sidenote: And Socrates will never desert Alcibiades so long as he is not spoiled by the Athenian people.] _Soc._ The reason was that I loved you for your own sake, whereas other men love what belongs to you; and your beauty, which is not you, is fading away, just as your true 132 self is beginning to bloom. And I will never desert you, if you are not spoiled and deformed by the Athenian people; for the danger which I most fear is that you will become a lover of the people and will be spoiled by them. Many a noble Athenian has been ruined in this way. For the demus of the great-hearted Erechtheus is of a fair countenance, but you should see him naked; wherefore observe the caution which I give you.
Ideas discussed in this chapter
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