The dialogues of Plato in five volumes, Vol. 2 · Plato
ALCIBIADES, SOCRATES.
_Al._ What caution? _Soc._ Practise yourself, sweet friend, in learning what you ought to know, before you enter on politics; and then you will have an antidote which will keep you out of harm’s way. _Al._ Good advice, Socrates, but I wish that you would explain to me in what way I am to take care of myself. _Soc._ Have we not made an advance? for we are at any rate tolerably well agreed as to what we are, and there is no longer any danger, as we once feared, that we might be taking care not of ourselves, but of something which is not ourselves. [Sidenote: _How is a man to take care of himself?_] _Al._ That is true. _Soc._ And the next step will be to take care of the soul, and look to that? _Al._ Certainly. _Soc._ Leaving the care of our bodies and of our properties to others? _Al._ Very good. [Sidenote: He who would take care of himself must first of all know himself.] _Soc._ But how can we have a perfect knowledge of the things of the soul?—For if we know them, then I suppose we shall know ourselves. Can we really be ignorant of the excellent meaning of the Delphian inscription, of which we were just now speaking? _Al._ What have you in your thoughts, Socrates?
_Soc._ Then the eye, looking at another eye, and at that in the eye which is most perfect, and which is the instrument of vision, will there see itself? _Al._ That is evident. _Soc._ But looking at anything else either in man or in the world, and not to what resembles this, it will not see itself? _Al._ Very true. _Soc._ Then if the eye is to see itself, it must look at the eye, and at that part of the eye where sight which is the virtue of the eye resides? _Al._ True. [Sidenote: And the soul which would know herself must look especially at that part of herself in which she resembles the divine.] _Soc._ And if the soul, my dear Alcibiades, is ever to know herself, must she not look at the soul; and especially at that part of the soul in which her virtue resides, and to any other which is like this? _Al._ I agree, Socrates. _Soc._ And do we know of any part of our souls more divine than that which has to do with wisdom and knowledge? _Al._ There is none. _Soc._ Then this is that part of the soul which resembles the divine; and he who looks at this and at the whole class of things divine, will be most likely to know himself?
_Al._ Clearly. _Soc._ And self-knowledge we agree to be wisdom? _Al._ True. _Soc._ But if we have no self-knowledge and no wisdom, can we ever know our own good and evil? _Al._ How can we, Socrates? _Soc._ You mean, that if you did not know Alcibiades, there would be no possibility of your knowing that what belonged to Alcibiades was really his? _Al._ It would be quite impossible. [Sidenote: He who knows not himself and his belongings, will not know others and their belongings, and therefore he will not know the affairs of states.] _Soc._ Nor should we know that we were the persons to whom anything belonged, if we did not know ourselves? _Al._ How could we? _Soc._ And if we did not know our own belongings, neither should we know the belongings of our belongings? _Al._ Clearly not. _Soc._ Then we were not altogether right in acknowledging just now that a man may know what belongs to him and yet not know himself; nay, rather he cannot even know the belongings of his belongings; for the discernment of the things of self, and of the things which belong to the things of self, appear all to be the business of the same man, and of the same art. [Sidenote: _Happiness without virtue impossible._] _Al._ So much may be supposed.
_Soc._ And he who knows not the things which belong to himself, will in like manner be ignorant of the things which belong to others? _Al._ Very true. _Soc._ And if he knows not the affairs of others, he will not know the affairs of states? _Al._ Certainly not. _Soc._ Then such a man can never be a statesman? _Al._ He cannot. _Soc._ Nor an economist? _Al._ He cannot. _Soc._ He will not know what he is doing? 134 _Al._ He will not. _Soc._ And will not he who is ignorant fall into error? _Al._ Assuredly. [Sidenote: And, if he knows not what he is doing, he will be miserable and will make others miserable.] _Soc._ And if he falls into error will he not fail both in his public and private capacity? _Al._ Yes, indeed. _Soc._ And failing, will he not be miserable? _Al._ Very. _Soc._ And what will become of those for whom he is acting? _Al._ They will be miserable also. _Soc._ Then he who is not wise and good cannot be happy? _Al._ He cannot. _Soc._ The bad, then, are miserable? _Al._ Yes, very. _Soc._ And if so, not he who has riches, but he who has wisdom, is delivered from his misery? _Al._ Clearly. _Soc._ Cities, then, if they are to be happy, do not want walls, or triremes, or docks, or numbers, or size, Alcibiades, without virtue[60]?
_Al._ Yes. _Soc._ And so you will act rightly and well? _Al._ Yes. _Soc._ In which case, I will be security for your happiness. _Al._ I accept the security. _Soc._ But if you act unrighteously, your eye will turn to the dark and godless, and being in darkness and ignorance of yourselves, you will probably do deeds of darkness. _Al._ Very possibly. _Soc._ For if a man, my dear Alcibiades, has the power to do what he likes, but has no understanding, what is likely to be the result, either to him as an individual or to the state—for 135 example, if he be sick and is able to do what he likes, not having the mind of a physician—having moreover tyrannical power, and no one daring to reprove him, what will happen to him? Will he not be likely to have his constitution ruined? [Sidenote: _The conversion of Alcibiades._] _Al._ That is true. _Soc._ Or again, in a ship, if a man having the power to do what he likes, has no intelligence or skill in navigation, do you see what will happen to him and to his fellow-sailors? _Al._ Yes; I see that they will all perish. _Soc._ And in like manner, in a state, and where there is any power and authority which is wanting in virtue, will not misfortune, in like manner, ensue?
_Soc._ That is not well said, Alcibiades. _Al._ What ought I to have said? _Soc._ By the help of God. _Al._ I agree; and I further say, that our relations are likely to be reversed. From this day forward, I must and will follow you as you have followed me; I will be the disciple, and you shall be my master. _Soc._ O that is rare! My love breeds another love: and so like the stork I shall be cherished by the bird whom I have hatched. _Al._ Strange, but true; and henceforward I shall begin to think about justice. _Soc._ And I hope that you will persist; although I have fears, not because I doubt you; but I see the power of the state, which may be too much for both of us. [55] Cp. Symp. 213 C. [56] Cp. Symp. 217 E ff. [57] Cp. Symp. 181 E. [58] About £406. [59] Cp. Rep. i. 332 foll. [60] Cp. Arist. Pol. vii. 1. § 5. [61] Cp. Arist. Pol. i. 5. § 7.
Ideas discussed in this chapter
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