The dialogues of Plato in five volumes, Vol. 2 · Plato
SCENE:—The house of Callicles.
_Gor._ In the case supposed:—yes. _Soc._ And the same holds of the relation of rhetoric to all the other arts; the rhetorician need not know the truth about things; he has only to discover some way of persuading the ignorant that he has more knowledge than those who know? [Sidenote: _The false analogy of the arts._] _Gor._ Yes, Socrates, and is not this a great comfort?—not to have learned the other arts, but the art of rhetoric only, and yet to be in no way inferior to the professors of them? [Sidenote: And is the rhetorician as ignorant of good and evil, just and unjust, as about special arts; or will Gorgias teach him these things first?] _Soc._ Whether the rhetorician is or is not inferior on this account is a question which we will hereafter examine if the enquiry is likely to be of any service to us; but I would rather begin by asking, whether he is or is not as ignorant of the just and unjust, base and honourable, good and evil, as he is of medicine and the other arts; I mean to say, does he really know anything of what is good and evil, base or honourable, just or unjust in them; or has he only a way with the ignorant of persuading them that he not knowing is to be esteemed to know more about these things than some one else who knows? Or must the pupil know these things and come to you knowing them before he can acquire the art of rhetoric? If he is ignorant, you who are the teacher of rhetoric will not teach him—it is not your business; but you will make him seem to the multitude to know them, when he does not know them; and seem to be a good man, when he is not. Or will you be unable to teach him rhetoric 460 at all, unless he knows the truth of these things first? What is to be said about all this? By heaven, Gorgias, I wish that you would reveal to me the power of rhetoric, as you were saying that you would.
_Soc._ I was thinking at the time, when I heard you saying so, that rhetoric, which is always discoursing about justice, could not possibly be an unjust thing. But when you added, shortly afterwards, that the rhetorician might make a bad use of rhetoric I noted with surprise the inconsistency into which 461 you had fallen; and I said, that if you thought, as I did, that there was a gain in being refuted, there would be an advantage in going on with the question, but if not, I would leave off. And in the course of our investigations, as you will see yourself, the rhetorician has been acknowledged to be incapable of making an unjust use of rhetoric, or of willingness to do injustice. By the dog, Gorgias, there will be a great deal of discussion, before we get at the truth of all this. [Sidenote: The paradoxes of Socrates arouse the ire of Polus.] _Polus._ And do even you, Socrates, seriously believe what you are now saying about rhetoric? What! because Gorgias was ashamed to deny that the rhetorician knew the just and the honourable and the good, and admitted that to any one who came to him ignorant of them he could teach them, and then out of this admission there arose a contradiction—the thing which you so dearly love, and to which not he, but you, brought the argument by your captious questions—[do you seriously believe that there is any truth in all this?] For will any one ever acknowledge that he does not know, or cannot teach, the nature of justice? The truth is, that there is great want of manners in bringing the argument to such a pass.
_Pol._ Yes. _Soc._ And you, like him, invite any one to ask you about anything which he pleases, and you will know how to answer him? _Pol._ To be sure. _Soc._ And now, which will you do, ask or answer? _Pol._ I will ask; and do you answer me, Socrates, the same question which Gorgias, as you suppose, is unable to answer: What is rhetoric? _Soc._ Do you mean what sort of an art? _Pol._ Yes. [Sidenote: Socrates in his answer contrives to give Polus a lesson.] _Soc._ To say the truth, Polus, it is not an art at all, in my opinion. _Pol._ Then what, in your opinion, is rhetoric? _Soc._ A thing which, as I was lately reading in a book of yours, you say created art. _Pol._ What thing? _Soc._ I should say a sort of experience. _Pol._ Does rhetoric seem to you to be an experience? _Soc._ That is my view, but you may be of another mind. _Pol._ An experience in what? _Soc._ An experience in producing a sort of delight and gratification. _Pol._ And if able to gratify others, must not rhetoric be a fine thing? _Soc._ What are you saying, Polus? Why do you ask me whether rhetoric is a fine thing or not, when I have not as yet told you what rhetoric is?
_Pol._ Did I not hear you say that rhetoric was a sort of experience? _Soc._ Will you, who are so desirous to gratify others, afford a slight gratification to me? _Pol._ I will. _Soc._ Will you ask me, what sort of an art is cookery? _Pol._ What sort of an art is cookery? [Sidenote: _Once more, ‘What is rhetoric?’_] _Soc._ Not an art at all, Polus. _Pol._ What then? _Soc._ I should say an experience. _Pol._ In what? I wish that you would explain to me. [Sidenote: He puts rhetoric and cookery in the same class; and that class is flattery.] _Soc._ An experience in producing a sort of delight and gratification, Polus. _Pol._ Then are cookery and rhetoric the same? _Soc._ No, they are only different parts of the same profession. _Pol._ Of what profession? _Soc._ I am afraid that the truth may seem discourteous; and I hesitate to answer, lest Gorgias should imagine that I am making fun of his own profession. For whether or no this is that art of rhetoric which Gorgias practises I 463 really cannot tell:—from what he was just now saying, nothing appeared of what he thought of his art, but the rhetoric which I mean is a part of a not very creditable whole. _Gor._ A part of what, Socrates? Say what you mean, and never mind me.
_Soc._ In my opinion then, Gorgias, the whole of which rhetoric is a part is not an art at all, but the habit of a bold and ready wit, which knows how to manage mankind: this habit I sum up under the word ‘flattery’; and it appears to me to have many other parts, one of which is cookery, which may seem to be an art, but, as I maintain, is only an experience or routine and not an art:—another part is rhetoric, and the art of attiring and sophistry are two others: thus there are four branches, and four different things answering to them. And Polus may ask, if he likes, for he has not as yet been informed, what part of flattery is rhetoric: he did not see that I had not yet answered him when he proceeded to ask a further question: Whether I do not think rhetoric a fine thing? But I shall not tell him whether rhetoric is a fine thing or not, until I have first answered, ‘What is rhetoric?’ For that would not be right, Polus; but I shall be happy to answer, if you will ask me, What part of flattery is rhetoric? _Pol._ I will ask, and do you answer? What part of flattery is rhetoric? [Sidenote: _Shams and flatteries._] [Sidenote: Rhetoric is the shadow of a part of politics.]
_Soc._ Will you understand my answer? Rhetoric, according to my view, is the ghost or counterfeit of a part of politics. _Pol._ And noble or ignoble? _Soc._ Ignoble, I should say, if I am compelled to answer, for I call what is bad ignoble:—though I doubt whether you understand what I was saying before. _Gor._ Indeed, Socrates, I cannot say that I understand myself. _Soc._ I do not wonder, Gorgias; for I have not as yet explained myself, and our friend Polus, colt by name and colt by nature, is apt to run away[31]. [Sidenote: ‘But what in the world does this mean?’] _Gor._ Never mind him, but explain to me what you mean by saying that rhetoric is the counterfeit of a part of politics. _Soc._ I will try, then, to explain my notion of rhetoric, and if I am mistaken, my friend Polus shall refute me. We may 464 assume the existence of bodies and of souls? _Gor._ Of course. [Sidenote: Returning to first principles, Socrates assumes the existence of souls and bodies which may or may not be in a good condition, real or apparent.] _Soc._ You would further admit that there is a good condition of either of them? _Gor._ Yes. _Soc._ Which condition may not be really good, but good only in appearance? I mean to say, that there are many persons who appear to be in good health, and whom only a physician or trainer will discern at first sight not to be in good health.
_Gor._ True. _Soc._ And this applies not only to the body, but also to the soul: in either there may be that which gives the appearance of health and not the reality? _Gor._ Yes, certainly. [Sidenote: To the soul corresponds the art of politics which has two parts, legislation and justice, and to the body corresponds another nameless art of training which has two parts, medicine and gymnastic; and these four have four shams corresponding to them.] [Sidenote: _Rhetoric and Sophistic._] _Soc._ And now I will endeavour to explain to you more clearly what I mean: The soul and body being two, have two arts corresponding to them: there is the art of politics attending on the soul; and another art attending on the body, of which I know no single name, but which may be described as having two divisions, one of them gymnastic, and the other medicine. And in politics there is a legislative part, which answers to gymnastic, as justice does to medicine; and the two parts run into one another, justice having to do with the same subject as legislation, and medicine with the same subject as gymnastic, but with a difference. Now, seeing that there are these four arts, two attending on the body and two on the soul for their highest good; flattery knowing, or rather guessing their natures, has distributed herself into four shams or simulations of them; she puts on the likeness of some one or other of them, and pretends to be that which she simulates, and having no regard for men’s highest interests, is ever making pleasure the bait of the unwary, and deceiving them into the belief that she is of the highest value to them. Cookery simulates the disguise of medicine, and pretends to know what food is the best for the body; and if the physician and the cook had to enter into a competition in which children were the judges, or men who had no more sense than children, as to which of them best understands the goodness or badness of food, the physician would be starved to death. A flattery I deem this to be and of an ignoble sort, Polus, for to you 465 I am now addressing myself, because it aims at pleasure without any thought of the best. An art I do not call it, but only an experience, because it is unable to explain or to give a reason of the nature of its own applications. And I do not call any irrational thing an art; but if you dispute my words, I am prepared to argue in defence of them.
Cookery, then, I maintain to be a flattery which takes the form of medicine; and tiring, in like manner, is a flattery which takes the form of gymnastic, and is knavish, false, ignoble, illiberal, working deceitfully by the help of lines, and colours, and enamels, and garments, and making men affect a spurious beauty to the neglect of the true beauty which is given by gymnastic. [Sidenote: The shams are cooking, dressing up, sophistry, rhetoric.] [Sidenote: _Hard words pass between Polus and Socrates._] [Sidenote: Socrates excuses himself for the length at which he has spoken.] I would rather not be tedious, and therefore I will only say, after the manner of the geometricians, (for I think that by this time you will be able to follow,) as tiring : gymnastic :: cookery : medicine; or rather, as tiring : gymnastic :: sophistry : legislation; and as cookery : medicine :: rhetoric : justice.
And this, I say, is the natural difference between the rhetorician and the sophist, but by reason of their near connection, they are apt to be jumbled up together, neither do they know what to make of themselves, nor do other men know what to make of them. For if the body presided over itself, and were not under the guidance of the soul, and the soul did not discern and discriminate between cookery and medicine, but the body was made the judge of them, and the rule of judgment was the bodily delight which was given by them, then the word of Anaxagoras, that word with which you, friend Polus, are so well acquainted, would prevail far and wide: ‘Chaos’ would come again, and cookery, health, and medicine would mingle in an indiscriminate mass. And now I have told you my notion of rhetoric, which is, in relation to the soul, what cookery is to the body. I may have been inconsistent in making a long speech, when I would not allow you to discourse at length. But I think that I may be excused, because you did not understand me, and could make no use of my answer when I spoke shortly, and therefore I had to enter into an explanation. And if I show an 466 equal inability to make use of yours, I hope that you will speak at equal length; but if I am able to understand you, let me have the benefit of your brevity, as is only fair: And now you may do what you please with my answer.
_Pol._ What do you mean? do you think that rhetoric is flattery? _Soc._ Nay, I said a part of flattery; if at your age, Polus, you cannot remember, what will you do by-and-by, when you get older? _Pol._ And are the good rhetoricians meanly regarded in states, under the idea that they are flatterers? _Soc._ Is that a question or the beginning of a speech? _Pol._ I am asking a question. _Soc._ Then my answer is, that they are not regarded at all. [Sidenote: Polus cannot be made to understand that rhetoricians have no real power in a state, because they do not do what they ultimately will, but only what they think best.] _Pol._ How not regarded? Have they not very great power in states? _Soc._ Not if you mean to say that power is a good to the possessor. [Sidenote: _Polus is greatly irritated by Socrates._] _Pol._ And that is what I do mean to say. _Soc._ Then, if so, I think that they have the least power of all the citizens. _Pol._ What! are they not like tyrants? They kill and despoil and exile any one whom they please. _Soc._ By the dog, Polus, I cannot make out at each deliverance of yours, whether you are giving an opinion of your own, or asking a question of me.
_Pol._ I am asking a question of you. _Soc._ Yes, my friend, but you ask two questions at once. _Pol._ How two questions? _Soc._ Why, did you not say just now that the rhetoricians are like tyrants, and that they kill and despoil or exile any one whom they please? _Pol._ I did. _Soc._ Well then, I say to you that here are two questions in one, and I will answer both of them. And I tell you, Polus, that rhetoricians and tyrants have the least possible power in states, as I was just now saying; for they do literally nothing which they will, but only what they think best. _Pol._ And is not that a great power? _Soc._ Polus has already said the reverse. _Pol._ Said the reverse! nay, that is what I assert. _Soc._ No, by the great—what do you call him?—not you, for you say that great power is a good to him who has the power. _Pol._ I do. _Soc._ And would you maintain that if a fool does what he thinks best, this is a good, and would you call this great power? _Pol._ I should not. [Sidenote: For a fool and a flatterer cannot know what is good.] _Soc._ Then you must prove that the rhetorician is not a fool, and that rhetoric is an art and not a flattery—and so 467 you will have refuted me; but if you leave me unrefuted, why, the rhetoricians who do what they think best in states, and the tyrants, will have nothing upon which to congratulate themselves, if, as you say, power be indeed a good, admitting at the same time that what is done without sense is an evil.
_Pol._ Yes; I admit that. [Sidenote: _What men will is not what they think best._] _Soc._ How then can the rhetoricians or the tyrants have great power in states, unless Polus can refute Socrates, and prove to him that they do as they will? _Pol._ This fellow— _Soc._ I say that they do not do as they will;—now refute me. _Pol._ Why, have you not already said that they do as they think best? _Soc._ And I say so still. _Pol._ Then surely they do as they will? _Soc._ I deny it. _Pol._ But they do what they think best? _Soc._ Aye. _Pol._ That, Socrates, is monstrous and absurd. _Soc._ Good words, good Polus, as I may say in your own peculiar style; but if you have any questions to ask of me, either prove that I am in error or give the answer yourself. _Pol._ Very well, I am willing to answer that I may know what you mean. _Soc._ Do men appear to you to will that which they do, or to will that further end for the sake of which they do a thing? when they take medicine, for example, at the bidding of a physician, do they will the drinking of the medicine which is painful, or the health for the sake of which they drink?
_Pol._ Clearly, the health. _Soc._ And when men go on a voyage or engage in business, they do not will that which they are doing at the time; for who would desire to take the risk of a voyage or the trouble of business?—But they will, to have the wealth for the sake of which they go on a voyage. _Pol._ Certainly. [Sidenote: A man cannot will unless he knows the ultimate good for the sake of which he acts.] _Soc._ And is not this universally true? If a man does something for the sake of something else, he wills not that which he does, but that for the sake of which he does it. _Pol._ Yes. _Soc._ And are not all things either good or evil, or intermediate and indifferent? _Pol._ To be sure, Socrates. [Sidenote: _Good is the end of human action._] _Soc._ Wisdom and health and wealth and the like you would call goods, and their opposites evils? _Pol._ I should. _Soc._ And the things which are neither good nor evil, and 468 which partake sometimes of the nature of good and at other times of evil, or of neither, are such as sitting, walking, running, sailing; or, again, wood, stones, and the like:—these are the things which you call neither good nor evil? _Pol._ Exactly so.
_Soc._ Are these indifferent things done for the sake of the good, or the good for the sake of the indifferent? _Pol._ Clearly, the indifferent for the sake of the good. _Soc._ When we walk we walk for the sake of the good, and under the idea that it is better to walk, and when we stand we stand equally for the sake of the good? _Pol._ Yes. _Soc._ And when we kill a man we kill him or exile him or despoil him of his goods, because, as we think, it will conduce to our good? _Pol._ Certainly. _Soc._ Men who do any of these things do them for the sake of the good? _Pol._ Yes. _Soc._ And did we not admit that in doing something for the sake of something else, we do not will those things which we do, but that other thing for the sake of which we do them? _Pol._ Most true. _Soc._ Then we do not will simply to kill a man or to exile him or to despoil him of his goods, but we will to do that which conduces to our good, and if the act is not conducive to our good we do not will it; for we will, as you say, that which is our good, but that which is neither good nor evil, or simply evil, we do not will. Why are you silent, Polus? Am I not right?
_Pol._ You are right. _Soc._ Hence we may infer, that if any one, whether he be a tyrant or a rhetorician, kills another or exiles another or deprives him of his property, under the idea that the act is for his own interests when really not for his own interests, he may be said to do what seems best to him? [Sidenote: _Will is the correlative of good._] _Pol._ Yes. [Sidenote: No man does what he wills who does what is evil.] _Soc._ But does he do what he wills if he does what is evil? Why do you not answer? _Pol._ Well, I suppose not. _Soc._ Then if great power is a good as you allow, will such a one have great power in a state? _Pol._ He will not. _Soc._ Then I was right in saying that a man may do what seems good to him in a state, and not have great power, and not do what he wills? _Pol._ As though you, Socrates, would not like to have the power of doing what seemed good to you in the state, rather than not; you would not be jealous when you saw any one killing or despoiling or imprisoning whom he pleased, Oh, no! _Soc._ Justly or unjustly, do you mean? 469 _Pol._ In either case is he not equally to be envied?
_Soc._ Forbear, Polus! _Pol._ Why ‘forbear’? _Soc._ Because you ought not to envy wretches who are not to be envied, but only to pity them. _Pol._ And are those of whom I spoke wretches? _Soc._ Yes, certainly they are. [Sidenote: He who makes a bad use of power is not to be envied, but pitied.] _Pol._ And so you think that he who slays any one whom he pleases, and justly slays him, is pitiable and wretched? _Soc._ No, I do not say that of him: but neither do I think that he is to be envied. _Pol._ Were you not saying just now that he is wretched? _Soc._ Yes, my friend, if he killed another unjustly, in which case he is also to be pitied; and he is not to be envied if he killed him justly. _Pol._ At any rate you will allow that he who is unjustly put to death is wretched, and to be pitied? _Soc._ Not so much, Polus, as he who kills him, and not so much as he who is justly killed. _Pol._ How can that be, Socrates? _Soc._ That may very well be, inasmuch as doing injustice is the greatest of evils. _Pol._ But is it the greatest? Is not suffering injustice a greater evil? [Sidenote: _A paradox._] _Soc._ Certainly not. _Pol._ Then would you rather suffer than do injustice?
Ideas discussed in this chapter
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