The dialogues of Plato in five volumes, Vol. 2 · Plato
SCENE:—The house of Callicles.
_Cal._ The latter, Socrates, is more like the truth. [Sidenote: The temperate man is the sound, the intemperate the leaky vessel.] _Soc._ Well, I will tell you another image, which comes out of the same school:—Let me request you to consider how far you would accept this as an account of the two lives of the temperate and intemperate in a figure:—There are two men, both of whom have a number of casks; the one man has his casks sound and full, one of wine, another of honey, and a third of milk, besides others filled with other liquids, and the streams which fill them are few and scanty, and he can only obtain them with a great deal of toil and difficulty; but when his casks are once filled he has no need to feed them any more, and has no further trouble with them or care about them. The other, in like manner, can procure streams, though not without difficulty; but his vessels are leaky and unsound, and night and day he is compelled to be filling them, and if he pauses for a moment, he is in an agony of 494 pain. Such are their respective lives:—And now would you say that the life of the intemperate is happier than that of the temperate? Do I not convince you that the opposite is the truth?
_Cal._ What a strange being you are, Socrates! a regular mob-orator. _Soc._ That was the reason, Callicles, why I scared Polus and Gorgias, until they were too modest to say what they thought; but you will not be too modest and will not be scared, for you are a brave man. And now, answer my question. _Cal._ I answer, that even the scratcher would live pleasantly. _Soc._ And if pleasantly, then also happily? _Cal._ To be sure. _Soc._ But what if the itching is not confined to the head? Shall I pursue the question? And here, Callicles, I would have you consider how you would reply if consequences are pressed upon you, especially if in the last resort you are asked, whether the life of a catamite is not terrible, foul, miserable? Or would you venture to say, that they too are happy, if they only get enough of what they want? [Sidenote: Callicles professes a virtuous indignation at the very mention of the consequences of his own doctrine.] _Cal._ Are you not ashamed, Socrates, of introducing such topics into the argument? _Soc._ Well, my fine friend, but am I the introducer of these topics, or he who says without any qualification that all who feel pleasure in whatever manner are happy, and who admits of no distinction between good and bad pleasures? And I 495 would still ask, whether you say that pleasure and good are the same, or whether there is some pleasure which is not a good?
_Cal._ Certainly I was. _Soc._ And would you say that pleasure and knowledge are the same, or not the same? _Cal._ Not the same, O man of wisdom. _Soc._ And would you say that courage differed from pleasure? _Cal._ Certainly. _Soc._ Well, then, let us remember that Callicles, the Acharnian, says that pleasure and good are the same; but that knowledge and courage are not the same, either with one another, or with the good. [Sidenote: _The law of contradiction._] _Cal._ And what does our friend Socrates, of Foxton, say—does he assent to this, or not? _Soc._ He does not assent; neither will Callicles, when he sees himself truly. You will admit, I suppose, that good and evil fortune are opposed to each other? _Cal._ Yes. _Soc._ And if they are opposed to each other, then, like health and disease, they exclude one another; a man cannot have them both, or be without them both, at the same time? _Cal._ What do you mean? _Soc._ Take the case of any bodily affection:—a man may have the complaint in his eyes which is called ophthalmia? _Cal._ To be sure. 496 _Soc._ But he surely cannot have the same eyes well and sound at the same time? _Cal._ Certainly not. _Soc._ And when he has got rid of his ophthalmia, has he got rid of the health of his eyes too? Is the final result, that he gets rid of them both together?
_Cal._ Certainly not. _Soc._ That would surely be marvellous and absurd? _Cal._ Very. [Sidenote: A man may have good and evil by turns, but not at the same time.] _Soc._ I suppose that he is affected by them, and gets rid of them in turns? _Cal._ Yes. _Soc._ And he may have strength and weakness in the same way, by fits? _Cal._ Yes. _Soc._ Or swiftness and slowness? _Cal._ Certainly. _Soc._ And does he have and not have good and happiness, and their opposites, evil and misery, in a similar alternation[41]? _Cal._ Certainly he has. _Soc._ If then there be anything which a man has and has not at the same time, clearly that cannot be good and evil—do we agree? Please not to answer without consideration. [Sidenote: _The law of contradiction._] _Cal._ I entirely agree. _Soc._ Go back now to our former admissions.—Did you say that to hunger, I mean the mere state of hunger, was pleasant or painful? _Cal._ I said painful, but that to eat when you are hungry is pleasant. _Soc._ I know; but still the actual hunger is painful: am I not right? _Cal._ Yes. _Soc._ And thirst, too, is painful? _Cal._ Yes, very. _Soc._ Need I adduce any more instances, or would you agree that all wants or desires are painful? _Cal._ I agree, and therefore you need not adduce any more instances.
_Soc._ Very good. And you would admit that to drink, when you are thirsty, is pleasant? _Cal._ Yes. _Soc._ And in the sentence which you have just uttered, the word ‘thirsty’ implies pain? _Cal._ Yes. _Soc._ And the word ‘drinking’ is expressive of pleasure, and of the satisfaction of the want? _Cal._ Yes. _Soc._ There is pleasure in drinking? _Cal._ Certainly. _Soc._ When you are thirsty? _Cal._ Yes. _Soc._ And in pain? _Cal._ Yes. [Sidenote: But he may have pleasure and pain at the same time.] _Soc._ Do you see the inference:—that pleasure and pain are simultaneous, when you say that being thirsty, you drink? For are they not simultaneous, and do they not affect at the same time the same part, whether of the soul or the body?—which of them is affected cannot be supposed to be of any consequence: Is not this true? _Cal._ It is. _Soc._ You said also, that no man could have good and evil fortune at the same time? _Cal._ Yes, I did. [Sidenote: _The dialectical process_] _Soc._ But you admitted, that when in pain a man might also 497 have pleasure? _Cal._ Clearly. [Sidenote: Therefore pleasure and pain are not the same as good and evil.] _Soc._ Then pleasure is not the same as good fortune, or pain the same as evil fortune, and therefore the good is not the same as the pleasant?
_Cal._ I wish I knew, Socrates, what your quibbling means. _Soc._ You know, Callicles, but you affect not to know. _Cal._ Well, get on, and don’t keep fooling: then you will know what a wiseacre you are in your admonition of me. _Soc._ Does not a man cease from his thirst and from his pleasure in drinking at the same time? _Cal._ I do not understand what you are saying. _Gor._ Nay, Callicles, answer, if only for our sakes;—we should like to hear the argument out. _Cal._ Yes, Gorgias, but I must complain of the habitual trifling of Socrates; he is always arguing about little and unworthy questions. _Gor._ What matter? Your reputation, Callicles, is not at stake. Let Socrates argue in his own fashion. _Cal._ Well, then, Socrates, you shall ask these little peddling questions, since Gorgias wishes to have them. _Soc._ I envy you, Callicles, for having been initiated into the great mysteries before you were initiated into the lesser. I thought that this was not allowable. But to return to our argument:—Does not a man cease from thirsting and from the pleasure of drinking at the same moment? _Cal._ True. _Soc._ And if he is hungry, or has any other desire, does he not cease from the desire and the pleasure at the same moment? _Cal._ Very true.
_Soc._ Then he ceases from pain and pleasure at the same moment? _Cal._ Yes. _Soc._ But he does not cease from good and evil at the same moment, as you have admitted:—do you still adhere to what you said? _Cal._ Yes, I do; but what is the inference? [Sidenote: _to the man of the world is foolishness._] [Sidenote: Another point of view.] _Soc._ Why, my friend, the inference is that the good is not the same as the pleasant, or the evil the same as the painful; there is a cessation of pleasure and pain at the same moment; but not of good and evil, for they are different. How then can pleasure be the same as good, or pain as evil? And I would have you look at the matter in another light, which could hardly, I think, have been considered by you when you identified them: Are not the good good because they have good present with them, as the beautiful are those who have beauty present with them? _Cal._ Yes. _Soc._ And do you call the fools and cowards good men? For you were saying just now that the courageous and the wise are the good—would you not say so? _Cal._ Certainly. _Soc._ And did you never see a foolish child rejoicing? _Cal._ Yes, I have. _Soc._ And a foolish man too?
_Cal._ Yes, certainly; but what is your drift? _Soc._ Nothing particular, if you will only answer. 498 _Cal._ Yes, I have. _Soc._ And did you ever see a sensible man rejoicing or sorrowing? _Cal._ Yes. _Soc._ Which rejoice and sorrow most—the wise or the foolish? _Cal._ They are much upon a par, I think, in that respect. _Soc._ Enough: And did you ever see a coward in battle? _Cal._ To be sure. _Soc._ And which rejoiced most at the departure of the enemy, the coward or the brave? _Cal._ I should say ‘most’ of both; or at any rate, they rejoiced about equally. _Soc._ No matter; then the cowards, and not only the brave, rejoice? _Cal._ Greatly. _Soc._ And the foolish; so it would seem? _Cal._ Yes. _Soc._ And are only the cowards pained at the approach of their enemies, or are the brave also pained? _Cal._ Both are pained. [Sidenote: _A far-fetched argument,_] _Soc._ And are they equally pained? _Cal._ I should imagine that the cowards are more pained. _Soc._ And are they not better pleased at the enemy’s departure? _Cal._ I dare say. [Sidenote: Good is in proportion to pleasure, and the bad are often as much or more pleased than the good.] _Soc._ Then are the foolish and the wise and the cowards and the brave all pleased and pained, as you were saying, in nearly equal degree; but are the cowards more pleased and pained than the brave?
_Cal._ Yes. _Soc._ But surely the wise and brave are the good, and the foolish and the cowardly are the bad? _Cal._ Yes. _Soc._ Then the good and the bad are pleased and pained in a nearly equal degree? _Cal._ Yes. _Soc._ Then are the good and bad good and bad in a nearly equal degree, or have the bad the advantage both in good and evil? [i. e. in having more pleasure and more pain.] _Cal._ I really do not know what you mean. _Soc._ Why, do you not remember saying that the good were good because good was present with them, and the evil because evil; and that pleasures were goods and pains evils? _Cal._ Yes, I remember. _Soc._ And are not these pleasures or goods present to those who rejoice—if they do rejoice? _Cal._ Certainly. _Soc._ Then those who rejoice are good when goods are present with them? _Cal._ Yes. _Soc._ And those who are in pain have evil or sorrow present with them? _Cal._ Yes. _Soc._ And would you still say that the evil are evil by reason of the presence of evil? _Cal._ I should. _Soc._ Then those who rejoice are good, and those who are in pain evil? _Cal._ Yes. [Sidenote: _of which Callicles fails to see the drift._] _Soc._ The degrees of good and evil vary with the degrees of pleasure and of pain?
_Cal._ Yes. _Soc._ Have the wise man and the fool, the brave and the coward, joy and pain in nearly equal degrees? or would you say that the coward has more? _Cal._ I should say that he has. _Soc._ Help me then to draw out the conclusion which follows from our admissions; for it is good to repeat and review what is good twice and thrice over, as they say. 499 Both the wise man and the brave man we allow to be good? _Cal._ Yes. _Soc._ And the foolish man and the coward to be evil? _Cal._ Certainly. _Soc._ And he who has joy is good? _Cal._ Yes. _Soc._ And he who is in pain is evil? _Cal._ Certainly. _Soc._ The good and evil both have joy and pain, but, perhaps, the evil has more of them? _Cal._ Yes. [Sidenote: Therefore the bad man is as good as the good, or perhaps even better.] _Soc._ Then must we not infer, that the bad man is as good and bad as the good, or, perhaps, even better?—is not this a further inference which follows equally with the preceding from the assertion that the good and the pleasant are the same:—can this be denied, Callicles? _Cal._ I have been listening and making admissions to you, Socrates; and I remark that if a person grants you anything in play, you, like a child, want to keep hold and will not give it back. But do you really suppose that I or any other human being denies that some pleasures are good and others bad?
_Soc._ Let me now remind you of what I was saying to Gorgias and Polus; I was saying, as you will not have forgotten, that there were some processes which aim only at pleasure, and know nothing of a better and worse, and there are other processes which know good and evil. And I considered that cookery, which I do not call an art, but only an experience, was of the former class, which is concerned with pleasure, and that the art of medicine was of the class which is concerned with the good. And now, by the god of friendship, I must beg you, Callicles, not to jest, or to imagine that I am jesting with you; do not answer at random and contrary to your real opinion;—for you will observe that we are arguing about the way of human life; and to a man who has any sense at all, what question can be more serious than this?—whether he should follow after that way of life to which you exhort me, and act what you call the manly part of speaking in the assembly, and cultivating rhetoric, and engaging in public affairs, according to the principles now in vogue; or whether he should pursue the life of philosophy;—and in what the latter way differs from the former. But perhaps we had better first try to distinguish them, as I did before, and when we have come to an agreement that they are distinct, we may proceed to consider in what they differ from one another, and which of them we should choose. Perhaps, however, you do not even now understand what I mean?
_Soc._ Then I will proceed, and ask whether you also agree with me, and whether you think that I spoke the truth when 501 I further said to Gorgias and Polus that cookery in my opinion is only an experience, and not an art at all; and that whereas medicine is an art, and attends to the nature and constitution of the patient, and has principles of action and reason in each case, cookery in attending upon pleasure never regards either the nature or reason of that pleasure to which she devotes herself, but goes straight to her end, nor ever considers or calculates anything, but works by experience and routine, and just preserves the recollection of what she has usually done when producing pleasure. And first, I would have you consider whether I have proved what I was saying, and then whether there are not other similar processes which have to do with the soul—some of them processes of art, making a provision for the soul’s highest interest—others despising the interest, and, as in the previous case, considering only the pleasure of the soul, and how this may be acquired, but not considering what pleasures are good or bad, and having no other aim but to afford gratification, whether good or bad. In my opinion, Callicles, there are such processes, and this is the sort of thing which I term flattery, whether concerned with the body or the soul, or whenever employed with a view to pleasure and without any consideration of good and evil. And now I wish that you would tell me whether you agree with us in this notion, or whether you differ.
_Cal._ I do not differ; on the contrary, I agree; for in that way I shall soonest bring the argument to an end, and shall oblige my friend Gorgias. _Soc._ And is this notion true of one soul, or of two or more? _Cal._ Equally true of two or more. _Soc._ Then a man may delight a whole assembly, and yet have no regard for their true interests? _Cal._ Yes. [Sidenote: There are arts which delight mankind but which never consider the soul’s higher interest.] _Soc._ Can you tell me the pursuits which delight mankind—or rather, if you would prefer, let me ask, and do you answer, which of them belong to the pleasurable class, and which of them not? In the first place, what say you of flute-playing? Does not that appear to be an art which seeks only pleasure, Callicles, and thinks of nothing else? _Cal._ I assent. _Soc._ And is not the same true of all similar arts, as, for example, the art of playing the lyre at festivals? _Cal._ Yes. _Soc._ And what do you say of the choral art and of dithyrambic poetry?—are not they of the same nature? Do you imagine that Cinesias the son of Meles cares about what will tend to the moral improvement of his hearers, or about 502 what will give pleasure to the multitude?
_Cal._ Yes. _Soc._ Then poetry is a sort of rhetoric? _Cal._ True. _Soc._ And do not the poets in the theatres seem to you to be rhetoricians? _Cal._ Yes. [Sidenote: Poetry is of the nature of flattery.] _Soc._ Then now we have discovered a sort of rhetoric which is addressed to a crowd of men, women, and children, freemen and slaves. And this is not much to our taste, for we have described it as having the nature of flattery. [Sidenote: _The two sorts of rhetoric._] _Cal._ Quite true. [Sidenote: Oratory, too, as practised regards the interest of the speaker rather than the good of the people.] _Soc._ Very good. And what do you say of that other rhetoric which addresses the Athenian assembly and the assemblies of freemen in other states? Do the rhetoricians appear to you always to aim at what is best, and do they seek to improve the citizens by their speeches, or are they too, like the rest of mankind, bent upon giving them pleasure, forgetting the public good in the thought of their own interest, playing with the people as with children, and trying to amuse them, but never considering whether they are better or worse for this? _Cal._ I must distinguish. There are some who have a real 503 care of the public in what they say, while others are such as you describe.
_Cal._ Yes. _Soc._ And the same is true of a ship? _Cal._ Yes. _Soc._ And the same may be said of the human body? _Cal._ Yes. _Soc._ And what would you say of the soul? Will the good soul be that in which disorder is prevalent, or that in which there is harmony and order? _Cal._ The latter follows from our previous admissions. _Soc._ What is the name which is given to the effect of harmony and order in the body? _Cal._ I suppose that you mean health and strength? _Soc._ Yes, I do; and what is the name which you would give to the effect of harmony and order in the soul? Try and discover a name for this as well as for the other. _Cal._ Why not give the name yourself, Socrates? _Soc._ Well, if you had rather that I should, I will; and you shall say whether you agree with me, and if not, you shall refute and answer me. ‘Healthy,’ as I conceive, is the name which is given to the regular order of the body, whence comes health and every other bodily excellence: is that true or not? [Sidenote: _Callicles again turns restive._] _Cal._ True. [Sidenote: From order and law spring temperance and justice.] _Soc._ And ‘lawful’ and ‘law’ are the names which are given to the regular order and action of the soul, and these make men lawful and orderly:—and so we have temperance and justice: have we not?
_Cal._ Granted. [Sidenote: The true rhetorician will seek to implant these virtues, to implant justice and take away injustice.] _Soc._ And will not the true rhetorician who is honest and understands his art have his eye fixed upon these, in all the words which he addresses to the souls of men, and in all his actions, both in what he gives and in what he takes away? Will not his aim be to implant justice in the souls of his citizens and take away injustice, to implant temperance and take away intemperance, to implant every virtue and take away every vice? Do you not agree? _Cal._ I agree. _Soc._ For what use is there, Callicles, in giving to the body of a sick man who is in a bad state of health a quantity of the most delightful food or drink or any other pleasant thing, which may be really as bad for him as if you gave him 505 nothing, or even worse if rightly estimated. Is not that true? _Cal._ I will not say No to it. [Sidenote: The body of the sick and the soul of the wicked must be chastised and improved.] _Soc._ For in my opinion there is no profit in a man’s life if his body is in an evil plight—in that case his life also is evil: am I not right?
_Cal._ Yes. _Soc._ When a man is in health the physicians will generally allow him to eat when he is hungry and drink when he is thirsty, and to satisfy his desires as he likes, but when he is sick they hardly suffer him to satisfy his desires at all: even you will admit that? _Cal._ Yes. _Soc._ And does not the same argument hold of the soul, my good sir? While she is in a bad state and is senseless and intemperate and unjust and unholy, her desires ought to be controlled, and she ought to be prevented from doing anything which does not tend to her own improvement. _Cal._ Yes. [Sidenote: _Then ‘One man must do for two.’_] _Soc._ Such treatment will be better for the soul herself? _Cal._ To be sure. _Soc._ And to restrain her from her appetites is to chastise her? _Cal._ Yes. _Soc._ Then restraint or chastisement is better for the soul than intemperance or the absence of control, which you were just now preferring? _Cal._ I do not understand you, Socrates, and I wish that you would ask some one who does. [Sidenote: Callicles does not wish to be improved.] _Soc._ Here is a gentleman who cannot endure to be improved or to subject himself to that very chastisement of which the argument speaks!
Ideas discussed in this chapter
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