Six metaphysical meditations · René Descartes
MEDITAT. V.
One thing there is worthy my Consideration, which is, that I find in my self innumerable _Ideas_ of certain things, which tho perhaps they _exist no where without_ Me, yet they cannot Be said to be _Nothing_; and tho they are _Thought_ upon by me at my _will_ and _pleasure_, yet they are not _made_ by _Me_, but have their own _True_ and _Immutable Natures_. As when, for example, * I _Imagine_ a _Triangle_, tho perhaps such a _Figure Exists no where_ out of my _Thoughts_, nor ever _will Exist_, yet the _Nature_ thereof is _determinate_, and its _Essence_ or Form is _Immutable_ and _Eternal_, which is neither _made_ by me, nor _depends_ on my mind, as appears for that many _properties_ may be _demonstrated_ of this Triangle, _viz._ That its three Angles are equal to two right ones, that to its Greatest Angle the Greatest side is subtended, and such like, which I now _clearly_ know whether _I will or not_, tho before _I_ never thought on them, when I _imagine_ a Triangle, and consequently they could not be invented by Me. And ’tis nothing to the purpose for me to say, that perhaps this _Idea_ of a Triangle came to me by the Organs of _sense_, because I have sometimes seen bodies of a _Triangular Shape_; for I can think of Innumerable other _Figures_, which I cannot suspect to have come in through my _senses_, and yet I can _Demonstrate_ various _properties_ of them, as well as of a _Triangle_, which certainly are all _true_, seeing I know them _clearly_, and therefore they are _something_, and not a meer _Nothing_, for ’tis Evident that _what is true is something_.
And now I have sufficiently Demonstrated, that _what I clearly perceive, is True_; And tho I had _not demonstrated_ it, yet such is the _Nature_ of my _Mind_, that I could not but give my _Assent_ to what I _so_ perceive, at least, as long as I _so_ perceive it; and I remember (heretofore when I most of all relied on _sensible Objects_) that I held those _Truths_ for the most _certain_ which I _evidently_ perceived, such as are concerning _Figures_, _Numbers_, with other parts of _Arithmetick_, and _Geometry_, as also whatever relates to _pure_ and _abstracted Mathematicks_. Now therefore, if from this alone, _That I can frame the Idea of a Thing in my Mind_, it follows, _That whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive belonging to a thing_, does _Really belong to it_; Cannot I from hence draw an Argument to Prove the _Existence_ of a _God_? Certainly I find the _Idea_ of a _God_, or _infinitely perfect Being_, as _naturally_ in me, as the _Idea_ of any _Figure_, or _Number_; and I as _clearly_ and _distinctly_ understand that it appertains to his _Nature Always to Be_, as I know that what I can _demonstrate_ of a _Mathematical Figure_ or _Number_ belongs to the _Nature_ of that _Figure_ or _Number_: so that, tho all things which I have _Meditated_ upon these three or four days were not _true_, yet I may well be as _certain_ of the _Existence_ of a _God_, as I have hitherto been of _Mathematical Truths_.
_Doubt._ Yet this Argument at first sight appears not so _evident_, but looks rather like a _sophism_; for seeing I am used in all other things to _Distinguish Existence_ from _Essence_, I can easily perswade my self that the _Existence_ of _God_ may be _distinguish’d_ from his _Essence_, so that I may _Imagine God_ not to _Exist_. _Solution._ But considering it more strictly, ’tis manifest, that the _Existence_ of _God_ can no more be _seperated_ from his _Essence_, then the _Equality_ of the _Three Angles_ to _two right ones_ can be _seperated_ from the _Essence_ of a _Triangle_, or then the _Idea_ of a _Mountain_ can be _without_ the _Idea_ of a _valley_; so that ’tis no less a _Repugnancy_ to think of a _God_ (that is, _A Being infinitely perfect_) who wants _Existence_ (that is, who wants a _Perfection_) then to think of a _Mountain_, to which there is _no Valley adjoyning_. _Doubt._ But what if I cannot imagine _God_ but as _Existing_, or a _Mountain without a Vally_? yet supposing me to think of a _Mountain with a Vally_, it does not from thence follow, that there _Is a Mountain_ in the World; so supposing me to think of a _God_ as _Existing_, yet does it not follow that _God Really Exists_. For my _Thought imposes_ no _necessity_ on Things, and as I may imagine a _Winged Horse_, tho no _Horse_ has _Wings_, so I may imagine an _existing God_, tho no _God exist_.
_Solution._ ’Tis true the _Sophism_ seems to lie in this, yet tho I cannot conceive a _Mountain_ but with a _Vally_, it does not from hence follow, that a _Mountain_ or _Vally_ do _Exist_, but this will follow, that whether a _Mountain_ or a _Vally do_ or _do not Exist_, yet they cannot be _seperated_: so from hence that I cannot think of _God_ but as _Existing_, it follows that _Existence_ is _Inseperable_ from _God_, and therefore that he _Really Exists_; Not because my _Thought_ does all this, or _Imposes_ any _necessity_ on any Thing, but contrarily, because the _necessity_ of the thing it self (_viz._ of _Gods Existence_) _Determines_ me to _think_ thus; for ’tis not in my Power to think a _God_ without _Existence_ (that is, _A Being absolutely perfect_ without the _Cheif Perfection_) as it is in my Power to imagine a Horse either _with_ or _without Wings_. _Doubt._ And here it cannot be said, that I am forced to suppose _God Existing_, after I have supposed him _endowed_ with all _Perfections_, seeing _Existence_ is one of them; but that my _First Position_ (_viz._ His _Absolute Perfection_) is not _necessary_. Thus, for example, ’tis not _necessary_ for me to think all _Quadrilateral Figures_ inscribed in a _Circle_; But supposing that I think _so_, I am then _necessitated_ to Confess a _Rhombe Inscribed_ therein, and yet this is evidently _False_.
_Solution._ For tho I am not forced at any time to think of a _God_; yet as often as I cast my Thoughts on a _First_ and _Cheif Being_, and as it were bring forth out of the Treasury of my Mind an _Idea_ thereof, I must of necessity attribute thereto all Manner of _Perfections_, tho I do not at that time _count_ them over, or _Remark_ each single One; which _necessity_ is sufficient to make me hereafter (when I come to consider _Existence_ to be a _Perfection_) conclude _Rightly, That the First and Chief Being does Exist_. Thus, for example, I am not obliged at any time to imagine a _Triangle_, yet whenever I please to Consider of a _Right-lined Figure_ having only _three Angles_, I am then _necessitated_ to allow it all those _Requisites_ from which I may argue rightly, _That the Three Angles thereof are not Greater then Two Right Ones_, Tho upon the first consideration this came not into my Thought. But when I enquire what Figures may be _inscribed_ within a _Circle_, I am not at all _necessitated_ to think that all _Quadrilateral Figures_ are of that sort; neither can I possibly imagine this, whilst I admit of nothing, but what I _clearly_ and _distinctly_ Understand: and therefore there is a great Difference between these _False suppositions_, and _True natural Ideas_, the _first_ and _Chief_; whereof is that of a _God_; For by many wayes I understand _That_ not to be a _Fiction depending_ on my _Thought_, but an _Image_ of a _True_ and _Immutable Nature_; As first, because I can think of no other thing but _God_ to Whose _Essence Existence_ belongs. Next because I cannot Imagine _Two_ or _More Gods_, and supposing that he is _now_ only One, I may plainly perceive it _necessary_ for _Him_ to _Have been from Eternity_, and _will Be to Eternity_; And Lastly because I perceive many Other Things in _God_, Which I cannot _Change_, and from which I cannot _Detract_.
But whatever way of Argumentation I use, it comes All at last to this one Thing, That I am fully perswaded of the _Truth_ of those things only, which appear to me _clearly_ and _distinctly_. And tho some of those things, which I so perceive, are obvious to _every_ Man, and some are only discover’d by Those that search more _nighly_, and enquire more _carefully_, yet when such _truths_ are discover’d, they are esteem’d no less _certain_ than the Others. For Example, Tho it do not so easily appear, that in a Rightangled Triangle, the square of the Base is equal to the squares of the sides, as it appears, that the Base is suspended under its Largest Angle, yet the _first Proposition_ is _no less certainly_ believed when once ’tis perceived, then this _Last_. Thus in Reference to _God_; certainly, unless I am overrun with _Prejudice_, or have my thoughts begirt on all sides with _sensible Objects_, I should acknowledge nothing _before_ or _easier_ then him; For what is more _self-evident_ then that there is a _Chief Being_, or then that a _God_ (to whose _essence alone Existence_ appertains) does _Exist_? And tho serious Consideration is required to perceive thus much, yet _Now_, I am not only equally _certain_ of it, as of what seems most _certain_, but I perceive also that the _Truth_ of other Things so _depends_ on it, that without it nothing can ever be _perfectly known_.
For tho my _nature_ be _such_, that during the time of my _Clear_ and _Distinct_ Perception, I cannot but believe it _true_; yet my _Nature_ is _such_ also, that I cannot fix the _Intention_ of my _Mind_ upon one and the same thing alwayes, so as to perceive it _clearly_, and the Remembrance of what _Judgement_ I have formerly made is often stirred up, when I cease attending to those reasons for which I passed such a Judgment, other Reasons may then be produced, which (if I did not _know God_) may easily _move_ me in my _Opinion_; and by this means I shall never attain to the _true_ and _certain Knowledge_ of any Thing, but _Wandring_ and _Unstable opinions_. So, for example, when I consider the Nature of a Triangle, it plainly appears to me (as understanding the Principles of Geometry) that its three Angles are equal to two right ones; And this I must of necessity think _True_ as long as I attend to the _Demonstration_ thereof; but as soon as ever I withdraw my Mind from the _Consideration_ of its _Proof_ (altho I remember that I have once _Clearly_ perceived it) yet perhaps I may _doubt_ of Its _Truth_, being as yet _Ignorant_ of a _God_; For I may perswade my self, that I am so framed by _Nature_, as to be _deceived_ in those things which I imagine my self to perceive most _evidently_, Especially when I recollect, that heretofore I have often accounted many things _True_ and _Certain_, which afterward upon other Reasons I have Judged as False.
But when I perceive that there is a _God_; because at the same time I also Understand that all things _Depend_ on Him, and that he is not a _Deceiver_; and when from hence I Collect that all those Things which I _clearly_ and _distinctly_ perceive are _necessarily True_; tho I have no further Respects to those Reasons which induced me to believe it _True_, yet if I do but remember, that I have _once clearly_ and _distinctly_ perceived it, no Argument can be brought on the contrary, that shall make me _doubt_, but that I have _true_ and _certain_ Knowledge thereof; and not onely of that, but of all other _Truths_ also which I remember that I have _once Demonstrated_, such as are _Geometrical Propositions_ and the like. What now can be _Objected_ against me? shall I say, that I am so made by _Nature_, as to be often _deceived_? No; For I now Know that I cannot be _deceived_ in those Things, which I _clearly_ Understand. Shall I say, that at other times I have esteem’d many Things _True_ and _Certain_, which afterwards I found to be _falsities_? No; for I perceived none of those things _clearly_ and _distinctly_, but being Ignorant of this _Rule_ of _Truth_, I took them up for Reasons, which Reasons I afterward found to be _Weak_. What then can be said? Shall, I say, (as lately I objected) that Perhaps I am _asleep_, and that what I now think of is no more _True_, then the _Dreams_ of People _asleep_? But this it self _moves_ not my Opinion; for certainly tho I were _asleep_, if any thing appear’d _evident_ to my Understanding, ’twould be _True_. And Thus I Plainly see, that the _Certainty_ and _Truth_ of all _Science_ Depends on the _Knowledge_ of the _True God_, so that before I had _Known Him_, I did _Know nothing_; But now many things both of _God_ himself, and of other _Intellectual Things_, as also of _Corporeal nature_, which is the _Object_ of _Mathematicks_, may be _Plainly Known_ and _Certain_ to me.
Text from Project Gutenberg, public domain in the United States.