Six metaphysical meditations · René Descartes
MEDITAT. VI.
But that this may be made more _Plain_, I must first examine the _difference_ between _Imagination_, and _pure Intellection_, or _Understanding_. So, for example, when I _Imagine_ a Triangle, I do not only _Understand_ that it is a _figure comprehended_ by _three Lines_, but I also _behold_ with the _eye_ of my _mind_ those _three lines_ as it were _before Me_, and this is that which I call _imagination_. But if I convert my Thoughts to a _Chiliogone_, or _Figure consisting_ of a _Thousand Angles_, I know as well that this Is a _figure comprehended_ by a _Thousand sides_, as I know that a _Triangle_ is a _Figure Consisting_ of _three sides_; but I do not in the same Manner _Imagine_, or _behold_ as _present_ those _thousand sides_, as I do the _three sides_ of a _Triangle_. And tho at the time when I so think of a _Chiliogone_, I may _confusedly_ represent to my self some _Figure_ (because whenever I Think of a _Corporeal Object_, I am used to _Imagine_ some _Shape_ or other) yet ’tis evident that this _Representation_ is not a _Chiliogone_, because ’tis in nothing _different_ from what I should Represent to my self if I thought of a _Milion-angled figure_, or any other Figure of _More sides_; Neither does such a _Confused Representation_ help me in the least to know those _Properties_, by which a _Chiliogone_ differs from other _Polygones_ or _Manyangled Figures_. But if a Question be put concerning a _Pentagone_, I know I may _Understand its Shape_, as I _Understand_ the _Shape_, of a _Chiliogone_, without the help of _Imagination_, but I can also _imagine_ it, by applying the _Eye_ of my _Mind_ to its _Five sides_, and to the _Area_ or _space_ contained by Them; And herein I manifestly perceive that there is required a _peculiar sort_ of _Operation_ in the _Mind_ to _imagine_ a Thing, which I require not to _Understand_ a Thing; which _New Operation_ of the _Mind_ plainly shews the _difference_ between _imagination_ and _pure Intellection_.
Besides this, I Consider that this _Power_ of _Imagination_ which is in me (as it differs from the _Power_ of _Understanding_) does not appertain to the _Essence_ of _Me_, that is, of _my mind_, for tho I _wanted_ it, yet certainly I should be the _same He, that_ now _I am_: from whence it seems to follow, that it depends on something _different_ from _my self_; and I easily perceive that if any _Body_ whatever did _Exist_, to which my _Mind_ were so _conjoyn’d_, that it may Apply it self when it pleased to _Consider_, or (as it were) _Look_ into _this Body_; From hence, I say, I perceive _It may so be_, that by this very _Body_ I may _Imagine Corporeal Beings_: So that this _Manner_ of _Thinking_ differs from _pure Intellection_ only in this, that the _Mind_, when it _Understands_, does as it were turn _it self_, to _it self_, or _Reflect_ on it self, and _beholds_ some or other of those _Ideas_ which are in it self; But when it _Imagines_, it _Converts_ it self upon _Body_, and therein _beholds_ something Conformable to that _Idea_, which it hath _understood_, or _perceived_ by _Sense_. But ’tis to be remembred, that I said, I easily conceive Imagination _May be_ so performed, supposing _Body_ to _Exist_. And because no so convenient manner of Explaining it offers it self, from thence I _probably_ guess, that _Body_ does _Exist_. But this I only say _probably_, for tho I should accurately search into all the Arguments drawn from the _distinct Idea_ of _Body_, which I find in my _Imagination_, yet I find none of them, from whence I may _necessarily_ conclude, _that Body does Exist_.
But I have been accustomed to _Imagine_ many other things besides that _Corporeal Nature_ which is the _Object_ of _pure Mathematicks_; such as are, _Colours_, _Sounds_, _Tasts_, _Pain_, &c. but none of these so _distinctly_. And because I perceive these better by _Sense_, from Which by the Help of the _Memory_ they come to the _Imagination_, that I may with the Greater advantage treat of them, I ought at the same time to Consider _Sence_, and to try whether from what I perceive by that way of _Thought_, which I call _Sense_, I can deduce any certain Argument for the _Existence_ of _Corporeal Beings_. And first I will here reflect with my self, what those things were, which being perceived by _Sence_ I have heretofore thought _True_, and the _Reasons_ why I _so thought_: I will then enquire into the _Reasons_ for which I afterwards _doubted_ those things. And last of all I will consider what I _ought_ to _think_ of those Things at _Present_. [Sidenote: _The Reasons why I Trusted my Senses._] First therefore I have always thought that I have had an _Head_, _Hands_, _Feet_, and other _Members_, of which _This Body_ (which I have look’d upon as a _Part_ of _Me_, or Perhaps as my _Whole self_) Consists; And I have also thought that this _Body_ of _Mine_ is Conversant or engaged among many _Other Bodies_, by which it is Liable to be _affected_ with what is _advantagious_ or _hurtful_; What was _Advantagious_ I judged by a certain _sense_ of _Pleasure_, what was _Hurtful_ by a _sense_ of _Pain_. Furthermore, besides _Pleasure_ and _Pain_, I perceived in my self _Hunger_, _Thirst_, and other such like _Appetites_, as also certain _Corporeal Propensions_ to _Mirth_, _Sadness_, _Anger_, and other like _Passions_.
As to What hapned to me from _Bodies without_, Besides the _Extension_, _Figure_, and _Motion_ of those _Bodies_, I also perceived in them _Hardness_, _Heat_, and other _tactile Qualities_, as also _Light_, _Colours_, _Smells_, _Tasts_, _Sounds_, &c. and by the _Variation_ of these I _distinguish’d_ the _Heaven_, _Earth_, and _Seas_, and all other _Bodies_ from each other. Neither was it wholly without Reason (upon the account of these _Ideas_ of _Qualities_, which offer’d themselves to my Thoughts, and which alone I _properly_ and _Immediately perceived_) that I thought my self to Perceive some Things _Different_ from my _Thought, viz._ The _Bodies_ or _Objects_ from whence these _Ideas_ might _Proceed_; for I often found these _Ideas_ come upon me without my _Consent_ or _Will_; so that I can neither perceive an _Object_ (_tho I had a mind to it_) unless it were _before_ the Organs of my _Sense_; Neither can I _Hinder_ my self from perceiving it, when it is _Present_. And seeing that those _Ideas_ which I take in by sense are much more _Lively_, _Apparent_ and in their kind more _distinct_, than any of those which _I knowingly_ and _Willingly_ frame by Meditation, or stir up in my _Memory_; it seems to me that they cannot proceed from _my self_. There remains therefore no other way for them to come upon me, but from some other Things _Without_ Me. Of Which Things seeing _I_ have no other Knowledge but from these _Ideas_, _I_ cannot Think but that these _Ideas_ are _like_ the Things.
Moreover, Because _I_ remember that _I_ first made use of my _senses_ before my _Reason_; and because _I_ did perceive that those _Ideas_ which _I_ my self did frame were not so _Manifest_ as those which _I_ received by my _senses_, but very often _made up of their parts_, _I_ was easily perswaded to think that _I_ had no _Idea_ in my _Understanding_, which I had not _First_ in my _sense_. Neither was it without Reason that _I_ Judged, _That Body_ (which by a _peculiar right I_ call my _Own_) to be _more nighly_ appertaining to _Me_ then any _other Body_. For from It, as from other _Bodies_, _I_ can never be _seperated_, _I_ was _sensible_ of all _Appetites_ and _Affections in It_ and _for It_, and lastly _I_ perceived _pleasure_ and _Pain_ in its Parts, and not in any other Without it. But why from the _sense_ of Pain a certain _Grief_, and from the _sense_ of _pleasure_ a certain _Joy_ of the _Mind_ should arise, or Why that _Gnawing_ of the _stomach_, Which _I_ call _Hunger_, should put me in mind of _Eating_, or the _driness_ of my _Throat_ of _Drinking_, _I_ can give no other Reason but _that I am taught so by Nature_. For to my thinking there is no _Affinity_ or _Likeness_ between that _Gnawing_ of the _Stomach_, and the desire of _Eating_, or between the _sense_ of _Pain_, and the _sorrowful thought_ from thence arising. But in this as in all other _judgments_ that I made of _sensible objects_, I seem’d to be taught by _Nature_, for I first perswaded my self that things were _so_ or _so_, before ever I enquired into a Reason that may prove it.
But now that I begin better to know _my self_ and the Author of my _Original_, I do not think, that all things, which I seem to have from my _senses_ are _rashly_ to be _admitted_, neither are all things so _had_, to be _doubted_. And first because I know that whatever I _clearly_ and _distinctly_ perceive, _may be_ so made by _God_ as I perceive them; the _Power_ of _understanding clearly_ and _distinctly_ one Thing _without_ the other is sufficient to make Me _certain_ that One Thing is _different_ from the Other; because it _may_ at least be placed apart by _God_, and that it may be esteem’d _different_, it matters not by what _Power_ it _may_ be so _sever’d_. And therefore from the knowledge I have, that _I my self exist_, and because at the same time I understand that nothing else appertains to my _Nature_ or _Essence_, but that I am a _thinking Being_, I rightly conclude, that my _Essence_ consists in this alone, that I am a _thinking Thing_. And tho _perhaps_ (or, as I shall shew presently, ’tis _certain_) I have a _Body_ which is very _nighly_ conjoyned to me, yet because on this side I have a clear and _distinct Idea_ of my self, as I am only a _thinking Thing, not extended_; and on the other side because I have a _distinct Idea_ of my _Body_, as it is onely an _extended_ thing, _not thinking_, ’tis from hence _certain_, that I _am really distinct from my Body_, and that I can _exist without_ it.
Moreover I find in my self some _Faculties_ endow’d with _certain_ peculiar waies of _thinking_, such as the _Faculty_ of _Imagination_, the _Faculty_ of _Perception_ or _sense_; without which _I_ can conceive my _whole self clearly_ and _distinctly_, but (changing the phrase) _I_ cannot _conceive_ those _Faculties_ without _conceiving My self_, that is, an _understanding substance_ in which they are; for none of them in their _formal Conception_ includes _understanding_; from whence I perceive they are as _different_ from _me_, as the _modus_ or _manner_ of a Thing is _different_ from the _Thing it self_. I acknowledge also, that I have several other _Faculties_, such as _changing_ of _place_, _putting on various shapes_, &c. Which can no more be understood without a _substance_ in which they are, then the foremention’d _Faculties_, and consequently they can no more be understood to _Exist_ without that _substance_: But yet ’tis Manifest, that this sort of _Faculties_, to the End they may exist, ought to be in a _Corporeal_, _Extended_, and not in an _Understanding substance_, because _Extension_, and not _Intellection_ or _Understanding_ is included in the _Clear_ and _Distinct conception_ of them.
But there is also in me a certain _Passive Faculty_ of _sense_, or of _Receiving_ and _Knowing_ the _Ideas_ of _sensible Things_; of which _Faculty_ I can make no use, unless there were in my self, or in something else, a certain _Active Faculty_ of _Producing_ and _Effecting_ those _Ideas_. But this cannot be in my self, for it Pre-supposes no _Understanding_, and those _Ideas_ are Produced in me, tho I help not, and often against my _Will_. There remains therefore no Place for this _Active Faculty_, but that it should be in some _substance different_ from me. In which because all the _Reallity_, which is contain’d _Objectively_ in the _Ideas_ Produced by that _Faculty_, ought to be contain’d _Formally_ or _Eminently_ (as I have Formerly taken notice) this _substance_ must be either _a Body_ (in which what is in the _Ideas Objectively_ is contain’d _Formally_) or it Must Be _God_, or some _Creature_ more _excellent_ then a _Body_ (In which what is in the _Ideas Objectively_ is contain’d _Eminently_). But seeing that _God_ is not a _Deceivour_, ’tis altogether Manifest, that _he_ does not Place these _Ideas_ in me either _Immediately_ from himself, or _Mediately_ from any other Creature, wherein their _Objective Reallity_ is not * contain’d _Formally_, but only _Eminently_. And seeing _God_ has given me no _Faculty_ to discern Whether these Ideas proceed from _Corporeal_ or _Incorporeal Beings_, but rather a _strong Inclination_ to believe that they are sent from _Corporeal Beings_, there is no Reason Why God should not be counted a _Deceiver_, if these _Ideas_ came from any Where, but from _Corporeal Things_. Therefore we must conclude that there are _Corporeal Beings_. Which perhaps are not all the same as I comprehend them by _my sense_ (for Perception by sense is in many Things very _Obscure_ and _Confused_) but those things at least, which I _clearly_ and _distinctly_ Understand, that is to say, all those things which are comprehended under the _Object_ of _Pure Mathematicks_; those things I say at least are _True_.
As to What Remains, They are either some _Particulars_, as that the Sun is of such a _Bigness_ or _Shape_, _&c._ or they are Things less _Clearly_ Understood, as _Light_, _Sound_, _Pain_, &c. And tho these and such like Things may be very _Doubtful_ and _Uncertain_, yet because _God_ is not a _Deceiver_, and because that (Therefore) none of my Opinions can be _false_ unless God has Given me some _Faculty_ or other to _Correct_ my _Error_, hence ’tis that I am incouraged with the Hopes of attaining _Truth_ even in these very Things. And certainly it cannot be doubted but whatever _I_ am taught by _Nature_ has something therein of _Truth_. By _Nature_ in General I understand either _God_ himself, or the _Coordination_ of Creatures Made by God. By my _Own Nature_ in _Particular_ I understand the _Complexion_ or _Association_ of all those things which are given me by God.
Now there is nothing that this _my Nature_ teaches me more _expresly_ then that I have a _Body_, Which is not _Well_ when I _feel Pain_, that this _Body_ wants _Meat_ or _Drink_ When I am _Hungry_ or _Dry_, _&c._ And therefore I ought not to Doubt but that these things are _True_. And by this _sense_ of _Pain_, _Hunger_, _Thirst_, &c. My _Nature_ tells me that _I_ am not in my _Body_, as a _Mariner_ is in his _Ship_, but that I am most _nighly conjoyn’d_ thereto, and as it were _Blended therewith_; so that _I_ with _It_ make up _one_ thing; For Otherwise, when the _Body_ were hurt, _I_, who am only a _Thinking Thing_, should not therefore _feel_ Pain, but should only _perceive_ the Hurt with the _Eye_ of my _Understanding_ (as a _Mariner perceives_ by his _sight_ whatever is broken in his Ship) and when the _Body_ wants either Meat or Drink, I should only _Understand_ this want, but should not have the _Confused sense_ of _Hunger_ or _Thirst_; I call them _Confused_, for certainly the _Sense_ of _Thirst_, _Hunger_, _Pain_, &c. are only _Confused Modes_ or _Manners_ of _Thought_ arising from the _Union_ and (as it were) _mixture_ of the _Mind_ and _Body_. I am taught also by _Nature_, that there are many other _Bodies Without_ and _About_ my _Body_, some whereof are to be _desired_, others are to be _Avoided_. And because that I Perceive very Different _Colours_, _Sounds_, _Smells_, _Tasts_, _Heat_, _Hardness_, and the Like, from thence I Rightly conclude that there are _Correspondent Differences_ in _Bodies_, from which these _different perceptions_ of _sense_ proceed, tho perhaps not _Alike_. And because that some of these _perceptions_ are _Pleasant_, others _Unpleasant_, ’tis evidently _certain_, that my _Body_, or rather my _Whole self_ (as _I_ am compounded of a _Mind_ and _Body_) am liable to be _Affected_ by these _Bodies_ which encompass me about.
There are many Other Things Also which _Nature_ seems to teach Me, but _Really_ I am not taught by It, but have gotten them by an _ill use_ of Passing my Judgement _Inconsiderately_, and from hence it is that these things happen often to be _false_; as that all _space_ is _Empty_, in which I find _nothing_ that _works_ upon my _Senses_; That in a _hot Body_ there is something _like_ the _Idea_ of _Heat_ which is in me; That in a _White_ or _Green_ Body there is the same _Whiteness_ or _Greenness_ which I _perceive_; And the same _Taste_ in a _bitter_ or _sweet_ Thing, _&c._ That _Stars_, _Castles_, and Other _Remote_ Bodies are of the same _Bigness_ and _Shape_, as they are _Represented_ to my _senses_: and such like. But that I may not admit of any Thing in this very matter, which I cannot _Distinctly_ perceive, it behoves me here to determine more _Accurately_ What I mean when I say, _That I am taught a Thing by Nature_.
Here I take _Nature_ more _strictly_, then for the _Complication_ of all those Things which are Given me by _God_; For in this _Complication_ there are many things contain’d which relate to the _Mind alone_, as, That I perceive What is _done_ cannot be _not Done_, and all Other things which are known by the _Light_ of _Nature_, but of these I speak not at present. There are also many Other Things which belong _only_ to the _Body_, as, That it _tends Downwards_ and such like, of these also I treat not at Present. But I speak of those Things only which _God_ hath bestowed upon me as I am _Compounded_ of a _Mind_ and _Body together_, and not _differently Consider’d_. ’Tis _Nature_ therefore thus taken that teaches me to _avoid troublesome Objects_, and _seek_ after _pleasing Ones_; but it appears not that this _Nature_ teaches us to conclude any thing of these Perceptions of our _senses_, before that we make by our _Understanding_ a diligent examination of _outward Objects_; for to Enquire into the _Truth_ of Things belongs not to the _Whole Compositum_ of a Man as he Consists of _Mind_ and _Body_, but to the _Mind alone_.
So that tho a _star affect_ my eye no _more_ then a _small spark_ of Fire, yet there is in my Eye no _Real_ or _Positive Inclination_ to _believe_ One no bigger then the Other, but thus I have been used to Judge from my Childhood without any Reason: and tho coming nigh the Fire I feel Heat, and Coming too nigh I feel Pain, yet there is no Reason to perswade me, That in the Fire there is any thing _like_ either that Heat or that Pain, but only that there is something therein, Whatever it be, that excites in us those _sensations_ of Heat or Pain: and so tho in some space there may be nothing that Works on my _senses_, it does not from thence follow, that there is no _Body_ there; for I see that in these and many other things I am used to overturn the Order of Nature, because I use these _perceptions_ of _sense_ (which properly are given me by Nature to make known to the mind what is _advantagious_ or _hurtful_ to the _Compositum_, whereof the _mind_ is part, and _so far_ only they are _Clear_ and _Distinct_ enough) as _certain Rules_ immediately to discover the _Essence_ of _External Bodies_, of Which they make known nothing but very _Obscurely_ and _Confusedly_. [Sidenote: Medit. 4.]
I have * formerly shewn how my _Judgement_ happens to be false notwithstanding _Gods Goodness_. But now there arises a new _Difficulty_ concerning those very things which _Nature_ tells me I am to _prosecute_ or _avoid_, concerning my _Internal senses_, Wherein I find many _Errors_, as when a Man being deceived by the Pleasant Taste of some sort of Meat, devours therein some hidden Poyson. But in this very Instance it cannot be said, that the Man is impelled by Nature to desire the _Poyson_, for of that he is wholly Ignorant; but he is said to Desire the _Meat_ only as being of a grateful Taste; and from hence nothing can be concluded but, That _Mans-Nature_ is not _All-knowing_; which is no Wonder seeing Man is a _Finite Being_, and therefore nothing but _Finite Perfections_ belong to him. But We often err even in those things to Which we are _Impelled_ by _Nature_, as when sick men desire that _Meat_ or _Drink_, which will certainly prove Hurtful to them. To this it may perhaps be reply’d, That they _Err_ in this because their _Nature_ is _Corrupt_.
But this Answers not the Difficulty, For a sick man is no less _Gods Creature_ then a Man in Health, and therefore ’tis as Absurd to Imagine a _Deceitful Nature_ imposed by _God_ on the One as on the Other; And as a Clock that is made up of Wheels and Weights does no less strictly observe the _Laws_ of its _Nature_, when it is _ill_ contrived, and tells the hours _falsly_, as when it answers the Desire of the Artificer in all performances; so if I consider the body of a Man as a meer _Machine_ or _Movement_, made up and compounded of _Bones_, _Nerves_, _Muscles_, _Veins_, _Blood_, and _Skin_; so that, tho there were no _mind_ in It, yet It would perform all those Motions which now are in it (those only excepted which Proceed from the _Will_, and consequently from the _Mind_) I do easily acknowledge, that it would be as _natural_ for him (if for example sake he were sick of a _Dropsie_) to suffer that _Driness_ of his _Throat_ which uses to bring into his mind the _sense_ of _Thirst_, & that thereby his Nerves and other Parts would be so disposed as to take Drink, by Which his disease would be encreased; As (supposing him to be troubled with no such Distemper) by the like Driness of Throat he would be disposed to Drink, when ’tis Requisite.
And tho, if I respect the Intended use of a Clock I may say that it _Errs_ from its _Nature_, when it tells the Hours _wrong_, and so considering the _Movement_ of a _Mans Body_ as contrived for such _Motions_ as are used to be performed thereby, I may think That also to _Err_ from its _Nature_, if its _Throat_ is _Dry_, when it has no want of Drink for its _Preservation_. Yet I Plainly discover, that this last _Acceptation_ of _Nature_ differs much from that whereof we have been speaking all this While, for this is only a _Denomination extrinsick_ to the Things whereof ’tis spoken, and _depending_ on my _Thought_, while it _Compares_ a _sick_ man, and a _disorderly_ Clock with the _Idea_ of an _healthy_ man and a _Rectified_ Clock. But by _Nature_ in its former _Acceptation_ I Understand something that is _Really_ in the _Things_ themselves, which therefore has something of _Truth_ in it. But tho Respecting only a _Body sick_ of a Dropsie it be an _Extrinsick Denomination_ to say, that its _Nature_ is _Corrupt_, because it has a _Dry Throat_, and stands in _no need_ of Drink; yet respecting the _Whole Compound_ or _Mind joyn’d_ to such a _Body_, ’tis not a _meer Denomination_, but a _real Error_ of _Nature_ for it to _thirst_ when _drink_ is _hurtful_ to it. It remains therefore here to be inquired, how the _Goodness_ of _God_ suffers _Nature so taken_ to be _deceivable_.
Text from Project Gutenberg, public domain in the United States.