The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 04 · Thomas Hobbes
RIGHT HONOURABLE,
I had once resolved to answer my Lord Bishop’s objections to my book DE CIVE in the first place, as that which concerns me most; and afterwards to examine his Discourse of LIBERTY and NECESSITY, which, because I had never uttered my opinion of it, concerned me the less. But seeing it was your Lordship’s and my Lord Bishop’s desire that I should begin with the _latter_, I was contented so to do, and here I present and submit it to your Lordship’s judgment. And first I assure your Lordship I find in it no new argument neither from _Scripture_ nor from _reason_, that I have not often heard before, which is as much as to say, I am not surprised.
The _preface_ is a handsome one, but it appeareth even in that, that he hath mistaken the question. For whereas he says thus, _If I be free to write this Discourse, I have obtained the cause_: I deny that to be true, for it is enough to his freedom of writing, that he had not written it, unless he would himself. If he will obtain the cause, he must prove that before he writ it, it was not necessary he should prove it afterward. It may be his Lordship thinks it all one to say, _I was free_ to write it, and, _It was not necessary_ I should write it. But I think otherwise. For he is _free_ to do a thing, that may do it if he have the will to do it, and may forbear, if he have the will to forbear. And yet if there be a _necessity_ that he shall have the _will_ to do it, the action is necessarily to follow: and if there be a _necessity_ that he shall have the _will_ to forbear, the forbearing also will be necessary. The question therefore is not, whether a man be a _free agent_, that is to say, whether he can write or forbear, speak or be silent, according to his _will_; but, whether the _will_ to write, and the _will_ to forbear, come upon him according to his _will_, or according to anything else in his own power. I acknowledge this _liberty_, that I _can_ do if I _will_; but to say, I can _will_ if I _will_, I take to be an absurd speech. Wherefore I cannot grant my Lord the cause upon his _preface_.
In the next place, he maketh certain distinctions of _liberty_, and says he meaneth not _liberty_ from sin, nor from _servitude_, nor from _violence_; but, from _necessity_, _necessitation_, _inevitability_, and _determination to one_. It had been better to _define_ liberty, than thus to _distinguish_. For I understand never the more what he means by _liberty_; and though he say he means _liberty_ from _necessitation_, yet I understand not how such a _liberty_ can be, and it is a taking of the question without proof. For what is else the question between us, but whether _such_ a liberty be possible or not? There are in the same place other distinctions: as a liberty of _exercise only_, which he calls a _liberty of contradiction_, namely of doing not good, or evil _simply_, but of doing this or that good, or this or that evil _respectively_, and a _liberty of specification and exercise also_, which he calls a liberty of _contrariety_, namely a liberty not only to do good or evil, but also to do or not do this or that good or evil. And with these _distinctions_ his Lordship says he _clears the coast_, whereas in truth, he darkeneth his own meaning and the question, not only with the jargon of _exercise only_, _specification also_, _contradiction_, _contrariety_, but also with pretending distinction where none is: for how is it possible that the _liberty_ of doing or not doing this or that good or evil, can consist, as he says it does in God and good angels, without a liberty of doing or not doing good or evil?
The next thing his Lordship does, after clearing of the coast, is the dividing of his forces, as he calls them, into _two_ squadrons, _one_ of places _of Scriptures_, the _other_ of _reasons_, which allegory he useth, I suppose, because he addresseth the discourse to your Lordship, who is a military man. All that I have to say touching this, is, that I observe a great part of those his _forces_ do look and _march_ another way, and some of them _fight_ amongst themselves. And the first place of _Scripture_, taken from Numb. xxx. 13, is one of those that look another way; the words are, _If a wife make a vow, it is left to her husband’s choice either to establish it or make it void_. For it proves no more but that the husband is a _free_ and _voluntary agent_, but not that his _choice_ therein is not _necessitated_ or not _determined_ to what he shall choose, by precedent _necessary_ causes. For if there come into the husband’s mind greater good by establishing than abrogating such a vow, the establishing will follow necessarily; and if the evil that will follow in the husband’s opinion outweigh the good, the contrary must needs follow: and yet in this following of one’s _hopes_ and _fears_, consisteth the nature of _election_. So that a man may both choose this, and cannot but choose this, and consequently _choosing_ and _necessity_ are joined together.
The second place of Scripture is Joshua, xxiv. 15. The third is 2 Sam. xxiv. 12, whereby it is clearly proved, that there is _election_ in _man_, but not proved that such _election_ was not _necessitated_ by the _hopes_, and _fears_, and considerations of _good_ and _bad_ to follow, which depend not on the _will_, nor are subject to _election_. And therefore one answer serves all such places, if there were a thousand. But his Lordship supposing, it seems, I might answer, as I have done, that _necessity_ and _election_ might stand together, and instance in the actions of _children_, _fools_, or _brute beasts_, whose _fancies_, I might say, are _necessitated_ and _determined_ to _one_; before these his proofs out of Scripture, desires to prevent that instance, and therefore says that the actions of _children_, _fools_, _madmen_, and _beasts_, are indeed _determined_, but that they proceed not from _election_, nor from _free_, but from _spontaneous agents_. As for example, that the _bee_, when it maketh honey, does it _spontaneously_; and when the _spider_ makes his web, he does it _spontaneously_, but not by _election_. Though I never meant to ground my answer upon the experience of what _children_, _fools_, _madmen_, and _beasts_ do; yet that your Lordship may understand what can be meant by _spontaneous_, and how it differeth from _voluntary_, I will answer that _distinction_, and show that it _fighteth_ against its fellow arguments.
Your Lordship therefore is to consider, that all _voluntary_ actions, where the thing that induceth the _will_ is not _fear_, are called also _spontaneous_, and said to be done by a man’s _own_ accord. As when a man giveth money voluntarily to another for merchandise, or out of affection, he is said to do it of his own accord, which in Latin is _sponte_, and therefore the action is _spontaneous_; though to give one’s money willingly to a thief to avoid killing, or throw it into the sea to avoid drowning, where the motive is _fear_, be not called _spontaneous_. But every _spontaneous_ action is not therefore _voluntary_, for _voluntary_ presupposes some precedent _deliberation_, that is to say, some _consideration_, and _meditation_, of what is likely to _follow_, both upon the doing, and abstaining from the action deliberated of; whereas many actions are done of our _own_ accord, and are therefore _spontaneous_, for which nevertheless, as my Lord thinks, we never _consulted_ nor _deliberated_ in ourselves. As when making no question nor any the least doubt in the world, but the thing we are about is good, we _eat_ and _walk_, or in anger _strike_ or _revile_, which my Lord thinks spontaneous, but not voluntary nor elective actions, and with _such_ kind of actions, he says _necessitation_ may stand, but not with such as are _voluntary_, and proceed upon _election_ and _deliberation_. Now if I make it appear to your Lordship, that those actions, which, he says, proceed from _spontaneity_, and which he ascribes to _children_, _fools_, _madmen_, and _beasts_, proceed from _election_ and _deliberation_, and that actions _inconsiderate_, _rash_, and _spontaneous_, are ordinarily found in those, that are by themselves and many more thought as _wise_, or wiser than ordinarily men are, then my Lord Bishop’s argument concludeth, that _necessity_ and _election_ may stand together, which is contrary to that which he intendeth by all the rest of his arguments to prove.
And first your Lordship’s own experience furnishes you with proof enough, that _horses_, _dogs_, and other brute _beasts_, do _demur_ oftentimes upon the way they are to take, the horse retiring from some strange figure that he sees, and coming on again to avoid the spur. And what else doth a man that _deliberateth_, but one while _proceed_ toward action, another while _retire_ from it, as the _hope_ of greater _good_ draws him, or the _fear_ of greater evil _drives_ him away. A _child_ may be so young as to do what it does without all _deliberation_, but that is but till it have the chance to be hurt by doing of somewhat, or till it be of age to understand the rod: for the actions, wherein he hath once had a check, shall be _deliberated_ on the second time. _Fools_ and _madmen_ manifestly _deliberate_ no less than the _wisest_ men, though they make not so good a _choice_, the images of things being by disease altered. For _bees_ and _spiders_, if my Lord Bishop had had so little to do as to be a spectator of their actions, he would have confessed not only _election_, but _art_, _prudence_, and _policy_, in them, very near equal to that of mankind. Of _bees_, Aristotle says, _their life is civil_.
Again, his Lordship is deceived, if he think any _spontaneous_ action, after once being checked in it, differs from an action _voluntary_ and _elective_: for even the setting of a man’s foot, in the posture for _walking_, and the action of ordinary _eating_, was once _deliberated_ of how and when it should be done, and though afterward it became _easy_ and _habitual_, so as to be done without _forethought_; yet that does not hinder but that the act is _voluntary_, and proceedeth from _election_. So also are the _rashest_ actions of _choleric_ persons _voluntary_ and upon _deliberation_: for who is there but very young children, that hath not _considered_ when and how far he _ought_, or safely _may_ strike or revile? Seeing then his Lordship agrees with me, that such actions are _necessitated_, and the _fancy_ of those that do them _determined_ to the action they do, it follows out of his Lordship’s own doctrine, that the liberty of _election_ does not take away the _necessity_ of _electing_ this or that _individual_ thing. And thus one of his arguments fights against another. The second argument from Scripture, consisteth in histories of men that did one thing, when if they would, they might have done another; the places are two: one is 1 Kings iii. 10, where the history says, God was pleased that Solomon, who might, if he would, have asked _riches_, or _revenge_, did nevertheless ask _wisdom_ at God’s hands: the other is the words of St. Peter to Ananias, Acts v. 4: _After it was sold, was it not in thine own power?_
To which the answer is the same with that I answered to the former places, that they prove there is _election_, but do not disprove the _necessity_, which I maintain, of what they so elect. The fourth argument (for to the third and fifth I shall make but one answer) is to this effect; _If the decrees of God, or his foreknowledge, or the influence of the stars, or the concatenation of causes, or the physical or moral efficacy of causes, or the last dictate of the understanding, or whatsoever it be, do take away true liberty, then Adam before his fall had no true liberty. Quicquid ostendes mihi sic incredulus odi._ _That_ which I say _necessitateth and determinateth every action_, that his Lordship may no longer doubt of my meaning, _is the sum of all things, which being now existent, conduce and concur to the production of that action hereafter, whereof if any one thing now were wanting, the effect could not be produced_. This _concourse_ of _causes_, whereof every one is _determined_ to be such as it is by a like concourse of _former_ causes, may well be called (in respect they were all set and ordered by the eternal cause of all things, God Almighty) the _decree_ of God. But that the _foreknowledge_ of God should be a cause of any thing, cannot be truly said, seeing foreknowledge is knowledge, and knowledge depends on the existence of the things known, and not they on it.
The _influence of the stars_ is but a small part of the whole cause, consisting of the concourse of all agents. Nor does the _concourse of all causes_ make one simple _chain_ or concatenation, but an innumerable number of chains, joined together, not in all parts, but in the first link God Almighty; and consequently the whole cause of an event, doth not always depend on one single chain, but on many together. _Natural_ efficacy of _objects_ does _determine voluntary_ agents, and _necessitates_ the _will_, and consequently the _action_; but for _moral_ efficacy, I understand not what he means. _The last dictate of the judgment_, concerning the good or bad, that may follow on any action, is not properly the _whole cause_, but the last part of it, and yet may be said to produce the effect _necessarily_, in such manner as the last feather may be said to break a horse’s back, when there were so many laid on before as there wanted but that one to do it. Now for his _argument_, that _if the concourse of all the causes necessitate the effect, that then it follows, Adam had no true liberty_: I deny the consequence; for I make not only the _effect_, but also the _election_, of that particular effect _necessary_, inasmuch as the will itself, and each propension of a man during his deliberation, is as much necessitated, and depends on a sufficient cause, as any thing else whatsoever. As for example, it is no more necessary that fire should burn, than that a man or other creature, whose limbs be moved by fancy, should have _election_, that is _liberty_, to do what he hath a fancy to do, though it be not in his _will_ or _power_ to _choose_ his _fancy_, or choose his _election_ and _will_.
_Thou wilt ask me then, why does God yet complain, for who hath resisted his will?_ To this therefore the Apostle answers, not by denying it was God’s _will_, or that the decree of God concerning Esau was not before he had sinned, or that Esau was not necessitated to do what he did; but thus: _Who art thou, O man, that interrogatest God? Shall the work say to the workman, why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same stuff to make one vessel to honour, another to dishonour?_ According therefore to this answer of St. Paul, I answer my Lord’s objection, and say, the _power_ of God alone without other helps is sufficient _justification_ of any action he doth. That which men make amongst themselves here by pacts and covenants, and call by the name of justice, and according whereunto men are accounted and termed rightly _just_ or _unjust_, is not that by which God Almighty’s actions are to be measured or called just, no more than his counsels are to be measured by human wisdom. That which he does, is made just by his doing it; just, I say, in him, though not always just in us.
For a man that shall command a thing openly, and plot secretly the hindrance of the same, if he punish him that he so commandeth, for not doing it, it is unjust. So also, his counsels are therefore not in vain, because they be his, whether we see the use of them or not. When God afflicted Job, he did object no sin unto him, but justified his afflicting of him, by telling him of his _power_: (Job xl. 9:) _Hast thou, saith God, an arm like mine?_ (Job xxviii. 4): _Where wert thou when I laid the foundations of the earth?_ and the like. So our Saviour, (John ix. 3) concerning the man that was born blind, said, it was not for his sin, or for his parents' sin, but that the power of God might be shown in him. _Beasts_ are subject to death and torments, yet they cannot sin: it was God’s will they should be so. _Power irresistible justifies all actions, really and properly_, in whomsoever it be found; less power does not, and because such power is in God only, he must needs be just in all actions, and we, that not comprehending his counsels, call him to the bar, commit injustice in it. I am not ignorant of the usual reply to his answer, by distinguishing between _will_ and _permission_, as that God Almighty does indeed sometimes _permit_ sins, and that he also foreknoweth that the sin he permitteth, shall be committed, but does not _will_ it, nor _necessitate_ it.
Text from Project Gutenberg, public domain in the United States.