The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 04 · Thomas Hobbes
TO THE ARGUMENTS FROM REASON.
Of the arguments from _reason_, the first is that which his Lordship saith is drawn from Zeno’s beating of his man, which is therefore called _argumentum baculinum_, that is to say, a wooden argument. The story is this; Zeno held, that all actions were necessary; his man therefore being for some fault beaten, excused himself upon the necessity of it: to avoid this excuse, his master pleaded likewise the necessity of beating him. So that not he that maintained, but he that derided the necessity, was beaten, contrary to that his Lordship would infer. And the argument was rather withdrawn than drawn from the story. The second argument is taken from certain inconveniences which his Lordship thinks would follow such an opinion. It is true that ill use might be made of it, and therefore your Lordship and my Lord Bishop ought, at my request, to keep private what I say here of it. But the inconveniences are indeed none, and what use soever be made of truth, yet truth is truth, and now the question is not, what is fit to be preached, but, what is true. The first inconvenience he says, is this; _That the laws, which prohibit any action, will be unjust_. 2. _That all consultations are vain._ 3. _That admonitions to men of understanding, are of no more use, than to children, fools, and madmen._
4. _That, praise, dispraise, reward and punishment, are in vain._ 5, 6. _That counsels, acts, arms, books, instruments, study, tutors, medicines, are in vain._ To which arguments his Lordship expecting I should answer, by saying, the ignorance of the event were enough to make us use the means, adds, as it were a reply to my answer foreseen, these words: _Alas! how should our not knowing the event be a sufficient motive to make us use the means?_ Wherein his Lordship says right, but my answer is not that which he expecteth: I answer, First, that the _necessity_ of an _action_ doth not make the _laws_, that prohibit it, _unjust_. To let pass, that not the _necessity_, but the _will_ to break the _law_, maketh the action _unjust_, because the _law_ regardeth the _will_, and no other precedent causes of action. And to let pass, that no _law_ can possibly be _unjust_, inasmuch as every man maketh, by his consent, the law he is bound to keep, and which consequently must be just, unless a man can be unjust to himself. I say, what _necessary_ cause soever precede an _action_, yet if the action be _forbidden_, he that doth it _willingly_ may justly be punished. For instance, suppose the law on pain of death prohibit stealing, and that there be a man, who by the strength of temptation is _necessitated_ to steal, and is thereupon put to death, does not this punishment deter others from theft? Is it not a cause that others steal not? Doth it not frame and make their wills to justice?
To make the _law_, is therefore to make a _cause_ of _justice_, and to _necessitate_ justice; and consequently, it is no injustice to make such a law. The intention of the _law_ is not to grieve the _delinquent_, for that which is past, and not to be undone; but to make him and others _just_, that else would not be so, and respecteth not the evil act _past_, but the _good to come_; insomuch as without the good intention for the future, no past act of a delinquent could justify his killing in the sight of God. But you will say, how is it just to kill one man to amend another, if what were done were _necessary_? To this I answer, that men are justly killed, not for that their _actions_ are not _necessitated_, but because they are _noxious_, and they are spared and preserved whose actions are not noxious. For where there is no law, there no killing nor anything else can be unjust; and by the right of nature, we destroy, without being unjust, all that is noxious, both beasts and men; and for beasts we kill them justly, when we do it in order to our own preservation, and yet my Lord himself confesseth, that their actions, as being only _spontaneous_, and not _free_, are all _necessitated_ and determined to that one thing they shall do.
For men, when we make societies or commonwealths, we lay not down our right to kill, excepting in certain cases, as murder, theft or other offensive action; so that the right, which the _commonwealth_ hath to put a man to death for crimes, is not created by the _law_, but remains from the first right of _nature_, which every man hath to preserve himself; for that the law doth not take the right away in the case of criminals, who were by the law excepted. Men are not therefore put to death, or punished, for that their theft proceedeth from _election_; but because it was _noxious_ and contrary to men’s preservation, and the punishment conducing to the preservation of the rest, inasmuch as to punish those that do voluntary hurt, and none else, frameth and maketh men’s _wills_ such as men would have them. And thus it is plain, that from the _necessity_ of a _voluntary_ action, cannot be inferred the _injustice_ of the _law_ that forbiddeth it, or the magistrate that punisheth it.
Secondly, I deny that it maketh _consultations_ to be in _vain_; it is the _consultation_ that _causeth_ a man, and _necessitateth_ him to _choose_ to do one thing rather than another: so that unless a man say that that cause is in vain which necessitateth the effect, he cannot infer the superfluousness of consultation out of the necessity of the election proceeding from it. But it seemeth his Lordship reasons thus: If I must do this rather than that, I shall do this rather than that, though I consult not at all; which is a false proposition and a false consequence, and no better than this: If I shall live till to-morrow, I shall live till to-morrow, though I run myself through with a sword to-day. If there be a _necessity_ that an action shall be done, or that any effect shall be brought to pass, it does not therefore follow, that there is nothing necessarily requisite as a means to bring it to pass; and therefore when it is determined, that one thing shall be chosen before another, it is determined also for what _cause_ it shall so be chosen, which cause, for the most part, is _deliberation_ or _consultation_, and therefore consultation is not in vain, and indeed the less in vain by how much the election is more necessitated, if _more_ and _less_ had any place in _necessity_.
The same answer is to be given to the third supposed inconvenience, namely, that _admonitions_ are in _vain_; for the admonitions are parts of consultation, the admonitor being a counsellor for the time to him that is admonished. The fourth pretended inconvenience is, that _praise_, _dispraise_, _reward_, and _punishment_ will be in _vain_. To which I answer, that for _praise_ and _dispraise_, they depend not at all on the _necessity_ of the action praised or dispraised. For what is it else to _praise_, but to say a thing is good? Good, I say, for me, or for somebody else, or for the state and commonwealth? And what is it to say an action is good, but to say it is as I would wish? or as another would have it, or according to the will of the state? that is to say, according to the law. Does my Lord think that no action can please me, or him, or the commonwealth, that should proceed from _necessity_? Things may be therefore _necessary_, and yet _praise-worthy_, as also _necessary_, and yet _dispraised_, and neither of them both in vain, because _praise_ and _dispraise_, and likewise _reward_ and _punishment_, do by example make and conform the will to good and evil. It was a very great praise in my opinion, that Velleius Paterculus (Lib. ii. 35) gives Cato, where he says that he was good by _nature_, _et quia aliter esse non potuit_.
To the fifth and sixth inconveniences, that _counsels_, _arts_, _arms_, _instruments_, _books_, _study_, _medicines_, and the like, would be _superfluous_, the same answer serves as to the former, that is to say, that this consequence, _if the effect shall necessarily come to pass, then it shall come to pass without its causes_, is a false one, and those things named counsels, arts, arms, &c. are the causes of these effects. His Lordship’s _third_ argument consisteth in other _inconveniences_, which he saith will follow, namely, _impiety_ and _negligence_ of religious duties, as repentance, and _zeal_ to God’s service, &c. To which I answer as to the rest, that they follow not. I must confess, if we consider the greatest part of mankind, not as they should be, but as they are, that is, as men, whom either the study of acquiring wealth, or preferment, or whom the appetite of sensual delights, or the impatience of meditating, or the rash embracing of wrong principles, have made unapt to discuss the truth of things: I must, I say, confess that the dispute of this question will rather hurt than help their piety; and therefore if his Lordship had not desired this answer, I should not have written it, nor do I write it but in hopes your Lordship and his will keep it private. Nevertheless in very truth, the _necessity_ of events does not of itself draw with it any _impiety_ at all. For _piety_ consisteth only in _two_ things; one, that we honour God in our hearts, which is, that we think as highly of his _power_ as we can, for to honour anything is nothing else but to think it to be of great power; the other is, that we signify that honour and esteem by our words and actions, which is called _cultus_, or _worship of God_.
He therefore that thinketh that all things proceed from God’s _eternal will_, and consequently are _necessary_, does he not think God _omnipotent_? Does he not esteem of his _power_ as highly as is possible? which is to honour God as much as may be in his heart. Again, he that thinketh so, is he not more apt by _external_ acts and words to acknowledge it, than he that thinketh otherwise? yet is this external acknowledgment the same thing which we call _worship_. So that this opinion fortifies _piety_ in both kinds, external and internal; therefore is far from destroying it. And for _repentance_, which is nothing else but a glad returning into the right way, after the grief of being out of the way; though the cause that made him go astray were necessary, yet there is no reason why he should not grieve; and, again though the cause why he returned into the way were necessary, there remained still the causes of joy. So that the _necessity_ of the actions taketh away neither of those parts of _repentance_, grief for the error, and joy for returning.
And for _prayer_, whereas he saith that the _necessity_ of things destroy _prayer_, I deny it; for though _prayer_ be none of the _causes_ that _move_ God’s _will_, his will being unchangeable, yet since we find in God’s word, he will not give his blessings but to those that ask, the motive of prayer is the same. _Prayer_ is the gift of God no less than the _blessing_, and the prayer is decreed together in the same decree wherein the blessing is decreed. It is manifest that _thanksgiving_ is no cause of the blessing past, and that which is past is sure and necessary, yet even amongst men thanks is in use as an acknowledgment of the benefit past, though we should expect no new benefit for our gratitude. And prayer to God Almighty is but thanksgiving for God’s blessings in general, and though it precede the particular thing we ask, yet it is not a cause or means of it, but a signification that we expect nothing but from God, in such manner, as he, not as we, will; and our Saviour by word of mouth bids us pray, _thy will_, not our will, _be done_, and by example teaches us the same; for he prayed thus, _Father if it be thy will, let this cup pass_, &c. The end of prayer, as of thanksgiving, is not to _move_ but to _honour_ God Almighty, in acknowledging that what we ask can be effected by him only.
_The fourth argument from reason is this: the order, beauty, and perfection of the world requireth that in the universe should be agents of all sorts; some necessary, some free, some contingent. He that shall make all things necessary, or all things free, or all things contingent, doth overthrow the beauty and perfection of the world._ In which argument I observe, first a _contradiction_; for seeing he that _maketh_ anything, in that he maketh it, maketh it to be _necessary_; it followeth that he that maketh all things, maketh all things necessarily to be: as if a workman make a garment, the garment must necessarily be; so if God make every thing, every thing must necessarily be. Perhaps the beauty of the world requireth, though we know it not, that some agents should work without deliberation (which his lordship calls _necessary_ agents) and some agents with deliberation (and those both he and I call _free_ agents) and that some agents should work, and we not know how (and their effects we both call _contingents_); but this hinders not but that he that electeth may have his _election_ necessarily determined to _one_ by _former_ causes, and that which is _contingent_, and imputed to fortune, be nevertheless _necessary_ and depend on _precedent_ necessary causes. For by _contingent_, men do not mean that which hath _no_ cause, but that which hath not for cause anything that we perceive; as for example, when a traveller meets with a shower, the journey had a cause, and the rain had a cause sufficient to produce it; but because the journey caused not the rain, nor the rain the journey, we say they were contingent one to another. And thus you see that though there be three sorts of events, _necessary_, _contingent_, and _free_, yet they may be _all_ necessary without destruction of the beauty or perfection of the universe.
To the first argument from reason, which is, _That if liberty be taken away, the nature and formal reason of sin is taken away_; I answer by denying the consequence: the nature of sin consisteth in this, that the _action_ done proceed from our _will_ and be against the _law_. A judge in judging whether it be sin or no, which is done against the law, looks at no higher cause of the action, than the will of the doer. Now when I say the action was _necessary_, I do not say it was done _against_ the will of the doer, but _with_ his will, and _necessarily_, because man’s will, that is every volition or act of the will and purpose of man had a _sufficient_, and therefore a _necessary_ cause, and consequently every _voluntary_ action was _necessitated_. An action therefore may be _voluntary_ and a _sin_, and nevertheless be _necessary_; and because God may afflict by a right derived from his _omnipotence_, though sin were not, and because the example of punishment on voluntary sinners, is the cause that produceth justice, and maketh sin less frequent, for God to punish such sinners, as I have said before, is no injustice. And thus you have my answer to his Lordship’s objections both out of Scripture, and from reason. ------- CERTAIN DISTINCTIONS, WHICH HIS LORDSHIP SUPPOSING MIGHT BE BROUGHT TO EVADE HIS ARGUMENTS, ARE BY HIM REMOVED.
He says a man may perhaps answer, that the _necessity_ of things held by him, is not a _stoical_ necessity, but a _Christian_ necessity, &c. But this _distinction_ I have not used, nor indeed ever heard before, nor could I think any man could make _stoical_ and _Christian_ two kinds of _necessity_, though they may be two kinds of _doctrine_. Nor have I drawn my answer to his Lordship’s arguments from the authority of any sect, but from the nature of the things themselves. But here I must take notice of certain words of his Lordship’s in this place, as making against his own tenet. _Where all the causes_, saith he, _being joined together, and subordinate one to another, do make but one total cause, if any one cause, much more the first, in the whole series or subordination of causes, be necessary, it determines the rest, and without doubt maketh the effect necessary_. For that which I call the _necessary_ cause of any effect, is the _joining_ together of all causes subordinate to the first, into one total cause. _If any of these_, saith he, _especially the first, produce its effect necessarily, then all the rest_ are determined. Now it is manifest, that the first cause is a necessary cause of all the effects that are next and immediate to it, and therefore by his Lordship’s own reason all effects are necessary.
Nor is that distinction of necessary in respect of the _first cause_, and necessary in respect of _second causes_, mine; it does, as his Lordship well notes, imply a contradiction. But the distinction of _free_ into _free from compulsion_, and _free from necessitation_, I acknowledge. For to be _free from compulsion_ is to do a thing so as _terror_ be not the cause of his _will_ to do it; for a man is then only said to be compelled, when fear makes him willing to it: as when a man willingly throws his goods into the sea to save himself, or submits to his enemy for fear of being killed. Thus all men that do anything for _love_, or _revenge_, or _lust_, are _free from compulsion_, and yet their actions may be as necessary as those that are done by compulsion; for sometimes other passions work as forcibly as fear. But _free from necessitation_, I say, no man can be, and it is that which his Lordship undertook to disprove.
This _distinction_, his Lordship says, uses to be _fortified_ by two reasons, but they are not mine. The first he says, is, that it is granted by all divines, that an _hypothetical necessity_, or necessity upon supposition, may stand with _liberty_. That you may understand this, I will give you an example of _hypothetical necessity_. If _I shall live, I shall eat_. This is an _hypothetical necessity_. Indeed it is a necessary proposition, that is to say, it is necessary that that proposition should be true whensoever uttered, but it is not the necessity of the thing, nor is it therefore necessary that the man should live, nor that the man should eat. I do not use to _fortify_ my distinctions with such reasons; let his Lordship confute them how he will, it contents me; but I would have your Lordship take notice hereby, how easy and plain a thing, but withal false, with the grave usage of such terms as _hypothetical necessity_, and _necessity_ upon _supposition_, and such like terms of Schoolmen, may be obscured and made to seem _profound learning_.
The second reason that may confirm the distinction of _free from compulsion_, and _free from necessitation_, he says is, that God and good angels do good necessarily, and yet are more free than we. This reason, though I had no need of, yet I think it so far forth good, as it is true that God and good angels do good necessarily, and yet are free; but because I find not in the articles of our faith, nor in the decrees of our church, set down in what manner I am to conceive God and good angels to work by necessity, or in what sense they work _freely_, I suspend my sentence in that point, and am content that there be a _freedom from compulsion_, and yet no _freedom from necessitation_, as hath been proved, in that a man may be necessitated to some action without threats and without fear of danger. But how my Lord can avoid the consisting together of _freedom_ and _necessity_, supposing God and good angels are freer than men, and yet do good necessarily, that we must examine: _I confess_, saith he, _that God and good angels are more free than we, that is, intensively in degree of freedom, not extensively in the latitude of the object, according to a liberty of exercise not of specification_.
Again, we have here two distinctions that are no distinctions, but made to seem so by terms invented by I know not whom to cover ignorance, and blind the understanding of the reader: for it cannot be conceived that there is any liberty greater, than for a man to do what he will. One heat may be more intensive than another, but not one liberty than another; he that can do what he will, hath all liberty possible, and he that cannot, hath none at all. Also _liberty_, as his Lordship says the Schools call it, of _exercise_, which is as I have said before, a liberty to do or not to do, cannot be without a _liberty_, which they call, of _specification_, that is to say, a liberty to do, or not to do this or that in particular. For how can a man conceive he hath liberty to do anything, that hath not liberty to do this, or that, or somewhat in particular? If a man be forbidden in Lent to eat this, and that, and every other particular kind of flesh, how can he be understood to have a liberty to eat flesh, more than he that hath no licence at all? You may by this again see the vanity of distinctions used in the _Schools_, and I do not doubt but that the imposing of them, by authority of _doctors_ in the _Church_, hath been a great cause that men have laboured, though by sedition and evil courses, to shake them off; for nothing is more apt to beget hatred, than the tyrannizing over men’s reason and understanding, especially when it is done, not by the Scriptures, but by the pretence of learning, and more judgment than that of other men.
In the next place his Lordship bringeth two arguments against distinguishing between _free from compulsion_ and _free from necessitation_. The first is, that _election_ is opposite not only to _coaction_ or _compulsion_, but also _necessitation_ or determination to one. This is it he was to prove from the beginning, and therefore bringeth no new argument to prove it; and to those brought formerly, I have already answered. And in this place I deny again, that election is opposite to either; for when a man is compelled, for example, to subject himself to an enemy or to die, he hath still election left him, and a deliberation to bethink which of the two he can better endure. And he that is led to prison by force, hath election, and may deliberate whether he will be hauled and trained on the ground, or make use of his own feet: likewise when there is no _compulsion_, but the strength of _temptation_ to do an evil action, being greater than the motives to _abstain_, it necessarily determines him to the doing of it; yet he deliberates while sometimes the motives to do, sometimes the motives to forbear, are working on him, and consequently he _electeth_ which he will. But commonly when we see and know the strength that moves us, we acknowledge _necessity_; but when we see not, or mark not the force that moves us, we then think there is none, and that it is not _causes_ but _liberty_ that produceth the action. Hence it is that they think he does not choose this, that of necessity chooses it; but they might as well say, fire doth not burn, because it burns of necessity.
Text from Project Gutenberg, public domain in the United States.