The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 04 · Thomas Hobbes
TO THE ARGUMENTS FROM REASON.
The second argument is not so much an argument as a distinction, to show in what sense it may be said that _voluntary_ actions are _necessitated_, and in what sense not. And therefore his Lordship allegeth, as from the authority of the _Schools_, and that which rippeth up the bottom of the _question_, that there is a double act of the _will_. The one, he says, is _actus imperatus_, an act done at the command of the will, by some inferior faculty of the soul; as to open or shut one’s eyes; and this act may be compelled: the other, he says, is _actus elicitus_, an act allured or drawn forth by allurement out of the will, as to _will_, to _choose_, to _elect_; this he says cannot be compelled. Wherein, letting pass that metaphorical speech of attributing command and subjection to the faculties of the soul, as if they made a commonwealth or family within themselves, and could speak one to another, which is very improper in searching the truth of a question, you may observe, first, that to compel a _voluntary_ act, is nothing else but to will it; for it is all one to say, my will commands the shutting of my eyes, or the doing of any other action; and to say, I have the will to shut my eyes: so that _actus imperatus_, here, might as easily have been said in English a _voluntary action_, but that they that invented the term, understood not anything it signified.
Secondly, you may observe, that _actus elicitus_, is exemplified by these words, to _will_, to _elect_, to _choose_, which are all one, and so to will is here made an act of the will; and indeed as the will is a faculty or power in a man’s soul, so to will is an act of it according to that power; but as it is absurdly said, that to dance is an act allured or drawn by fair means out of the ability to dance; so is it also to say, that to will is an act allured or drawn out of the power to will, which power is commonly called the will. Howsoever it be, the sum of his Lordship’s distinction is, that a _voluntary_ act may be done by _compulsion_, that is to say, by foul means, but to will that, or any act, cannot be but by _allurement_, or fair means. Now seeing fair means, allurements, and enticements, produce the action which they do produce, as _necessarily_ as foul means and threatening; it follows, that to _will_ may be made as _necessary_ as anything that is done by _compulsion_. So that distinction of _actus imperatus_ and _actus elicitus_ are but words, and of no effect against necessity.
His Lordship in the rest of his discourse, reckoneth up the opinion of certain professions of men, touching the causes wherein the necessity of things, which they maintain, consisteth. And first he saith, the _astrologer_ deriveth his _necessity_ from the _stars_; secondly, that the _physician_ attributeth it to the _temper_ of the body. For my part, I am not of their opinion, because, neither the stars alone, nor the temperature of the patient alone, is able to produce any effect, without the concurrence of all other agents. For there is hardly any one action, how casual soever it seem, to the causing whereof concur not whatsoever is _in rerum naturâ_, which because it is a great paradox, and depends on many antecedent speculations, I do not press in this place. Thirdly, he disputeth against the opinion of them that say, _external objects_ presented to men of such and such temperatures, do make their actions _necessary_; and says, the power such objections have over us, proceeds from our own fault: but that is nothing to the purpose, if such fault of ours proceedeth from causes not in our own power, and therefore that opinion may hold true for all that answer.
Further he says, _prayer_, _fasting_, &c. may alter our _habits_; it is true, but when they do so, they are _causes_ of the contrary _habit_, and make it _necessary_, as the former habit had been necessary, if _prayer_, _fasting_, &c. had not been. Besides, we are not moved or disposed to prayer or any other action, but by outward objects, as pious company, godly preachers, or something equivalent. Fourthly, he says a resolved mind is not easily surprised, as the mind of Ulysses, who when others wept, alone wept not; and of the philosopher, that abstained from striking, because he found himself angry; and of him that poured out the water when he was thirsty, and the like. Such things I confess have, or may have been done, and do prove only that it was not necessary for Ulysses then to weep, nor for that philosopher to strike, nor for that other man to drink; but it does not prove that it was not necessary for Ulysses then to abstain, as he did, from weeping, nor for the philosopher to abstain, as he did, from striking, nor for the other man to forbear drinking, and yet that was the thing his Lordship ought to have proved. Lastly his Lordship confesses, that the _dispositions_ of objects may be _dangerous_ to _liberty_, but cannot be _destructive_. To which I answer, it is impossible: for _liberty_ is never in any other danger than to be lost; and if it cannot be lost, which he confesses, I may infer, it can be in no danger at all.
“Video meliora, proboque, Deteriora sequor.” But that saying, as pretty as it is, is not true; for though Medea saw many reasons to forbear killing her children, yet the last dictate of her judgment was, that the present revenge on her husband outweighed them all, and thereupon the wicked action _necessarily_ followed. Then the story of the Roman, who of two competitors, said, one had the better reason, but the other must have the office. This also maketh against his Lordship, for the last dictate of his judgment that had the bestowing of the office, was this, that it was better to take a great bribe, than reward a great merit. Thirdly, he objects that things nearer the sense, move more powerfully than reason; what followeth thence but this, the sense of the present good is commonly more immediate to the action, than the foresight of the evil consequence to come? Fourthly, whereas his Lordship says, that do what a man can, he shall sorrow more for the death of his son than for the sin of his soul, makes nothing to the last dictate of the understanding; but it argues plainly, that sorrow for sin is not _voluntary_, and by consequence, that _repentance_ proceedeth from causes.
The last part of this discourse containeth his Lordship’s opinions about reconciling _liberty_ with the _prescience_ and _decrees_ of God, otherwise than some _divines_ have done, against whom, he says, he had formerly written a treatise, out of which he repeateth only two things: one is, _That we ought not to desert a certain truth, for not being able to comprehend the certain manner of it_. And I say the same, as for example, that his Lordship ought not to desert this certain truth, _that there are certain and_ necessary causes _which make every man to_ will _what he willeth, though he do not_ yet conceive in what manner the _will_ of man is _caused_. And yet I think the manner of it is not very hard to conceive, seeing we see daily, that _praise_, _dispraise_, _reward_, and _punishment_, _good_ and _evil_, sequels of men’s _actions_ retained in _memory_, do frame and make us to the _election_ of whatsoever it be that we elect, and that the memory of such things proceeds from the _senses_, and _sense_ from the operation of the objects of sense, which are external to us, and governed only by God Almighty; and by consequence all _actions_, even of _free_ and _voluntary_ agents, are necessary.
The other thing that he repeateth, is, that the best way to reconcile _contingence_ and _liberty_ with _prescience_ and the _decrees_ of _God_, is to subject future _contingencies_ to the _aspect of God_. The same is also my opinion, but contrary to what his Lordship all this while laboured to prove. For hitherto he held _liberty_ and _necessity_, that is to say, _liberty_ and the _decrees_ of _God_, irreconcileable, unless the _aspect of God_, which word appeareth now the first time in this discourse, signify somewhat else besides _God’s will_ and _decree_, which I cannot understand. But he adds that we must subject them, according to that _presentiality_ which they have in eternity, which he says cannot be done by them that conceive _eternity_ to be an _everlasting succession_, but only by them that conceive it as an _indivisible point_. To which I answer, that as soon as I can conceive _eternity_ to be an _indivisible point_, or anything but an _everlasting succession_, I will renounce all that I have written on this subject.
I know St. Thomas Aquinas calls _eternity_, _nunc stans_, an _ever-abiding now_; which is easy enough to say, but though I fain would, yet I could never conceive it: they that can, are more happy than I. But in the mean time his Lordship alloweth all men to be of my opinion, save only those that can conceive in their minds a _nunc stans_, which I think are none. I understand as little how it can be true his Lordship says, that God is not _just_, but _justice_ itself; not _wise_, but _wisdom_ itself; not _eternal_, but _eternity_ itself; nor how he concludes thence, that _eternity_ is a _point indivisible_, and not a _succession_, nor in what sense it can be said, that an _infinite point_, and wherein is no _succession_, can comprehend all _time_, though time be _successive_. These phrases I find not in the Scripture; I wonder therefore what was the design of the Schoolmen to bring them up, unless they thought a man could not be a true Christian unless his understanding be first strangled with such hard sayings. And thus much for answer to his Lordship’s discourse, wherein I think not only his _squadrons of arguments_, but also his _reserve of distinctions_, are defeated. And now your Lordship shall have my doctrine concerning the same question, with my _reasons_ for it, positively, and as briefly as I can, without any terms of _art_, in plain English.
Text from Project Gutenberg, public domain in the United States.