The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 04 · Thomas Hobbes
MY OPINION ABOUT LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.
First I conceive, that when it cometh into a man’s mind to do or not to do some certain action, if he have no time to _deliberate_, the doing it or abstaining _necessarily_ follow the _present_ thought he hath of the _good_ or _evil_ consequence thereof to himself. As for example, in sudden _anger_, the _action_ shall follow the thought of _revenge_; in sudden _fear_, the thought of _escape_. Also when a man hath time to _deliberate_, but deliberates not, because never anything appeared that could make him doubt of the consequence, the _action_ follows his opinion of the _goodness_ or _harm_ of it. These actions I call VOLUNTARY, my Lord, if I understand him aright that calls them SPONTANEOUS. I call them _voluntary_, because those _actions_ that follow immediately the _last_ appetite, are _voluntary_, and here where is one only appetite, that one is the last. Besides, I see it is reasonable to punish a _rash_ action, which could not be justly done by man to man, unless the same were _voluntary_. For no _action_ of a man can be said to be without _deliberation_, though never so sudden, because it is supposed he had time to _deliberate_ all the precedent time of his life, whether he should do that kind of action or not. And hence it is, that he that killeth in a sudden passion of _anger_, shall nevertheless be justly put to _death_, because all the time, wherein he was able to consider whether to kill were good or evil, shall be held for one continual _deliberation_, and consequently the killing shall be judged to proceed from _election_.
Secondly, I conceive when a man _deliberates_ whether he shall do a thing or not do it, that he does nothing else but consider whether it be better for himself to do it or not to do it. And to _consider_ an action, is to imagine the _consequences_ of it, both _good_ and _evil_. From whence is to be inferred, that _deliberation_ is nothing else but _alternate_ imagination of the _good_ and _evil_ sequels of an _action_, or, which is the same thing, alternate _hope_ and _fear_, or alternate _appetite_ to do or quit the action of which he _deliberateth_. Thirdly, I conceive that in all _deliberations_, that is to say, in all alternate _succession_ of contrary _appetites_, the last is that which we call the WILL, and is immediately next before the doing of the action, or next before the doing of it become impossible. All other _appetites_ to do, and to quit, that come upon a man during his deliberations, are called _intentions_ and _inclinations_, but not _wills_, there being but one _will_, which also in this case may be called the _last will_, though the _intentions_ change often. Fourthly, I conceive that those _actions_, which a man is said to do upon _deliberation_, are said to be _voluntary_, and done upon _choice_ and _election_, so that _voluntary_ action, and action proceeding from _election_ is the same thing; and that of a _voluntary agent_, it is all one to say, he is _free_, and to say, he hath not made an end of _deliberating_.
Fifthly, I conceive _liberty_ to be rightly defined in this manner: _Liberty is the absence of all the impediments to action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsical quality of the agent_. As for example, the water is said to descend _freely_, or to have _liberty_ to descend by the channel of the river, because there is no impediment that way, but not across, because the banks are impediments. And though the water cannot ascend, yet men never say it wants the _liberty_ to ascend, but the _faculty_ or _power_, because the impediment is in the nature of the water, and intrinsical. So also we say, he that is tied, wants the _liberty_ to go, because the impediment is not in him, but in his bands; whereas we say not so of him that is sick or lame, because the impediment is in himself. Sixthly, I conceive that nothing taketh beginning from _itself_, but from the _action_ of some other immediate _agent_ without itself. And that therefore, when first a man hath an _appetite_ or _will_ to something, to which immediately before he had no appetite nor will, the _cause_ of his _will_, is not the _will_ itself, but _something_ else not in his own disposing. So that whereas it is out of controversy, that of _voluntary_ actions the _will_ is the _necessary_ cause, and by this which is said, the _will_ is also _caused_ by other things whereof it disposeth not, it followeth, that _voluntary_ actions have all of them _necessary_ causes, and therefore are _necessitated_.
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