The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 04 · Thomas Hobbes
MY REASONS.
For the first five points, wherein it is explicated I, what _spontaneity_ is; II, what _deliberation_ is; III, what _will_, _propension_, and _appetite_ are; IV, what a _free agent_ is: V, what _liberty_ is; there can no other proof be offered but every man’s own experience, by reflection on himself, and remembering what he useth in his mind, that is, what he himself meaneth when he saith an action is _spontaneous_, a man _deliberates_; such is his _will_, that _agent_ or that _action_ is _free_. Now he that reflecteth so on himself, cannot but be satisfied, that _deliberation_ is the _consideration of the good and evil sequels of an action to come_; that by _spontaneity_ is meant _inconsiderate action_, or else nothing is meant by it; that _will_ is the _last act of our deliberation_; that a _free agent_ is he _that can do if he will_, and _forbear if he will_; and that _liberty is the absence of external impediments_. But to those that out of custom speak not what they conceive, but what they hear, and are not able, or will not take the pains to consider what they think when they hear such words, no argument can be sufficient, because _experience_ and _matter of fact_ are not verified by other men’s arguments, but by every man’s own _sense_ and _memory_. For example, how can it be proved that to _love_ a thing and to think it _good_ is all one, to a man that doth not mark his own meaning by those words? Or how can it be proved that _eternity_ is not _nunc stans_, to a man that says those words by custom, and never considers how he can conceive the thing in his mind?
Also the sixth point, that a man cannot imagine anything to begin _without a cause_, can no other way be made known, but by trying how he can imagine it; but if he try, he shall find as much reason, if there be no cause of the thing, to conceive it should begin at one time as another, that he hath equal reason to think it should begin at all times, which is impossible, and therefore he must think there was some special cause why it began then, rather than sooner or later; or else that it began never, but was _eternal_. For the seventh point, which is, that all _events_ have _necessary_ causes, it is there proved, in that they have _sufficient_ causes. Further let us in this place also suppose any event never so casual, as the throwing, for example, _ames ace_ upon a pair of dice, and see, if it must not have been _necessary_ before it was thrown. For seeing it was thrown, it had a _beginning_, and consequently a _sufficient_ cause to produce it, consisting partly in the _dice_, partly in outward things, as the posture of the parts of the _hand_, the measure of _force_ applied by the caster, the posture of the parts of the _table_, and the like. In sum, there was nothing wanting which was necessarily requisite to the producing of that particular cast, and consequently the cast was necessarily thrown; for if it had not been thrown, there had wanted somewhat requisite to the throwing of it, and so the cause had not been _sufficient_. In the like manner it may be proved that every other accident, how _contingent_ soever it seem, or how _voluntary_ soever it be, is produced _necessarily_, which is that that my Lord Bishop disputes against. The same may be proved also in this manner.
Let the case be put, for example, of the weather. _It is necessary that to-morrow it shall rain or not rain._ If therefore it be not _necessary_ it shall rain, it is _necessary_ it shall not rain, otherwise there is no necessity that the proposition, _it shall rain or not rain_, should be true. I know there be some that say, it may necessarily be true that one of the two shall come to pass, but not, singly that it shall rain, or that it shall not rain, which is as much to say, _one_ of them is _necessary_, yet neither of them is _necessary_; and therefore to seem to avoid that absurdity, they make a distinction, that neither of them is true _determinate_, but _indeterminate_; which distinction either signifies no more but this, one of them is true, but we know not which, and so the necessity remains, though we know it not; or if the meaning of the distinction be not that, it hath no meaning, and they might as well have said, one of them is true _Titirice_, but neither of them, _Tu patulice_. The last thing, in which also consisteth the whole controversy, namely that there is no such thing as an agent, _which when all things requisite to action are present, can nevertheless forbear to produce it_; or, which is all one, that there is no such thing as _freedom from necessity_, is easily inferred from that which hath been before alleged. For if it be an _agent_, it can _work_; and if it _work_, there is nothing wanting of what is requisite to produce the _action_, and consequently the cause of the action is _sufficient_; and if _sufficient_, then also _necessary_, as hath been proved before.
Text from Project Gutenberg, public domain in the United States.