The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 04 · Thomas Hobbes
AN ANSWER, ETC.
_T. H._ Hitherto his Lordship discharges me of atheism. What need he to say that _all nations, how barbarous soever, yet have their Gods and religious rites, and atheists are frighted with thunder, and feel the blind blows of conscience_? It might have been as apt a preface to any other of his discourses as this. I expect therefore in the next place to be told, that I deny again my afore-recited doctrine. _J. D._ Yet, to let us see how inconsistent and irreconcileable he is with himself, elsewhere reckoning up all the laws of nature at large, even twenty in number, he hath not one word that concerneth religion, or hath the least relation in the world to God. As if a man were like the colt of a wild ass in the wilderness, without any owner or obligation. Thus in describing the laws of nature, this great clerk forgetteth the God of nature, and the main and principal laws of nature, which contain a man’s duty to his God, and the principal end of his creation.
_T. H._ After I had ended the discourse he mentions of the laws of nature, I thought it fittest in the last place, once for all, to say they were the laws of God, then when they were delivered in the word of God; but before, being not known by men for any thing but their own natural reason, they were but theorems, tending to peace, and those uncertain, as being but conclusions of particular men, and therefore not properly laws. Besides, I had formerly in my book _De Cive_, cap. IV, proved them severally, one by one, out of the Scriptures: which his Lordship had read and knew. It was therefore an unjust charge of his to say, I had not one word in them that concerns religion, or that hath the least relation in the world to God; and this upon no other ground than that I added not to every article, _this law is in the Scripture_. But why he should call me (ironically) a great clerk, I cannot tell. I suppose he would make men believe, I arrogated to myself all the learning of a great clerk, bishop, or other inferior minister.
A learned bishop, is that bishop that can interpret all parts of Scripture truly, and congruently to the harmony of the whole; that has learnt the history and laws of the Church, down from the apostles' time to his own; and knows what is the nature of a law civil, divine, natural, and positive; and how to govern well the parochial ministers of his diocese, so that they may both by doctrine and example keep the people in the belief of all articles of faith necessary to salvation, and in obedience to the laws of their country. This is a learned bishop. A learned minister, is he that hath learned the way by which men may be drawn from avarice, pride, sensuality, profaneness, rebellious principles, and all other vices, by eloquent and powerful disgracing of them, both from Scripture and from reason; and can terrify men from vice, by discreet uttering of the punishments denounced against wicked men, and by deducing, rationally, the damage they receive by it in the end. In one word, he is a learned minister that can preach such sermons as St. Chrysostom preached to the Antiochians, when he was presbyter in that city. Could his Lordship find in my book, that I arrogated to myself the eloquence or wisdom of St. Chrysostom, or the ability of governing the church? It is one thing to know what is to be done, another thing to know how to do it. But his Lordship was pleased to use any artifice to disgrace me in any kind whatsoever.
_J. D._ Perhaps he will say that he handleth the laws of nature there, only so far as may serve to the constitution or settlement of a commonwealth. In good time, let it be so. He hath devised us a trim commonwealth, which is founded neither upon religion towards God, nor justice towards man; but merely upon self-interest, and self-preservation. Those rays of heavenly light, those natural seeds of religion, which God himself hath imprinted in the heart of man, are more efficacious towards preservation of a society, whether we regard the nature of the thing, or the blessing of God, than all his _pacts_, and _surrenders_, and _translations of power_. He who unteacheth men their duty to God, may make them eye-servants, so long as their interest doth oblige them to obey; but is no fit master to teach men conscience and fidelity.
_T. H._ He has not yet found the place where I contradict either the existence, or infiniteness, or incomprehensibility, or unity, or ubiquity of God. I am therefore yet absolved of atheism. But I am, he says, inconsistent and irreconcileable with myself; that is, I am (though he says not so) he thinks, a forgetful blockhead. I cannot help that: but my forgetfulness appears not here. Even his Lordship, where he says, “those rays of heavenly light, those seeds of religion, which God himself hath imprinted in the heart of man (meaning natural reason), are more efficacious to the preservation of society, than all the _pacts, surrenders_, and _translating of power_,” had forgotten to except the old pact of the Jews, and the new pact of Christians. But pardoning that, did he hope to make any wise man believe, that when this nation very lately was an anarchy, and dissolute multitude of men, doing every one what his own reason or imprinted light suggested, they did again out of the same light call in the king, and peace again, and ask pardon for the faults, which that their illumination had brought them into, rather than out of fear of perpetual danger and hope of preservation? _J. D._ Without religion, societies are like but soapy bubbles, quickly dissolved. It was the judgment of as wise a man as T. H. himself, though perhaps he will hardly be persuaded to it, that Rome owed more of its grandeur to religion, than either to strength or stratagems. _We have not exceeded the Spaniards in number, nor the Gauls in strength, nor the Carthaginians in craft, nor the Grecians in art, &c. but we have overcome all nations by our piety and religion._
_T. H._ Did not his Lordship forget himself here again, in approving this sentence of Tully, which makes the idolatry of the Romans, not only better than the idolatry of other nations; but also better than the religion of the Jews, whose law Christ himself says he came not to destroy but to fulfil? And that the Romans overcame both them and other nations by their piety, when it is manifest that the Romans overran the world by injustice and cruelty, and that their victories ought not to be ascribed to the piety of the Romans, but to the impiety as well of the Jews as of other nations? But what meant he by saying “Tully was as wise a man as T. H. himself, though perhaps he will hardly be persuaded to it?” Was that any part of the controversy? No: then it was out of his way. God promiseth to assist good men in their way, but not out of their way. It is therefore the less wonder that his Lordship was in this place deserted of the light, which God imprints in the hearts of rudest savages. _J. D._ Among his laws he inserteth _gratitude_ to men as the third precept of the law of nature; but of the gratitude of mankind to their Creator, there is a deep silence. If men had sprung up from the earth in a night, like mushrooms or excrescences, without all sense of honour, justice, conscience, or gratitude, he could not have vilified the human nature more than he doth.
_T. H._ My Lord discovers here an ignorance of such method as is necessary for lawful and strict reasoning, and explication of the truth in controversy. And not only that, but also how little able he is to fix his mind upon what he reads in other men’s writings. When I had defined ingratitude universally, he finds fault that I do not mention ingratitude towards God, as if his Lordship knew not that an universal comprehends all the particulars. When I had defined equity universally, why did he not as well blame me for not telling what that equity is in God? He is grateful to the man of whom he receives a good turn, that confesseth, or maketh appear he is pleased with the benefit he receiveth. So also gratitude towards God is to confess his benefits. There is also, in gratitude towards men, a desire to requite their benefits; so there is in our gratitude towards God, so far to requite them, as to be kind to God’s ministers, which I acknowledged in making sacrifices a part of natural divine worship; and the benefit of those sacrifices is the nourishment of God’s ministers. It appears therefore, that the bishop’s attention in reading my writings, was either weak in itself, or weakened by prejudice.
_J. D._ From this shameful omission or preterition of the main duty of mankind, a man might easily take the height of T. H. his religion. But he himself putteth it past all conjectures. His principles are brim full of prodigious impiety. _In these four things, opinions of ghosts, ignorance of second causes, devotion to what men fear, and taking of things casual for prognostics, consisteth the natural seed of religion_; the culture and improvement whereof, he referreth only to _policy_. Human and divine politics, are but politics. And again, _mankind hath this from the conscience of their own weakness, and the admiration of natural events, that the most part of men believe that there is an invisible God, the maker of all visible things_. And a little after he telleth us, that _superstition proceedeth from fear without right reason, and atheism from an opinion of reason without fear_; making atheism to be more reasonable than superstition. What is now become of that divine worship which natural reason did assign unto God, the honour of existence, infiniteness, incomprehensibility, unity, ubiquity? What is now become of that dictate or precept of reason, concerning _prayers_, _thanksgivings_, _oblations_, _sacrifices_, if uncertain opinions, ignorance, fear, mistakes, the conscience of our own weakness, and the admiration of natural events, be the only seeds of religion?
He proceedeth further, that _atheism itself, though it be an erroneous opinion, and therefore a sin, yet it ought to be numbered among the sins of imprudence or ignorance_. He addeth, that _an atheist is punished not as a subject is punished by his king, because he did not observe laws: but as an enemy, by an enemy, because he would not accept laws_. His reason is, because _the atheist never submitted his will to the will of God, whom he never thought to be_. And he concludeth that man’s obligation to obey God proceedeth from his weakness, (De Cive, XV. 7: vol. II. p. 336): _Manifestum est obligationem ad prestandam ipsi_ (Deo) _obedientiam, incumbere hominibus propter imbecilitatem_. First, it is impossible that should be a sin of mere ignorance or imprudence, which is directly contrary to the light of natural reason. The laws of nature need no new promulgation, being imprinted naturally by God in the heart of man. _The law of nature was written in our hearts by the finger of God, without our assent_; or rather, _the law of nature is the assent itself_. Then if nature dictate to us that there is a God, and that this God is to be worshipped in such and such a manner, it is not possible that atheism should be a sin of mere ignorance.
Secondly, a rebellious subject is still a subject _de jure_, though not _de facto_; by right, though not by deed: and so the most cursed atheist that is, ought by right to be the subject of God, and ought to be punished not as a just enemy, but as a disloyal traitor. Which is confessed by himself: _this fourth sin_ (that is, of those who do not by word and deed confess one God, the supreme King of Kings) _in the natural kingdom of God is the crime of high treason, for it is a denial of Divine power, or atheism_. Then an atheist is a traitor to God, and punishable as a disloyal subject, not as an enemy. Lastly, it is an absurd and dishonourable assertion, to make our obedience to God to depend upon our weakness, because we cannot help it, and not upon our gratitude, because we owe our being and preservation to him. _Who planteth a vineyard, and eateth not of the fruit thereof? And who feedeth a flock, and eateth not of the milk of the flock?_ And again, _Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory, and honour and power; for thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they are and were created_. But it were much better, or at least not so ill, to be a downright atheist, than to make God to be such a thing as he doth, and at last thrust him into the Devil’s office, to be the cause of all sin.
_T. H._ Though this bishop, as I said, had but a weak attention in reading, and little skill in examining the force of an argument, yet he knew men, and the art, without troubling their judgments, to win their assents by exciting their passions. One rule of his art was to give his reader what he would have him swallow, a part by itself, and in the nature of news, whether true or not. Knowing that the unlearned, that is most men, are content to believe, rather than be troubled with examining, therefore, a little before, he put these words, _T. H. no friend to religion_, in the margin. And in this place, before he offer at any confutation, he says my principles are brim full of _prodigious impieties_. And at the next paragraph, in the margin, he puts that _I excuse atheism_. This behaviour becomes neither a bishop, nor a Christian, nor any man that pretends to good education. Fear of invisible powers, what is it else in savage people, but the fear of somewhat they think a God?
What invisible power does the reason of a savage man suggest unto him, but those phantasms of his sleep, or his distemper, which we frequently call ghosts, and the savages thought gods; so that the fear of a God, though not of the true one, to them was the beginning of religion, as the fear of the true God was the beginning of wisdom to the Jews and Christians? Ignorance of second causes made men fly to some first cause, the fear of which bred devotion and worship. The ignorance of what that power might do, made them observe the order of what he had done; that they might guess by the like order, what he was to do another time. This was their prognostication. What prodigious impiety is here? How confutes he it? Must it be taken for impiety upon his bare calumny? I said superstition was fear without reason. Is not the fear of a false God, or fancied demon, contrary to right reason? And is not atheism boldness grounded on false reasoning, such as is this, _the wicked prosper, therefore there is no God_?
He offers no proof against any of this; but says only I make atheism to be more reasonable than superstition; which is not true: for I deny that there is any reason either in the atheist or in the superstitious. And because the atheist thinks he has reason, where he has none, I think him the more irrational of the two. But all this while he argues not against any of this; but enquires only, what is become of my natural worship of God, and of his existency; infiniteness, incomprehensibility, unity, and ubiquity. As if whatsoever reason can suggest, must be suggested all at once. First, all men by nature had an opinion of God’s existency; but of his other attributes not so soon, but by reasoning, and by degrees. And for the attributes of the true God, they were never suggested but by the Word of God written. In that I say atheism is a sin of ignorance, he says I excuse it. The prophet David says, _the fool hath said in his heart, there is no God_. Is it not then a sin of folly? It is agreed between us, that right reason dictates, there is a God. Does it not follow, that denying of God is a sin proceeding from misreasoning.
If it be not a sin of ignorance, it must be a sin of malice. Can a man malice that which he thinks has no being? But may not one think there is a God, and yet maliciously deny him? If he think there is a God, he is no atheist; and so the question is changed into this, whether any man that thinks there is a God, dares deliberately deny it? For my part I think not. For upon what confidence dares any man, deliberately I say, oppose the Omnipotent? David saith of himself, _My feet were ready to slip when I saw the prosperity of the wicked_. Therefore it is likely the feet of men less holy slip oftener. But I think no man living is so daring, being out of passion, as to hold it as his opinion. Those wicked men that for a long time proceeded so successfully in the late horrid rebellion, may perhaps make some think they were constant and resolved atheists: but I think rather that they forgot God, than believed there was none.
He that believes there is such an atheist, comes a little too near that opinion himself; nevertheless if words spoken in passion signify a denial of a God, no punishment preordained by law, can be too great for such an insolence; because there is no living in a commonwealth with men, to whose oaths we cannot reasonably give credit. As to that I say, _an atheist is punished by God not as a subject by his king, but as an enemy_; and to my argument for it, namely, _because he never acknowledged himself God’s subject_, he opposeth, that if nature dictate that there is a God, and to be worshipped in such and such manner, then atheism is not a sin of mere ignorance: as if either I or he did hold that nature dictates the manner of God’s worship, or any article of our creed, or whether to worship with or without a surplice. Secondly, he answers that a rebel is still a subject _de jure_, though not _de facto_: and it is granted. But though the king lose none of his right by the traitor’s act, yet the traitor loseth the privilege of being punished by a precedent law; and therefore may be punished at the king’s will, as Ravaillac was for murdering Henry IV of France.
An open enemy and a perfidious traitor are both enemies. Had not his Lordship read in the Roman story, how Perseus and other just enemies of that state were wont to be punished? But what is this trifling question to my _excusing of atheism_? In the seventh paragraph of chapter XV. of my book _De Cive_, he found the words in Latin, which he here citeth. And to the same sense I have said in my _Leviathan_, that the right of nature whereby God reigneth over men, is to be derived not from his creating them, as if he required obedience, as of gratitude; but from his irresistible power. This he says is absurd and dishonourable. Whereas first all power is honourable, and the greatest power is most honourable. Is it not a more noble tenure for a king to hold his kingdom, and the right to punish those that transgress his laws, from his power, than from the gratitude or gift of the transgressor. There is nothing therefore here of dishonour to God Almighty. But see the subtilty of his disputing. He saw he could not catch _Leviathan_ in this place, he looks for him in my book _De Cive_, which is Latin, to try what he could fish out of that: and says I make our obedience to God, depend upon our weakness; as if these words signified the _dependence_, and not the _necessity_ of our submission, or that _incumbere_ and _dependere_ were all one.
_J. D._ For T. H. his God is not the God of Christians, nor of any rational men. Our God is every where, and seeing he hath no parts, he must be wholly here, and wholly there, and wholly every where. So nature itself dictateth. _It cannot be said honourably of God that he is in a place; for nothing is in a place, but that which hath proper bounds of its greatness._ But T. H. his God is not wholly every where. _No man can conceive that any thing is all in this place, and all in another place at the same time, for none of these things ever have or can be incident to sense._ So far well, if by _conceiving_ he mean _comprehending_; but then follows, _That these are absurd speeches taken upon credit, without any signification at all, from deceived philosophers, and deceived or deceiving Schoolmen_. Thus he denieth the ubiquity of God. A _circumscriptive_, a definitive, and a repletive being in a place, is some heathen language to him.
_T. H._ Though I believe the omnipotence of God, and that he can do what he will, yet I dare not say how every thing is done, because I cannot conceive nor comprehend either the Divine substance, or the way of its operation. And I think it impiety to speak concerning God any thing of my own head, or upon the authority of philosophers or Schoolmen, which I understand not, without warrant in the Scripture: and what I say of omnipotence, I say also of ubiquity. But his Lordship is more valiant in this place, telling us that God is _wholly here_, and _wholly there_, and _wholly every where_; because he has no parts. I cannot comprehend nor conceive this. For methinks it implies also that the whole world is also in the whole God, and in every part of God. Nor can I conceive how any thing can be called _whole_, which has no parts, nor can I find anything of this in the Scripture. If I could find it there, I could believe it; and if I could find it in the public doctrine of the Church, I could easily abstain from contradicting it.
The Schoolmen say also, that the soul of man (meaning his upper soul, which they call the rational soul) is also _wholly_ in _the whole man_, and _wholly_ in _every part_ of the man. What is this, but to make the human soul the same thing in respect of man’s body, that God is in respect of the world? These his Lordship calls here rational men, and some of them which applaud this doctrine, would have the high court of parliament corroborate such doctrines with a law. I said in my _Leviathan_, that it is no honourable attribute to God, to say he is _in a place_, because infinite is not confined within a place. To which he replies, _T. H. his God is not wholly every where_. I confess the consequence. For I understand in _English_, he that says any thing to be _all here_, means that _neither all nor any of the same thing is elsewhere_. He says further, I take a _circumscriptive, a definitive, and a repletive_ being in a place to be heathen language. Truly, if this dispute were at the bar, I should go near to crave the assistance of the court, lest some trick might be put upon me in such obscurity.
Ideas discussed in this chapter
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