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Concept

Analytic–synthetic distinction

Analytic–synthetic distinction
unbekannt, möglicherweise Elisabeth von Stägemann (Schule von Anton Graff) · Public domain · source

Overview

semantic distinction, used primarily in philosophy to distinguish propositions (in particular, statements that are affirmative subject–predicate judgments) into two types: analytic propositions and synthetic propositions

Overview adapted from Wikipedia (CC BY-SA 4.0; see the article history for authors).

Possible passages

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  1. IV. Of the Difference Between Analytical and Synthetical Judgements. In all judgements wherein the relation of a subject to the predicate is cogitated (I mention affirmative judgements only here; the application to negative will be very easy), this relation is possible in two different ways. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as somewhat which is contained (though covertly) in the conception A; or the…

    Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason

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  2. All principles of geometry are no less analytical. That a straight line is the shortest path between two points, is a synthetical proposition. For my concept of straight contains nothing of quantity, but only a quality. The attribute of shortness is therefore altogether additional, and cannot be obtained by any analysis of the concept.

    Immanuel Kant, Kant's Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics

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  3. Such a statement will be the conclusion of an analytic inference. Of this sort are all mathematical demonstrations. But synthetic reasoning is of another kind. In this case the facts summed up in the conclusion are not among those stated in the premises. They are different facts, as when one sees that the tide rises _m_ times and concludes that it will rise the next time.

    Charles S. Peirce, Chance, Love, and Logic

    Close in meaning to Analytic–synthetic distinction; the term itself is not named.

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Philosophers who discussed Analytic–synthetic distinction

Related ideas

Opposing perspectives

Place in the tradition

Part of American philosophy.

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