PhiloWikiConceptsPhilosophersBooksInteractive graph

Argument

Naturalistic fallacy

Naturalistic fallacy
G. E. Moore · Public domain · source

Overview

In metaethics, the naturalistic fallacy is the claim that it is possible to define good in terms of merely described entities, properties, or processes such as pleasant, desirable, or fitness. The term was introduced by British philosopher G. E. Moore in his 1903 book Principia Ethica.

Moore's naturalistic fallacy is closely related to the is–ought problem, which comes from David Hume's Treatise of Human Nature (1738–40); however, unlike Hume's view of the is–ought problem, Moore (and other proponents of ethical non-naturalism) did not consider the naturalistic fallacy to be at odds with moral realism.

Overview adapted from Wikipedia (CC BY-SA 4.0; see the article history for authors).

Possible passages

Found by search and not yet checked by a person; they may only mention the idea in passing.

  1. But this method of escape from the charge of having committed the naturalistic fallacy has been closed by Bentham himself. For his fundamental principle is, we see, that the greatest happiness of all concerned is the _right_ and proper _end_ of human action.

    G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica

    States what Naturalistic fallacy is; opens on Naturalistic fallacy.

    Read the chapter · Open in the reader

  2. 75. There is no method of reasoning more common, and yet none more blameable, than, in philosophical disputes, to endeavour the refutation of any hypothesis, by a pretence of its dangerous consequences to religion and morality. When any opinion leads to absurdities, it is certainly false; but it is not certain that an opinion is false, because it is of dangerous consequence.

    David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

    The author is tied to Naturalistic fallacy in the knowledge graph.

    Read the chapter · Open in the reader

  3. But, in the _second_ place, should it be asked, whether we ought to search for these principles in _nature_, or whether we must look for them in some other origin? I would reply, that our answer to this question depends upon the definition of the word Nature, than which there is none more ambiguous and equivocal.

    David Hume, Philosophical Works, v. 2

    The author is tied to Naturalistic fallacy in the knowledge graph.

    Read the chapter · Open in the reader

Philosophers who discussed Naturalistic fallacy

Related ideas

Place in the tradition

Part of Analytic philosophy.

Explore Naturalistic fallacy in the interactive graph →